MANAGING PEACEFUL MASS AGITATIONS BY POLICE

(FOCUS ON BABA RAMDEV AND ANNA HAZARE AGITATIONS)

BY

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Preface

This research project titled ‘Managing Peaceful Mass Agitation by Police (covering recent agitations by Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare etc.) has been sponsored by SVP National Police Academy, (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India), Hyderabad. The study has broadly focused upon various issues and perspectives associated with Baba Ramdev’s Ramlila ground incident and Anna Hazare agitation as handled by Delhi Police. Though every effort has been made to evaluate the handling of these agitations by the police involving perceptions and opinions of randomly selected representatives of public, media, protest groups and some police personnel who actually handled the incidents at ground level, many more evaluative steps are required to taken in order to improve the operational capability of Indian police forces towards handling public agitations in days to come. Public protests have been part of the Indian political life for a very long time. And these are an important safety valve for strongly held views. In addition, the right to protest in public is a synthesis of iconic freedoms: free assembly and free speech. The Supreme Court of India has rightly pointed out that every police force in the country has to ensure that it takes appropriate preventive steps as well as maintains public order or law and order, as the case may be. In the event of any untoward incident resulting into injury to a person or property of an individual or violation of his rights, it is the Police alone that shall be held answerable and responsible for the consequences as may follow in law. The Police is to maintain and give precedence to the safety of the people as ‘salus populi supremo lex’ (the safety of the people is the supreme law) and ‘salus republicae supremo lex’ (safety of the State is the supreme law) which coexist and are not only important and relevant but lie at the heart of the doctrine that the welfare of an individual must yield to that of the community.

Balancing the rights of protesters and other citizens with the duty to protect people and property from the threat of harm or injury defines the policing dilemma in relation to public protest. In a democratic society, planning and action at every level must be seen to reconcile all these factors, particularly when a minority of people may be determined to cause disorder. An effective police approach then may be to consider how to facilitate a peaceful protest and also to look at the implications. If it is likely that it could involve a significant level of
disorder or disruption because of, for example, the scale of the protest, then police must plan for it; train for it; and have a suitable array of tactics including prospective restrictions and communications to deal with it. Peaceful protest requires careful interpretation of the law. The law is an important consideration in public order events but successful policing depends on the exercise of discretion on how the law is enforced. Therefore, in order to achieve such level of preparedness and awareness systematic steps are required to be taken so that our Police forces are suitably updated to effectively deal with mass public protests in the country in days to come. It is strongly hoped that the outcome of this research project report will pave way for future analytic and reformative measures to make the police forces most successful and effective in day to day handling of public disorder and mass protest in the country.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>6-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Background</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Need and Importance of the Study</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Aims and Objectives</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Literature Review</td>
<td>11-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Types of Protest Activity</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 The Context of Modern Protest</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Public Order Policing Tactics in Different Nations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Review of Tactics in US</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Public Order Policing in UK</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Public Order Policing in South Africa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Review of Tactics in India</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 Crowd Phychology &amp; Public Order Policing</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 Intelligence</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10 Equipment for Riot Control</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Case Studies</td>
<td>45-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Baba Ramdev: Ramlila Ground Incident</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Anna Hazare Agitation - Case Study</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Timeline Agitations</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Methodology - Procedural Dimensions</td>
<td>66-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Methodology</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Tools and Techniques of Data Collection</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Sample/Data Collected and Analysis Method

5. Legal Framework and Standing Orders

5.1 Constitutional Provisions

5.2 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Maintenance of Public Order and Tranquility - Unlawful Assemblies:

5.3 Punjab Police Rules- Use of Force against Crowds

5.4 Punjab Police Rules: Rioting

5.5 Commissioner of Police, Delhi Circulars


5.7 SOPs to deal with public agitations with non-lethal measures- MHA Task Force recommendations.

6. Social Media and Public Protests

6.1 Social Mobilization Literature

6.2 Social Media and its Handling

6.3 Strategy for Social Media

7. Data and Results Analysis

7.1 Use of Force Justified by Police when Protesters Verbally Abuse a Police Officer

7.2 Use of Force is justified by Police when Protesters Push a Police Officer

7.3 Use of Force is justified by Police when Protesters use Physical Violence against a Police Officer.

7.4 Use of Lathi-charge to disperse the Crowd.

7.5 Use of Tear Gas to Disperse the Crowd

7.6 Use of Firing to Disperse the Protesting Crowd.

7.7 Use of Water Cannon to Disperse the Protesting Crowd.

7.8 Holding of Protesters in a Controlled Area justified when Protesters disrupt day to day activities of General Public.

7.9 Holding of protesters in a controlled area justified when protesters threaten to damage public and private property.

7.10 Holding of protesters in a controlled area justified when protesters threaten public safety

7.11 Police informs about arrangements in advance to the public.
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations
by Police

7.12 Police need to provide regular briefing on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence.

7.13 Better Coordination between Police and Media.

7.14 Trusted source for getting information on mass protests.

7.15 Police behaviour with Public during Protest.

7.16 How confident are you that Police will effectively manage large scale public protests in the future?

7.17 Delhi Police Officers workshop – Issues Emerged

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

8.1 Develop Standard Operating Procedures for Dealing with Mass Agitation

8.2 Gather Prior Intelligence

8.3 ‘Containment’ Tactics

8.4 Prepare Contigency Plans

8.5 Setup Specialized Force in Every State to deal with Protests

8.6 Improve Procedures for Registration of Cases

8.7 Enact New Legislative Procedures

8.8 Authentic leadership and Participatory Decision Making

8.9 Deal robustly with police misconduct

8.10 Communication is Critical

8.11 Improve Training & Guidance

8.12 Harnessing Technology for Communication and Equipment

8.13 Involve Community and Protesting Groups Members

8.14 Conclusion

8.15 Summary of Recommendations

9. References

10. Annexures
# List of Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- A</td>
<td>QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- B</td>
<td>QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STATE/PARAMILITARY POLICE FORCE</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- C</td>
<td>STANDING ORDER NO. 72: UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- D</td>
<td>STANDING ORDER NO. 152: USE OF TEAR SMOKE</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- E</td>
<td>STANDING ORDER NO. 256: STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- F</td>
<td>STANDING ORDER NO. 325: DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND MODALITIES OF THE USE OF WATER CANNON FOR CROWD CONTROL</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- G</td>
<td>CIRCULAR NO. 35/2011 OF DELHI POLICE-CONDUCT OF RALLIES, PROCESSIONS ETC.</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- H</td>
<td>CIRCULAR NO. 12/2012 OF DELHI POLICE</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- I</td>
<td>CIRCULAR NO. 20/2012 OF DELHI POLICE</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- J</td>
<td>CONTROL OF LAWFUL AND UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- K</td>
<td>STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH PUBLIC AGITATIONS WITH NON-LETHAL MEASURES (MHA TASK FORCE REPORT)</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- L</td>
<td>REPLY TO QUERIES ON ANNA HAZARE AGITATION BY DELHI POLICE</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- M</td>
<td>SAMPLE DELHI POLICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AGITATION AT RAMLILA GROUND</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- N</td>
<td>DETAILS OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED BY THE POLICE IN CONNECTION WITH ANNA HAZARE AGITATION</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- O</td>
<td>RAF MODEL</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- P</td>
<td>OLD BATONS</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- Q</td>
<td>KETTLING TACTICS TO HANDLE PUBLIC PROTEST</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- R</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS FROM NURTING THE BRITISH MODEL</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- S</td>
<td>SUGGESTED SOFT SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CONSTABLES TO INSPECTORS</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- T</td>
<td>TRAINING PROGRAM FOR INDUCTION TO LAW AND ORDER DUTIES</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- U</td>
<td>SUMMARY OF U.P. STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ITS CONTENTS (CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE &amp; MASS AGITATIONS)</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure- V</td>
<td>CHRONOLOGICAL ACTIVITY LOG</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Charts & Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart/Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chart – I</td>
<td>RESEARCH FRAMEWORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chart –II</td>
<td>MODEL FOR MANAGING PEACEFUL MASS AGITATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table-A</td>
<td>LIST OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED EQUIPMENTS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table-B</td>
<td>THE PARADIGM SHIFT FOR INDIAN POLICE FOR SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF PEACEFUL MASS AGITATIONS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

The two agitations, Ramdev and Anna Hazare, presented two diametrically opposite public order policing strategies adopted by police. As a part of this project, these two contrasting police strategies, latest SOPs and Supreme Court directives on managing agitations were studied, Public Perception Survey was conducted and views from states were also taken to evolve a model for managing mass protests by police in India.

It was the paramilitary model to repress the Ramdev agitation at midnight, in Ramlila ground, by Delhi Police, on 5th June, 2011. Force used by the police to disperse protesters resulted in violence, loss of human life and destruction of property. On the other hand, in Anna Hazare agitation dated 16th to 28th Aug, 2011, police exhibited greater tolerance to agitation and community disruption, acceptance of rights of agitators, ongoing communication between police and demonstrators, use of volunteers from protesting group for managing crowd, informing the organizers about police plans & arrangements and avoidance of arrests. The police strategy worked well in managing the peaceful mass agitation and was appreciated by public and media. The research concludes that, in today’s scenario, the paramilitary model of public order policing is not only in direct conflict with continuum of force doctrine but is also counterproductive and recommends a paradigm shift in public order policing in India for managing peaceful mass protests. The key elements of the suggested model are- prior intelligence, facilitation of peaceful protests, Standard Operating Procedures, specialized battalions/units, communication with public before, during and after the protest, negotiations with protesters, public order training, authentic leadership, contingency planning and leveraging technology.

(Keywords: Public order policing strategy, Mass protests, Use of force, Public order training)
Executive Summary

The year 2013, according to some analysts, has been the year of protests; the contention carries a fair amount of merit. The year witnessed several mass protests, not just in India but across the continents, with different origins. In Brazil, people agitated against bus fares, in Turkey, they rose up against a building project, in Indonesia, it was due to higher fuel prices, for Bulgarians, the cause of mass agitation was government’s cronyism, in Europe, protest was against austerity, and Egypt remains plagued with protests and counter protests. Indians took to the streets of several cities after the gang rape of a 23-year-old medical student, to protest at the lack of protection that the state affords women. Each demonstration was angry in its own way, yet some common strands, including the ineptitude of police in handling them, are difficult to miss. What has confounded the pundits is not only their widespread emergence from one nation to another, but also the bewildering speed and passion with which they were participated by the angry middle class. Women and youth came out in large number. Protesters were organised not by any lobby or any union but by social networking sites, which quickly spread information and made causes fashionable. In these protests, revelry and rage were mixed in condemnation of corruption, incompetence and arrogance of those in power. The use of some of the old methods of dealing with crowds, in these protests, did not help the police either; it only led to outrage in public, criticism in media and hauling up in the courts. This new dimension to public order has not only flummoxed police forces but also found them grappling for the right response and strategies to deal with it.

Increasing Influence of Social Media

“We come from Facebook”, placards in Brazil announced during protests, protesters in Egypt, Iran, Moldova and Tunisia were called “Twitter revolutionaries”. Turkey’s Prime Minister acknowledged the role of social media, grudgingly. Countries like India, Turkey and Brazil where digital media are especially popular have demonstrated that social media can act as a spur to rally, manage and intensify agitations.
Social media allows information including visuals to spread rapidly and supporters arrive more quickly than police can organise themselves to manage the developing situation. As the crowd swells quickly, it can no longer be dispersed merely by use of force. Moreover, videos of any police excess or mishandling spreads like wild fire, snowballing the situation, building the pent up rage beyond a flash point- before the authorities can sit up and mobilise measures.

A video circulated during the protests in Brazil guided citizen journalists to adopt military formations to catch government wrongdoing from every available angle. For co-ordinating protests, several hundred social-media pages advertised demonstrations across Brazil, offering tips on dodging water cannon.

**Legal framework for managing protests**

The Criminal Procedure Code sections 129-132, Indian Penal Code sections141-158, Police Act sections 30 &38 and Police Rules 14.56 lay down the legal provisions and procedures available to the police for handling agitations and unlawful assemblies. These provisions are to be seen along with the rights of the citizens to hold peaceful protests in a democratic country. Surveys indicate that majority of citizens are in favour of use of force by police against the protesters only when there is physical assault on a police officer or property is being damaged by the protesting crowd. For provocations like abuse to police officer or some disruption in public activity like traffic, use of force by police did not find much support. In other words, police are required to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful agitations, where demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence, even if these protests cause a level of irritation, obstruction or disruption.

Given this background and the complex composition of new age protestors, the age old police approach to deal with protests needs a review. Handling several demonstrations and their spin-off irritants, like disruption in traffic, disputes and sometimes street violence- police generally are scornful of them. At the planning stage, even before the show begins, the battle lines are drawn. As it was witnessed during the Anna Hazare agitation in Delhi, veering on the permission to hold the rally and the venue to hold it had already made the organisers of the agitation suspicious of police, and had convinced public that every move of police is only intended to quell the agitation. With passions running high, distrust between the police and
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations
by Police

Agitators makes it a tinderbox waiting for a match. What can light the tinderbox is any slight provocation from police which could otherwise be viewed as one-off incident.

This template needs a paradigm shift. The starting point for the police should unambiguously be in favour of facilitating peaceful assembly which in democracy is the right of every citizen. Police should demonstrate explicit consideration of the facilitation of peaceful protest throughout the planning process and during the deployment for peaceful conduction of protests. However, the police may impose lawful, necessary and proportionate restrictions, in the interests of public safety or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. And in striking this right balance, between the rights of agitators and other citizens with the duty to protect people and property from the threat of harm or injury, lies the crux of policing in relation to public protest. In dealing with this dilemma, depending on the peculiar nature of each situation, the police administrator must take a common sense approach.

**Critical Role of Communication**

When police become hate object of the protesters and there is trust deficit, the single most important element to prevent violence and stand offs- communication with protest groups- is the first casualty. The police should invariably seek to improve dialogue with protest groups in advance whenever possible, to gain a better understanding of the intent of the protesters and the nature of the protest activity. This can greatly facilitate the protest and ensure a proportionate policing response. The police should also inform and warn the protesters and the public in advance that restrictions may be placed on protesters and nature of arrangements in place to reduce disruption and the threat of disorder.

To improve level of communication with the public the police should develop a strategy to effectively communication with the media before, during and after protests to convey a policing perspective of events. In the absence of availability of authentic information from official channels, distorted bits and pieces of misinformation can add fuel to fire. In disseminating information, the effort should be to minimise surprises from police for the public to avoid inconvenience and for the protesters to avoid panic reaction in the face of police actions.

**Training and Guidance to Police Officers**

There is an urgent need to undertaking a review of current public order training imparted to police officers deployed for law and order duties. This should also include an examination of
current tactics employed by the police forces, such as the use of shields and batons, rubber bullets, water cannons and tear gas shells to ensure that they are subjected to medical assessment. Public Order training should also include dealing with peaceful protest as the present training curriculum only focuses on handling of unlawful assembly and protests. Such training should incorporate and emphasise relevant human rights principles.

Training should also be given to officers to exhibit restraint even in the face of provocation by protesters and the tactics to deal with individual use of force such as distraction, in collective action such as public order operations. These practices would ensure that minor localized incidents do not develop into flash points in precarious situations.

A message should also go in the force that individual acts of misconduct by the members of the force would not be tolerated and swift and robust action should invariably be taken in such matters by the officers in command. It should be also be ensured that all the officers display prominently their names and badges at all times during public order operations.

**Strategies to Harness Technology**

Technology, which till now in managing mass protests has been the bane for police forces, can serve them too. The protesters mobile internet access can be technically throttled. Activities over social networks are easily monitored by police and can forewarn them of impending law and order situation and also help them in identifying main troublemakers. Footage available on the internet sites, like the YouTube, provides authorities with visual records of those who attend and violated law during the protests. Although as a counter measure, YouTube has already introduced a face-blurring tool. Police in Brazil are using head-mounted face-detection cameras, which authorities claim can capture up to 400 faces a second. Cheap drones are available in market today to monitor the crowd activity, covering a wide range of area. Police forces in America have kit capable of recording the identifying code of all the mobile phones within a given area; this can help in establishing the identity of the protesters. Video recording of protests has helped police in deterring protesters from indulging in unlawful activities in the Indian state of Bihar.

Mass protests, today’s mode of expression of resentment for many and a matter of anxiety and concern for the establishment, have emerged as a new phenomenon quickly taking centre stage in public order. The only choice police have is to adapt to deal with them.
1. Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND

Police is required to respond to public protest and agitations in a highly professional manner. These emotionally charged situations often bring police in conflict with other agencies and public at large depending on the way police use force against protesters and handle them. Many times due to excessive use of force the situation gets aggravated unnecessarily and public opinion gets strongly charged against the police, which lead to widespread sympathy for the agitators while putting the police on the back foot.

During the recent years several mass protests have taken place, not just in India but across the continents, with different origins and varying forms of protest. The year 2013, according to some analysts, was the year of protests. It witnessed several mass agitations, not just in India, but also across the world. In Brazil, people agitated against bus fares; in Turkey, they rose up against a building project; in Indonesia, it was due to higher fuel prices; for Bulgarians, it was government cronyism; in Europe, it was against austerity; and Egypt remains plagued with protests and counter-protests. Indians took to the streets after the gang-rape of a 23-year-old student, during the Anna Hazare and Baba Ramdev agitations. Each demonstration was angry in its own way, yet some common strands, including ineptitude of police in handling them, are difficult to miss.

Each demonstration expresses its anger in its own way; the youth especially women come out in large numbers. Protests are being planned and organized by social networking sites, which quickly spread information and share causes in a fashionable way. In these protests, revelry and rage are often mixed in condemnation of corruption, incompetence and arrogance of those in power. The use of some of the old methods of dealing with crowd, in these protests, do not help the police either; it only lead to outrage in public, criticism in media and hauling up in the
courts. This new dimension to public order has not only perplexed police forces but has also found them grappling for the right response and strategies to deal with it.

The police have to witness unprecedented mob handling encounters which many times come under severe attacks by public as well as the media. Some of the police actions which are caught on camera are repeatedly shown on the visual media channels provoking public rage against the police. Additionally, the police officer’s role often is ambiguous to the public and wrongdoers among protesters try to exploit the situation to their advantage and do not appreciate police intervention and resent them. The characteristics intrinsic to law enforcement behaviour make it a natural focal point for this trend.

The two incidents of major public protests in India spearheaded by Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare have greatly touched the national attention and accelerated the process of evaluation and reformation of police handling of public protests in the country. The Ramlila Maidan incident of Baba Ramdev in the year 2011 became the first case wherein right to sleep was regarded as a fundamental right being one of the landmark judgments in the Indian jurisprudence. Regarding this incident Supreme Court of India sternly pulled up the Delhi Police for the midnight crackdown at yoga teacher Baba Ramdev's Ramlila ground rally, holding that the incident could have been avoided by more patient handling. The court also held Baba Ramdev guilty of negligence. Baba Ramdev's rally in the Ramlila ground, was held to protest against what he called the government's inaction on the black money issue. Thousands of the yoga guru's followers were at the grounds when the Delhi Police swooped down to evict the Baba. Some of Baba Ramdev's followers retaliated. A woman, Rajbala, was among 30 people badly injured and later she died in hospital.

The Supreme Court of India took Suo Moto cognizance over the incident that took place on that night and issued notices to all concerned to show cause and file their personal affidavits explaining the conduct of the police authorities and the circumstances which led to the use of such force against the large number of people who were sound asleep at Ramlila Maidan. The Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment in this case which took into consideration the violation of the Freedom of Speech and Expression and other such Constitutional Right. The Apex court held that both Ramdev and the Delhi Police were responsible for the midnight crackdown at Ramlila Maidan and directed criminal prosecution of police personnel and
Ramdev’s supporters who had behaved violently during the incident. The police force was observed to misuse their power by assaulting sleeping victims with their violent attack on them in middle of the night, thereafter violating their fundamental right. The court awarded a compensation of Rs.5 lakh for the family members of Rajbala, who had died in the incident. The bench also awarded a compensation of Rs.50,000 for those who suffered very severe injuries and Rs.25,000 for those with minor injuries.

The movement launched by an anti-corruption activist Anna Hazare began with a hunger strike in New Delhi on 5 April 2011 to exert pressure on the Indian government to enact a stringent anti-corruption law to remove corruption from government agencies through introduction of a Jan Lokpal Bill. In an early morning crackdown on 5th April 2011, Anna Hazare and his close aides were detained by police after Anna Hazare three hours before he was to sit on his agitation and who had vowed to go ahead with his fast for a strong Lokpal and defy prohibitory orders at the venue of his agitation. The fast led to nation-wide protests in support which ended on 9 April 2011, a day after the government accepted Hazare's demands. The government issued a gazette notification on the formation of a joint committee, consisting of government and civil society representatives, to draft the legislation.

On 16 August 2011, Hazare was arrested, four hours before the planned indefinite hunger strike demanding Lokpal Bill. Later in the afternoon, Hazare refused bail. The magistrate dispatched him to Tihar jail for seven days. Thousands marched in support from the India Gate to Jantar Mantar. Opposition parties came out against the arrest, likening the government action to the emergency imposed in the country in 1975. Both houses of Parliament adjourned over the issue.¹

After his arrest, Hazare received support from people across the country. There were reports of "nearly 570 demonstrations and protests by Anna supporters across the country". Due to the millions of protesters nationwide, the government allowed him to begin a public hunger strike of fifteen days. After talks with public authorities, Hazare decided to hold his protest at Ramlila Maidan, New Delhi. On 20 August Hazare "left the Tihar Jail for the Ramlila Grounds". Hazare promised reporters "he would fight to the 'last breath' until the government gets his team's Jan Lokpal Bill passed in this session of Parliament, which ends on 8 September.” On 20 August

¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Hazare seen on 20.08.2014
2011 thousands came to show their support for Hazare, Hazare ended his fast on 28 August, after the Lokpal Bill passed unanimously.²

The police action in both these incidents of mass protest came under severe criticism by the public at large in which social media played a highly significant role. This requires a detailed review of related facts and circumstances of the incidents with a broader view to improve police preparedness to deal with mass public protests in future.

1.2 NEED AND IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

There is a need to look into following issues for future interventions:

- Whether the use of force by police through traditional methods is proving effective to deal with present day protests by educated society and whether the police procedures and techniques which have remained antiquated and oppressive need to be synchronized with the changed times.
- Whether the role played by social media and visual news channels in arousing passion and repeated excessive exposure of some critical incidents is proving fatal from law and order point of view or otherwise.
- Whether there is lack of relevant police training, professional preparedness and suitable response to such mass protest incidents and whether new training inputs to handle people with sensitivity can improve the overall police effectiveness to deal with public disorder in the future. Also devising latest training courses on handling and monitoring the social media by law enforcement officers. Emphasis on ethics, conflict resolution, negotiations and development of emotional intelligence among police officers during training. Introduction of new equipment and suitable training for mob control and public protest handling techniques.
- Whether attitudinal issues at the cutting edge in the police who actually deal with public protests/agitations need to be suitably re-looked into.
- Whether leadership and chain of command at the time of handling public agitations and protests require to be professionally sensitized.

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Hazare seen on 20.08.2014
• Whether there is need to analyze the decision making process in dealing with actual field situation, in other words operational freedom to officers on the spot compared to efficacy of the orders issued from the top from decision makers at remote locations require delicate balancing.

1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of the report is: To provide an overview of the police handling of Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare public protest incidents at Delhi and the lessons derived there from.

The specific objectives are:
1. To examine the specific incidents of public protests/agitations by Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare with special focus on the handling of these incidents by the Delhi Police.
2. To propose suitable recommendations/interventional strategies for effective police handling of mass public protests/agitations from futuristic point of view.
2. Literature Review

Mass protests, throughout history have come at a time when enough of the population has been affected by policies of the rulers and elite. They have often been met with tough resistance, efficient crackdown by the guardians of the rulers/governments, be they local police, militias, or national militaries. The protests have many different origins. In Brazil people rose up against bus fares, in Turkey against a building project. Indonesians have rejected higher fuel prices, Bulgarians the government’s cronyism. In the euro zone they march against austerity, and the Arab spring has become a protest against almost everything. Each angry demonstration is angry in its own way and accordingly the law enforcement response is designed by the authorities.

2.1 TYPES OF PROTEST ACTIVITY

Protest is a broad term, referring to various activities undertaken by those who wish to express their opposition to, or support for, amongst other things, an idea, policy, campaign or event. Here is a wide range of protest activity which includes demonstrations, assemblies and rallies, marches, parades and processions, pickets and strikes, and leaflet drops. For the purposes of this review, it is useful to highlight a number of critical distinctions between types of protest activity.

2.1(a) Organised Declared Protests

Around 95% of protest activity involves organised, declared, planned protests (in the form of demonstrations, processions and static assemblies) which are notified to the police. Advance written notification of public processions is required to be given to the police as per the directions in Supreme Court CWP No. 77 of 2007. This provides a means of communication

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3 http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf seen on 18.08.2014
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations
by Police

between the police and organisers, and enables the police to work with protest organisers to agree the scale, location or route and timing of the demonstration or protest, ensure the safety of the protesters and plan an appropriate policing operation to facilitate the protest event. On the day of the protest, the organisers will appoint (non-police) volunteers to supervise the protest and maintain control and order. This often enables the policing operation to be reduced, adjusting policing responses to the majority of protesters who are peaceful and self-policed by volunteers from organisers of protests.

2.1(b) Non-Declared Planned Protests

A small but significant minority of protest activity comprises protests and demonstrations which have no identifiable organisers. Some are planned and (informally) declared (through sources such as the internet or newspaper) but are not notified to the police. This form of protest activity includes civil disobedience, where individuals deliberately but peacefully obstruct authorities or disobey laws to express their opposition to a particular idea or policy or dissatisfaction with government action.

This type of protest activity poses particular challenges to the police. With no identifiable organisers or representatives willing to engage with the police on behalf of the protesters, the police are unable to gain accurate information regarding the intentions of the protesters, the location or route of the protest or demonstration, likely protester numbers and timing of the event. This hampers the ability of the police to ensure the safety of the protesters and to plan an appropriate policing operation to facilitate the protest. In addition, these types of protests rarely include stewards to supervise the protest and maintain order. With no stewards and no individuals or group with overall responsibility or control of the protest, the risk for potential disorder increases. This in turn impacts on the nature, size and planning of the policing operation, as the police have to respond to the heightened risk of disruption, damage, disorder or threat to life.

2.1(c) Non-Declared Spontaneous Protests

Spontaneous protests may or may not be organised but, given their very nature, they will not be declared or notified to the police in advance. This type of protest poses challenges to the police for the same reasons identified in relation to non declared planned protests above. Again the heightened risks associated with this type of protest activity may impact on the nature and size
of the policing operation. An example of this type of protest activity was the Pro-Gaza demonstration outside the Israeli Embassy on the 28th December 2008. Here several hundred demonstrators blocked the street in response to Israeli military action in Gaza. There were no event organisers. Criminal damage was caused to a number of premises and police responding to the incident encountered violence.

2.1(d) Long Term Protests
Another type of protest activity which has become more prevalent in recent years comprises protests intended to continue over an extended period of time. The intention is to continually raise public awareness in relation to a particular concern or achieve particular objectives. This type of protest has the potential to impose significant demands on police resources in the event that a policing operation is required on an ongoing 24 hour basis to ensure the safety of the protesters and the wider public. Anna Hazare and Ramdev protests are an example of this type of protest.

2.1(e) Violent Protests
A very small subset of protest activity comprises protests which are intended to be disorderly and/or violent. These types of protests fall outside the protection of ECHR Article 11.52 They pose significant challenges for the police, who are required to prevent crime and protect the public from risk of harm.

2.2 THE CONTEXT OF MODERN PROTEST
Technological advancement and advent of mobile telephony & internet has added a new dimension to conduction and management of protest. Mobile telephones combined with cameras have had a fundamental effect on the news media, particularly the speed at which news can be received and then broadcast. The public at any major event are now an important source – often the first – of video, still images, text messages and e-mails. This activity is known as citizen journalism, and the published product is known as user-generated content (UGC). This capturing of incidents any time anywhere and the ability of current technology to upload it for

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4 http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/adapting-to-protest-20090705.pdf seen on 18.08.2014
public viewing at virtually no cost has far reaching implication for the manner in which public order policing needs to be conducted today.

It is widely acknowledged that the watershed for citizen journalism was reached on the 7th July 2005 following the terrorist attacks in London. Within 24 hours the BBC alone had received 1,000 stills and videos, 3,000 texts and 20,000 e-mails. Never before had the sights and sounds of major disaster on the Underground been available to the public. The BBC’s first indication of the bus explosion in Tavistock Square was pictures sent in by a nearby resident suspicious of a government cover-up because he had seen no report of it on TV. In reality, it was just 15 minutes after the explosion and the BBC, like everyone else, was still getting to grips with events elsewhere.

Handling this material raises considerable issues for the broadcasters, particularly the need to sift and verify information, and to guard against hoaxes and manipulation. Now all the major broadcasters have processes managed by dedicated teams. The BBC’s UGC Hub is a 24/7 operation within the main newsroom. It has a key role within the BBC guidelines on the use of UGC. On an average day it handles 12,000 e-mails and around 200 pictures. However, some 7,000 pieces of video came in one week during the July 2008 floods. The emergence of new media has been described as “a potentially radical shift of who is in control of information, experience and resources.” The ‘citizen journalists’ are members of the public who play an active role in collecting analysing and distributing media themselves. Consequently, individual and collective police action is under enormous public scrutiny.

Social networking sites, such as Facebook, encourage links to groups as well as individuals, generating a ‘spider-web’ of connections between a diverse spectrum of communities. Some social networking and video-sharing sites have the capability to be accessed on mobile phones. This allows the entire network to be updated, whether through text, photos or videos, instantly at any time and from any location. Technology has allowed for a more flexible and responsive protest community which is capable of advanced communication and immediate reaction to events on the ground.

The pace and sophistication of communication arguably left police, particularly officers on the ground, less well informed than protesters with high specification mobile phones, who could access or post on websites and get an overview of the situation. This reality is in stark contrast
to reports from the police of inability at times to communicate using the police radio. The challenge for the police is to keep pace with a dynamic, IT intelligent protest community and the technology available for use.

2.3 PUBLIC ORDER POLICING TACTICS IN DIFFERENT NATIONS

Various studies and perceptions existing regarding handling of public protests internationally indicate that police intervention is always considered as unpleasant and offensive by the protesters and many times by the society in general because of repeated media projections and coloring of the incidents affecting the social faculties. This always puts law enforcement agencies on the defensive and weak footing. On the other hand, on certain occasions police personnel also have been responsible for deterioration of the agitation problem which not only bring a bad name to the whole force but also lowers their morale and motivation. The perusal of the global best practices also point out towards reformation of the public protest handling strategies by the police as well as up-gradation of mob handling equipment and supportive strategies.

However, according to the United Nations (UN), governments and law enforcement agencies can adopt and implement rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms to deal with public protests but keep the ethical issues associated with the use of force and firearms constantly under review. Although the specific country’s dynamics may dictate which approach is suitable for the police in crowd management, it is imperative to look into what other practices countries use in the policing of public events. Current international research supports continuous police training in crowd control and management. Education and training in crowd control depend on a knowledge management system available within the police, which capture operational reports on successes and failures.

Knowledge management system is an organization’s ability to capture lessons - learned, and best and worst practices in the context of crowd control operations. The greater challenge in this area is that crowd control and management training appears by all intentions to be an internal police matter to benefit all citizens. This requires clear and comprehensive police leadership to ensure that such training actually occurs within all appropriate police structures. In principle every law enforcement agency is required to conduct and document semi-annual
training for all officers on the law full and appropriate or professional use of force and deadly force. This training must be designed to reflect current standards established by statutory and law, as well as state wide, county and individual agency policy. It should include, but not necessarily be limited to; the use of force in general, the use of physical and mechanical force, the use of deadly force, and the limitations that govern the use of force and deadly force.

Most police departments in Australia have a use of force policy which addresses operational plans and issues, including crowd management. Outlining procedure and guidelines, on specific department of police, the Victoria Police Department, have adopted what they call a Tactical Option Model designed to assist members in understanding that they have a range of tactical options and that these options must be considered with communication and safety central to their decision making. The model indicate that prior to choosing an option, members should conduct a risk assessment of the situation, prepare a plan, make all possible inquiries about the subject and request any assistance deemed necessary. In critical situations where operational equipment was deployed and resulted in injury, after care and medical attention must be provided. To ensure that police members fully apply this model, training in operational safety tactics is provided by the Centre for Operational Safety.

In Chile, when mass protest was launched by students protesting against high education fees the police used non-lethal means to disperse crowd of students in the city of Santiago water cannon were brought in as used to disperse these crowd. In Senegal police normally wear full riot gear and apply methods similar to the French approach. It makes use of shields and batons. In order to disperse violent crowd and demonstrators, tear gas and water cannons are utilized. The country subscribes to the use of force (lethal) and uses firearms but only where situations dictate such.

In Zambia, the use of lethal force and the fatal shooting of unarmed civilians has become an embarrassment to the authorities and has resulted in the police recently taking delivery of new riot control equipment that includes, for the first time, rubber bullets and bulletproof vests. Receipt of the equipment, particularly rubber bullets, has raised hopes that the security services will no longer have reason to resort to live ammunition to quell civil disorders. The police in Ghana are guided by their police act and makes provision for the use of lethal force in controlling riots. In practice, the police had been severely criticized since most of the violent
riot situations have been coupled by incidents of fatalities. Many at times warning shots fired by the police to scare away a group/crowd have resulted in the death of one person. Ghana police seem to prefer using warning shots, which in most of the cases result in deaths. As a result of this situation the Ghana Police are now reviewing their approach to policing of crowd control situations. In Botswana police usually use teargas and rubber bullets to control public protest action.

In detailing many types of protests and rebellions throughout recent centuries, professor of anthropology, Richard Robbins (2002), suggests that the way the world system is structured, protests could unfortunately be considered a “normal” state of affairs: There has been a tendency for social scientists and others to see [protests, riot or even revolt as] a breakdown of some sort in the social order. So-called functional theories of protest assumed that in the normal workings of society protest is unnecessary and unhealthy. Order, rather than conflict is the normal state of affairs. According to this popular framework, when protest, especially violent protest is present, we will find uprooted, marginal, and disorganized people.

2.4 REVIEW OF TACTICS IN US -

2.4(a) Assessing Protest Policing Strategies⁵ - To identify the factors that explain the way the police handle any particular demonstration Earl et al. (2003) divided the literature on police motivation into four categories. The first stated that the larger the threat the demonstration presented (based on size and militancy) the more likely the police would be present and take physical action against the demonstration. The second argued that the weaker the group was politically, the greater the likelihood of police action. The third category was the interaction of threat and weakness levels. The final group was the relative strength and history of brutality of a police department would predict its future actions at protests. What they found was that police use of force was a rare phenomenon and perceived threat level was the most important predictor of the use of force. Assessments about the level of threat in this study were based on the size and militancy of the demonstration once it had commenced rather than any factors relating to how the police themselves conceptualized the nature of the organizations involved.

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This research conducted in US was hampered by the lack of direct access to police officials to ask them about their motivations in each case.

Fillieule and Jobard (1998) examined the policing of demonstrations by the French police and found that there were three interacting factors that predicted the way any individual demonstration would be policed. The first factor was the police perception of the nature of the demonstration and its organizers. This involved an assessment of both the tactics they might use and the legitimacy of their goals in the minds of the police. The second factor is the nature of any outside political pressure on the police. Directives from civilian political leaders to either repress or tolerate specific protests because of larger political considerations often trumped normal police assessments. Finally, the actual tactics utilized by the demonstrators had a strong affect on police practices. The police are generally well prepared to respond to an unexpected escalation of disorder by demonstrators and adjust their tactics as needed in keeping with political directives and their own perceptions of the legitimacy of the protesters making the interaction of these variables fluid even during the course of a demonstration.

2.4(b) Shift in Police Philosophy from ‘escalated force’ to ‘negotiated management’- Winter (1998) and Della Porta (1998) each claim that ‘police knowledge’ about assessing and responding to demonstrations is structured by policing philosophies that guide how police commanders approach each unique situation. Winter claims that, in addition to a unique diagnosis of each demonstration, police attitudes and tactics are organized around a coherent policing philosophy. In his review of West German protest policing tactics from 1960 to 1990, he identifies internal debates among police executives about the best way to orient their assessments of and responses to demonstrations. Overall, he notes a shift away from a more repressive form of policing characterized by a police philosophy tied to strongly supporting the stability of the state as an institution, which he calls ‘staatspolizei’, and towards a more tolerant form of protest policing: ‘burgerpolizei’, which is oriented towards protecting the stability of civil society. This overarching philosophy organizes the police assessments of the nature of the threat posed by any particular demonstration as well as the appropriate range of responses. During the staatspolizei period of the 1960s, the police were much more likely to view political demonstrations as a threat to the authority and legitimacy of the state and thus use more repressive measures. By the 1980s, many demonstrations were treated more leniently because they had come to be seen as a legitimate part of the democratic process now that the
police viewed a healthy democracy as extending beyond formal governmental authority to civil society.

Protest policing in the United States is also organized around shifting philosophies about the nature of the threat posed by political demonstrations. McCarthy and McPhail (1998) and McPhail et al. (1998) argue that there has been an important transition in the style of protest policing from the 1960s to the 1980s. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the police operated under a philosophy of “escalated force” in which the militancy of protesters was met by increased militancy by the police. Any show of force or violence by the protesters was met with overwhelming force in return. In response to the growing violence at demonstrations during this period, a new doctrine of “negotiated management” emerged based on greater cooperation between police and demonstrators and an effort to avoid violence. The new approach called for the protection of free speech rights, toleration of community disruption, ongoing communication between police and demonstrators, avoidance of arrests, and limiting the use of force to situations where violence is occurring (Schweingruber, 2000). This new philosophy is now in place in much of the United States and Europe (McPhail et al., 1998; Waddington, 1994; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998).

2.4(c) ‘Command and Control’ or the ‘zero tolerance approach’ model - During the last decade, though, the detente between police and demonstrators has eroded. For a variety of reasons, cops have reverted to tougher tactics, especially when policing large, high-profile protests like the Pittsburgh summit, according to researchers who observe such events and study law enforcement policy.

This new approach, dubbed "command and control" or "selective incapacitation," blends elements of both previous strategies. Police may negotiate small issues, but they impose strict limits on where, when, how and even if people can protest. Their plans stress advance surveillance and intelligence-gathering, a massive show of force, zero tolerance of disruption, and quick arrests and lengthy detentions of people they identify as provocateurs, sometimes even before a rally happens, and without probable cause. The new pre-emptive policy seem to have lessened the risk of widespread, violent protester-police clashes, many protest policing experts conclude, but at the expense of free-speech rights.

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6 McPhail et al., 1998.
7 Alex S. Vitale, 2005.
There are five general elements to the “command and control” style of public order policing. These are aversion to disruption, controlled access, divide and conquer, shock and awe, and zero tolerance. What these practices share is their orientation towards heightening the ability of the police to micro-manage all important aspects of the demonstration from the granting of permits to the dispersal of demonstrators. In each practice, there is an emphasis on exercising direct control over the demonstrators rather than allowing for their self regulation. This micro-management of control allows the police to quickly suppress any disorderly behavior that might interfere with the normal functioning of the city.

Aversion to disruption refers to the department’s desire to prevent demonstrations from interfering with the normal functioning of the city as much as possible. This is expressed in a number of different ways. First, the NYPD has been denying many organizations the right to have marches on city streets. They have instead forced them to demonstrate on the sidewalk. Even then, protest organizers have been told that they can march or picket on the sidewalk only as long as they do not interfere with other pedestrians. Second, those demonstrations that have been granted permits are routinely forced to march in out-of-the-way locations and are contained within one lane of traffic. Marches are often restricted to parts of the city that are relatively empty on the day for which the demonstration is planned. Almost no organizations are given permission for marches through highly trafficked areas such as Times Square or Fifth Avenue. Third, the police are now restricting the hours at which demonstrations can occur. This includes the time of day and the number of hours of the demonstration. Several recent demonstrations have ended in arrests after police enforced such time restrictions at the end of otherwise peaceful, permitted events. All of this is in keeping with the “broken windows” theory’s emphasis on “quality of life”.

Local residents have come to demand that the police are guarantors of peace and quiet, whether that means dislodging homeless people or noisy teenagers. One of the ways that the police maintain order at demonstrations is by controlling access. The police have come to rely on wooden and metal barriers not just to separate the protesters from the public, but also to establish a limited number of entry points to the demonstration. When arriving at a demonstration, people are often sent several blocks in different direction trying to find the appropriate point of entry. If a demonstration becomes larger than the established protest area, the police block additional demonstrators from even approaching the demonstration area by setting up barricaded check points on surrounding streets, sometimes one to three blocks from
the actual demonstration area. These access points are also often used to control the dispersal of crowd, forcing people to leave in small groups moving in different directions, and prevent people from attempting to continue the protest outside the designated area. Once demonstrators arrive they face additional barriers. At all large demonstrations, the crowd are subdivided into smaller groups by the use of interlocking metal ‘‘French barriers’’. This system of divide and conquer allows the police to have easy access to almost all parts of the demonstration, while making it impossible for demonstrators to circulate freely through the protest area. This interferes with leafleting, petitioning, and other activities that require movement through the crowd. The overwhelming show of force is intended to have a shock and awe value to deter outbreaks of violence or other unpermitted or unlawful behavior.

One of the practices closely tied to ‘‘broken windows’’ policing is zero tolerance. This practice involves the rigorous enforcement of legal statutes as a way of restoring a sense of order in a particular location. If an area is rife with crime and public disorder, the police can use the zero tolerance enforcement of minor violations to assert their control over the area and re-establish a sense of orderly public space. This is often achieved by deluging areas with officers for a short period of time, consistent with the shock and awe approach. In the context of demonstrations, this can be seen in the lack of flexibility in dealing with protest activities that may fall outside the bounds of strictly legal or permitted activity. If a planned sidewalk march becomes unexpectedly large, they will be told to remain on the sidewalk rather than adjusting plans and allowing them to utilize a lane of traffic. Similarly, as mentioned above, the end times of demonstrations are often strictly enforced, even if this heightens rather than lessens the possibility of confrontation between the police and demonstrators.

This zero tolerance approach is often maintained through the use of force, even against peaceful protests. Failure to abide by the provisions of a permit have been met with riot squads shutting down sound systems, horses charging people standing in the street, and mass arrests of protesters at the expiration time of a permit to demonstrate. The police use of force in these circumstances is completely unconnected to the notion of a ‘‘continuum of force’’ used in other policing situations. The continuum of force doctrine says that the police should only use the minimum amount of force in a given situation to affect a lawful end. If someone verbally challenges an officer, they cannot take out a gun and shoot them. They can forcefully grab a person to place them under arrest, but they cannot use a baton or pepper spray unless the person is violently resisting them. Similarly the ‘‘negotiated management’’ approach to public order
policing says that the police should use force against demonstrators only when there is the presence or imminent threat of violence and/or property destruction. The zero tolerance approach, however, views the use of force as appropriate in any situation where a violation of the law or a permit has occurred, no matter how minor. This “command and control” style of policing had, until 2003, been effective in containing and reducing disorder at most political demonstrations. It is vulnerable, however, when confronted by very large crowd or protesters who directly resist police management of demonstrations. The police system of micromanagement might have worked well if the crowd had been no more than the 100,000 expected.

As police departments review the varieties of strategies available to them in dealing with large and small-scale demonstrations they must attempt to balance the desire of residents and businesses to avoid disruption with the rights of demonstrators to express their views. The nature of that balancing point and how it is achieved is a constantly shifting equation. It is clear from this review of the NYPD’s recent practices that their attempt to eliminate any disruptive effects through the micro-command and control of demonstrations has had negative consequences for police-community relations. It has also failed in many instances to achieve this goal of avoiding disruption by failing to be flexible, especially in dealing with unexpectedly large demonstrations. In addition, the readiness of many police departments to use high levels of force against passive crowd engaged in only marginally illegal behavior is in direct conflict with the continuum of force doctrines that guide other forms of policing. Rather than adopting paramilitary or command and control models, police should re-examine the usefulness of the negotiated management approach to protest policing.

2.5 PUBLIC ORDER POLICING IN UK

There has always been a strong tradition of protest in the UK. Over 5,000 protests took place in the London Metropolitan area in the year 2008 alone. The vast majority were notified to police and peaceful. The right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental human right and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of a democratic society. However, issues surrounding protest have often been controversial, the use of force to police protest being principal among them.

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British policing has always had a clear identity, separate from the rest of the world; no more so than in its approach to public order. That approach, of putting the police amongst the people to maintain security and facilitate protest, is quite distinct from other countries in Western Europe where police often use equipment including water cannon, CS gas and other physical measures to control crowd and separate the police from the protest crowd.

The British policing model sets the police amongst the people, ‘toe-to-toe’ in public order policing terms, without recourse to some separate specialised force or unit, or, except in a very exceptional circumstances, resort to the mechanised creators of distance between police and protesters – water cannon or baton guns. This situation has prevailed even in circumstances where the model is infinitely more difficult to apply successfully: where crowd are large and provocative or violent, or where large-scale frustration and discontent are vented on the police themselves or on street furniture and iconic structures and locations.  

The HMIC (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary) report – Adapting to Protest – was published on 07 July 2009. Conducted at the request of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, this review looked at the policing methods used on 01 April 2009 during the G20 summits in London.

This report in particular seeks to consider:

- the policing of public protests held during the G20 summit on 1st and 2nd of April 2009
- public perceptions, the legal framework and police professional practice
- the sequence of events on 1st April 2009
- the tactics employed during the police operation relating to the G20 protests
- the immediate issues arising in relation to the policing of protests as a result of this review.

The report made a number of immediate recommendations, including that police:

- Facilitate peaceful protest
- Improve dialogue with protest groups where possible
- Improve communication with the public

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• Moderate the impact of containment when used
• Improve training to equip officers to deal with the full spectrum of protest activity
• Wear clear identification at all times and that:
• National guidance on the policing of protest needs overhauling by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).

2.5(a) Adapting to Protest – Nurturing the British Model of Policing

This report was published on 25 November 2009, and asks the question “How best should the police as a service adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing while retaining the core values of the British model of policing?”

This review builds on the recommendations of Adapting to Protest and develops a practical framework for police decision-making to facilitate peaceful protest. It includes the response from ACPO to the recommendations made by HMIC in July and provides further details of the ACPO review of national public order training.

Three flow diagrams were developed as a way to provide, clear practical guidance for public order practitioners. These diagrams can help to devise appropriate command and control frameworks for large-scale public order operations.

• Facilitating Peaceful Protest flow diagram
• Use of Public Highway flow diagram
• Protests on Private Land flow diagram (revised June 2010)

2.5(b) Policing Public Order – An overview and review of progress against the recommendations of Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing –

This report by HMIC found that police forces cannot plan for a quiet world and must swiftly adapt in real-time to protests that pose risks to public safety.

In UK, the Kettle Tactics approach is used to control large, and potentially violent, protests. Andy Hayman predicted in a Times blog: "The tactics are "to herd the crowd into a pen, known
as 'the kettle'... the police will not want groups splintering away from the main crowd." Policing experts say the procedure dictates that officers move protesters to a pre-designated spot. As other protesters join the crowd, the police noose draws gradually tighter. Eventually protesters find themselves surrounded by police specially trained in crowd control. Kettling has already been unsuccessfully challenged in the courts on the grounds that it constitutes false imprisonment and that it contravenes freedom of movement. But police defend it, arguing that the tactic provides an efficient and relatively safe way of controlling crowd who may contain individuals bent on violence. Revealingly, the derivation of the very word differs depending on which side of the police line one stands. Security expert Mal Geer of Prime Media, a firm instructing journalists how to cope in riot situations, says Kettling is so called because "it takes the steam out of a potentially violent situation". With legal backing from Britain's highest court, combined with the belief among law and order professionals in containment as the "least worst" option, it could be that the police kettle tactic has a continuing future.¹⁴

2.5(c) Police Support Unit -

In UK, Police Support Unit or PSU is a unit of police officers who have undergone specialist training in public order policing. The majority of UK Forces use Mercedes Sprinter Vans, known as 'Carriers', as standard transport for PSUs. These vehicles are equipped with mesh window shields and outfitted with storage compartments for officers' riot and Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense (CBRN) kit. Carrier drivers must undergo specialist driver training in 'riot conditions' before qualifying as a carrier driver. Standard kit for PSU officers consists of a transparent acrylic riot shield, a baton, a visored 'NATO' helmet, shin and elbow guards, along with fireproof coveralls when required. This level of protection allows officers to deal with a variety of violent situations, including riots, football violence and suspects armed with a variety of weapons. PSU officers are trained to a higher standard of operational readiness than their divisional counterparts. Training exercises undertaken encompass a variety of public order scenarios; officers will undergo extensive riot training including being petrol bombed in large scale engagements, prison clearance tactics, football stadium scenarios, night club scenarios, aircraft, rail and various 'angry-man' scenarios, as well as additional specialist training. PSU units spend considerable time training with other

¹⁴ Paul Lewis, 2012.
specialist police teams as well as certain military units. A PSU consists of: 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants, 18 Constables plus 2 medics and 3 drivers.  

2.5(d) Training in Public order Policing in UK.

The new national public order training curriculum was developed in 2011. The new curriculum is made up of a number of modules (e.g. training standards, command roles, tactics), each of which includes a number of elements. There are three command courses. The operational or Bronze commanders’ course, the tactical or Silver commanders’ course and the strategic or Gold commanders’ course. A pre-requisite for attendance at these courses is the completion of an impressive and comprehensive e-learning package, which includes relevant legislation on human rights and the use of force, crowd dynamics, command structures, facilitation of the press, briefings for officers, dress codes and considerations when using the tactic of containment. The ‘no surprises’ approach to communication and engagement with communities are also explored.  

The police forces in UK have developed training in public order which comprises three courses in public order command training for the strategic, tactical and operational commanders. Public order training for officers includes the use of force, some useful details of what these programs cover are given below:-

**Training on Use of Force** - Public order training for commanders and public order units should fully incorporate training on the use of force which includes:

(a) Legal tests for the use of force (reasonableness; absolute necessity); the principles of necessity and the minimum level of force and the ‘continuum of the use of force’ model (from communication and negotiation to escalation and back to de-escalation).

(b) Recognition that police officers have the right in law to use force in self defense or the protection of others but remain individually accountable for any use of force;

(c) Consideration of the impact of individual uses of force in a collective operational environment. Operational commanders must consider the necessity of levels of force that can

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be reasonably foreseen, e.g. the response of individual officers to a command to disperse an unruly crowd.

(d) Existing requirements on the proper recording and reporting of all uses of force.

Public order training should also include dealing with peaceful protests as the present training curriculum only focuses on handling unlawful assembly and protests. Such training should incorporate and emphasize relevant human rights principles, human values, conflict management, negotiation skills, stress management skills, communication skills, use of protective riot control gear by member of force, use of non-lethal weapons & new drill formations.

**Public Order Training** - Indian police forces can adopt useful recommendations of HMIC (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary), UK to include in the public order training curriculum to achieve a consistent approach to police action:18

(a) Explicit training on the public order legal framework, including:

   (i) The starting point of facilitating peaceful protest.
   (ii) Police public order powers.
   (iii) Human rights obligations of police.

(b) Integrated training on the use of force, including:

   (i) Legal tests for the use of force (reasonableness; absolute necessity).
   (ii) Principles of necessity and minimum level of force.
   (iii) Continuum of the use of force model.
   (iv) Individual uses of force in a collective policing environment.

(c) A clear and definitive link between officer safety training (OST) and all levels of public order training (generalist, specialist and command) so that officers are well versed in the minimum use of force and necessity principles and the continuum of the use of force model.

(d) Comprehensive scenario and contingency planning: public order commanders must be competent to routinely identify and assess a range of possible operational scenarios and manage a variety of outcomes.

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(e) Consideration of the relationship between crowd dynamics and police action and tactics and the complexity of crowd membership and development of a more discriminating approach to crowd management: dealing with individuals rather than homogeneous mass.

(f) Consideration of appropriate and proportionate police tactics and levels of force in relation to a range of scenarios, for example:

(i) Mass peaceful protest on a national basis, eg a Climate Camp;
(ii) Protest and counter-protest in contested space.
(iii) Sporadic, disruptive activities with low levels of criminal damage.
(iv) Running disorder: looting and criminal damage to property.
(v) Small determined group attacks on iconic sites such as statues.
(vi) Attempted mass trespass of private land housing critical national infrastructure, such as power stations.
(vii) Protests resulting in serious violent disorder.

Public Order Command Training - HMIC recommends that public order command training should be significantly enhanced to provide explicit guidance to officers on:

(a) communication strategies before, during and after public order policing events which should include the following:

(i) A community engagement strategy should be prepared at the early stages of planning for a public order operation, identifying key stakeholders or influencers within the protest community, the wider community and any group(s) opposed to the protest event. Police commanders should seek the views, expectations and concerns of all key stakeholders and affected communities regarding the event and the related policing operation.

(ii) No promises should be made by police officers engaging with protest communities which are unsustainable or give unfair advantage or accommodation to a particular protest group, or are contrary to law. All police engagement should accord with the standards of professional behaviour adhering to the principles of confidentiality,
equality, honesty and integrity, as well as the Human Rights.

(iii) A no surprises communication philosophy should be adopted: ongoing communication should be maintained with all relevant stakeholders throughout the operational planning stages and during the event itself. Protesters and the public should be made aware of likely police action in order to make informed choices and decisions.

(iv) A media strategy should be developed in advance of the operation. Relevant media personnel should be invited to a briefing to ensure an accurate understanding of the police operational approach and style.

(v) A clear audit trail should be maintained of all communications with the protest community, the media and the wider public as part of the Event Policy file.

(vi) Following the operation, the community engagement and media strategies – and actions and decisions taken in relation to both – should be reviewed to identify learning for future events.

(b) understanding and managing crowd dynamics which should include the following:

(i) Prior to a crowd event, police should seek to inform themselves about the culture and general conduct of particular protest crowd. Planning for an operation should include gathering information on the underlying intent of the protest group.

(ii) The information regarding the general protest culture of the group should be considered in the local context and an assessment made as to how the policing operation can be designed to facilitate the legitimate intentions of the protesters.

(iii) Police strategy or tactics should not be oriented exclusively towards the control of the crowd through the threat or use of force but should ensure the effective facilitation of the legitimate intentions underpinning the protesters’ action. This should be effectively communicated to protesters, together with an indication of what conduct will and will not be tolerated by the police.

(iv) Initial contact with the protest group at the commencement of the policing operation should be characterised by low impact visibility, information gathering and should engage with crowd members to gather information about their intentions,
(v) Depending on the nature of the risk, escalation in police deployment may be necessary. A graduated tactical approach should be characterised by firm but targeted communication of tolerance limits and some increased visibility of the police capability to use force. Critically, police should seek to communicate to those posing the risk that they are creating the potential for police action.

(vi) Any targeted intervention by police should be informed by an accurate intelligence assessment about the source of the risk or factors causing the problem and ensure that any police response accurately reflects and is proportionate to the actual level and sources of risk.

2.6. PUBLIC ORDER POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA -

In August 2011, the Ministry of Police undertook a process of amending the Public Order Policing (POP) policy due to the increase in incidents involving the use of force in public order policing, the related injuries to participants and the negative publicity related to various incidents. This led to establishment of public order policing units with the South African Police Service, the better training of personnel, adequate intelligence to predict riots, the establishment of contingency plans and the re-equipment of police forces.

The relevant focus areas of public order policing to ensure a more effective and professional POP service addressed were:

- Effective crowd management that is informed by constitutional and legal imperatives will be dependent on a number of factors. This includes continuous training and education which hinges on effective knowledge management systems within the police.
- The point of departure is that SAPS must ensure peaceable order is sustained without infringing or appearing to infringe upon individual and collective democratic freedoms. This means applying force that is reasonably necessary and proportional to the level of resistance encountered.
As a result of the policy on public order policing, SAPS has now standardised the training of public order policing unit, as well as enhancing its human and physical resource capacities.

Police action, particularly around policing public protests, must always be motivated by sound knowledge of police purpose and involve constant application of the law.

Approach to transformation must speak to human resource development; from recruitment to retirement. It must involve a change in attitude, values and norms of behaviours. There must also be a responsibility of management to foster and implement the changes and strategy.

One of the critical and fundamental changes around improving training is that henceforth all new entry level police members will in future during basic training undergo basic crowd management training as part of their curriculum.

The policing of public protests and gathering does not necessarily occur on a daily basis and the members of the POP units must be able to be deployed to other visible policing activities. The specialised skills of such units, in fact, could assist the police in some of their visible policing activities such as road block and cordon and search operations.

The success of effective response by the SAPS with regard to public order policing is thus dependent on a strong line of command and control. It has been proved that command and control has different meaning to different people. Within the context of policing public policing, command and control simply means that certain people must know that they have different roles to play. There cannot be a disconnect between a commander and platoon.

Dangerous Weapons Act of 2013 (Act No.15 of 2013), a new piece of legislation that has been promulgated to address the possession of weapons during public gatherings and mass demonstrations.

In developing policy and guidelines for public order policing, South African Police aimed to ensure that their policing approach is consistent with:

- Constitutionally-accorded rights for all individuals.
- Effective and peaceful crowd control demands.
- An approach that does not impact negatively and enhances tensions between the police and community.
- Policing approach does not generate the very violence it seeks to control in public protests.

SAP acknowledges that there are still challenges around securing convictions after arresting perpetrators during violent public protests. On many occasions, many protests have been accompanied by serious provocations, intimidations, public violence and even elements of criminality.

As expected, when police arrest the perpetrators at the scene, usually nobody claims responsibility for these actions as such rendering the investigations very difficult, particularly in securing convictions in courts. SAP also challenges law-abiding citizens to come forward with information in helping trace some of these provocative elements.

The policy states that each public protest must be video recorded. Whilst the police have a responsibility to police gatherings within the framework of the law, the Gatherings Act confers considerable responsibilities on conveners or organisers of events to ensure that such events are carried out in an orderly and peaceful manner. Any contravention of this must result in the organisers facing criminal charges.

2.7. REVIEW OF TACTICS IN INDIA

In India, agitations by various sections over a range of issues recorded an increase of nearly 7 per cent in 2012 compared to 2011, with 78,444 protests and demonstrations reported all over the country. In 98 agitations, the police opened fire at the protesters and 65 such instances were recorded in Madhya Pradesh, where 121 people were injured. In all, 13 civilians and 6 policemen were killed, whereas 354 civilians and 863 policemen were injured in the agitations. The maximum number of agitations was political in nature (37.13 per cent), followed by protests on issues other than communal, student, government employees or labour-related (25
per cent). Communal agitations accounted for 4.95 per cent and student protests, about 9.41 per cent of the total number.20

According to David H. Bailey (1991), a well-known authority on the Indian police, there are three broad categories of public violence/disorder to which India is subjected: violence of remonstrance, violence of confrontation, and violence of frustration. There are five broad causes of the types of violence mentioned above. These can be categorized as; i. Social Causes: In India, the historical social structures and ‘hierarchy’ has been a root cause for social unrest. Caste has been a fundamental divisive factor in our society. ii. Communal Causes: Religious orthodoxy and blind adherence to extreme view-points is another fundamental cause for unrest. In India, the existence of every religion side by side has been the matter of strength in our multi-cultural system but fringe elements often create unrest. iii. Economic Causes: Underdevelopment is arguably a cause of tension. The desire to improve one’s position in competition with others, itself creates stress and in India, with 250 million people below the poverty line, the strain is significant. iv. Administrative Causes: The administrative machinery is not always perceived by people to be objective and fair. Slackness in delivery of services, lethargy in enforcement of laws is at times a major reason for frustration in citizens. Corrupt and self-seeking behaviour of some officials compounds the problem further. One of the major causative factors for the eruption of public disorder is the inadequacy of the administration in enforcing the legitimate constitutional, statutory and traditional rights of citizens leading to serious discontentment among them. v. Political Causes: In a vibrant democratic system, not a totalitarian regime, divergent political view-points can lead to tension. More important, however, is the problem of political expediency where a section of the political leadership tries to use the administration for furthering its own political agenda. The increasing propensity to use public office for private gain, unwarranted interference in crime investigation and day to day functioning of police, short-term populism at the cost of durable solutions, complexities of a federal polity – all these make it difficult to address some of the growing threats to public order. Added to this is the relatively low importance attached to public order in our political discourse. All these contribute to breakdown of the public order fabric. Hostilities arising out of such tensions and conflicts provide opportunity for deteriorated situations leading to serious challenges for the police.

The National Police Commission (1977-81), while dealing with public order issues and the police, observed: “Increasing violence is seen as the most disturbing feature of the contemporary law and order situation in the country. Newspapers frequently report details of violent incidents involving large groups of agitators who clash with the police while articulating some issue of discontent and frustration. Police action to restore order in such situations frequently involves the use of force, including firearms on some occasions, which in turn, draws adverse public reaction and escalates tension and hostility between the public and the law enforcement agency.”

Padmanabhaiah Committee (2000) while commenting on the need for revamping the police system in the emerging internal security scenario observed that: “Internal security is an important element of national security. It would be prudent for the policy makers to realize that the present-day challenges to internal security, especially those posed by covert designs of the Pakistan ISI, or Maoist-Marxist extremist groups and of the religious fundamentalists are of such a nature that to meet them squarely, meaningfully and effectively, the society and the country need a highly motivated, professionally skilled, infra-structurally self-sufficient and sophisticatedly trained police force.”

2.8 CROWD PSYCHOLOGY & PUBLIC ORDER POLICING21 -

The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (ESIM) is now the leading scientific theory of crowd psychology. It provides a theoretical basis for accurately explaining and predicting the nature of crowd behaviour, particularly as this relates to the emergence of collective disorder. The ESIM recognises the contextually determined nature of crowd action and defines the social psychological processes determining the positive and negative impacts that police tactics can have upon crowd dynamics. The ESIM has been extensively validated via studies of a wide range of different types of crowd event, attracts a high level of support

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within the scientific community and is consistent with the wide array of literature on public disorder, from Criminology to Social History.

Covering a wide range of relevant research from disciplines as diverse as Social Psychology, Criminology and Social History, based on ESIM “Crowd Psychology & Public Order Policing: An Overview of Scientific Theory and Evidence” report provides an overview of the literature on scientific crowd psychology from its origins in the nineteenth Century to date. The report gives particular focus to more recent developments in scientific understanding and the implications of this for the successful management of crowd events. The central conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

Research overwhelmingly demonstrates that the indiscriminate use of force by the police during an event can negatively impact upon crowd dynamics to increase the risk that a crowd poses to public order. The disproportionate and indiscriminate threat or use of force can create psychological processes in the crowd that draw into conflict those who had come to the event with no prior conflictual intention. Therefore, police strategy and tactics should be oriented toward proactively avoiding the production of these processes during crowd events. This can be facilitated by enhancing and actively creating perceptions of police legitimacy among crowd participants through a) a strategic orientation toward the facilitation of peaceful behaviour within a crowd; b) a graded and information led tactical profile which has a dynamic capacity for achieving dialogue and communication with those within crowd before, during and after the event; c) avoidance of the undifferentiated threat or use of force.

Therefore, it can be concluded on the basis of scientific research that collective conflict can emerge during crowd events as a consequence of the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of police force. This occurs because of the unanticipated impact that policing can have upon crowd psychology and dynamics. There is now compelling evidence that the most effective means for achieving proportionality in the policing crowd is through a strategic focus upon facilitation and a graded, differentiated and information led approach to the use of force. It is recommended that police public order strategy and tactics are developed in ways that increase the links between tactical responses and continuous ‘dynamic risk assessment’. To achieve such changes it is proposed that it will be necessary to a) undergo a thorough reform of public order training in order to develop greater conformity with scientific knowledge and evidence;
b) increase police capability for ‘dialogue’ and communication with crowd and formally recognise these as primary tactical options for public order policing.

2.9 INTELLIGENCE

Clearly, intelligence plays the most crucial role in prevention / peaceful management of mass agitations. Intelligence agencies operate both at State and district levels. There is a well established system of plainclothesmen gathering intelligence. Perhaps, more stress is required on intelligence gathering / data analysis by uniformed personnel. “Many of the failures in the recent riots were largely due to the negligence of the uniformed staff to monitor intelligence” – from report of the National Police Commission.

At present the intelligence advices received from State level are often reported to be too general in nature to be of much practical use. Here too, it is seen that the old system has fallen in disuse. Police & administration have for long maintained records of various physical data. If updated regularly, a critical scrutiny of these records, particularly of the fluctuations therein, can reveal a number of pointers. Such records should be properly maintained by the police officers in-charge of the districts and police stations. Intelligence agencies at the district and the State level should look for significant data indicating an imbalance in any particular area. The district level agency should constantly feed the State level agency updated data relating to its district. The State level agency should interpret this data on an aggregate basis for the whole State. With such analysis, the advice of the State intelligence agencies to the district units would be more precise and useful and would enable the district administration and police to develop well chalked out plans in advance.

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2.9(a) Intelligence - Industrial disputes: To anticipate threats to public order from mass agitations by labours, district police must collect on a continual bases a variety of basic data relating to all industrial establishments in their jurisdictions. These data should include:

- The total number of industrial establishments,
- The layout of the establishments and the location of vital and sensitive installations,
- Number of workers in each establishment,
- Number of unions with their membership, the political and social affiliation of the unions, the identity of union leaders,
- Historical account of past strikes and other forms of agitations in the industrial establishment,
- Current account of agreements entered into or the awards enforced in these establishments, and
- An account of the important court proceedings initiated by the labour and management, etc.

Besides such information relating to the personnel, it would also be necessary to compile information about the nature of products manufactured by the industrial establishments, the normal channels of their transport and the end point of their release for use by consumers or some other industry or for export, the sensitive nature of the products from the point of view of the security needs of the country, etc. The police should have all this information on an ongoing basis so that in the event of an industrial dispute they would have a full picture of what they are expected to protect and whom they are expected to deal with.

Responsibility for compiling these basic data and information should be taken on by a special cell of the Intelligence wing at the district level. A similar cell in the Intelligence at State headquarters should cover major industrial establishments which may give rise to industrial disputes having ramifications over more than one district. The public sector, both Central and State, should also be covered by these cells. The most important point in the working of these cells would be the constant updating of the information collected from time to time and their dissemination to the various operative units at the sub-division, circle and police station level at regular intervals.

Besides collecting the basic data and information as detailed above, these cells should also
collect intelligence about matters that arise in the day-to-day working of the establishments which generate friction between the labour and management. *Timely knowledge of such matters would help the police to anticipate crisis situations and be adequately prepared to deal with them.* It is, however, important to note that collection of intelligence on such matters is not meant to secure police intervention in these disputes unless there is a distinct public order angle.

These cells may need to be strengthened when any specific labour dispute arises and tension begins to build up. Special teams at the local level may have to be deployed for collecting intelligence in depth about the likely *agitationist plans of the organisers*. Intelligence so collected would be of great help when the need arises for actual police intervention at some point of time in the course of a dispute.

**2.9(b) Intelligence – Agrarian Problems:** Gathering intelligence on local agrarian problems is more difficult than collecting intelligence related industrial disputes, because the spread of the police in the rural areas is disproportionately thin; more so in the context of the progressively increasing attention that the rural areas are being given in the scheme of overall development of the country. The growing awareness of the people in the countryside of the scope for their development and their legitimate share of the output of the country’s economy is bound to increase tensions and conflicts in the rural areas. The rising aspirations and expectations of the weaker sections of the community, particularly in the rural areas, are also likely to generate situations of confrontation and conflict. *Political battles will be more intensely fought in the rural set up, with the rural electorate progressively realising the importance and strength of its numbers.*

Against this backdrop, it is clear that the task of policing the rural areas will have to be given much more attention than is being given now. The first essential step would be to *increase the spread of the regular police in the rural areas and reduce the gap in the density of police presence in the urban area and the rural area* as compared to each other.

Agrarian problems are known to give rise to large scale mass agitations, even organised raids and killings. While the causes of some such incidents are strictly local, large scale agitations also arise from well organised movements transcending districts and even at times States. However, facilities for quick transmission of information, mobility, awareness of the mode of working of the police and access to supervisory levels which are available to the urban public
do not, and cannot possibly, exist in the same measure in the rural areas. In their absence the regular police will require considerable assistance in rural areas to get a good grip over a prevailing situation and deal with it satisfactorily. Irrespective of the density of police presence in the rural area, the regular police will require some special arrangement at the village level to secure information relevant to police tasks.

The village chowkidari system was originally rendering some assistance to the regular police in this regard, but it has now ceased to be as effective as it was earlier. Chowkidars have traditionally served the regular district police as a source of information and a point of contact that enabled them to remain in touch with the ground situation in the village. The Chowkidari system needs to be strengthened. Without effective Chowkidari, ground level intelligence collection from rural areas is not easy.

2.9 (c) Intelligence – Extremist Activities: Extremist activities are covered by several intelligence agencies – both at State and Centre level. It is not known how efficiently the intelligence gathered by different agencies is collated and analysed at any central information clearing house or how effectively such analyses reports are shared with those who may need them. Uttar Pradesh, so far, has not faced this menace to the same degree as faced by some other states. This, however, cannot be a reason for not expecting such activities in future and for not being fully prepared.

Preparations will call for thorough sharing of intelligence findings with agencies of neighbouring states and corroborating those findings with the ground level developments in the State.

2.10 EQUIPMENT FOR RIOT CONTROL

2.10(a) Taser

A Taser, sometimes spelled Tazer, is an electroshock weapon sold by Taser International. It uses electrical current to disrupt voluntary control of muscles causing "neuromuscular incapacitation". Someone struck by a Taser experiences stimulation of his or her sensory

nerves and motor nerves, resulting in strong involuntary muscle contractions. Tasers do not rely only on pain compliance, except when used in Drive Stun mode, and are thus preferred by some law enforcement over non-Taser stun guns and other electronic control weapons. Tasers were introduced as non-lethal weapons to be used by police to subdue fleeing, belligerent, or potentially dangerous people, who would have otherwise been subjected to more lethal weapons such as a firearm. A 2009 Police Executive Research Forum study said that officer injuries drop by 76% when a Taser is used. However, while Taser CEO Rick Smith has stated that police surveys show that the device has saved 75,000 lives, there has been some controversy where Tasers have been implicated in instances of serious injury or death.

2.10(b)  **Stinger and Dye-marker Grenades**[^24]

A hand grenade is any small bomb that can be thrown by hand. A variety of types of hand grenades exists, the most common being explosive grenades designed to detonate after impact or after a set amount of time. Grenadiers were originally soldiers who specialized in throwing grenades.

These, also called stinger rounds, consist of a number of rubber balls ranging from around 0.32 to 0.60 inches (8.1 to 15.2 mm) in diameter, and are used for direct fire. The small diameter means that each ball contains far less energy than a baton round, but it also limits the range. *Rubber slugs*, used in 12 gauge firearms, consist of a fin stabilized full bore diameter rubber projectile. These are used for long range, accurate direct fire shots on individual targets.

2.10(c)  **Pepper Spray/Ball Launcher**[^25]

A pepper-spray projectile, also called a pepper-spray ball, pepper-ball or pepper-spray pellet is a projectile weapon made up of a powdered chemical that irritates eyes and nose (see pepper spray). These forced compliance weapons launch a fragile projectile which breaks

upon impact and releases an irritant payload.

A pepper-spray projectile may be a sphere, hence the name pepper-ball, but it may also come in other shapes. The irritant payload may differ from product to product but is usually a powder, less frequently a liquid, gas or aerosol. Some companies offer different substances as payload for their projectiles and launcher systems, so potential seller can choose a substance that is certified for use in their country. Also, projectiles with an inert dummy payload are often offered, for training and testing purposes.

A powder called PAVA (capsaicin II) pepper is often used. Pepper-spray weapons systems are used by law enforcement, military and other organizations, and individuals. The weapon is used generally in the role of stand-off weapons, where physical proximity to a suspect is deemed dangerous but deadly force is not warranted. The systems are not limited to classic standoff situations and allow agents to apply as many rounds as required to bring individual suspects, multiple suspects, or crowd into compliance.

2.10(d) Electronic Disabling Device

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP), also sometimes called a transient electromagnetic disturbance, is a short burst of electromagnetic energy. Such a pulse may occur in the form of a radiated electric or magnetic field or conducted electrical current depending on the source, and may be natural or man-made. The term "electromagnetic pulse" is commonly abbreviated to the acronym EMP (which is pronounced by saying the letters separately, "E-M-P").

EMP interference is generally damaging to electronic equipment, and at higher energy levels a powerful EMP event such as a lightning strike can damage physical objects such as buildings and aircraft structures. The management of EMP effects is an important branch of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) engineering. The damaging effects of high-energy EMP have been used to create EMP weapons. These are typically divided into nuclear and non-nuclear devices. Such weapons, both real and fictional, are gaining awareness from the public by means of popular culture.

2.10(e) Portable Laser Dazzler

A dazzler is a directed-energy weapon intended to temporarily blind or disorient its target with intense directed radiation. Targets can include sensors or human vision. Dazzlers emit infrared or invisible light against various electronic sensors, and visible light against humans, when they are intended to cause no long-term damage to eyes. The emitters are usually lasers, making what is termed a laser dazzler. Most of the contemporary systems are man-portable, and operate in either the red (a laser diode) or green (a diode-pumped solid-state laser, DPSS) areas of the electromagnetic spectrum. Initially developed for military use, non-military products are becoming available for use in law enforcement and security.

Weapons designed to cause permanent blindness are banned by the 1995 United Nations Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons. The dazzler is a non-lethal weapon intended to cause temporary blindness or disorientation and therefore falls outside this protocol.

2.10(f) Active Denial System (ADS)

The Active Denial System (ADS) is a non-lethal, directed-energy weapon developed by the U.S. military, designed for area denial, perimeter security and crowd control. Informally, the weapon is also called the heat ray since it works by heating the surface of targets, such as the skin of targeted human subjects. Raytheon is currently marketing a reduced-range version of this technology. The ADS was deployed in 2010 with the United States military in the Afghanistan War, but was withdrawn without seeing combat. On August 20, 2010, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department announced its intent to use this technology on prisoners in the Pitchess Detention Center in Los Angeles, stating its intent to use it in "operational evaluation" in situations such as breaking up prisoner fights. The ADS

is currently only a vehicle-mounted weapon, though U.S. Marines and police are both working on portable versions. ADS was developed under the sponsorship of the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program with the Air Force Research Laboratory as the lead agency. There are reports that Russia is developing its own version of the Active Denial System.

2.10(g) Dazzler Lasers

Commonly used in compact operations, laser dazzlers have become the new threat deterrent alternative to lethal force. By employing laser light to temporarily blind the opposition, laser dazzlers are unique and portable device that confuses and intimidates potential threats by sending a brilliant burst of laser energy into the path of suspecting individuals. Typically a laser dazzler operates at the 532nm wavelength (green spectrum) and has an output rating between 35mW and 200mW.

These devices can be hand held or weapon mountable for versatility, convenience and ease of use. Some laser dazzlers have adjustable focus and can essentially flood a target with blinding light. Using a broader beam allows a larger swath path and less precision is needed to effectively produce a tactical advantage. Tighter beams allow longer range and increases maximum effectiveness at longer distances. Laser Dazzlers, dazzle the enemy with blinding light which disorientates and confuses combatants.

As a non-lethal device, laser dazzlers cut down on collateral damage, giving fighting forces an alternative to lethal force. Soldiers assigned to check points and road blocks use laser dazzlers to halt incoming vehicles, increasing security to the region. Civilian uses, include self defense applications and counter measures that pose a threat in high risk areas. Recently, government's have deployed large scale laser dazzlers as an effective means to thwart suicide planes and aircraft from violating no fly zones and protected aerospace.

2.10(h) Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)\(^{30}\)

The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) is an acoustic hailing device and sonic weapon developed by LRAD Corporation to send messages, warnings, and harmful, pain inducing tones over longer distances than normal loudspeakers. LRAD systems have been used to counter piracy, as non-lethal crowd control weapons, and as communication devices.

According to the manufacturer's specifications, the systems weigh from 15 to 320 pounds (6.8 to 145.1 kg) and can emit sound in a 30° beam at 2.5 KHz.

LRAD systems are used by maritime, law enforcement, military and commercial security companies to send instructions and warnings over distances, and to force compliance. LRAD is also used to deter wildlife from airport runways, wind and solar farms, nuclear power facilities, mining and agricultural operations and other industrial facilities.

3. The Case Studies

In this chapter brief facts and circumstances concerning the agitations led by Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare have been presented as these public protests vis-à-vis the role of Delhi Police are of special focus in this study. Though the Delhi Police has expressed its inability to part with official documents and details concerning the Ramlila Ground incident of June 4-5, 2011 to the investigators of this study, however, most of the details have been collected with the help of other agencies including media reports, the Supreme Court of India verdict and other published documents and other information gathered from discussion with Delhi Police Officers. Brief details of these agitations are given as below:

3.1 Baba Ramdev: Ramlila Ground Incident

The Delhi Police have claimed that Baba Ramdev's yoga session had turned into a rally in which 'provocative' speeches were made by religious and political leaders, including Baba Ramdev. Delhi Police have also blamed Bharat Swabhiman Trust for creating a ruckus and indulging in vandalism when police approached Baba Ramdev asking him to end his protest. The FIR states that "Baba Ramdev made a provocative speech in which he had said that his protest would end only with his death or if 1.25 crore people wanted it to end". The FIR registered at the Kamla Market Police Station states that 'provocative speeches' led to the cancellation of permission given for the Yoga Shiver. Police also said Ramdev and his associates refused to accept the letter cancelling permission for his camp and dared senior officials to do "whatever they wanted to do". Police said the organizer, Bharat Swabhiman Trust, had sought permission for a yoga session for 5,000 people from June 1 for 20 days but the numbers swelled to over 25,000 by June 3 midnight.
Ramdev and his followers were sitting on a protest against corruption at the Maidan from where police evicted them on Saturday night after cancelling permission for the agitation, citing a threat to the yoga guru's life. In the FIR police said that though the organizers had sought permission only for 5,000 people, but it installed 800 toilets, numerous booster pumps and set up a 40-bed hospital inside the Maidan. "On June 4 morning, the yoga session led by Baba Ramdev went on for three hours and it took the colour of a rally due to the presence of religious and political leaders who made provocative speeches," it adds. "They urged people to intensify their protest and said if their demands were not met, they would not move out of the Maidan. Keeping their activities in view, senior officials, after consultations, decided to cancel the permission for the camp. Around 12:30 am police went to meet Ramdev and his associates who refused to accept the letter cancelling the permission. Ramdev, who leaped from the stage to the ground, addressed his followers through a public address system and asked women to form his inner security cordon while youth formed the outer one. He also asked the elderly to move to the back, the FIR said.

As more and more followers gathered near him, he returned to the stage and continued his speech. In between, his followers used bricks and stones, flower pots and lathis, iron rods and fire-fighter spray and indulged in violence. None of his followers listened to police requests to

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stay calm adding that police resorted to using water cannons to disperse the crowd which had some effect. However, they gathered with 'renewed vigour' and began pelting stones. Though a portion of the right side of the stage caught fire, it was brought under control and police resorted to lobbing teargas shells which resulted in the dispersing of the crowd. The violence also resulted in damage to some vehicles, furniture, electronic and electrical equipment on the premises. The followers and office-bearers of Bharat Swabhiman Trust gathered there and attacked police with dangerous substances and obstructed the functioning of public servants leading to injuries to policemen. Their act also resulted in damage to private and public property. They created a riot situation in a public place, said the FIR.

3.1(a) Official Version of the Amicus Curiae

According to Dr. Dhavan, the learned amicus curiae in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 122 of 2011, Ramlila Maidan Incident dated 4/5 June 2011 Vs Home Secretary, Union of India & Others in Supreme Court of India, Baba Ramdev was the first person to raise the issue of black money publically. The black money outside the country was estimated at total of Rs.400 lakh crore or nearly nine trillion US Dollar. On 27th February, 2011, an Anti-Corruption Rally was held at Ramlila Maidan, New Delhi where more than one lakh persons are said to have participated including Baba Ramdev. On 20th April, 2011, the President of Bharat Swabhiman Trust, Delhi Pradesh submitted an application to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi proposing to take Ramlila Maidan on rent, subject to the general terms and conditions, for holding a yoga training camp for 4 to 5 thousand people between 1st June, 2011 to 20th June, 2011. He had also submitted an application to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Central District) seeking permission for holding the Yoga Training Camp which permission was granted by the DCP (Central District) vide his letter dated 25th April, 2011.

This permission was subject to the terms and conditions stated therein. Permission letter dated 25th April, 2011 reads as under: - “With reference to your letter No. Nil, dated 20.04.2011, on the subject cited above, I am directed to inform you that your request for permission to organize Yoga Training Session at Ramlila Ground from 01.06.2011 to 20.06.2011 by Bharat Swabhiman Trust Delhi Pradesh has been considered and permission is granted for the same subject to the conditions that there should not be any obstruction to the normal flow of traffic and permission from land owning agency is obtained. Besides this, you will deploy sufficient

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32 Supreme Court judgment passed in CWP No 122 of 2011.
numbers of volunteers at the venue of the function. Further, you are requested to comply with all the instructions given by police authorities time to time failing which this permission can be revoked at any time.” Continuing with his agitation for the return of black money to the country, Baba Ramdev wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on 4th May, 2011 stating his intention to go on a fast to protest against the Government’s inaction in that regard.

The Government made attempts to negotiate with Baba Ramdev and to tackle the problem on the terms, as may be commonly arrived at between the Government and Baba Ramdev. This process started with effect from 19th May, 2011 when the Prime Minister wrote a letter to Baba Ramdev asking him to renounce his fast. The Finance Minister also wrote a letter to Baba Ramdev informing him about the progress in the matter. On 23rd May, 2011, Baba Ramdev submitted an application for holding a dharna at Jantar Mantar, for which permission was also granted to him vide letter dated 24th May, 2011, which reads as follows:- “With reference to your letter dated 23.05.2011, on the subject mentioned above. I have been directed to inform you that you are permitted dharna/satyagrah at Jantar Mantar on 04.06.2011 from 0800 hrs. to 1800 hrs. with a very limited gathering.” In furtherance to the aforesaid permission, it was clarified vide letter dated 26th May, 2011 informing the organisers that the number of persons accompanying Baba Ramdev should not exceed two hundred. On 27th May, 2011, the DCP (Central District), on receiving the media reports about Baba Ramdev’s intention to organize a fast unto death at the Yoga Training Camp, made further enquiries from Acharya Virendra Vikram requiring him to clarify the actual purpose for such huge gathering. His response to this, vide letter dated 28th May, 2011, was that there would be no other programme at all, except residential yoga camp. However, the Special Branch, Delhi Police also issued a special report indicating that Baba Ramdev intended to hold indefinite hunger strike along with 30,000-35,000 supporters and that the organizers were further claiming that the gathering would exceed one lakh.

According to the learned amicus curiae, there is still another angle to this whole episode. When Baba Ramdev arrived at Delhi Airport on 1st June, 2011, four senior ministers of the UPA Government met him at the Airport and tried to persuade him not to pursue the said fast unto death since the Government had already taken initiative on the issue of corruption. In the meanwhile, large number of followers of Baba Ramdev had gathered at Ramlila Maidan by the afternoon of 4th June, 2011. In the evening of that very day, one of the Ministers who had met
Baba Ramdev at the Airport, Mr. Kapil Sibal, made public a letter from Baba Ramdev’s camp calling off their agitation. This was not appreciated by Baba Ramdev, as, according to him, the Government had not stood by its commitments and, therefore, he hardened his position by declaring not to take back his Satyagraha until a proper Government Ordinance was announced in place of forming a Committee. The ministers talked to Baba Ramdev in great detail but of no avail. It is stated that even the Prime Minister had gone the extra mile to urge Baba Ramdev not to go ahead with the hunger strike, promising him to find a “pragmatic and practical” solution to tackle the issue of corruption.

Various attempts were made at different levels of the Government to resolve this issue amicably. Even a meeting of the ministers with Baba Ramdev was held at Hotel Claridges. It was reported by the Press/Media that many others supported the stand of Baba Ramdev. It was widely reported that Mr. Sibal had said: “we hope he honours his commitment and honours his fast. This Government has always reached out but can also rein in.” The Press reported the statement of the Chief Minister, Delhi as stated by the officials including police officers in the words: “action would be taken if Baba Ramdev’s Yoga Shiver turns into an agitation field and three-tier security arrangements have been made for the Shiver which is supported to turn into a massive Satyagraha”. Even Anna’s campaign endorsed Baba Ramdev’s step. In this background, on 4th June, 2011, Baba Ramdev’s hunger strike began with the motto of ‘bhrashtachar mitao Satyagraha, the key demands being the same as were stated on 27th February, 2011. As already noticed, Baba Ramdev had been granted permission to hold Satyagraha at Jantar Mantar, of course, with a very limited number of persons. Despite the assurance given by Acharya Virendra Vikram, as noted above, the event was converted into an Anshan and the crowd at the Ramlila Maidan swelled to more than fifty thousand. No yoga training was held for the entire day. At about 1.00 p.m., Baba Ramdev decided to march to Jantar Mantar for holding a dharna along with the entire gathering. Keeping in view the fact that Jantar Mantar could not accommodate such a large crowd, the permission dated 24/26th May, 2011 granted for holding the dharna was withdrawn by the authorities.

Certain negotiations took place between Baba Ramdev and some of the ministers on telephone, but, Baba Ramdev revived his earlier condition of time-bound action, an ordinance to bring black money back and the items missing on his initial list of demands. At about 11.15 p.m., it is stated that Centre’s emissary reached Baba Ramdev at Ramlila Maidan with the letter assuring
a law to declare black money hoarded abroad as a national asset. The messenger kept his mobile on so the Government negotiators could listen to Baba Ramdev and his aides. The conversation with Baba Ramdev convinced the Government that Baba Ramdev will not wind up his protest. At about 11.30 p.m., a team of police, led by the Joint Commissioner of Police, met Baba Ramdev and informed him that the permission to hold the camp had been withdrawn and that he would be detained. At about 12.30 a.m., a large number of CRPF, Delhi Police force and Rapid Action Force personnel, totalling approximately to 5000 (as stated in the notes of the Amicus. However, from the record it appears to be 1200), reached the Ramlila Maidan. At this time, the protesters were peacefully sleeping.

Thereafter, at about 1.10 a.m. the police reached the dais/platform to take Baba Ramdev out, which action was resisted by his supporters. At 1.25 a.m., Baba Ramdev jumped into the crowd from the stage and disappeared amongst his supporters. He, thereafter, climbed on the shoulders of one of his supporters, exhorting women to form a barricade around him. A scuffle between the security forces and the supporters of Baba Ramdev took place and eight rounds of teargas shells were fired. By 2.10 a.m., almost all the supporters had been driven out of the Ramlila Maidan. The police sent them towards the New Delhi Railway Station. Baba Ramdev, who had disappeared from the dais earlier, was apprehended by the police near Ranjit Singh Flyover at about 3.40 a.m. At that time, he was dressed in Salwar-Kameez with a Dupatta over his beard. He was taken to the Airport guest-house. It was planned by the Government to fly Baba Ramdev in a chopper from Safdarjung Airport. However, at about 9.50 a.m. the Government shelved this plan and put him in an Indian Air Force helicopter and flew him out of the Indira Gandhi International Airport.

Evidence Based Facts/Information

On the basis of the material/factual evidence submitted by the Amicus Curiae to the Supreme Court of India, the following facts stand clearly clarified with regard to the police action on Baba Ramdev in Ramlila ground on 4/5 June 2010 as:

The Crowd was Peaceful and Sleeping

The crowd entered the Ramlila Ground from one entrance without any hassle and cooperatively [CD marked D003163” of 23 minutes @ 17 minutes] Police was screening each and every individual entering the premises. On 04th June 2011 many TV channel live coverage shows
about two kilometre long queue to enter the Maidan not even a single was armed, lathi or baseball bats etc. The crowd was already slept by 10.00-10.30 pm shown in newspaper photographs of 05.06.2011. People requesting the police with folded hands recorded in CCTV Cameras

Police Entered Abruptly to Rescind Order and Remove Baba Ramdev
The CD of 23 minutes on Police entry and Baba Ramdev’s reaction @ 10 minutes Baba requests that he should be arrested in the morning with a warrant;

No Provocation was made by Baba Ramdev on 4 May, 2011
Though in general Baba Ramdev’s speeches carry aggressive issues but no ‘Inciting speech’ was made by him on 4th May night – In general Baba Ramdev’s speech carry aggressive issues but on 04.06.2011, no provocation was made by Baba Ramdev in any manner; says he is ready to get arrested but his followers should not be harmed; asks his women supporters to form a security ring around him; requests participants not to fight with Police and be calm; also requests Police not to manhandle his supports. (CDs of 23 minutes @ 10 minute.)

Was the Lathi Charge Ordered and Were Lathis Used
The police itself admit use of water cannon and tear gas but denies lathi charge “No lathi charge even ordered on public, no organized lathi-charge by policeman; but evidence shows that lathis being used; Police beating people with Lathi’s also in CD @ 47 minute shows lathi-charge.

Bricks
The CD @1hr.11 min, Police entering from the back area and throwing bricks on the crowd inside the pandal.

Water Cannon and Tear Gas
Initially Water cannon was used and after it proved ineffective then tear gas was fired towards right side of the stage resulting in a small fire.

To the question whether such an attempt can be permitted or justified in the given circumstances of the present case, the Supreme Court of India held that judicially and on the strength of impartial logic the answer has to be in the negative as a sleeping crowd cannot be included within the bracket of an unlawful category unless there is sufficient material to brand
it as such. The facts as uncovered and the procedural mandate having been blatantly violated, is malice in law and also the part played by the police and administration shows the outrageous behaviour which cannot be justified by law in any civilized society.

3.1(b) Findings and Directions of the Supreme Court of India

“In discharge of its judicial functions, the courts do not strike down the law or quash the State action with the aim of obstructing democracy in the name of preserving democratic process, but as a contribution to the governmental system, to make it fair, judicious and transparent. The courts take care of interests which are not sufficiently defended elsewhere and/or of the victims of State action, in exercise of its power of judicial review. In my considered view, in the facts of the present case, the State and the police could have avoided this tragic incident by exercising greater restraint, patience and resilience. The orders were passed by the authorities in undue haste and were executed with force and overzealousness, as if an emergent situation existed. The decision to forcibly evict the innocent public sleeping at the Ramlila grounds in the midnight of 4th/5th June, 2011, whether taken by the police independently or in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs is amiss and suffers from the element of arbitrariness and abuse of power to some extent. The restriction imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression was unsupported by cogent reasons and material facts. It was an invasion of the liberties and exercise of fundamental freedoms. The members of the assembly had legal protections available to them even under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the restriction was unreasonable and unwarrantedly executed. The action demonstrated the might of the State and was an assault on the very basic democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. Except in cases of emergency or the situation unexceptionably demanding so, reasonable notice/time for execution of the order or compliance with the directions issued in the order itself or in furtherance thereto is the prerequisite. It was primarily an error of performance of duty both by the police and respondent No.4 but the ultimate sufferer was the public at large.

From the facts and circumstances that emerge from the record before this Court, it is evident that it was not a case of emergency. The police have failed to establish that a situation had arisen where there was imminent need to intervene, having regard to the sensitivity and perniciously perilous consequences that could have resulted, if such harsh measures had not been taken forthwith.

33Supreme Court judgment passed in CWP No 122 of 2011.
The State has a duty to ensure fulfilment of the freedom enshrined in our Constitution and so it has a duty to protect itself against certain unlawful actions. It may, therefore, enact laws which would ensure such protection. The rights and the liberties are not absolute in nature and uncontrolled operation. While placing the two, the rule of justice and fair play requires that State action should neither be unjust nor unfair, lest it attracts the vice of unreasonableness or arbitrariness, resultantly vitiating the law, the procedure and the action taken there under.

It is neither correct nor judicially permissible to say that taking of police permission for holding of dharnas, processions and rallies of the present kind is irrelevant or not required in law. Thus, in my considered opinion, the requirement of associating police, which is an important organ of the State for ensuring implementation of the rule of law, while holding such large scale meetings, dharnas and protests, would not infringe the fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 19(1) (a) and 19(1) (b) of the Constitution. This would squarely fall within the regulatory mechanism of reasonable restrictions, contemplated under Articles 19(2) and 19(3). Furthermore, it would help in ensuring due social order and would also not impinge upon the rights of others, as contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The police authorities, who are required to maintain the social order and public tranquillity, should have a say in the organizational matters relating to holding of dharnas, processions, agitations and rallies of the present kind. However, such consent should be considered in a very objective manner by the police authorities to ensure the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression as understood in its wider connotation, rather than use the power to frustrate or throttle the constitutional right. Refusal and/or withdrawal of permission should be for valid and exceptional reasons. The executive power, to cause a restriction on a constitutional right within the scope of Section 144 Cr.P.C., has to be used sparingly and very cautiously. The authority of the police to issue such permission has an inbuilt element of caution and guided exercise of power and should be in the interest of the public. Such an exercise of power by the police should be aimed at attainment of fundamental freedom rather than improper suppression of the said right.

I have held that the respondent no.4 is guilty of contributory negligence. The Trust and its representatives ought to have discharged their legal and moral duty and should have fully cooperated in the effective implementation of a lawful order passed by the competitive authority under Section 144 Cr.P.C. Due to the stature that Baba Ramdev enjoyed with his
followers, it was expected of him to request the gathering to disperse peacefully and leave the Ramlila Maidan. He ought not to have insisted on continuing with his activity at the place of occurrence. Respondent no.4 and all its representatives were bound by the constitutional and fundamental duty to safeguard public property and to abjure violence. Thus, there was legal and moral duty cast upon the members of the Trust to request and persuade people to leave the Ramlila Maidan which could have obviously avoided the confrontation between the police and the members of the gathering at the Ramlila Maidan.

As difficult as it is to anticipate the right to any freedom or liberty without any reasonable restriction, equally difficult it is to imagine existence of a right not coupled with a duty. The duty may be a direct or an indirect consequence of a fair assertion of the right. Part III of the Constitution, although confers rights, duties, regulations and restrictions are inherent there under. It can be stated with certainty that the freedom of speech is the bulwark of democratic Government. This freedom is essential for the appropriate functioning of the democratic process. The freedom of speech and expression is regarded as the first condition of liberty in the hierarchy of liberties granted under our constitutional mandate.

It is undisputable that the provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. are attracted in emergent situations. Emergent power has to be exercised for the purposes of maintaining public order. The material facts, therefore, should demonstrate that the action is being taken for maintenance of public order, public tranquillity and harmony.

Even if an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. had to be given effect to, still Respondent no.4 had a right to stay at the Ramlila Maidan with permissible number of people as the land owning authority-MCD had not revoked its permission and the same was valid till 20th June, 2011. The chain of events reveals that it was a case of police excesses and, to a limited extent, even abuse of power.

From the material placed before the Court, I am unable to hold that the order passed by the competent authority and execution thereof are mala fide in law or in fact or is an abdication of power and functions by the police. The action, of course, partially suffers from the vice of arbitrariness but every arbitrary action necessarily need not be mala fide. Similarly every incorrect decision in law or on facts of a given case may also not be mala fide but every mala fide decision would be an incorrect and impermissible decision and would be vitiated in law.
Upon taking into consideration the cumulative effect of the affidavits filed on record and other documentary evidence, I am unable to dispel the argument that the decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India reflected its shadow on the decision making process and decision of the police authorities. I also find that there would be no illegality if the police authorities had acted in consultation with the Union Ministry as it is the collective responsibility of various departments of the State to ensure maintenance of law and order and public safety in the State.

Every person/body to whom such permission is granted, shall give an undertaking to the authorities concerned that he/it will cooperate in carrying out their duty and any lawful orders passed by any competent court/authority/forum at any stage of the commencement of an agitation/dharna/ procession and/or period during which the permission granted is enforced. This, of course, shall be subject to such orders as may be passed by the court of competent jurisdiction.

Even on the touchstone of the principle of ‘in terrorism’, I am of the view that the police have not acted with restraint or adhered to the principle of ‘least invasion’ with the constitutional and legal rights available to respondent no.4 and the members of the gathering at the Ramlila Maidan.

The present case is a glaring example of trust deficit between the people governing and the people to be governed. Greater confidence needs to be built between the authorities in power and the public at large. Thus, I hold and direct that while considering the ‘threat perception’ as a ground for revoking such permissions or passing an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., ‘care perception’ has to be treated as an integral part thereof. ‘Care perception’ is an obligation of the State while performing its constitutional duty and maintaining social order.

It is unavoidable for this Court to direct that the police authorities should take such actions properly and strictly in accordance with the Guidelines, Standing Orders and the Rules applicable thereto. It is not only desirable but also a mandatory requirement of the present day that the State and the police authorities should have a complete and effective dispersement plan in place, before evicting the gathering by use of force from a particular place, in furtherance to an order passed by an executive authority under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C.

This is not a case where the Court can come to the conclusion that the entire police force has acted in violation to the Rules, Standing orders and have fallen stray in their uncontrolled zeal.
of forcibly evicting innocent public from the Ramlila Maidan. There has to be a clear distinction between the cases of responsibility of the force collectively and the responsibility of individual members of the forces. I find from the evidence on record that some of the police officers/personnel were very cooperative with the members of the assembly and helped them to vacate the Ramlila Maidan while others were violent, inflicted cane injuries, threw bricks and even used tear-gas shells, causing fire on the stage and total commotion and confusion amongst the large gathering at the Ramlila Maidan. Therefore, these two classes of Police Force have to be treated differently.

Thus, while directing the State Government and the Commissioner of Police to register and investigate cases of criminal acts and offences, destruction of private and public property against the police officers/personnel along with those members of the assembly, who threw bricks at the police force causing injuries to the members of the force as well as damage to the property, I issue the following directions: a. Take disciplinary action against all the erring police officers/personnel who have indulged in brick-batting, have resorted to lathi charge and excessive use of tear gas shells upon the crowd, have exceeded their authority or have acted in a manner not permissible under the prescribed procedures, rules or the standing orders and their actions have an element of criminality. This action shall be taken against the officer/personnel irrespective of what ranks they hold in the hierarchy of police. b. The police personnel who were present in the pandal and still did not help the evacuation of the large gathering and in transportation of sick and injured people to the hospitals have, in my opinion, also rendered themselves liable for appropriate disciplinary action. c. The police shall also register criminal cases against the police personnel and members of the gathering at the Ramlila ground (whether they were followers of Baba Ramdev or otherwise) who indulged in damage to the property, brick-batting etc. All these cases have already been reported to the Police Station Kamla Market. The police shall complete the investigation and file a report under section 173 of the Cr.P.C. within three months from today.

I also direct that the persons who died or were injured in this unfortunate incident should be awarded ad hoc compensation. Smt. Rajbala, who got spinal injury in the incident and subsequently died, would be entitled to the adhoc compensation of Rs.5 lakh while persons who suffered grievous injuries and were admitted to the hospital would be entitled to compensation of Rs.50, 000/- each and persons who suffered simple injuries and were taken to
the hospital but discharged after a short while would be entitled to a compensation of Rs.25,000/- each. For breach of the legal and moral duty and for its contributory negligence, the consequences of financial liability would also pass, though to a limited extent, upon the respondent no.4-Trust as well. Thus, I direct that in cases of death and grievous hurt, 25% of the awarded compensation shall be paid by the Trust. The said amount shall be paid to the Commissioner of Police, who in turn, shall issue a cheque for the entire amount in favour of the injured or the person claiming for the deceased.”

On the basis of the facts and circumstances of the above case it is clearly evident that the Delhi Police and for that matter any police in the country need to improve and refine their approach and capability to handle public unrest and protests especially from protection of the human rights of the protesting persons’ point of view. Police requires specialized training and sensitization in this regard in a highly systematic and special manner.

3.2 ANNA HAZARE AGITATION - CASE STUDY

Anna Hazare began his hunger strike on 5 April 2011 at Jantar Mantar in Delhi. This was in reaction to the rejection by the Indian government of his request for the formation of a joint committee comprising government and civil society representatives. Hazare had wanted the committee to draft an anti-corruption bill containing stronger punishments and giving more independence to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas (ombudsmen in the states). Protests spread to a number of cities in India and there were gatherings in solidarity with the protests around the world. Hazare gave a call for indefinite fast and Dharna at Jantar Mantar from 16th August, 2011. He demanded that the version of the Lokpal Bill proposed by them be passed by the Parliament. What followed later was a huge public agitation covered in the national media which was handled by the Delhi Police with many inputs from the highest functionaries in the Government of India. Based on this experience, a set of guidelines are being proposed for the handling of public order during agitations.

Anna Hazare gave a call to the people to reach Jai Prakash Narayan Park on 16'h August despite refusal of permission. Prohibitory orders were imposed under section 144 Cr. P.C.

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On the morning of 16 August 2011, Hazare, along with close associates, was remanded to judicial custody for seven days. Hazare was picked up by police at about 7.30 am from a residence in east Delhi for "intending to defy prohibitory orders". Late afternoon, he was produced before a special executive magistrate. After he refused to sign a personal bond to be allowed to get out on bail he was remanded in judicial custody for seven days. Within hours of his detention, a spokesperson for Team Anna said that he had begun his hunger protest while in police custody and that he was not accepting even water to drink. The arrest of Hazare and some of his close associates, set off a groundswell of protests across the country. The arrest was condemned by political parties, the chief ministers of some non-Congress ruled States, non-government organisations and even parliament did not transact any business after an uproar on the issue forced an adjournment for the day.

Anna Hazare was arrested under 107 /151 Cr.P.C. 2600 followers were detained under section 65 of the Delhi Police Act from various places and from around Jai Prakash Narayan Park. Police also got Chhatersal Stadium and other venues declared as temporary jails where agitators could be detained and then released. This was in view of the fact that Tihar could not have accommodated such a large number of agitators. Almost all the agitators were arrested. Anna's lawyers attempted to file a writ in the Supreme Court without success. Anna was released on the same day as potential for breach of peace had diminished. The national media had extended substantial support to the agitation and the whole country was watching the events on TV.

A view of the Anna Hazare Agitation

Realizing the enormous support for his agitation, Anna refused to come out of the Tihar jail. He started his Anshan there itself. A huge crowd gathered outside Tihar Jail which, at
its peak, rose to twenty thousand. Anna and his supporters raised certain demands for coming out of Tihar. They demanded Ram Lila Ground for their agitation for unlimited period with permission to continue their protest indefinitely or till their bill was passed by Parliament or otherwise. Since Anna was fasting, medical factors had also to be given due weightage. Delhi Police engaged in protracted negotiations and they managed to restrict Anna Hazare and his team down to 15 days of ‘dharna’. Delhi Police also managed to secure a written undertaking in this regard from Team Anna.

Since the Supreme Court of India vide order dated 16th April, 2009 in Writ (Crl.) 77 of 2007 had laid out guidelines on the manner of handling public agitations making it mandatory for organizers of protests to meet police and review plans for peaceful protest, they had to give an undertaking to maintain peace. Armed with these recent orders and knowing the capacity of venues, Delhi Police started engaging with the organizers on permission for the protest. Delhi Police refused permission to Anna Hazare and his supporters for the agitation proposed to be conducted at Jantar Mantar. It was reasoned that the crowd would exceed the capacity and would adversely affect public safety. Delhi Police was of the view that one single organization cannot be allowed to take up all of Jantar Mantar indefinitely. Delhi Police, therefore, requested the organizers of the agitation to choose any place other than Jantar Mantar. Anna Hazare and his team showed their preference for five places including Jantar Mantar. After engagement and mutual discussions, Delhi Police permitted Anna Hazare and his team to hold dharna at Jai Prakash Narayan Park. Negotiations broke down when Anna Hazare and his team refused to accept a time limit to their ‘dharna’. They also refused to limit the gathering to the capacity of venue. The permission, therefore, to organize their agitation at Jai Prakash Narayan Park had to be denied.

As there was enormous public support for Anna Hazare and their non-violent method of agitation, the entire police force was deployed without lathis. Armed Guards with automatic weapons were deployed around Ramlila Ground for security purpose. The public was allowed inside after security checks. The crowd which gathered at other places like Prime Minister’s, Ministers, Members of Parliament residences were also handled without lathis by the police. Absolutely no force was used. The organizers were repeatedly advised in writing that police was unarmed and they should deploy volunteers
to control rowdies. Supporters of Anna Hazare, particularly, the organizers undertook the responsibility to maintain the nonviolent nature of their agitation. The organizers had deployed volunteers and made repeated appeals to the crowd to control them. Special arrangements were made by deploying teams in plain clothes of crime branch officers for contingency removal of Anna Hazare to Medicity Hospital. The entire plan for his contingency evacuation was rehearsed several times. Organizers were kept in confidence that they would be informed before Anna Hazare would be removed. The onus of deciding when to remove Anna Hazare was left to their own doctor.

The entire arrangement was handled by the unarmed policemen with the exception of those deployed for security duties. The onus was on the organizers and their volunteers to keep the agitation peaceful. The contingency plan was rehearsed and perfected several times. The organizers were kept in confidence. The traffic rules were enforced to curb lawlessness in other parts of the city. Negotiations at the highest level led to the subsequent calling off the agitation. Restraint in using force, public support and negotiation with the leaders of the agitators ensured that people enjoyed their right to protest without creating an unmanageable law and order situation. The Indian Express in its edition of August 29, 2011 mentioned that over the last ten days, they had witnessed a new standard in public order policing, one that respected a group's democratic rights.

It is absolutely necessary to have adequate intelligence in respect of the scale and magnitude of agitation, the degree and magnitude of public support that agitators enjoy and the need to use force or restrain the use of force. In the case of the agitation by Anna Hazare, the Police had to have adequate intelligence of what kind of support Anna Hazare enjoyed. It was not clear to them at the outset that the agitation had the support of large number of people and also of the national media. The response to the agitation, therefore, initially was confusing one. It was, nonetheless, clear to them that the method being adopted by the organizers of the agitation was of a non-violent character and therefore there was a need to restrain the use of force. More so, because of the handling of previous agitation by Baba Ramdev where the Supreme Court had set up a Suo-moto inquiry to investigate police brutalities and lathi charge. They also had to assess the magnitude and duration of the agitation, the place where demonstration was to be allowed, the capacity of the venue and the terms and conditions on which the agitation...
could be allowed. There was a recognition that the democratic right of people to protest had to be tempered with the requirements of law and order.

3.3 TIMELINE AGITATIONS

Ramdev Agitation

4 June 2011

- Swami Ramdev begins his indefinite hunger strike at Ramlila Maidan in Delhi to bring back the black money stashed in tax havens abroad.
- 65,000 followers gathered at Ramlila Maidan.
- In a press conference in the evening Kapil Sibal made public a letter from Ramdev's camp to call off the hunger strike. Ramdev took it as a betrayal and hardened his position.

5 June 2011

- At midnight, police raided the grounds. A large police force lobbed tear gas shells, burned the place and lathicharge the crowd at 1 am (IST) to evict them.
- Delhi Police arrested Ramdev, who was disguised in a salwar kameez with a group of female protesters heading peacefully towards the New Delhi Railway Station
- Ramdev was held in a government guesthouse for a few hours and then sent to Dehradun in a BSF aircraft.
- Ramdev was sent to his Patanjali Yogpeeth ashram in Haridwar where he delivered a press conference.
- 53 people were injured and were treated at the Lok Nayak Jai Prakash (LNJP) hospital, AIIMS Trauma Center and Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital.
- One of Baba Ramdev's supporters was injured in the incident and her condition was still critical as of 17 August 2011.
- Protesters huddled near the Metro station, bus depots and railway stations. Many walked down to Gurdwara Bangla Sahib and other nearby ashrams. According to New Delhi railway station authorities, supporters continued to leave in batches through the course of the day. While several supporters spent the day at a park near Ramlila Maidan, others took shelter at an Arya Samaj facility in Paharganj.
- Ramdev was prohibited from entering Delhi for 15 days.

6 June 2011

- Prime Minister Manmohan Singh justified the action against Baba Ramdev as an operation that had to be conducted, and that there was no alternative. However, Manmohan Singh did not elaborate as to why force was used on a peaceful gathering and why the swoop was done at 1 am in the morning.

**Anna Hazare Agitation**

15 August 2011

- Anna Hazare announced at a press conference that he and his supporters were determined to go ahead with the fast on 16 August 2011 as planned. He also urged people to court arrest to push for a stronger Lokpal bill.
- Section 144 was imposed a night before the planned protest date, at JP Park, Rajghat and Dilli Gate, which prohibited assembly of five or more persons.

16 August 2011

- Anna Hazare was detained by Delhi Police in the early morning before he could start his hunger strike at JP park, Delhi. Delhi Police had asked Anna not to leave his home, which he declined, and Anna was detained at his residence in Mayur Vihar. Arvind Kejriwal, Kiran Bedi, Manish Sisodia and more than 1200 supporters were also taken into preventive custody by the Police.
- Anna Hazare was sent to seven days judicial custody to Tihar jail after refusing to sign a personal bond to be released on bail.
- Kiran Bedi and Shanti Bhushan, detained by Delhi Police on the morning ahead of Anna Hazare's fast unto-death, were released in the evening at around 6:30 pm IST.
- The current telecom minister Kapil Sibal was greeted with black flags and booed by a group of students at a seminar on the Jan Lokpal bill.
- With the Government of India, preparing to release Anna Hazare late in the night, however Anna refused to come out of Tihar jail until the government agreed to an unconditional permission to hold protests at JP Park.
- Demonstrations were held all over India protesting Anna Hazare's arrest. In Chennai, Mahatma Gandhi's secretary, V Kalyanam led the protesters. He said – "India will get a sure gold medal if corruption is entered as an item in the Olympic Games. We may not be a force in football or athletics or hockey. But India is the undisputed global leader in corruption.” Referring to Anna Hazare’s arrest in New Delhi, Kalyanam said it was easier to fight foreign tyranny than the tyranny of our own people. He ridiculed the contention of Union ministers like Kapil Sibal and Chidambaram that Parliament was supreme and civil society had no voice.
17 August 2011

- After almost a day, Anna still refused to leave jail and spent the night in a room in Tihar jail, despite the government decision to free him.
- Delhi Police made concessions for Anna Hazare to fast, stepping up from seven days to 14 days and finally 21 days at Ramlila Maidan.
- Congress made a statement that they suspected a foreign hand in the protests and asked the government to probe if the US was behind Anna’s agitation.

18 August 2011

- Anna Hazare agreed to leave jail after Delhi Police granted him permission to fast for 15-days against corruption at Ramlila Maidan. However, he would spend another night in Jail till the venue is ready.
- Arvind Kejriwal left Tihar jail being there for two days. Kejriwal called this move as just the beginning of their fight against corruption, and also confirmed that Anna Hazare would leave the jail once the grounds at Ramlila Maidan are ready for the fast.

19 August 2011

- Anna Hazare left Tihar Jail after three days and was welcomed by a huge crowd assembled nearby.
- Paying obeisance to Mahatma Gandhi at Rajghat and Amar Jawan Jyoti at the India Gate, Anna Hazare reached Delhi's Ramlila Maidan to launch a 15-day mass protest against corruption.
- Anna Hazare finally launched his protest at Ramlila Maidan as he declared that he will not quit the venue till the Jan Lokpal Bill is passed.
- Varun Gandhi, Bharatiya Janata Party MP announced that he will introduce Anna Hazare's Jan Lokpal Bill in the Lok Sabha as a private member's bill, saying that Jan Lokpal Bill is better than anything the nation has seen before and would like to make a small contribution in his own way.

21 August 2011

- Anna Hazare’s camp on Sunday called their supporters to confront individual Members of Parliament and Union Ministers at their residence and also warned the UPA government that its days would be numbered if it failed to pass the Bill by 30 August.
- Over 100,000 supporters had thronged Ramlila Maidan on Sunday, to show their support against corruption.
- Around 50,000 supporters marched in the streets on Mumbai to support Anna Hazare's call for an effective anti-corruption legislation. The marchers started from the Bandra railway station and walked all the way to Juhu, reportedly in one of the biggest protests in Mumbai.
22 August 2011

- On behalf of Anna Hazare, Sri Sri Ravishankar on Monday met NDA leaders at L. K. Advani's residence to discuss the Lokpal issue and garner opposition support.
- Anna Hazare, on his 7th day of fast said he would not negotiate with any other mediator, including P. Chidambaram or Kapil Sibal. He also said he would only negotiate with Congress MP Rahul Gandhi, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) or Maharashtra Chief minister Prithviraj Chavan regarding the Jan Lokpal Bill.

23 August 2011

- Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Tuesday appealed Anna Hazare to end his fast. He wrote a letter to Anna stating that he will ask Lok Sabha Speaker Meira Kumar if Anna's Jan Lokpal Bill can be sent to the Standing Committee. Prime Minister also said that the government was concerned about Anna's health.

24 August 2011

- Bharatiya Janata Party MP Varun Gandhi visited Ramlila Maidan on Wednesday morning. He stated his visit was as a common man and had nothing to do with his party as he supported the cause of Anna Hazare.
- An all-party meeting was chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at his official residence in New Delhi represented by finance minister Pranab Mukherjee. However the meeting ended with Mukherjee appealing Anna Hazare to end his fast, prompting the civil society to declare that they were "back to square one".

25 August 2011

- Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Thursday offered a new formula saying that the Government was ready to debate all versions of the Lokpal Bill in circulation at Parliament. He also said that the bills prepared by Aruna Roy's NCPRI and Jaiprakash Narain will also be debated by the Parliament along with the Jan Lokpal Bill.
- Union Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh met Anna Hazare at his protest camp at Ramlila Maidan. Deshmukh reportedly conveyed a message from the Prime Minister to urge Anna to end his fast and also asked him to consider the Prime Minister offer to debate all versions of Lokpal Bill in Parliament.
- Anna Hazare had asked Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to start the parliamentary discussion the next morning itself. Hazare had also put forward his three demands to the Prime Minister – Citizen's Charter, Lokayuktas in all states with Lokpal powers and inclusion of lowest to highest bureaucracy.
- Popular South Indian actor Vijay met Anna Hazare at Ramlila Maidan and also fasted throughout the day to express his support towards anti-corruption. Saluting Hazare's "will-power", Vijay said its praiseworthy the way the movement got public support that too without any political background.

26 August 2011

- Government asked Anna Hazare to guarantee of ending his fast once the discussion (debate) opens in Parliament.

27 August 2011

- Bollywood actor Aamir Khan met Anna Hazare at Ramlila Maidan. Supporting the anti-corruption campaign, Khan urged Anna to end his fast stating his leadership is required for the campaign as passing the bill will be a long process.
- Finance minister Pranab Mukherjee on Saturday initiated his debate in the Parliament on the Lokpal Bill issue. Initiating the speech, Mukherjee again requested Anna to end his fast.
- Bharatiya Janata Party MP Sushma Swaraj, during the debate in Lok Sabha, expressed her party's support for Anna Hazare, and said the BJP largely agrees with the three pre-conditions (Citizen's Charter, Lokayuktas in all states with Lokpal powers and inclusion of lowest to highest bureaucracy) laid down by Anna to end his hunger strike and is willing to vote in favour it.
- Supporting Anna Hazare anti-corruption movement, singer Sonu Nigam performed at Ramlila Maidan on Saturday. Sonu took blessings of Anna, who was on his 12th day of his indefinite fast.
- Government agreed to voice vote on Lokpal debate in Parliament.
- Both the houses have passed the resolution agreeing upon all the three conditions set by Anna in Jan Lokpal Bill. "We have won only half the battle," said Hazare standing before wildly cheering crowd and flanked by his key aides and Union minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, former Maharashtra chief minister who has been an interlocutor. "I congratulate every MP on what has happened today." Anna Hazare said. Anna Hazare also declared of breaking fast on Sunday morning at 10 am.

28 August 2011

- Anna Hazare ended his 12-day fast after 288 hours on Sunday morning at around 10 am IST(UTC+05:30) before thousands of cheering supporters at Ramlila Maidan. Hazare was driven straight to Medanta Medcity run by eminent cardiologist Dr Naresh Trehan who was attending to him along with his team during his entire period of fast.
- Thousands of supporters gathered at India Gate following anti-corruption crusader's call to celebrate.
4. Methodology - Procedural Dimensions

4.1 METHODOLOGY -

The broad objectives of the study were:

- To examine specific incidents of public protests/agitations by Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare with special focus on handling of these incidents by Delhi Police and;
- To propose suitable recommendations/interventional strategies for effective police handling of mass public protests/agitations from futuristic point of view.

In order to examine the police handling of peaceful mass agitations with special reference to the agitations organized by Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare at Delhi, the following procedural dimensions have been outlined for the present study:

For the academic review of the incidents the available information/record related to the agitations of Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare was examined vis-à-vis the role of Delhi Police along with intensive scrutiny of the case files, related literature in addition to the data collection techniques such as; Structured interviews with Police, aggrieved party members and media etc.; Questionnaires for collection of data from concerned quarters/agencies and Survey. Public perception survey was carried out during the research work to determine public perception on police use of force, police equipment, police behaviour, preparedness, communication with public and media, use of media and invite suggestions from public, protesters and police officers. A sample size of 500 respondents belonging to four categories i.e. public, media, retired police officers, and protestor groups were studied along with the perceptions of 5 State Police Forces and 13 Commission-rates/District Police Forces. Opinion/views of 18 state police forces and one paramilitary force dealing with law and order were invited through a questionnaire on public tactics, equipment, training, legislation and community participation.
measures for dealing with mass agitations. Response was received from 5 State Police Forces, one paramilitary force and 13 Commission-rates/District Police Forces and many useful suggestions were incorporated in recommendations of this report.

A workshop involving Delhi Police officers, representatives of media and some protest groups was conducted in January, 2014, wherein discussions were focused on the first-hand information of Delhi Police officers who dealt with the protests/agitations and suggestions were solicited concerning various remedial interventions for effective police handling of public protests/agitations on the basis of their personal experiences. In Ramdev agitation information was taken from Supreme Court’s CWP No. 122 of 2011 as ongoing litigation in Ramdev agitation against the police made them reluctant to cooperate with scholarly research. For the purpose of this work landmark directive in Supreme Court CWP 77 of 2007 was also incorporated. The relevant Delhi Police circular No. 35/2011, 12/2012 and 20/2012 & Standing order No. 72 of 1989, 152 of 1989 and 325 of 2006 were also included as a part of this research work. Data was also collected on Anna Hazare and Ramdev agitation from Delhi police regarding the police tactics, police arrangement, complaints against police, police equipment and police training. Apart from that the investigators also interacted with officers of Delhi Police who were directly involved with ground level handling of these agitations and also reviewed the infrastructural and training parameters of the Rapid Action Force Academy of Public Order (RAPO) at Meerut which is controlled and managed by the CRPF. The collected data was statistically analysed and findings were drawn.
Chart I - Research Framework

- Public perception survey
- Present status & views/suggestions from states
- Interviews, Government Circulars and Orders & Supreme Court directives
- Data from Delhi Police & Workshop with Delhi Police Officers
- Review of literature and practices abroad

RESEARCH MANAGING PEACEFUL MASS AGITATIONS BY POLICE

RECOMMENDATION
4.2 TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION

For academic/analytic review of the incidents all available relevant Information/record related to the agitations (Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare) was examined vis-à-vis the role of Delhi Police along with intensive scrutiny of the case files, related literature has been done in addition to the following data collection techniques:

- Structured interviews with Police, Aggrieved Party, and Media etc.
- Questionnaire/s for collection of data from concerned quarters/agencies.
- Survey

The questionnaires were developed which included each and every aspect of the study to have complete information about various aspects related to police handling of public protests/agitations. In the present study, there are two questionnaires which have been used for data collection.

- Questionnaire No. 1 for Public/Protesters (Annexure-I)
- Questionnaire No. 2 for Police forces (Annexure-II)

4.2(a) Designing of Questionnaire for Public:

The questionnaire for public has 9 questions. The choice is collected on Likert three point scale for question No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 with question No. 2, 3, 4, 5 has 13 sub question. Question No.6 requires ranking & question No. 9 requires writing of suggestions from public apart from the issues covered in first 8 questions and their sub parts.

1. In question No.1 broad categories of public, media, retired police officers & protestor groups were identified for analysis. This form was also filled by serving police officers separately.

2. During the protests police excesses and over reaction becomes a major issue and their behavior with the crowd comes under criticism time and again. To gauge public view on police behavior and public expectations from police, following questions are included which covered frequent happenings at the time of protests in police dealing with public.
Question - Use of force is justified by police when protesters –
A. Verbally abuse a Police Officer.
B. Pushes a Police officer:
C. Uses physical violence against a Police officer:

3. In case the use of force becomes necessary during the protests, the police uses Lathi charge, tear gas or water cannons at present to disperse the crowd. The questions below are included to gauge public view on use of these methods by police.

Question - Type of force used by police to disperse crowd –
A. Police should use Lathi-charge:
B. Police should use Tear Gas:
C. Police should use Firing:
D. Police should use Water Cannon:

4. Question on holding the protesters in controlled area in different scenarios is included as this tactics has been used very often by police in India and abroad.

Question - Holding of Protesters in a controlled area for a number of hours when public order is under threat is justified:
A. When Protesters disrupt day to day activities of the general public:
B. When Protesters threaten to damage public and private property:
C. When Protesters threaten public safety and could harm the public:
5. Question on communication of police with public is included as communication between the two is critical before, during and after the agitation. Coordination between media and Police is essential for informing public and restoring their confidence.

Question - Communication of police with Public:

A. Do you think situation can be managed better if police informs about arrangements in advance to public:

Ans: i) Yes, it will help a lot.
    ii) it will help to some extent.
    iii) It does not matter.

B. Do you think police need to provide regular briefing on the situation to counter misinformation & restore confidence:

Ans: i) Yes, it will help a lot.
    ii) it will help to some extent.
    iii) It does not matter.

C. There should be better coordination between police & Media -

Ans: i) Yes, it will help a lot.
    ii) it will help to some extent.
    iii) It does not matter.

6. Today there are varieties of way by which public get information. Police has to look at all such means of dissemination of information such as News channels, Internet & News. The question below is to ascertain the importance of different channels of information for different sections of society.

Question - Rank the following in order you trust them to get information on mass protest (Rank –1,2,3 or 4)

A. News Channels
B. INTERNET (SOCIAL MEDIA YOUTUBE)
C. News Papers
D. Police Briefings/Police website/Control Room

...
7. Police behavior has been in focus and can play a very important role in managing the mass agitation. Their friendly demeanor or indifference can change the course of events during the man protests. Therefore, this question is included in the questionnaire.

Question - Give your comments about the police behavior with public during protest-

Ans: i) They are very helpful.
   ii) Need a lot of improvement.
   iii) They do not interact with public.

8. This question is included to get feedback from public as to what is their present opinion about the current capabilities of police in handling mass agitations. Similar view of police officers was also taken.

Question - How confident are you that Police will effectively manage large scale public protests in the future?

Ans: i) Very confident.
   ii) Little confident.
   iii) Not confident.

Q.9. To get any additional suggestion not covered by above 8 questions, this question is included in the favour of suggestions from public.

4.2(b) Designing the Questionnaire for the States.

For the research data collection, qualitative data was also collected from the States and Paramilitary Forces who are the actual handlers of protests. The questionnaire seeking opinion on five aspects of managing agitation was send to all the States.

The questions included were:

1. Police methods/Tactics to deal with mass agitation/public protests:
   Existing –
   Proposed –

   This question was included in the questionnaire as the police tactics to deal with mass agitation decides the measures that police would adopt to handle agitation and to
ascertain whether there is any thinking by police leadership to review & rethink the present tactics employed to deal with them.

2. Equipment/Technology used for effective handling of mass agitations/public protests in the State.

   Existing –
   Proposed –

   Equipment like water cannons, lathis & cane shields, tear gas guns & grenades, mounted police etc. are invariably used/deployed during agitations. The police equipment is considered outdated and not so appropriate to deal with present day protests. In order to get the views of State forces this question on equipment was included.

3. What upgradation of training curriculum/methodology has been done/proposed to be incorporated to sensitize the state police force to deal with mass agitation/public protest in an effective manner?

   Existing –
   Proposed –

   It was also observed that present day training imparted to policemen lays emphasis on dealing with illegal assemblies, with little or no inputs on dealing with peaceful agitations and the rights of protestors. As training the policemen would be critical in preparing them to handle mass agitations, the question on training was included.

4. Any change/new legislation/government order which is required to be done in order to strengthen policing capabilities to handle mass agitations/public protests more effectively.

   As the changed situation/circumstances in society demand different response from law enforcement for which mere change in tactics, equipment & training may not be sufficient. In order to deal with new phenomenon in public order like mass protests that we see today, new laws may be required so that the police deal with them effectively within the perimeter of law. To get the views of States on new legislation this question was included.
5. Any other observations/suggestions (including community participation measures, use of new technology etc.) to improve police response to effectively deal with mass public protests/agitations.

A mass protest is something where in the old practices/response of Police have been found to be ineffective/inadequate. It also calls for some radical thinking on the part of police administrators. Involving community to manage such agitations could be one such measure; use of technology in some innovative way can be another. In order to get an idea about any such practices that may have been evolved by the States in dealing with mass protests, this question was included in the questionnaire.

A feasibility trying-out survey was conducted for preliminary data on a small sample of 52 subjects from all categories of primary data segments for assessing whether the research protocol is realistic and workable and the proposed data analysis techniques to uncover the potential problem of rural youth employability are practicable and worth applicable.

4.3 SAMPLE/DATA COLLECTED AND ANALYSIS METHOD –

Information/Research Data concerning Police Officers, aggrieved party members, media persons, academicians, retired police personnel etc. is of direct relevance to this study and therefore. In the study, the sample size is 500 respondents belonging to four categories i.e. Public, Media, Retired police officers, and any protestor group.

1. Public – 500 (Including academicians, retired police officials, aggrieved party members and media representatives)
2. State Police Forces – 5 (West Bengal, Jharkhand, Tamilnadu, Punjab and Rapid Action Force)
3. Commissionrates/District Police Forces – 13 (CP/Kolkata, SP Thiruvallaur, Tamilnadu, SSSP, SAS Nagar, SBS Nagar, Bathinda, Barnala, Sangrur, Roop Nagar, Patiala, Jalandhar, Tarn Taran & Amritsar)

A workshop involving Delhi Police officers, representatives of media and some protest groups was conducted at Advance Training Centre 17, Mother Teresa Crescent, Chanukah Puri, New Delhi in which discussions were focused on the handling of the two incidents of public protest by Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare at Delhi and suggestions were solicited concerning various
remedial interventions for effective Police handling of public protests/agitations in future on the basis of their personal experiences.

Apart from that the investigators also interacted with officers of Delhi Police who were directly involved with ground level handling of these agitations and also reviewed the infrastructural and training parameters of the Rapid Action Force Academy of Public Order (RAPO) at Meerut which is controlled and managed by the CRPF.

Data Collection & Compilation Techniques -

i. Documentation of the cases which shall include dimensions of critical evaluation of the role of police.

ii. Collection of data from concerned subjects/agencies through questionnaire/s and structured interviews.

iii. Lessons for the police

iv. Compilation of the research report

Statistical Analysis -

The statistical analysis of collected data has been done with the help of relevant statistical techniques - For the purpose of data analysis, Chi-square test is used. Chi-square test is used to test the systematic association between row categories and column categories. The column contains the categories of respondents i.e. Public, Media, Retired police officers, and any protestor group. The row categories are the responses received from the respondents belonging to different categories. The idea is to test if the different respondent categories have differences of opinion on the question asked which has been done through the null and alternate hypothesis as tested in Chi-square. The list wise deletion and the missing values were excluded from the analysis and the analysis is based on the available dataset.
5. Legal Framework and Standing Orders

It would be easy but thoroughly misleading to believe that the challenges of policing public protest could be resolved by just tightening up the law. No statute can ever deal neatly with the complex realities which arise when people are motivated to demonstrate their passion for a cause in public. The need to influence, observe and respond to protesters’ mood demands more than a rigid response within a conveniently harsh legal environment. Justified and proportionate use of force is at the heart of effective policing of protest. This chapter provides a short summary of the constitutional and legal framework for policing protest in India:

5.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc.
(1) All citizens shall have the right:
1. to freedom of speech and expression:
2. to assemble peaceably and without arms:
3. to form associations or unions:
4. to move freely throughout the territory of India:
5. to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
6. omitted
7. to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade of business.

(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.

(4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and
integrates of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred
by the said sub clause.

(5) Nothing in sub clause (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far
as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of any of the rights conferred by the said clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the
protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.

(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular,
nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or
prevent the State from making any law relating to,

(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on
any occupation, trade or business, or

(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade,
business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or
otherwise.

5.2 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 – MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC
ORDER AND TRANQUILITY - UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES:

Section 129.

(1) **Dispersal of Assembly by Use of Civil Force** – Any Executive Magistrate or officer in-charge of a police
station or, in the absence of such officer in-charge, any police officer, not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, may
command any unlawful assembly, or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the
public peace, to disperse; and it shall thereupon be the duty of the members of such assembly to disperse
accordingly.

(2) If, upon being so commanded, any such assembly does not disperse, or if, without being so commanded, it
conducts itself in such a manner as to show a determination not to disperse, any Executive Magistrate or Police
officer referred to in sub-section (1), may proceed to disperse such assembly by force, and may require the
assistance of any male person, not being an officer or member of the armed forces and acting as such, for the
purpose of dispersing such assembly, and, if necessary, arresting and confining the persons who form part of it, in
order to disperse such assembly or that they may be punished according to law.

Section 130.

(1) **Use of Armed Forces to Disperse Assembly**: If any such assembly cannot be otherwise dispersed, and if it is
necessary for the public security that it should be dispersed, the Executive Magistrate of the highest rank who is
present may cause it to be dispersed by the armed forces.

2) Such Magistrate may require any officer in command of any group of persons belonging to the armed forces to
disperse the assembly with the help of the armed forces under his command, and to arrest and confine such
persons forming part of it as the Magistrate may direct, or as it may be necessary to arrest and confine in order to
disperse the assembly or to have them punished according to law.

(3) Every such officer of the armed forces shall obey such requisition in such manner as he thinks fit, but in so
doing he shall use as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing
the assembly and arresting and detaining such persons.

Section 131

Power of Certain Armed Force Officers to Disperse Assembly - When the public security is manifestly
endangered by any such assembly and no Executive Magistrate can be communicated with, any commissioned or
Gazetted officer of the armed forces may disperse such assembly with the help of the armed forces under his
command, and may arrest and confine any persons forming part of it, in order to disperse such assembly or that
they may be punished according to law; but if, while he is acting under this section, it becomes practicable for him
to communicate with an Executive Magistrate, he shall do so, and shall thenceforward obey the instructions of the
Magistrate, as to whether he shall or shall not continue such action.

5.3  PUNJAB POLICE RULES- USE OF FORCE AGAINST CROWD

Instructions regarding the use of force by the Police against Crowd are as follows:-
The use of force by the Police is regulated entirely by the provisions of the law. Those
provisions are contained in Chapter-V (especially Sections 46 and 50), and Chapter IX
(especially Sections 127 and 128) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

I. The main principle to be observed is that the degree of force employed shall be regulated according to the
circumstances of each case. The object of the use of force is to quell a disturbance of the peace, or to
disperse an assembly which threatens such disturbance and has either refused to disperse or shows a
determination not to disperse, no ulterior objects, such as punitive or repressive effect, shall be taken into
consideration.

II. Any officer in charge of a Police Station or Police officer of higher rank has power, independently of the
authority of a Magistrate, to call upon an unlawful assembly to disperse and to use force to disperse it.
(See Section 127, Criminal Procedure Code). When a Magistrate other than an honorary Magistrate) is
present or can be communicated with without such delay as would prejudice the situation, an assembly
shall not be called upon to disperse nor shall force be used to disperse it without orders of such
Magistrate, provided that, if a gazette Police Officer is present, and no Magistrate having first class or
higher powers is present, such Police officer shall act independently in ordering an assembly to disperse.
In other circumstances the senior Police officer present, having the powers of an officer in charge of a
Police Station, shall act on his own responsibility, but shall communicate with and report his action to the
senior Magistrate, who may be accessible, as soon as possible. Whether acting under the orders of a
Magistrate or not, once the order to disperse a crowd has been given, the method by which force shall be
applied and the degree of force to be used shall be decided by the senior Police officer present, provided
that, if the District Magistrate is himself present, he, as head of the Police force of the district, shall be recognized to be the senior office present. For the purposes of this rule a Sub-Divisional Magistrate within his sub-division shall have the status of a District Magistrate, i.e. he shall be recognized by all Police officers of the sub-division as the senior Police officer and shall have power to decide the method and degree of force to be used.

III. All attempts to disperse a crowd by warnings, exhortation, etc. shall be made before it is declared an unlawful assembly and, as such, ordered to disperse. Once an order to disperse has been defied, or when the attitude of a crowd is obviously defiant, force shall be used without hesitation. The degree of force used shall be the minimum which the responsible officer, with the exercise of due care and attention, decides to be necessary for the effective dispersal of the crowd and the making of such arrests as may be desired. The degree and duration of the use of force shall be limited as much as possible, and the least deadly weapon which the circumstances permit shall be used.

IV. The effectiveness of force depends mainly upon the determination with which it is applied, its direction against the most defiant section of the crowd to be dispersed and its absolute control. Failure to act on this principle results inevitably in more force being applied and more dangerous weapons being used than would otherwise have been necessary. It is not possible to lay down any more-definite rule as to when different methods of different weapons shall be used. The officer responsible is required to decide this in each case on consideration of the strength and attitude of the crowd to be dispersed, and the strength of the force available for its dispersal.

V. When the responsible Police officer, whether acting under the orders of a Magistrate or independently, considers that the use of firearms is necessary, he shall, unless circumstances make such action impossible, warn the crowd that if they do not immediately disperse, fire with live ammunition will be opened upon them. If the District Magistrate or, in a Sub-division, the sub-division officer is present, his orders shall invariably be obtained immediately the necessity of opening fire becomes imminent. If the senior Police officer present is of non-gazetted rank, he shall at such stage obtain the orders of the senior Magistrate present (other than an honorary Magistrate).

VI. In order that the decision to open fire may be promptly acted upon without loss of control or confusion, the responsible Police officer shall, as soon as it appears likely that the use of firearms will be necessary, tell off a detachment of armed Police to be held in readiness. When fire is to be opened, the responsible Police officer shall decide the minimum volume necessary to be effective in the circumstances and shall give precise orders accordingly, as to the particular men or files who are to fire and the number of rounds to be fired; and whether volleys or independent aimed shots are to be fired, and shall ensure that his orders are not exceeded and that no firing contrary to or without orders takes place. Whatever volume of fire is ordered, it shall be applied with the maximum of effect; the aim shall be kept low and directed at the most threatening parts of the crowd; in no circumstances shall firing over the heads of or at the fringes of the crowd be allowed. Since buckshot is not an effective charge at any range at which it is safe to use it. Government has directed that the use of buckshot ammunition against crowd should be prohibited.

VII. When no Magistrate is present, the Police officer in command, as is contemplated in the Criminal Procedure Code, shall be responsible for the opening of fire, invariably, whether the order to use firearms has been given by a Magistrate, or by a Police officer, the order to cease fire shall be given as soon as the unlawful assembly shows a disposition to retire or disperse.

VIII. While the disposition of the Police of the Police must be left to the Police officer in command, every precaution should be taken that a force armed with firearms is not brought so close to a dangerous crowd, as to risk its either being overwhelmed by numbers or being forced to inflict heavy casualties. If the use
of firearms cannot be avoided, firing should be carried out from a distance sufficient to obviate the risk of the force being rushed and to enable strict fire-control to be maintained.

IX. On occasions of religious festivals Police carrying firearms should ordinarily not be employed to escort processions. They should be posted in front or in the rear of the procession where they are in least danger of being thrown into confusion by the mob and can be kept under the control of the officer in command and their petty officers.

X. On occasions when firearms have been used against unlawful assemblies it should be the duty of the Magistrate, if one is present, to make adequate arrangements for the care of the wounded persons and for their removal to hospital and also for the disposal of the dead, if any. He should also, then and there, draw up a full report in consultation with the senior Police officer present, stating all the circumstances and nothing the number of rounds of ammunition issued and expended. If no Magistrate is present, this report shall be prepared by the senior Police officer who shall also take all possible action with regard to wounded and dead.

Instructions Governing the Action of Police when the Use of Military Force Becomes Necessary:

I. A Police officer, of whatever rank, has no authority to require any officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, in command of a military detachment to use force in dispersing a crowd. Any Magistrate may make such a requisition (Section 130, Criminal Procedure Code) and, in emergencies when no Magistrate can be communicated with, a commissioned officer of the regular army may himself order military force to be used. When no Magistrate is available and troops are present and their intervention is, in the opinion of the senior Police officer present, necessary, that officer shall inform the senior commissioned regular army officer present of the situation, requesting his assistance in support of the Police if necessary. The military officer receiving such report will decide whether to act on it.

II. When military force has been set in motion for the dispersal of a crowd, any Police force previously employed in contact with such crowd shall be withdrawn to prevent confusion. The senior Police officer present and the officer commanding the troops shall confer as to the method and exact time of such withdrawal, and as to the subsequent employment of the Police; provided that, if the District Magistrate is present, his instructions shall be obtained and acted upon. While no rule can be laid down absolutely, the normal procedure should be for the Police to be so withdrawn as to leave a free field of action to the troops, and to be used thereafter (a) in support of the troops for making arrests and pursuing a broken mob, (b) for guarding the flanks and rear of the troops from attack and preventing the outbreak of disturbances in other areas.

III. It must be noted that, when the order to disperse an unlawful assembly by military force has been given, the senior Police officer on the spot and all Police at the time within the area where military force is being employed come under the orders of the senior military officer present, who is in charge of the operation of dispersal, and remain under his orders to this extent and for the period necessary, but the latter most consult the senior Police officer present in any action he thinks it necessary to take. When control of the situation is definitely handed over by the senior civil officer to the military authorities, the Police force come fully under military control.

(Note: - These instructions are in conformity with the secret instructions on the subject issued by the Government of India, Army Department).

(3) Only an officer in charge of a Police Station (and Police officers superior in rank of virtue of Section 551, Criminal Procedure Code) can act under Section 127, Criminal Procedure Code. When any other Police officer
encounters an unlawful assembly, he should immediately send for a Magistrate or a Police officer empowered to act under section 127, Criminal Procedure Code. Should the unlawful assembly commit any overt act of violence before the arrival of such Magistrate or Police officer, the senior Police officer on the spot, in virtue of other powers conferred by the law, should take such action as is necessary to deal with the situation. Section 149, Criminal Procedure Code, empowers every Police officer to interpose for the purpose of preventing, and required that every Police officer shall, to the best of his ability, prevent the commission of any cognizable offence. Section 152, Criminal Procedure Code, empowers a Police officer of his own authority to interpose to prevent any injury attempted to be committed in his view to any public property. In addition all Police officers have the same right to private defense which is granted to every person. Every Police officer should be fully acquainted with this right which is laid down in Section 96 to 106, Indian Penal Code. Section 97, Indian Penal Code, makes it clear that every person, and therefore, every Police officer, has a right to defend the body of any person, as well as his own body, against any offence affecting the human body and the property of any other person as well as of himself, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief, or criminal trespass. The extent to which the right of private defense may be exercised is laid down in Sections 99, 100, 101 and 103, and the period during which the right exists is explained in Sections 102 and 105.

5.4 PUNJAB POLICE RULES: RIOTING

The law about rioting is contained in Ss. 141, 142, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 154, 155 and 156 I.P.C. S. 141 I.P.C. merely defines an unlawful assembly. The quality of unlawfulness attaches to an assembly if the common object is of any one or more of the descriptions contained in the five clauses of that section.

If force is used by such assembly in the prosecution of the common object, such assembly is guilty of rioting (S. 146, 147 I.P.C.). If deadly arms are used then S. 148 applies. S. 149 I.P.C. required the following three things primarily for conviction of all the members:-

1. That one should be a member of an unlawful assembly. Mere presence is, however, not necessary to support the finding that he had the common object. There must be some direct or circumstantial evidence that he share common object.
2. That in prosecution of the common object of that assembly an offence should be committed by a member of that unlawful assembly.
3. That offence should be of a nature that the members of the assembly knew the offence to be likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object.

Use of Force against Unlawful Assemblies.

Ss. 30, 30-A, 31 and 32 Police Act

Whenever the officer in charge of a Police Station feels that the taking out of the proposed procession or the forming of proposed assembly may cause a breach of the peace unless it is controlled, he is required to approach the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or District Magistrate and the latter may require by general or special notice that the persons convening or collecting such assembly or directing or promoting such procession shall apply for a license. Thereafter the taking out of the license becomes obligatory and suitable conditions for the regulation and conduct of procession and the conduct of the assembly can be stipulated by Supdt. of Police.

1. The Supdt. of Police or A.S.P. can also issue directions for conduct of assemblies or processions even if notice is issued by D.M. or not or even if license is not taken.
2. S.P. or A.S.P. can also move District Magistrate for proclaiming a prohibitory order u/s 144 Cr.P.C. banning assemblies or processions for certain period and in a particular area.

3. In addition, it is also the duty of every Police officer to keep order on the public roads, streets etc. and to prevent obstruction on the occasion of assemblies and processions on public roads, streets, in the neighborhood of places of worship etc. vide sec. 31 Police Act and any one violating such orders is liable u/s 32 Police Act.

4. S. 32 Police Act is also applicable against organizers of processions for breach of conditions of license. It is a non-cognizable offence.

Action on Spot

If an assembly or procession is violating the conditions of license or disobeys the directions given by S.P. or A.S.P. regarding its conduct or contravenes the prohibitory order u/s 144 Cr.P.C. or indulges in acts of violence or threatens peace or adopts any of the five objects given u/s 141 I.P.C., it becomes an unlawful assembly and can be dispersed u/s 127 Cr.P.C.

A lawful assembly even if it is likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace can be dispersed u/s 127 Cr.P.C.

Force can be used against unlawful assemblies by Police under the following provisions of law:-
- S. 46 and 50 Cr.P.C.
- S. 127 and 128 Cr.P.C.
- S. 149 and 152 Cr.P.C.
- Ss’. 96 to 106 I.P.C.

Use of Tear Gas

Tear smoke should be invariably used first: if its use fails then lathis or batons and in the last resort only fire arms should be used. Warning should be always given for use of each kind of force in case the mob does not disperse within stipulated period. The senior Police officer shall give clear and precise orders to specific men for firing specific number of rounds and at defiant section of the mob. The aim should be low. Order to cease fire must be given as soon as assembly disperses. The force should always remain at sufficient distance from crowd. 303’ rifles with modern type of ammunition or 410 bore muskets should be used for firing.

Firing should always be controlled and regulated.

After use of force, the dead shall be sent to mortuary and the injured to the hospital. First aid should be given always. A detailed report should also be drawn up and sent to D.M. or higher officers. A case should also be registered against the rioters for the offences committed by them.

Use of Military Force:

In case the need of the help of military force is deemed essential, then it is only a magistrate who can requisition military. No Police officer of any rank can do so. In the absence of magistrate, a commissioned officer of army can himself order military force to be used.

When military force has been set in motion, the Police will withdraw to leave a free field of action to the military. Police can be used for help in arresting and for establishment of law and order in or near about and will be for all purposes under control of military force.

Standard Operating Procedures to deal with Public Agitations with Non-Lethal Measures:

With the broad objective of dispersal of an unlawful assembly with minimum necessary force with minimum possible collateral damage and with non-lethal measures the task force constituted under the chairmanship of
Union Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India has recommended Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to deal with public agitations with Non-Lethal measures which have been given in Annexure-K

5.5 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, DELHI, CIRCULARS

Circular No. 12/2012: The Commissioner of Police, Delhi has issued directions in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of Suo Moto Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 122 of 2011, Ram Lila Maidan incident dated 4/5-06-2011 Versus Home Secretary, Union of India & Others, which have been given in Annexure -H.

Circular no. 35/2011: The Commissioner of Police, Delhi has issued guidelines regarding the conduct of rallies, processions, demonstrations & protests in the light of the directions given by the Supreme Court of India and the Delhi High Court. The onus of maintaining peace during the protest has been laid on the organizers. The detailed instructions have been in Annexure -G.

Section 28 of Delhi Police Act:

The Commissioner of Police have powers to make regulations for regulating traffic and for preservation of order in public places, etc. and by way of notification in official gazette form regulations to provide for the matter mentioned in this section.

Section 29 of Delhi Police Act:

Power to give directions to the public- The Commissioner of Police and, subject to the orders, if any, made by the Commissioner of Police, every Police officer not inferior in rank to an Inspector, may from time to time as occasion may arise, but not so as to contravene any regulation made under section 28 or any law, rule or bye-law referred to in sub-section (4) of that section, all such orders either orally or in writing as may be necessary to –

a. Direct the conduct of, and behavior or action of persons constituting processions or assemblies on or along streets;

b. Specify the routes by which and the times at which any such processions may pass or shall not pass;

c. Prevent obstruction –
   (i) On the occasion of all processions and assemblies; and
   (ii) In the neighborhood of all places of worship during the time of worship; and
   (iii) In all cases when any street or public place or place of public resort may be thronged or liable to be obstructed;

d. Keep order on, and in, all streets, and at, and within, public bathing and washing places, fairs, temples, mosques, gurudwaras, churches and all other places of public resort or public worship;

e. Regulate and control the playing of music, singing or the beating of drums, tom-toms and other instruments and the blowing or sounding of horns or other noisy instruments in, and near, any street or public place;

f. Regulate and control the use of loudspeakers in residential areas, streets, near any public places and places of public amusement or public entertainment; or

g. Make reasonable orders consequential to, and in furtherance of any order made under this section.

Guiding Principles:

The Standing Order No. 72 issued by Commissioner Police Delhi explains Situations requiring dispersal of such assemblies differ from place to placed & time to time. It is therefore necessary for the Police officers of all ranks
to be fully acquainted with the legal provisions contained in sections 129 to 132 of Cr.P.C. and to act with utmost restraint and patience, taking care at the same time that the situation does not take an ugly turn & that there is no loss to life & property. The handling of such situations demands intelligence, alertness and coordination of various agencies particularly intelligence & law enforcing agencies and thoughtful anticipation of events to come. Hence much will depend upon the personal capability of the officer in-charge of the situation. However, following guidelines are issued for the information of and compliance by all concerned including gazetted officers:-

i) The various functions required in dealing with a riot can be carried out by accustomed drill movements with modifications necessitated by the situation. For example, if a single line is required, it should be formed in the usual way and not by endeavoring to get individual men to adopt the formation.

ii) There is a tendency from G.Os. to ASIs to give orders for a concerted movement to men individually instead of in the proper manner and through the proper channel. For example if a gazetted officer is required to form a cordon with four reserves, it is useless for him to endeavor to give orders personally to the one hundred constables involved. On the contrary, he should first explain to two or more upper subordinates at this disposal, the nature of the operations to be effected and they should then issue appropriate drill orders to their commands, which are usually small enough to hear the orders and carry them out. This initial briefing should be ensured so that the staff down the line is aware of their roles.

iii) It is essential that units should be kept together and that formations should be preserved. For example, it is extremely dangerous for men armed either with rifles, muskets or tear smoke guns to open fire unless they are in lines. Again foot or mounted Police seeking to disperse a crowd must maintain a line. Failure to maintain line may result in individuals being isolated in the crowd and severely hurt by its members, or in the heat of the movement by their own comrades. Further, a disciplined movement by a few men has far more greater effect than individual efforts by a large number in a heterogeneous way.

iv) Individual members of the force may, when excited by provocation or injury, start shouting thereby causing confusion and preventing the orders of responsible officers from being heard. It is therefore necessary that when dispersal action is on, no one should open his mouth except the officers who are required to give orders.

v) The principle of minimum force to be used shall be kept in view, but whenever force has to be used it should be used with determination and firmness. The instructions laid down in PPRs 14.56, section 28(1) (p) and section 29 of D.P. Act read with the Delhi (Control of Processions, Assemblies and playing of music in public places) Regulations, 1980, notified vide No. 3218/Spl. Cell dated 7.10.1980, should be followed.

vi) Whenever Police force is expected to go into action they should wear steel helmets, carry cane shields & other defensive equipment. The tear gas squad and the force which supports the tear gas squad shall wear duty and service respirators respectively. Tear gas guns and grenades shall be fired only by the officers/men trained in their use.

vii) The force shall always be divided into small sections and placed under the charge of action and platoon commanders in order to have effective control on them. In no case the strength of force used for dispersal of such assemblies shall be less than on section (commander and 5 constables) and they shall work under their own officers. This, however, shall not deter Police officer of authorized rank
to act for controlling situations likely to take an explosive turn in the circumstances mentioned in para 1 above till the arrival of reinforcements.

viii) Whenever it is decided to use gas or open fire, all Policemen present in between the procession and the gas squad or armed squad must be withdrawn forthwith by the sounding of a bugle or making a suitable announcement.

ix) For every major arrangement a suitable signal for withdrawing/ recalling the force shall be arranged and included in the briefing.

5.6 GUIDELINES OF WRIT PETITION (CRL) NO. 77 OF 2007) JUDGEMENT DATED APRIL 16, 2009 REGARDING DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC & PRIVATE PROPERTIES

Taking a serious note of various instances of large scale destruction of public and private properties in the name of agitations, bandhs, hartals and the like, suo motu proceedings were initiated by the Supreme Court.

Two Committees were appointed in this regard, one headed by a retired Judge of this Court, Justice K.T. Thomas and the other headed by F.S. Nariman, a senior member of the legal profession.

A. The report submitted by Justice K.T. Thomas Committee has made the following recommendations:

(i) The PDPP Act (Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984) must be so amended as to incorporate a rebuttable presumption (after the prosecution established the two facets) that the accused is guilty of the offence.

(ii) The PDPP Act to contain provision to make the leaders of the organization, which calls the direct action, guilty of abetment of the offence.

(iii) The PDPP Act to contain a provision for rebuttable presumption.

(iv) Enable the police officers to arrange videography of the activities damaging public property.

The recommendations were made on the basis of the following conclusions after taking into consideration the materials.

In respect of (i) above

“According to this Committee the prosecution should be required to prove, first that public property has been damaged in a direct action called by an organization and that the accused also participated in such direct action. From that stage the burden can be shifted to the accused to prove his innocence. Hence we are of the view that in situations where prosecution succeeds in proving that public property has been damaged in direct actions in which accused also participated, the court should be given the power to draw a presumption that the accused is guilty of destroying public property and that it is open to the accused to rebut such presumption. The PDPP Act may be amended to contain provisions to that effect.

In respect of (ii) above

“Next we considered how far the leaders of the organizations can also be caught and brought to trial, when public property is damaged in the direct actions called at the behest of such organizations. Destruction of public property has become so rampant during such direct actions called by organizations. In almost all such cases the top leaders of such organisations who really instigate such direct actions will keep themselves in the background and only the ordinary or common members or grass root level

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followers of the organisation would directly participate in such direct actions and they alone would be vulnerable to prosecution proceedings. In many such cases, the leaders would really be the main offenders being the abettors of the crime. If they are not caught in the dragnet and allowed to be immune from prosecution proceedings, such direct actions would continue unabated, if not further escalated, and will remain a constant or recurring affair.

Of course, it is normally difficult to prove abetment of the offence with the help of direct evidence. This flaw can be remedied to a great extent by making an additional provision in PDPP Act to the effect that specified categories of leaders of the organization which make the call for direct actions resulting in damage to public property, shall be deemed to be guilty of abetment of the offence. At the same time, no innocent person, in spite of his being a leader of the organization shall be made to suffer for the actions done by others. This requires the inclusion of a safeguard to protect such innocent leaders.”

In respect of (iii)

“After considering various aspects to this question we decided to recommend that prosecutions should be required to prove (i) that those accused were the leaders or office bearers of the organisation which called out the direct actions and (ii) that public property has been damaged in or during or in the aftermath of such direct actions. At that stage of trial it should be open to the court to draw a presumption against such persons who are arraigned in the case that they have abetted the commission of offence. However, the accused in such case shall not be liable to conviction if he proves that (i) he was in no way connected with the action called by his political party or that (ii) he has taken all reasonable measures to prevent causing damage to public property in the direct action called by his organisation.”

In respect of (iv)

“The Committee considered other means of adducing evidence for averting unmerited acquittals in trials involving offences under PDPP Act. We felt that one of the areas to be tapped is evidence through videography in addition to contemporaneous material that may be available through the media, such as electronic media. With the amendments brought in the Evidence Act, through Act 21 of 2000 permitting evidence collected through electronic devices as admissible in evidence, we wish to recommend the following:

(i) If the officer in charge of a police station or other law enforcing agency is of opinion that any direct action, either declared or undeclared has the potential of causing destruction or damage to public property, he shall avail himself of the services of video operators. For this purpose each police station shall be empowered to maintain a panel of local video operators who could be made available at short notices.

(ii) The police officer who has the responsibility to act on the information that a direct action is imminent and if he has reason to apprehend that such direct action has the potential of causing destruction of public property, he shall immediately avail himself of the services of the videographer to accompany him or any other police officer deputed by him to the site or any other place wherefrom video shooting can conveniently be arranged concentrating on the person/persons indulging in any acts of violence or other acts causing destruction or damage to any property.

(iii) No sooner than the direct action subsides, the police officer concerned shall authenticate the video by producing the videographer before the Sub Divisional or Executive Magistrate who shall record his statement regarding what he did. The original tapes or CD or other material capable of displaying the recorded evidence shall be produced before the said Magistrate. It is open to the Magistrate to entrust such CD/material to the custody of the police officer or any other person to be produced in court at the appropriate stage or as and when called for.
The Committee felt that offenders arrested for damaging public property shall be subjected to a still more stringent provision for securing bail. The discretion of the court in granting bail to such persons should be restricted to cases where the court feels that there are reasonable grounds to presume that he is not guilty of the offence. This is in tune with Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and certain other modern Criminal Law statutes. So we recommend that Section 5 may be amended for carrying out the above restriction.

Thus we are of the view that discretion to reduce the minimum sentence on condition of recording special reasons need not be diluted. But, instead of "reasons" the court should record "special reasons" to reduce the minimum sentence prescribed.

However, we felt that apart from the penalty of imprisonment the court should be empowered to impose a fine which is equivalent to the market value of the property damaged on the day of the incident. In default of payment of fine, the offender shall undergo imprisonment for a further period which shall be sufficient enough to deter him from opting in favour of the alternative imprisonment.”

To effectuate the modalities for preventive action and adding teeth to enquiry/investigation following guidelines are to be observed:

As soon as there is a demonstration organized:
(I) The organizer shall meet the police to review and revise the route to be taken and to lay down conditions for a peaceful march or protest;
(II) All weapons, including knives, lathis and the like shall be prohibited;
(III) An undertaking is to be provided by the organizers to ensure a peaceful march with marshals at each relevant junction;
(IV) The police and State Government shall ensure videograph of such protests to the maximum extent possible;
(V) The person in charge to supervise the demonstration shall be the SP (if the situation is confined to the district) and the highest police officer in the State, where the situation stretches beyond one district;
(VI) In the event that demonstrations turn violent, the officer-in-charge shall ensure that the events are videographed through private operators and also request such further information from the media and others on the incidents in question.
(VII) The police shall immediately inform the State Government with reports on the events, including damage, if any, caused by the police;
(VIII) The State Government shall prepare a report on the police reports and other information that may be available to it and shall file a petition including its report in the High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be for the Court in question to take suo-moto action.

B. SUGGESTIONS BY NARIMAN COMMITTEE

In the absence of legislation the following guidelines are to be adopted to assess damages:
(I) Wherever a mass destruction to property takes place due to protests or thereof, the High Court may issue suo motu action and set up a machinery to investigate the damage caused and to award compensation related thereto.
(II) Where there is more than one state involved, such action may be taken by the Supreme Court.
(III) In each case, the High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be, appoint a sitting or retired High Court judge or a sitting or retired District judge as a Claims Commissioner to estimate the damages and investigate liability.
(IV) An Assessor may be appointed to assist the Claims Commissioner.
(V) The Claims Commissioner and the Assessor may seek instructions from the High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be, to summon the existing video or other recordings from
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations
by Police

private and public sources to pinpoint the damage and establish nexus with the perpetrators of the damage.

(VI) The principles of absolute liability shall apply once the nexus with the event that precipitated the damage is established.

(VII) The liability will be borne by the actual perpetrators of the crime as well as organisers of the event giving rise to the liability - to be shared, as finally determined by the High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be.

(VIII) Exemplary damages may be awarded to an extent not greater than twice the amount of the damages liable to be paid.

(IX) Damages shall be assessed for:
(a) damages to public property;
(b) damages to private property;
(c) damages causing injury or death to a person or persons;
(d) Cost of the actions by the authorities and police to take preventive and other actions

(X) The Claims Commissioner will make a report to the High Court or Supreme Court which will determine the liability after hearing the parties.

The recommendations of Justice K.T. Thomas Committee and Mr. F.S. Nariman Committees above which have the approval of this Court shall immediately became operative. They shall be operative as guidelines.

C. ROLE OF MEDIA- Mr. F.S. Nariman Committee has suggested certain modalities which are essentially as follows:
(a) The Trusteeship Principle
- Professional journalists operate as trustees of public and their mission should be to seek the truth and to report it with integrity and independence.

(b) The Self Regulation Principles
- A model of self-regulation should be based upon the principles of impartiality and objectivity in reporting; ensuring neutrality; responsible reporting of sensitive issues, especially crime, violence, agitations and protests; sensitivity in reporting women and children and matters relating to national security; respect for privacy.

(c) Content Regulations
- In principle, content regulation except under very exceptional circumstances, is not to be encouraged beyond vetting of cinema and advertising through the existing statues. It should be incumbent on the media to classify its work through warning systems as in cinema so that children and those who are challenged adhere to time, place and manner restraints. The media must also evolve codes and complaint systems. But prior content control (while accepting the importance of codes for self restraint) goes to the root of censorship and is unsuited to the role of media in democracy.

(d) Complaints Principle
- There should be an effective mechanism to address complaints in a fair and just manner.

(e) Balance Principle
- A balance has to be maintained which is censorial on the basis of the principles of proportionality and least invasiveness, but which effectively ensures democratic governance and self restraint from news publications that the other point of view is properly accepted and accommodated.
It is felt that the appropriate methods have to be devised norms of self regulation rather than external regulation in a respectable and effective way both for the broadcasters as well as the industry. It has been stated that the steps constitute a welcome move and should be explored further. The proposed norms read as follows:

“The NBA believes that media that is meant to expose the lapses in government and in public life cannot be obviously be regulated by government, else it would lack credibility. It is a fundamental paradigm of freedom of speech that media must be free from governmental control in the matter of "content" and that censorship and free speech are sworn enemies. It therefore falls upon the journalistic profession to evolve institutional checks and safeguards, specific to the electronic media, that can define the path that would conform to the highest standards of rectitude and journalistic ethics and guide the media in the discharge of its solemn Constitutional duty. There are models of governance evolved in other countries which have seen evolution of the electronic media, including the news media, much before it developed in India. The remarkable feature of all these models is "self-governance", and a monitoring by a "jury of peers ".

The Committee has recommended the following suggestions:

(i) India has a strong, competitive print and electronic media
(ii) Given the exigencies of competition, there is a degree of sensationalism, which is itself not harmful so long as it preserves the essential role of the media viz: to report news as it occurs - and eschew comment or criticism. There are differing views as to whether the media (particularly the electronic media) has exercised its right and privilege responsibly. But generalisations should be avoided. The important thing is that the electronic (and print) media has expressed (unanimously) its wish to act responsibly. The media has largely responsible and more importantly, it wishes to act responsibly.
(iii) Regulation of the media is not an end in itself; and allocative regulation is necessary because the 'air waves' are public property and cannot technically be free for all but have to be distributed in a fair manner. However, allocative regulation is different from regulation per se. All regulation has to be within the framework of the constitutional provision.

However, a fair interpretation of the constitutional dispensation is to recognize that the principle of proportionality is built into the concept of reasonableness whereby any restrictions on the media follow the least invasive approach. While emphasizing the need for media responsibility, such an approach would strike the correct balance between free speech and the independence of the media.
(iv) Although the print media has been placed under the supervision of the Press Council, there is need for choosing effective measures of supervision - supervision not control.
(v) As far as amendments mooted or proposed to the Press Council Act, 1978 this Committee would support such amendments as they do not violate Article 19(1) (a) - which is a preferred freedom.
(vi) Apart from the Press Council Act, 1978, there is a need for newspapers and journals to set up their own independent mechanism.
(vii) The pre-censorship model used for cinema under the Cinematography Act, 1952 or the supervisory model for advertisements is not at all appropriate, and should not be extended to live print or broadcasting media.
(viii) This Committee wholly endorses the need for the formation of

(a) principles of responsible broadcasting
(b) institutional arrangements of self regulation
But the Committee emphasised the need not to drift from self regulation to some statutory structure which may prove to be oppressive and full of litigative potential.

(ix) The Committee approved of the NBA model as a process that can be built upon both at the broadcasting service provider level as well as the industry level and recommend that the same be incorporated as guidelines issued by this Court under Act 142 of the Constitution of India - as was done in Vishaka’s case.

Though there is a variety of constitutional and legal framework which exists to deal with various forms of public protest in India, however, more legal issues need to be looked into in order to deal with technologically supported diverse forms of mass agitations in an effective manner.

5.7 SOPs TO DEAL WITH PUBLIC AGITATIONS WITH NON-LETHAL MEASURES – MHA TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS.

Vide order No.1-11011/33/2010-IS-IV, Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (IS-I Division), New Delhi dated 22nd September, 2010, a task force under the chairmanship of Union Home Secretary was constituted to recommend SOPs to deal with public agitation with non-lethal measures. The members and State representatives of this Task Force were –

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members:</th>
<th>State Representatives:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Director, Intelligence Bureau.</td>
<td>1 Principal Home Secretary, Maharashtra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Special Secretary (IS)</td>
<td>2 Principal Home Secretary, Jammu &amp; Kashmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Director General, CRPF.</td>
<td>3 Principal Home Secretary, West Bengal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Director General, BSF.</td>
<td>4 Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Joint Secretary (Police Modernisation).</td>
<td>5 Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Director General, BPR &amp; D.: Member Secy.</td>
<td>6 Director General of Police, Jammu &amp; Kashmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Representative of DRDO.</td>
<td>7 Director General of Police, Manipur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The objective of the SOPs is to provide guidelines for dispersal of an unlawful assembly with minimum necessary force with minimum possible collateral damage. The task force recommendations were circulated by BPR & D in Feb. 2011. The tactics and procedure, including those for specific situations like dealing with stone pelting crowd in narrow streets, Attack against Govt. Buildings/Police Buildings, Attack against officers/Motorcades/Vehicles, and dealing with law and order problem created by women and children, are dealt with in the SOPs developed by MHA Task Force (attached as Annexure-K).
6. Social Media and Public Protests

6.1 SOCIAL MOBILIZATION LITERATURE

The top three dominant theory streams that seek to answer the questions how and why did people come to join a protest event? First, studies by Diani and McAdam (2003) and Gould (1993), for instance, have highlighted the positive role of social networks and specifically the different strengths of social ties, in influencing protest engagement. This expansive literature generates a basic hypothesis that: people are more likely to join a protest if their friends or family also join in the protest. Second, mobilizational frames theories (Snow and Benford 1992), have focused on how activists and the media frame claims, and direct repertories by employing rights rhetoric, generating a hypothesis that: people are more likely to protest if the protest grievance is framed in a rights discourse. Finally, and most topically, in an expansion on the dynamics of information chains theory (see: Easley and Kleinberg 2010; Lohmann 1994), recent academic writing has focused on the role social media (here meaning Facebook, Blogs and Twitter, not all Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as mobile SMS or email) in the motivating and mobilizing protesters (Bhuiyan 2011; Bode and Makarychev 2013; Segerberg and Bennett 2011), generating a hypothesis that: People are more likely to join protests if they use social media sources for information or protesters are more likely to have relied on social media as a central informational source.

Social network ties, their strength, closeness, density, have been understood by social scientists to be instrumental in recruitment, motivation and diffusion of mobilization (Gould 1993; Granovetter 1983). Furthermore, studies by Diani and McAdam (2003) and Klandermans and Oegema (1987), point out that specifically, prior contact with a movement participants, is the most influential aspect differentiating two supporters of a protest, when one participates and the other abstains. This expansive literature proposes two basic theories: (a) People who joined the

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protest events were more likely to do so if their friends or family also join in the protest and (b) People who joined the protest events were more likely to do so if they are members in different organizations.

Expanding on the dynamics of informational cascades theories (see: (Easley and Kleinberg 2010; Lohmann 1994), recent academic writing has been focused on the role social media in motivating individuals to join in protest events by enhancing and optimizing the channels through which information, necessary for mobilization, travels (Mejias 2010). We can divide this literature on the informational diffusion capabilities of social media further into two groups; that which focuses on social media as a tool for activists; and secondly that which focuses on how ‘ordinary’ citizens use and are affected by social media, during the mobilization process.

Youmans and York (2012), have demonstrated that activists have quickly adapted to this new medium, and have been specifically capable of using it to facilitate the within movement information dissemination, at much faster speeds then before.

Yet, activists’ use of social media and other online communications strategies has, as argued by Howard and Parks (2012), also enabled the state to track activists, prevent and prepare for protest actions, and facilitate the imprisonment and repression of dissidents. Thus, while speeding up activists’ ability to mobilize, social media has also left activist more exposed.

One could conclude that many of these differences are the product of greater access to information through social media. This would be directly in line with what has been argued by Garrett (2006), whereby social media have the ability to accelerate protest participation across divergent segments of society as well as, geographically diffuse protest.

Another argument in support of social media’s role in the mobilization process is that the weak ties present in social media aided the mobilization process. As argued by Granovetter, individuals with several and compounding weak ties actually have better access to information and thus, they are more likely to join in protest events, as well as other forms of collective engagement. The idea is that when people have few weak ties they are left out of any informational chains which are outside their immediate close network and thus, will be will be restricted by local news and the particular views of their close friends and relatives (Granovetter 1983).
A *compounding effect of social media on mobilization*

The data from the survey seems to show that social media facilitates an individual’s ability to ‘bridge’ organizational and personal networks, and link weak ties and strong ties. It seems that strong ties, of close familial and friendship groups, and weak ties of social media that facilitated the flow of information, had a compounding effect in the case of the EuroMaidan protest. As noted by Granovetter (1983) this type of ‘bridging,’ can take pressures off of the SMOs and activists and placing mobilizational pressure on individuals. This process personalizes protest engagement, gives participants ownership over the mobilization process and can also give rise to a variety of grassroots and self-organization mobilization, like the type we saw in Ukraine between December 2013 and February 2014. But at the same time it makes it more difficult for activists and leaders to control and manage the protests, their repertoires and trajectories. Many activists privately lamented that while the use social media has enabled ‘ordinary’ citizens to take a leading role in the mobilization process, which is empowering, it can also fragment the protest movement, allowing radical voice to take control.

While social media and internet news sites play an important role in diffusing information and for this reason are highly influential in motivating people and framing their protest claims though they are not in themselves mobilizing. Protesters were far more likely to join-in if they were accompanied by a friend or family member, and were more likely to use information coming from a trusted source. Specifically, the strength of ties was important in providing protesters with a sense of security, when making the decision to join in. Thus social media and social networks have a compounding effect on mobilization. Specially, social media helps to set the agenda and frame protest claims, unlike mainstream media.

6.2 **SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS HANDLING**

There is a significant vibrant community on social media which offers new opportunities and challenges to the police. Today if the police have no voice on social media, they risk having information about their activities distorted, sensationalised or circulated irresponsibly by someone else shaping the way that information from the police is presented on social media.

Social media gives the police an opportunity to have a two-way conversation and engagement with the community and transmit and update information very rapidly. It offers the police new and powerful ways to enlist the public’s assistance and ensures direct access to the section of
community which hitherto has never been in contact with police. The scope and speed of social media make it an attractive way for police departments to reach out to the public.

6.2 (a) Global Trend

A 2013 social media survey of the International Association of Chiefs of Police conducted in USA found that 96 per cent of police departments use social media in some capacity, and more than 80 per cent say it has helped them solve crimes. Three-quarters of those on social media have joined since 2010. The most frequently used social media platforms are Facebook (92.1 per cent), Twitter (64.8 per cent), and YouTube (42.9 per cent). Nixle, Flickr, LinkedIn, MySpace, Apps, Google+, Instagram, Pinterest, Foursquare, Vimeo, Blog, SMS Notification and Nextdoor. 80.4 per cent of agencies report that social media has helped solve crimes in their jurisdiction. 73.1 per cent of agencies state that social media has improved police-community relations.

Today, many police forces around the world are using social media for purposes of criminal investigations, listening/monitoring, intelligence, soliciting tips on crime, notifying the public of crime problems, providing emergency or disaster-related information, crime-prevention activities, community outreach/citizen engagement, public relations or reputation management, in-service training and virtual policing.

6.2 (b) Varied Usage and Benefits

The Oakland Police Department now uses Facebook and Nextdoor, in addition to Nixle and Twitter, and considers social media an important tool in keeping the general public in the loop. The Boise Police Department has been using social media since 2009, all officers in Boise have undergone social media training and new officers are required to do the same. Sacramento Police in USA, even uses YouTube and Instagram to show the public behind the scenes officer training, and recently posted a Day in the Life series on Instagram.

Beyond individual cases, crowd sourcing has become the central tool to identify suspects in the aftermaths of the 2011 riots in the United Kingdom. The Metropolitan Police (MET) and the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) of UK, used Twitter extensively to support investigations and to seek information on offenders. Both forces also used the photo-sharing site Flickr to

39 http://mashable.com/2014/03/16/police-departments-social-media/
publish photos of perpetrators captured on CCTV. The general public was asked to help in the identification of these people.

6.2 (c) Usage During Public Protests

EuroMaidan protests

On 21 November 2013, a few thousand people across Ukraine began protesting their government’s sudden refusal to sign the Free Trade and Association Agreements with the European Union, they called the protest events EuroMaidan (European Square). Their central claims, as depicted in protest posters, slogans and speeches, were focused on socio economic and political development and the desire for the Europeanization of Ukraine. Through the coordination of social movement organizations (SMOs) and political opposition parties, by 24 November, the protests grew in size to approximately 200,000–300,000 in Kyiv, up to tens of thousands in several west Ukrainian cities, and a few thousand to a few hundred in the east and south of the country. At first protests seemed to die down in the following week. But after a group of students and journalists were brutally beaten by militia in Kyiv on 30 November, the demands shifted to a focus on the protection of universal human and civic rights, and by 1 December, an estimated 800,000 ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians joined the protests in Kyiv.

Popular accounts of the EuroMaidan protests accentuate the role of social media and accentuate that the protests were started by a Facebook post. Some reports even go so far as to say that “social media fuelled” the EuroMaidan, or make claims about how social media was centrally important to the mobilization of protesters.

English Defence League protest

At an English Defence League protest in Birmingham, UK, the police used Twitter to talk to protesters and point them to the department’s Website and YouTube sites. Those sites featured officers telling the protesters the tactics the police would be using and also informing the protesters where they could peacefully protest. For many forces in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, publishing search warrants on social media for daily operations has become a standard activity and is a common part of an overall social media or communication strategy.

**Montreal student protests** -

A shakeup of the way social media was handled through the Montreal police Twitter account revealed how important use of social media can be to police operations. The Service de Police de la Ville de Montreal (SPVM) police account was overhauled in 2012 to provide real information to the public rather than simply serve as a public relations tool. The usefulness of this change became evident during the 2012 Montreal student protests. Live Tweeting impartial coverage of the protests and police responses, whilst engaging in rumour control, led to the police’s twitter hashtag #manifencours becoming the de-facto discussion stream over the protests and allowed the SPVM to become a trusted source of live information regarding the protests. The police decided to:

- live tweet protests and police activities
- share details of police operations
- communicate directly with students during the demonstrations
- address misinformation and disinformation (rumour control)
- monitor ongoing chatter
- remain neutral (something which was appreciated by the students)

Police created the #manifencours hashtag to identify SPVM tweets about the demonstrations not knowing how big the demonstrations would become. In fact, #manifencours became the de facto hashtag about the demonstrations, adopted by the students, media and the public.

The new-found credibility was to be essential in the days following. On a night when over 10,000 students clashed with a police blockade, protestors towards the rear of the lines began tweeting mis-information, including that the police had started firing rubber bullets on the protestors (which was untrue). The SPVM account used its credibility to dispel rumours and redirect the protestors down another street, which was successful in defusing the situation.

After a quick discussion with senior officers in the Command Centre, police began tweeting to the students using the #GGI hashtag (created by the students) to communicate with the protesters. Police tweeted suggestions the student continue their march down a specific nearby road.

Student protesters began retweeting the suggestion. People following the protest online also retweeted the suggestion, encouraging the students follow the recommendation of the police. Amazingly, video surveillance displays in the Command Centre showed the students following

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the instructions. The demonstration continued “super calm” with no incidents, much to the surprise of deployed police officers including members of the SWAT team.

6.2 (d) Virtual Warnings

A community police officer of the North Yorkshire Police, UK, as an early adopter on Twitter, is tweeting when he is out on patrol and what he is investigating, publishes crime appeals, gives crime-prevention advice, publishes good news stories of police work and engages in conversations with the public. Helsinki police, Finland does virtual community policing on the networks Facebook, IRC-Galleria, Messenger, Hommaforum and Demi. The virtual police station in 2011, for Helsinki alone, has recorded 246 acts of which were about 51 sexual crimes, another were 50 “virtual warnings”, usually related to bullying each other.

Nextdoor application on social media connects the residents of particular neighbourhoods, allowing police officers to engage more personally with citizens in their jurisdiction. For example, an officer could alert a specific neighbourhood of a robbery or break in without alarming nearby neighbourhoods. Nextdoor is seen as the 21st century evolution of neighbourhood watch, giving police officers the most positive engagement directly with the neighbourhoods they serve.

6.2 (e) Better Emergency Response

On April 15, 2013 in Massachusetts, USA, two devices detonated in quick succession near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, causing three deaths and approximately 280 injuries. Boston Police Department (BPD) successfully used Twitter to keep the public informed about the status of the investigation, to calm nerves and request assistance, to correct mistaken information reported by the press, and to ask for public restraint in the tweeting of information from police scanners from the blasts (correcting inflated fatality reports by some media sources) and that no suspect was in custody (in response to media speculation that a Saudi Arabian man had been arrested).

All of the BPD tweets about the bombings on April 15 were sent on the department’s official Twitter account, which was directly overseen by BPD’s Public Information Bureau chief. By the time the second suspect was captured on the evening of April 19, BPD’s Twitter account

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had more than 300,000 followers, up from about 40,000 prior to the week’s events. The official
tweet reporting the suspect’s capture was retweeted more than 140,000 times. In the aftermath
of the investigation, BPD was “applauded for leading an honest conversation with the public
during a time of crisis in a way that no police department has done before.”

6.2 (f) Communication with the Public

In cases of large-scale crises or in cases of investigations that receive special attention by the
public, police systems for communication with the public come under stress. One successful
way of dealing with the high demand has been the use of various social media sites that can
better balance high loads in their global infrastructures. During the 2011 riots in London43, the
Metropolitan police (MET), for instance, used Flickr to publish images of suspects. With
announcements on Twitter, the photos were extremely popular. The MET’s website traffic
increased dramatically during and just after the riots. Hosting images on a separate server
through Flickr helped ensure their site was not overloaded and could run at optimal levels, thus
ensuring the public could still gain policing information and advice.

After almost every major incident since the 2001 terrorist attacks, emergency responders have
cited communications and information-sharing failures. Social media tools allow emergency
managers to disseminate information to wider audiences, interact with the public, monitor
social media networks to get a better sense of what’s happening on the ground during a crisis,
get better situational awareness and improve collaboration for sharing information during an
emergency. It provides a flatter, less hierarchical approach for information-sharing suited for
crisis situation.

6.3 STRATEGY FOR SOCIAL MEDIA

For the police department it is important to have a strategy to plan, implement, and manage the
social media programme. Plan which tools (Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, blogs, and
so on) to use and how to use them considering the attributes, advantages, and disadvantages, of
each tool. Work out the manpower need, some dedicated team needs to be assigned solely for
this purpose, while others can be trained to create media content and feed the social media
centre. Ideally, at an advanced stage other gazetted officers at all levels should be able to post

content concerning their area. It is essential to plan how to use the tools to enhance the department’s message and how the tools will relate to each other. Also, a timeline for rolling out the new media and a plan for training all gazetted officers should be developed.

6.3 (a) Providing Content

As the site or tool is essentially about the content, the department should engage in social media only when it can regularly provide content. Until then, it is best to wait. Since the social media allows two ways communicate with the public. Some people will also say negative things about the police department, unsolicited and abusive feedback will occur. However, all that negative activity would happen whether the department is using the social media or not.

By using social media, departments can at least see what people are saying — and have the opportunity to rebut criticisms and engage the community. If the department creates a social media presence and then walks away from it, the department loses credibility—making future attempts to create such a presence difficult. Setting up a Facebook page requires a face or faces on the page. Post an identified officer within the department with profile information, and make the page human. The content shared is only good and the public is engaged when a real person is standing behind it.

Due to the legal risks and management concerns associated with participating in social media, a social media policy is essential. Sites such as Facebook and Twitter have their own terms of use and when users sign up, even police departments must agree to abide by those rules. Train the staff on how to use the tools effectively and encourage them to do so. Creating a presence in these areas is just the beginning. It takes time, sincere efforts, perseverance and commitment to build a following and reap benefits.

Suggestions for effective views of Social Media:

- Use social media as a means of community engagement and not just for information collection and dissemination.
- Focus on the content, update regularly and do not abandon efforts.
- Have a strategy to plan, implement, and manage the social media programme.
- Formulate a department social media policy for internal coordination and control.
- Assign manpower and resources and train the staff on how to use the tools effectively.
- Identify benchmarks to measure outcomes.
7. Data & Results Analysis

This chapter contains statistical analysis of the Public perception survey data which included 500 public representatives including academicians, retired police officials, aggrieved party members and media representatives. The issues that emerged during the workshop of Delhi police officers, who dealt with the mass agitations in Delhi, are also compiled in this chapter. The findings have been presented in tabular and graphical presentation forms for convenient understanding as well as a brief observation note at the end of each response category has also been given as follows:

7.1 USE OF FORCE JUSTIFIED BY POLICE WHEN PROTESTERS VERBALLY ABUSE A POLICE OFFICER

Table No. 1: Showing responses of public concerning justification of use of force by police when protesters verbally abuse a police officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Retired police officers</th>
<th>Any protester group</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td></td>
<td>186</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td></td>
<td>134</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>402</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure No. 1:** Showing responses of public concerning justification of use of force by police when protesters verbally abuse a police officer.

Majority of people suggest that use of force by police is never justified when a police officer is verbally abused by the protesters. However 34.48% people feel that it is justified sometimes whereas 20.08% perceive that the use force by police is always justified. The Chi-Square significance value of responses is $0.555$ ($p > 0.05$) which is non-significant. In other words it may be said that the respondents do not have significant difference of opinion i.e. the use of force is not justified when protesters verbally abuse a police officer.
### 7.2 USE OF FORCE IS JUSTIFIED BY POLICE WHEN PROTESTERS PUSH A POLICE OFFICER

**Table No 2:** Showing responses of public concerning justification of use of force by police when protesters push a police officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure No 2:** Showing responses of public concerning justification of use of force by police when protesters push a police officer.

Majority of people are of the opinion that use of force by police is never justified when a police officer is verbally abused by the protesters. However, 35.39% people feel that sometimes it is justified whereas 22.43% feel that it is always justified. The Chi-Square significance value of responses is .316 (p>.05) which is non-significant. In other words it may be said that the respondents do not have significant difference of opinion i.e. the use of force is not justified when protesters verbally abuse a police officer.
7.3 USE OF FORCE IS JUSTIFIED BY POLICE WHEN PROTESTERS USE PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER.

Table No. 3: Showing responses of public concerning justification of use of force by police when protesters use physical violence against a police officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 3: Showing responses of public concerning justification of use of force by police when protesters use physical violence against a police officer.

There are mixed responses by people towards the justification of the use of force by police when protesters use physical violence against a police officer. Almost equal percentage of them say it is always justified, it is sometimes justified or it is never justified. The Chi-Square value of responses is .305 ($p>0.05$) which is non-significant. In other words it may be said that the respondents do not have significant difference of opinion.
7.4 USE OF LATHI-CHARGE TO DISPERSE THE CROWD.

Table No. 4: Showing responses of public concerning use of Lathi-charge by police to disperse the crowd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>PUBLIC</th>
<th>MEDIA</th>
<th>RETIRED POLICE OFFICERS</th>
<th>ANY PROTESTER GROUP</th>
<th>OVERALL RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No 4: Showing responses of public concerning use of Lathi-charge by police to disperse the crowd.

Majority of people are of the opinion that the use of Lathi-charge is sometimes justified by Police to disperse the crowd, whereas a good number of them feel that it is never justified at all and very less percentage of them feel that it is always justified. The Chi-Square value of the responses is 786 (p>.05) which is non-significant, showing that respondents do not have significant difference on opinion but indicating that Police should use Lathi-charge to disperse the crowd if required.
### 7.5 USE OF TEAR GAS TO DISPERSE THE CROWD

**Table No. 5:** Showing responses of public concerning use of tear gas to disperse the crowd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Retired police officers</th>
<th>Any protester group</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure No. 5:** Showing responses of public concerning use of tear gas to disperse the crowd.

Majority of people are of the opinion that the use of Tear Gas is sometimes justified by Police to disperse the crowd, whereas a good number of them feel that it is never justified, however, very less percentage of them feel that it is always justified. The Chi-Square value of the responses is 0.68 (p>.05) which is non-significant, which indicates that respondents do not have significant difference on opinion but however, Police should use Tear Gas to disperse the crowd if required.
7.6 USE OF FIRING TO DISPERSE THE PROTESTING CROWD.

Table No. 6: Showing responses concerning use of firing to disperse the protesting crowd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Retired police officers</th>
<th>Any protester group</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 6: Showing responses concerning use of firing to disperse the protesting crowd.

Majority of people are of the opinion that firing should never be used to disperse the protesting crowd. However, a good number of them feel that it may be used sometimes whereas only a negligible percentage of them feel that it must be used always. The Chi-Square value is .043 (p<.05) which is significant and indicates that firing should never be used to disperse the protesting crowd.
### 7.7 USE OF WATER CANNON TO DISPERSE THE PROTESTING CROWD.

**Table No. 7:** Showing responses of public concerning use of water cannon to disperse protesting crowd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure No. 7:** Showing responses of public concerning use of water cannon to disperse protesting crowd.

- 22.5% Always
- 24.9% Never
- 52.6% Sometimes

Majority of people are of the opinion that water cannon sometimes may be used to disperse the protesting crowd. However, a good number of them feel that it may never be used sometimes whereas almost equal percentage of them feels that it may always be used. The Chi-Square value of responses is .007 (p<.05) which is highly significant indicating that Police should use Water Cannon to disperse the crowd if required so.
7.8 HOLDING OF PROTESTERS IN A CONTROLLED AREA JUSTIFIED WHEN PROTESTERS DISRUPT DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES OF GENERAL PUBLIC.

Table No. 8: Showing responses of public concerning justification in holding protesters in a controlled area when protesters disrupt day to day activities of general public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Retired police officers</th>
<th>Any protester group</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 8: Showing responses of public concerning justification in holding protesters in a controlled area when protesters disrupt day to day activities of general public.

Majority of people are of the opinion that holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified sometimes only when protesters disrupt day to day activities of general public. However, a good number of them feel that it is always justified whereas a less percentage of them feel that it is never justified at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .023 (p<.05) which is significant indicating that when protesters disrupt day to day activities of general public, holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified.
7.9 HOLDING OF PROTESTERS IN A CONTROLLED AREA JUSTIFIED WHEN PROTESTERS THREATEN TO DAMAGE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY.

Table No. 9: Showing responses of public concerning justification of holding protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten to damage public and private property.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No 9: Showing responses of public concerning justification of holding protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten to damage public and private property.

Is the holding of protesters in a controlled area justified when protesters threaten to damage public and private property? Majority of people are of the opinion that holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified always when protesters threaten to damage public and private property. However, a good number of them feel that it is justified only sometimes whereas a less percentage of them feel that it is never justified at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .053 (p<.05) which is significant indicating that when protesters threaten to damage public and private property, holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified.
7.10 HOLDING OF PROTESTERS IN A CONTROLLED AREA JUSTIFIED WHEN PROTESTERS THREATEN PUBLIC SAFETY

Table No. 10: Showing responses of public towards justification in holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten public safety.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Retired police officers</th>
<th>Any protester group</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 10: Showing responses of public towards justification in holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten public safety.

Majority of people are of the opinion that holding of protesters in a controlled area is always justified when protesters threaten public safety. However, a good number of them feel that it is justified only sometimes whereas almost an equal percentage of them feel that it is never justified at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .023 (p<.05) which is significant indicating that when protesters threaten to damage public and private property, holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified.
7.11 POLICE INFORMS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS IN ADVANCE TO THE PUBLIC.

Table No. 11: Showing responses of public concerning better management of situation if Police informs about arrangements in advance to the public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, It will help a lot</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will help to some extent</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It does not matter</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 11: Showing responses of public concerning better management of situation if Police informs about arrangements in advance to the public.

Majority of people are of the opinion that the situation can be better managed in case police informs about arrangements to the public in advance. However, a good number of respondents feel that it helps only to some extent whereas a very small percentage of them feel that it does not matter at all. The Chi-Square value is 0.142 (p>.05) which is non-significant indicating that situation can be managed better if police informs about arrangements in advance to public.
7.12 POLICE NEED TO PROVIDE REGULAR BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION TO COUNTER MISINFORMATION AND RESTORE CONFIDENCE.

Table No. 12: Showing responses of public concerning need to provide regular briefing by police on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, It will help a lot</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will help to some extent</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It does not matter</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 12: Showing responses of public concerning need to provide regular briefing by police on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence.

Majority of people are of the opinion that regular briefing by police on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence always helps. However, a good number of respondents feel that it helps only to some extent whereas a very small percentage of them feel that it does not matter at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .021 (p>.05) which is non-significant indicating that police always need to provide regular briefing on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence.
7.13 BETTER COORDINATION BETWEEN POLICE AND MEDIA.

Table No. 13: Showing responses of public concerning better coordination between police and media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, It will help a lot</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will help to some extent</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It does not matter</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 13: Showing responses of public concerning better coordination between police and media.

Majority of people are of the opinion that there should be better coordination between police and media. However, a good number of respondents feel that it is correct only to some extent whereas a very small percentage of them feel that it does not matter at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .003 (p>.05) which is highly significant indicating that respondents have highly significant difference of opinion indicating that there should be better coordination between police and media.
7.14 TRUSTED SOURCE FOR GETTING INFORMATION ON MASS PROTESTS.

Table No. 14: Showing responses of public towards News-channels, Social media (Internet), Newspapers and Police briefing/Police website/control room as trusted source of getting information on mass protest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Retired police officers</th>
<th>Any protester group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet (Social Media e.g. You tube etc.) as trusted source of getting information on mass protest</td>
<td>Rank1</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank2</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank3</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank4</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News channel as trusted source of getting information on mass protest</td>
<td>Rank1</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank2</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank3</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank4</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Paper as trusted source of getting information on mass protest</td>
<td>Rank1</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank2</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank3</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank4</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Briefing/Police Website/Control room as trusted source of getting information on mass protest</td>
<td>Rank1</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank2</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank3</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank4</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To the question as to grade the News-channels, Social Media (Internet), Newspaper and Police briefing/Police website/control room as trusted source of getting information on mass protests in the order of their preference; a majority of them Public 50.1% gave first preference to News-channels as their trusted source of getting information on mass protest, 27.3% trusted Internet, 21.7% trusted Police briefing/Police website/Control room and interestingly the lowest number i.e. 20.9% graded News papers as their trusted source of getting information on mass protests. This clearly shows that majority of the people do not trust police briefing/ police website/control room information as their trusted source of getting information on mass protests in the country.
7.15 **POLICE BEHAVIOUR WITH PUBLIC DURING PROTEST.**

Table No 15: Showing responses concerning police behavior with public during protest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are very helpful</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need a lot to improve</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They do not interact with public</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 15: Showing responses concerning police behavior with public during protest.

Majority of people are of the opinion that police need to improve their behaviour towards public during protest. However, a good number of people feel that they are very helpful during public protest while almost same percentage of people feel that they do not interact with public at all. The Chi-Square value is .006 (p<.05) which is highly significant indicating that police need to improve behaviour with public during protests.
7.16 HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT POLICE WILL EFFECTIVELY MANAGE LARGE SCALE PUBLIC PROTESTS IN THE FUTURE?

Table No. 16: Showing responses of public concerning how confident are they that police will effectively manage large scale public protest in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Retired police officers</th>
<th>Any protester group</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very confident</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little confident</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not confident</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure No. 16: Showing responses of public concerning how confident are they that police will effectively manage large scale public protest in the future.

The perception survey carried out during the research indicate that nearly 70% people are not or little confident that police in India will handle mass protests effectively.
Summary of Analysis and Findings of Public Perception Survey -

The results show very interesting professional and behavioural intricacies on the part of police along with the perceptions of public, media, retired police officers, and protesting groups concerning various aspects of police handling of mass public protests in the country as follows:

- In response to the question whether the use of force is justified by police when protesters verbally abuse a Police officer, majority of people suggest that use of force by police is never justified when a police officer is verbally abused by the protesters. However 34.48% people feel that it is justified sometimes whereas 20.08% perceive that the use of force by police is always justified. The Chi-Square significance value of responses is .555 (p>.05) which is non-significant. In other words it may be said that the respondents do not have significant difference of opinion i.e. the use of force is not justified when protesters verbally abuse a police officer.

- To the question whether the use of force is justified by Police when protesters push a police officer, majority of people are of the opinion that use of force by police is never justified when a police officer is verbally abused by the protesters. However, 35.39% people feel that sometimes it is justified whereas 22.43% feel that it is always justified. The Chi-Square significance value of responses is .316 (p>.05) which is non-significant. In other words it may be said that the respondents do not have significant difference of opinion i.e. the use of force is not justified when protesters verbally abuse a police officer.

- In response to the question whether the use of force is justified by police when protesters use physical violence against a Police officer, there are mixed responses by people towards the justification of the use of force by police when protesters use physical violence against a police officer. Almost equal percentage of them say it is always justified, it is sometimes justified or it is never justified. The Chi-Square value of responses is .305 (p>.05) which is non-significant. In other words it may be said that the respondents do not have significant difference of opinion.

- To the question whether Police should use Lathi-charge to disperse the crowd, majority of people are of the opinion that the use of Lathi-charge is sometimes justified by Police to disperse the crowd, whereas a good number of them feel that it is never justified at all and very less percentage of them feel that it is always justified. The Chi-Square value of
the responses is 786 (p>.05) which is non-significant, showing that respondents do not have significant difference on opinion but indicating that Police should use Lathi-charge to disperse the crowd if required.

- In response to the question whether police should use Tear Gas to disperse the crowd, majority of people are of the opinion that the use of Tear Gas is sometimes justified by Police to disperse the crowd, whereas a good number of them feel that it is never justified, however, very less percentage of them feel that it is always justified. The Chi-Square value of the responses is 0.68 (p>.05) which is non-significant, which indicates that respondents do not have significant difference on opinion but however, Police should use Tear Gas to disperse the crowd if required.

- To the question whether police should use firing to disperse the crowd, majority of people are of the opinion that firing should never be used to disperse the protesting crowd. However, a good number of them feel that it may be used sometimes whereas only a negligible percentage of them feel that it must be used always. The Chi-Square value is .043 (p<.05) which is significant and indicates that firing should never be used to disperse the protesting crowd.

- In response to the question whether police should use Water Cannon to disperse the protesting crowd, majority of people are of the opinion that water canon sometimes may be used to disperse the protesting crowd. However, a good number of them feel that it may never be used sometimes whereas almost equal percentage of them feel that it may always be used. The Chi-Square value of responses is .007 (p<.05) which is highly significant indicating that Police should use Water Cannon to disperse the crowd if required so.

- To the question whether holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified when protesters disrupt day to day activities of general public, majority of people are of the opinion that holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified sometimes only when protesters disrupt day to day activities of general public. However, a good number of them feel that it is always justified whereas a less percentage of them feel that it is never justified at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .023 (p<.05) which is significant indicating that when protesters disrupt day to day activities of general public, holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified.
In response to the question whether holding of protesters in a controlled area justified when protesters threaten to damage public and private property, majority of people are of the opinion that holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified always when protesters threaten to damage public and private property. However, a good number of them feel that it is justified only sometimes whereas a less percentage of them feel that it is never justified at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .053 (p<.05) which is significant indicating that when protesters threaten to damage public and private property, holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified.

To the question whether holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified when protesters threaten public safety, majority of people are of the opinion that holding of protesters in a controlled area is always justified when protesters threaten public safety. However, a good number of them feel that it is justified only sometimes whereas almost an equal percentage of them feel that it is never justified at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .023 (p<.05) which is significant indicating that when protesters threaten to damage public and private property, holding of protesters in a controlled area is justified.

In response to the question whether situation can be managed better if Police informs about arrangements in advance to the public, majority of people are of the opinion that the situation can be better managed in case police informs about arrangements to the public in advance. However, a good number of respondents feel that it helps only to some extent whereas a very small percentage of them feel that it does not matter at all. The Chi-Square value is 0.142 (p>.05) which is non-significant indicating that situation can be managed better if police informs about arrangements in advance to public.

To the question whether Police need to provide regular briefing on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence, majority of people are of the opinion that regular briefing by police on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence always helps. However, a good number of respondents feel that it helps only to some extent whereas a very small percentage of them feel that it does not matter at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .021 (p>.05) which is non-significant indicating that police always need to provide regular briefing on the situation to counter misinformation and restore confidence.
In response to the question whether there be better coordination between police and media, majority of people are of the opinion that there should be better coordination between police and media. However, a good number of respondents feel that it is correct only to some extent whereas a very small percentage of them feel that it does not matter at all. The Chi-Square value of responses is .003 (p>.05) which is highly significant indicating that respondents have highly significant difference of opinion indicating that there should be better coordination between police and media.

In response to the question as to grade the News-channels, Social Media (Internet), Newspaper and Police briefing/Police website/control room as trusted source of getting information on mass protests in the order of their preference; a majority of them 37.2% gave first preference to Police briefing/Police website/control room as their trusted source of getting information on mass protest, 24.3% trusted News-channels, 23% trusted Newspapers and interestingly the lowest number i.e. 15.6% graded Social Media (Internet) as their trusted source of getting information on mass protests. This clearly shows that majority of the people still trust police briefing/ police website/control room information as their trusted source of getting information on mass protests in the country.

To the question as to comment about police behavior with public during protest, majority of people are of the opinion that police need to improve their behavior towards public during protest. However, a good number of people feel that they are very helpful during public protest while almost same percentage of people feel that they do not interact with public at all. The Chi-Square value is .006 (p<.05) which is highly significant indicating that police need to improve behavior with public during protests.

In response to the question as to how confident are you that Police will effectively manage large scale public protests in the future, majority of people are having very little confidence about effective police handling of public protests in future. However, a good percentage of people are very confident about it whereas a small percentage are not at all confident about it. The Chi-Square value of responses is .041 (p<.05) which is significant indicating that police will effectively manage large scale public protest in the future.
Key Findings of Perception Survey -

The perception survey carried out during the research indicate that nearly 70% people are not or little confident that police in India will handle mass protests effectively.

The use of force for provocations like abusing a police officer was not acceptable to 45.44% respondents and 34.48% felt that force can be sometimes used only 20% favoured use of force. Similar response came for a provocation like pushing of a police officer by a protester, only 22.34% favoured use of force while 35.39% felt force can be used sometimes and 42.18% felt that the force should never be used. Even when the protesters use physical violence against a police officer, only 35.1% felt that force should always be used, 32.3% felt force should sometimes be used and 32.7% respondents still felt force should never be used. Which means that the police are expected to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful agitations, even where demonstrators do engage in minor acts of violence, though these protests may cause irritation, obstruction or disruption.

In the survey conducted during the research 79.9% (35.6% always & 44.3% sometimes) respondents favored holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters disrupt day to day activities of public. 77.7% (45.3% & 32.4%) respondents favored holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten to damage public and private property. 78.6% (53.1% always & 25.5% sometimes) respondents’ favored holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten public safety.

As per the survey 55.5% respondents felt that it will help a lot and 26.5% felt that it will help to some extent if there is better coordination among police and media. The development of effective plans to communicate with public and media, directly or indirectly, is an essential element of modern public order policing. Having an effective media relationship is becoming very important to police when addressing crowd management incidents.

The survey indicated that 52.6% public felt that it will help a lot and 33.6% felt that it will help to some extent to restore confidence of public and counter misinformation if police provides regular briefing on the situation. In the absence of availability of authentic information from official channels, misinformation can add fuel to the fire as it happened during the Ramdev agitation.
In the survey overwhelming majority of public 67.1% felt that it will help a lot, 24.6% felt it will help to some extent to manage the situation in mass agitations if police informs about arrangements in advance to public.

When public was asked to comment on police behaviour with public during the protest, 52.6% people felt that they need a lot to improve, 20.9% felt that police do not interact and only the remaining 26.4% felt that police are helpful.

Survey conducted during the research revealed that majority of public do not favour police firing in mass agitations (69.4% are never in favour & 25.9% in favour sometimes), Lathi charge by police to disperse crowd is never favoured by 34.9% of respondents, 51.6% favour it sometimes and only 13.5% favoured it. As for Tear Gas- 28.9% never favour it, 57.5% are in favour sometimes. And for use of Water Cannon by police- 22.5% favour it always and 52.6% favour its use sometimes. Therefore, public feels that police can resort to use of water cannon, tear gas and lathi charge if so required, water cannon most acceptable and lathi charge the least.

7.17 DELHI POLICE OFFICERS WORKSHOP – ISSUES EMERGED

1. In case of Baba Ram Dev episode the field Police officers carried the feeling that they were not taken into confidence for taking an important decision to disperse such big gathering of public when they were sleeping at night. It has brought a bad name to the Delhi Police. At present there is a feeling among cutting edge level police officials that there is no faith in the field level staff by the seniors. The field police personnel are the best judge of the ground level factors who should be suitably taken into account. They should be made part of the decision making process and remote control handling of public protests/agitations by the senior hierarchy may be avoided.

2. In every agitation/protest handling there need to be designated police spokes-person for giving briefs to the public and the media. Frequent use of words like “we are servants of the people and we are here to ensure law and order for the safety of the public and for maintenance of peaceful social environment” by police personnel can play very healthy and conciliatory role. Police officials should maintain cordial and positive relations with protesters.
3. Professional rivalries/jealousies towards police spokes-person by their own colleagues and senior officers should be suitably tackled. One A.C.P. rank officer was transferred due to such jealousies at Delhi as the A.C.P was handling media briefing and frequently appearing on media channels, the fact which did not go well with his seniors/colleagues.

4. Police media briefing center needs to be set-up at ground level rather than at headquarter level and the briefings should be honest and realistic rather than planned or structured. There is an urgent need to look into this aspect very carefully and take necessary steps in this regard.

5. Special attention needs to be paid towards development of basic leadership/communication skills among police personnel especially at the public-dealing level.

6. During twelve days agitation of Anna Hazare, the communication link by ground level police personnel was excellent with the protesting leaders but it was not fruitfully used by the police authorities as it should have been and suddenly the orders of seniors were flashed contrary to what could have been easily handled by field level officials.

7. Agitation is the ventilation of stressed public mind which needs to be understood by the police by way of patient hearing and tactful dealings. Behaviour and approach of police personnel towards public like communication, body language etc. need to be improved. Decent & polite language without use of habitual abuses/obscene words needs to be used with agitators.

8. Cases against protesters are registered and then withdrawn politically which should not be done. The legal course of action should always be adopted and followed. Indian law is very strong but political decisions make it weak.

9. In every police force there should be a separate mob handling unit on the lines of R.A.F.

10. Experiences and lessons learned from each major mass agitation/public protest need to be stored at a central place and these may be shared and discussed among various State Police Forces for case studies and follow up lessons.

11. Police approach to every mass agitation should be carefully planned involving suitable proactive inputs on the basis of the public mind analysis indicators.

12. Regular technological updating of police by providing latest gadgets to every police force in the country.

13. Social media analysis needs to be carefully monitored and necessary interventions need to be planned by the police in every major mass agitation/public protest. The social media
analysis can serve as effective police strategy. Face book and Tweets needs to be encouraged among police personnel.

14. Volunteers of the agitation should be regularly briefed by the police to handle anti-social elements with the help of video analysis of high resolution camera recordings.

The broad findings of the collected data indicate some specific initiatives which need to be taken at different levels in order to ensure an effective and professionally sound police response to every public protest for which the Indian citizens have their fundamental right to protest peacefully. Therefore, these findings have been suitably incorporated in identifying suitable recommendations in this study which have been given in the forthcoming chapter.
8. Conclusions and Recommendations

Public Perception Survey conducted during this research work revealed that overwhelming 69% of the respondents had little or no faith in police abilities to manage large scale public protests effectively. While a similar survey carried out in UK in May-June 2009 indicated that almost two-third (65%) state that they are confident that police will effectively manage large-scale protests in future.\(^4\)

Successfully policing public protest demands a combination of excellence in leadership, clarity of purpose, training, planning, communication, and - very importantly - the use of discretion. The policing of Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare agitations provided a significant challenge to the Delhi Police. The size of the security operations combined with the number of protest activities that took place was immense. The operation occurred against the backdrop of a very short notice period and a severe law and order threat level. The initial media perception of the police operations was predominantly positive with comment being made about restraint shown by the officers involved. But following the sudden assault on the protesters, however, the focus entirely changed to concentrate on the unjustified tactics employed and the way force was used by the police which came under severe criticism and scrutiny.

The findings and directions, point no. 1, of the SC in WP 122 of 2011, in Baba Ramdev agitation, observed-

>“in the facts of the present case, the State and the Police could have avoided this tragic incident by exercising greater restraint, patience and resilience. The orders were passed by the authorities in undue haste and were executed with force and overzealousness, as if an emergent situation existed. The decision to forcibly evict the innocent public sleeping at the Ramlila grounds in the midnight of 4th/5th June, 2011, whether taken by the police independently or in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs is amiss and suffers from the element of arbitrariness and abuse of power to some extent. The restriction imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression was unsupported by cogent reasons and material facts. It was an invasion of the liberties and exercise of fundamental freedoms. The members of the assembly had legal protections available to them even under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the restriction was unreasonable and unwarrantedly executed. The action demonstrated the might of the State

and was an assault on the very basic democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. Except in cases of emergency or the situation unexceptionably demanding so, reasonable notice/time for execution of the order or compliance with the directions issued in the order itself or in furtherance thereto is the prerequisite.’

On the basis of the findings of this study and in the light of some best global practices concerning effective police handling of public protest, a number of recommendations have been made to ensure that relevant human rights principles are firmly embedded within the framework of public order policing. Following are the recommendations which have been outlined:

8.1 DEVELOP STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH MASS AGITATION

8.1(a) Demonstrate explicit consideration of the facilitation of peaceful protest in planning and during the operations-

The findings and directions, point no. 4, of the SC in WP 122 of 2011 -

‘The police authorities, who are required to maintain the social order and public tranquility, should have a say in the organizational matters relating to holding of dharnas, processions, agitations and rallies of the present kind. However, such consent should be considered in a very objective manner by the police authorities to ensure the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression as understood in its wider connotation, rather than use the power to frustrate or throttle the constitutional right. Refusal and/or withdrawal of permission should be for valid and exceptional reasons. The executive power, to cause a restriction on a constitutional right within the scope of Section 144 Cr.P.C., has to be used sparingly and very cautiously. The authority of the police to issue such permission has an inbuilt element of caution and guided exercise of power and should be in the interest of the public. Such an exercise of power by the Police should be aimed at attainment of fundamental freedom rather than improper suppression of the said right.’

Public perception survey conducted during the research work indicate that a majority of citizens are in favour of the use of force by the police only when there is major physical assault on a police officer or public/private property is being damaged by the protesting crowd. The use of force for provocations like abusing a police officer was not acceptable to 45.44% respondents and 34.48% felt that force can be sometimes used only 20% favoured use of force. Similar response came for a provocation like pushing of a police officer by a protester, only 22.34% favoured use of force while 35.39% felt force can be used sometimes and 42.18% felt that the force should never be used. Even when the protesters use physical violence against a
police officer, only 35.1% felt that force should always be used, 32.3% felt force should sometimes be used and 32.7% respondents still felt force should never be used. Which means that the police are expected to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful agitations, even where demonstrators do engage in minor acts of violence, though these protests may cause irritation, obstruction or disruption.

Given this background and the complex composition of new-age protesters, the age-old police approach to deal with protests needs a review. Handling several demonstrations and their spin-off irritants like disruption in traffic and sometimes street violence, the police is generally scornful of them. At the planning stage, even before the show begins, the battle lines are drawn. This was witnessed during the Anna Hazare agitation in Delhi. Veering on the permission to hold the rally and the venue, the organizers of the agitation were already suspicious of the police and convinced the public that every move of the police was only intended to quell the agitation. In the surcharged atmosphere, distrust between the police and agitators made it a tinderbox. The situation settled only after due permission was granted for holding the protest at Ramlila ground. On the other hand in case of Ramdev agitation initial permission to hold the protest was suddenly withdrawn and subsequent action by police led to violence and loss of life and property.

This template needs a paradigm shift. The starting point for the police should unambiguously be in favour of facilitating peaceful assembly, which in a democracy is the right of every citizen. The police should demonstrate an explicit consideration of the facilitation of peaceful protest throughout the planning process and during the deployment for the peaceful conduction of protests. When officers realize they are at a protest to ensure these rights, they direct their responses accordingly, from planning to implement the plan. Officers must have a well-defined mission that encourages the peaceful gathering of people and uses planning, open communication, negotiation, and leadership to accomplish this goal.

**8.1(b) Strike a right balance - taking a common sense approach**

However, the police may impose lawful, necessary and proportionate restrictions in the interest of public safety, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. And in striking this right balance, between the rights of agitators and other citizens with the duty to protect people
and property from the threat of harm or injury, lies the essence of policing in relation to public protest. In dealing with this dilemma, depending on the peculiar nature of each situation, the police administrator must take a common sense approach. The police public order strategy and tactics should be developed in ways that increase the links between tactical responses and continuous ‘dynamic risk assessment’. The most effective means for achieving proportionality in the policing crowd is through a strategic focus upon facilitation and a graded, differentiated and information led approach to the use of force.

Begin with de-escalation- As there was enormous public support for Anna Hazare and their non-violent method of agitation, the entire police force was deployed without lathis. Armed Guards with automatic weapons were deployed around Ramlila Ground for security purpose. The public was allowed inside after security checks. The crowd which gathered at other places like Prime Minister's, Ministers, Members of Parliament residences were also handled without lathis by the Police. Absolutely no force was used. The organizers were repeatedly advised in writing that police was unarmed and they should deploy volunteers to control rowdies.

As the tension at the protest site remains high, the police deployment during protests in itself may lead to further escalation. It is recommended that de-escalation may be done by police by deploying local police, in their usual uniform, in the front interfacing the protesters, as long as there is no outbreak of violence. This soft approach means that officers do not wear hats, appear relaxed and friendly, and openly talk with people in the crowd. Deployment of heavily armed teams carrying special equipment/gadgets induces further tension in the crowd in anticipation of some police action. This can sometimes lead to unintended and avoidable flash points. More recently, the British Home Office consulted Dr. Clifford Stott, one of Europe’s leading researchers regarding crowd behaviour, who advocates a different approach for police to use when handling crowd. His studies on protesting football fans found that:

Large-scale disorder tended to emerge and escalate because indiscriminate, heavy-handed policing generated a group mentality among large numbers of fans that was based on shared perceptions that the police action was illegitimate. This had the effect of drawing ordinary fans into conflict with the police.

The finding here is that when a crowd perceives the police as overreacting or being heavy-handed, crowd members have a tendency to stop observing and start taking action. To prevent this from happening, Stott advocates using
what he calls a ‘softly, softly’ approach—a low-key approach in which officers mix with and relate to crowd members on the basis of their behaviour, rather than their reputation. If police approach a crowd with the expectation that its members are going to make trouble, it often turns out that way.45

British research on policing crowd confirms the strategic need for proactive relationship building by police. With British input, Vancouver police developed a meet-and-greet strategy. Instead of using riot police in menacing outfits, police officers in standard uniforms engaged the crowd. They shook hands, asked people how they were doing, and told them that officers were there to keep them safe. This created a psychological bond with the group that paid dividends. It becomes more difficult for people to fight the police after being friendly with individual officers. British law enforcement agencies call this the “softly-softly approach.” Law enforcement personnel mingle and relate to the crowd using low-key procedures based on participants’ behavior, rather than their reputation or officers’ preconceived notions of their intent.46

8.1(c) Existing SOPs for dealing with mass agitations-

Sections 129-132, CPC; Sections141-158, IPC; Sections 30 and 38, Police Act; and Police Rules 14.56 lay down the legal provisions and procedures available to the police to handle agitations and unlawful assemblies. These provisions are to be seen along with rights of the citizens to hold peaceful protests in a democratic country. There are useful existing guidelines issued by Delhi Police for handling agitations, such as, Guidelines for handling of lawful assembly and use of force to handle unlawful assembly (Annexure J), Delhi Police Standing Order No.325 (Reg. duties, responsibilities and modalities of the use of water canon for crowd control, Annexure F), as well as Standing Order No.152 (Reg. use of tear smoke in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies and/processions, Annexure D). Delhi Police Standing Order No.72/89 (Annexure C) contains useful instructions relating to unlawful assemblies dispersal and Circulars No. 35/2011 (Annexure G), 12/2012 (Annexure H), 20/2012 (Annexure I), issued particularly after Ramlila Grounds agitation by Baba Ramdev for dealing with such assemblies,

keeping in view directives of the Supreme Court in WP (c) no 122/2011, can serve as guidelines for states to follow. Guidelines issued in Supreme Court in WP (c) no 122/2011\(^7\)

As soon as there is a demonstration organized:

(I) The organizer shall meet the police to review and revise the route to be taken and to lay down conditions for a peaceful march or protest;
(II) All weapons, including knives, lathis and the like shall be prohibited;
(III) An undertaking is to be provided by the organizers to ensure a peaceful march with marshals at each relevant junction;
(IV) The police and State Government shall ensure videograph of such protests to the maximum extent possible;
(V) The person in charge to supervise the demonstration shall be the SP (if the situation is confined to the district) and the highest police officer in the State, where the situation stretches beyond one district;
(VI) In the event that demonstrations turn violent, the officer-in-charge shall ensure that the events are videographed through private operators and also request such further information from the media and others on the incidents in question.
(VII) The police shall immediately inform the State Government with reports on the events, including damage, if any, caused by the police;
(VIII) The State Government shall prepare a report on the police reports and other information that may be available to it and shall file a petition including its report in the High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be for the Court in question to take suo-moto action.

The undertaking format for grant of permission to hold protest has been redrafted by the Delhi Police vide their circular no 20/2012. The draft format, ‘Terms and conditions for taking out rallies/processions/ dharnas’ can be adopted by the police in other states.

Similarly, MHA constituted Task Force submitted report “Standard Operating Procedures To Deal With Public Agitations With Non-Lethal Measures”, in the year 2010 and BPRD circulated these guidelines in 2011 for handling unlawful assembly. The tactics and procedure, including those for specific situations like dealing with stone pelting crowd in narrow streets, Attack against Govt. Buildings/Police Buildings, Attack against officers/Motorcades/Vehicles, and dealing with law and order problem created by women and children, are dealt with in the SOPs developed by MHA Task Force (attached as Annexure-K). They emphasize the need to deploy duty magistrate, use of non-lethal weapons, training, procedure for deployment and dispersal of unlawful assembly.

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8.2 GATHER PRIOR INTELLIGENCE –

It is absolutely necessary to have adequate intelligence in respect of the scale and magnitude of agitation, the degree and magnitude of public support that agitators enjoy and the need to use force or restrain the use of force. In the case of the agitation by Anna Hazare, it was not clear to the police at the outset that the agitation had the support of large number of people and also of the national media. The response to the agitation, therefore, initially was confusing one. In Baba Ramdev agitation, the Special Branch, Delhi Police issued a special report indicating that Baba Ramdev intended to hold indefinite hunger strike along with 30,000-35,000 supporters and that the organizers were further claiming that the gathering would exceed one lakh. Although the permission was granted for holding a yoga training camp for 4 to 5 thousand people between 1st June, 2011 to 20th June, 2011. The DCP issued law and order arrangements detailing the requirement of Force for dealing with such a large gathering. The initial intelligence input in this case proved critical in drawing up the law and order plan.

Prior intelligence gathering is critical and it should be able to indicate the issues for agitation, the public support, estimated gathering and the composition, important leaders and parties supporting the agitation, the duration and sustainability of the protest, areas of mobilization and their plans during and after the agitation. Such intelligence can help police in planning in advance, in mobilization of resources and manpower and coordinating with other agencies, it also allows the policy makers time to look at the issues raised and the options available to them. The law and order arrangements can be drawn up accordingly and parleys with the organizers can be held anticipating the actual gathering and activity.

8.2 (a) Background Information and Intelligence 48-

Police must seek to know as much as they can about the protesting groups well in advance of a

48 Seen on 07.05.2015 at http://upsdma.up.nic.in/sdmplan/FINALDMP-%20Civil%20Disob%20&%20Mass%20Agit.pdf
demonstration/march etc. It not only provides warning, but insights as well. With better knowledge about the organizers one can read the situation through “their eyes” and anticipate what they are going to do. Police must continually assess their objectives against what the protesters are trying to accomplish. Some basic questions that needs to answered:

- Who are they? What is the overarching identity of the crowd? Are they strikers, caste/community factions, or social protestors?
  Understanding who they are will indicate what they may do. Do they identify themselves as strikers, ethnic groups, religious factions, or oppressed protestors against some social injustice? In large programmes it may be possible to determine identities and goals from advance assembling instructions, leaflets distributed to bystanders, placards and banners being carried, as well as, slogans and songs being expressed.

- What are their goals?
  *What the group wants to accomplish by assembling could determine the extent to which they can be accommodated once they have assembled.* They may seek only recognition for their cause. This usually means being seen and heard. If so, this goal is usually easy to accommodate. In some cases groups may have more demanding goals that cannot be accommodated by the officers at site, making confrontation likely.

- What is the composition of the crowd and are there any known factions?
  As previously indicated, crowds and demonstrations are frequently more heterogeneous than homogeneous.

- What are they capable of doing?
  Protest groups often claim that they will assemble large numbers of people to produce some disruptive action. Organizers exaggerate for two reasons. First, they want to boost their own people’s morale, and second they want the media to report that they have strength in numbers. Studying a group’s past activities may provide an indicator of what they are capable of doing in the future.

- What are their traditional behaviors?
  Different people do different things during protests. It varies with the group. For example, social protest organizations and striking unions will carry placards and banners. It is common to see in rural areas crowds sitting and blocking traffic to protest against some accident. Understanding the traditional behaviour of the protestors can be
helpful in deciding how to respond to their behaviors.

- When and where will they assemble?
  Every protest organizer has a time and place for assembling and perhaps a destination for the crowd to move. If the organizer attempts to mobilize large numbers of participants, the time and place(s) for assembling and dispersing must be made known in the instructions. This information may be stated in mobilization instructions, or disseminated by word of mouth.

- Where will they go?
  Many crowds have destinations. Organizations may march a specified distance to ensure that their cause gets sufficient attention. If so, tactical commanders should know the route and minimize disruptions to the rest of society. They may also decide about providing security along the route.

- What are the possible targets of violence?
  Rioters in particular may focus on target facilities.

- What is the worst case scenario?
  The worst case scenario must be recognized for the sake of avoidance. For many on-site managers, the worst case scenario often is the situation of a peaceful crowd degenerating into a violent riot.

- When and where will they disperse?
  Upon reaching its destination, the protest marchers may disperse. Even a well organized march, once disbanded and unsupervised, may become wayward. It may be important at times to transport the marchers back to the origin of the march.

During the course of an agitation programme, police officials may have to stop actions that threaten property, personal safety and public order. If such behavior is not stopped, it may generate a sense of empowerment among the protesters / rioters and encourage more destructive behavior. It is easy to see a few violent individuals in crowds and generalize this behavior to the entire crowd. Such generalizations are usually incorrect and dangerous. Generally only a few individuals engage in destructive behavior. The danger occurs when police respond collectively to the entire gathering and provoke individuals who were not involved in the violence. It is of utmost importance to identify the violent individuals and restrain them. Intelligence plays a key role here. With background information on key persons,
police will find it more effective to target them and to respond to that behavior, rather than the crowd as whole.

8.3 ‘CONTAINMENT’ TACTICS

In the Public Perception Survey conducted during the research 79.9% (35.6% always & 44.3% sometimes) respondents favored holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters disrupt day to day activities of public. 77.7% (45.3% & 32.4%) respondents favored holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten to damage public and private property. 78.6% (53.1% always & 25.5% sometimes) respondents’ favored holding of protesters in a controlled area when protesters threaten public safety.

Finally, containing a crowd is, perhaps, more important than disbursing a crowd; as forced dispersal can result in a crowd breaking up into a multitude of groups that would scatter over a vast area. This could pose even greater public order problems. A crowd is likely to be better controlled by means of containment—confining its activities to a given area.

The findings and directions, point no.13 & 14, of the SC in WP 122 of 2011 –

‘(13) ..while considering the ‘threat perception’ as a ground for revoking such permissions or passing an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., ‘care perception’ has to be treated as an integral part thereof. ‘Care perception’ is an obligation of the State while performing its constitutional duty and maintaining social order.

(14) It is unavoidable for this Court to direct that the police authorities should take such actions properly and strictly in accordance with the Guidelines, Standing Orders and the Rules applicable thereto. It is not only desirable but also a mandatory requirement of the present day that the State and the police authorities should have a complete and effective dispersement plan in place, before evicting the gathering by use of force from a particular place, in furtherance to an order passed by an executive authority under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C.’

Identification/earmarking of venues of mass agitations/public protests District and State level for ‘Containment’ of large protesting crowd. Identify adequate parking spaces during such agitations/protests. A mass protest scheme (S.O.P) should be drawn up for every important town, with due attention given to the dispersal plan. These schemes should be practiced every half-year. The object of the practice is to ensure that all officers are conversant with the details of the scheme and their duties therein. Medical aid and drinking water availability should be an essential part of the arrangements. Tower may be erected in strategic locations for mounting video camera for coverage of entire program. Installation of C.C.T.V. Cameras at strategic locations to feed the control room for total monitoring of activities in the venue and the
surroundings. This will help in passing crucial instruction from control room to field level officers who may not be aware of developments in the surrounding area. Compulsory use of CCTV and use of drones for recording and surveillance would also eliminate high handedness by the police and can help in analysis and inquiry at the later stage. Segments recorded by participants, bystanders, and media are useful; however, when departments record their own documentation, they ensure its value for case review, accountability and context.

The disturbances erupting at one place should be controlled and not be allowed to spread to new areas. The incidents should be nipped swiftly in the bud itself. Violation of laws like the traffic laws should be dealt with strictly in other parts of the city to curb lawlessness.

In containing the agitation to a controlled location ‘Kettling’ is a technique developed by UK forces. Kettling is finding acceptability among the public and judicial courts too, particularly when there is an apprehension of breach of peace or disruption of public activities and business as a result of agitation. The application of this technique is not ascertained for large protests, however, with some modifications for managing mass protests in large controlled area, by allowing more freedom to protesters, this method could be effective. (Note on Kettling attached at Annexure-Q)

8.4 PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS-

Agencies involved in managing a civil disobedience / mass agitation⁴⁹: Police is the primary agency for such situations. District administration, magistracy in particular, also has a key role in managing response operations. Other agencies that have major role in planning and execution of response operations are intelligence agencies, armed police (PAC) and army. For this Plan, all agencies other than police (i.e. even the magistracy) are support agencies. There are other support agencies viz. Department of Health, Department of Food & Civil Supplies, Directorate of Information & Public Relations (DIPR), and Department of Revenue (Scarcity), PHED and Fire Service.

Primary Agency’s (PA’s) role encompasses anticipation, preparedness, preventions, response and finally assistance in recovery. Support agency’s roles are varied. Intelligence plays a key role in anticipation, district administration (with police) in prevention, PAC and Army in

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⁴⁹ Seen on 07.05.2015 at http://upsdma.up.nic.in/sdmplan/FINALDMP-%20Civil%20Disob%20&%20Mass%20Agit.pdf
response, Fire Service in rescue, Health in providing medical care to victims and responders and F&CS, PHED and Revenue (Scarcity) in relief and DIRP in managing the information environment.

Every state should have contingency plan for handling mass agitations.

The Plan should provide all information required to handle mass agitation in the State while complying with the provisions of all Acts, executive orders, guidelines; and should be the most authentic and useful resource for ensuring the state of preparedness for effectively managing any mass agitation.

The planning for mass agitations should be covered under disaster management planning. The disaster management planning received a new orientation with the passage of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. This Act created NDMA and stipulated preparation of a National Plan on Disaster Management in consultation with the State Governments and expert bodies. It also stipulated that every Ministry and Department of the Government of India should make provisions, in its annual plan budgets, for carrying out activities and programmes set out in the disaster management plans.

The objectives of a DMP on Civil Disobedience & Mass Agitation would be:

1. To maintain law and order.
2. To provide information on time, to the people about the danger
3. To ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people.
4. To protect vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services.
5. To provide protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to the government
6. To minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are undertaken immediately.
7. Strengthening institutional mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of coordination

The Plan should consider the following objectives:
1. Classification of necessary activities for effective preparedness for different Departments / Organizations
2. Identifying emergency responses for different stages of mass agitation
3. Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and capacity building for risk mitigation, prevention and response
4. Creating heightened awareness among the community-members by education and communication activities.

Executive summary of the Disaster Management plan for handling mass agitations prepared by U.P. State and its contents\(^5\) are attached at Annexure-U.

**The suggestions received from the State Police Forces:-**

- Prepare complete and effective dispersement plans for identified locations for holding protests and the same should a part of police arrangements issued for handling protests.
- Trouble spots should be identified and area-wise list of potential communal agitators, trouble mongers and anti-social elements should be prepared. Watch should be maintained on them and they should be apprehended in time.
- Temporary jail should be identified and earmarked in advance by the police for mass arrests in the event of violation of terms & conditions and Laws.
- The police should be in touch with the electricity department to ensure uninterrupted power supply during the nights from the stage of preventive action till normalcy is restored.
- Arrangements should be made with the Railway authorities to restrict entry of outsiders into the town. If necessary, escorts should be provided to the trains. Some police force should be stationed on the outskirts of the town on roads also to restrict entry of the outsiders.
- A riot map should be drawn indicating the roads, radio stations, offices, and vulnerable points, patrol parties should move in all important streets and places were trouble is likely to occur and should be able to deal with any situation that they may encounter.
- Armed Police should escort the fire service/ambulance and the fire unit should be given adequate protection. Feeding arrangements have to be made to the men on duty at various points in a police vehicle.

\(^5\) Seen on 07.05.2015 at http://upsdma.up.nic.in/sdmplan/FINALDMP-%20Civil%20Disob%20&%20Mass%20Agit.pdf
• Use of helicopters, if possible for aerial recue, to identify the areas where there is spontaneous violence and crowd movement on a large scale for effective and better coordination among forces to be deployed to curtail the mob violence. (MHA Task Force recommendations)

• All liquor shops in the vicinity of agitation site shall be ordered to be closed.

• Places of worship should be checked to ensure that no arms, stones and knives and other weapons are kept there and good as are not sheltered therein.

**Be able to protect officers working with the crowd**- Protecting officers who work with a crowd is important. Have a tactical unit (with full protective equipment) on standby in a location near the demonstration but out of sight, available as an emergency response to protect or rescue officers in or others in danger of being harmed. Their mission is to protect people first and property second. Deploy the emergency response team as a last-ditch tactic when police have not been effective in managing the crowd with softer methods.  

The Stockholm, Sweden, Police Department uses highly visible and identifiable “dialogue police,” while British law enforcement agencies use “communication police.” The Boise Police Department, maintains a tactical unit with full protective equipment on standby in an out-of-sight location near the demonstration. The unit serves as an emergency response to protect officers and the public from harm. Its mission is to safeguard people first and property second. Deploying the emergency response team is a last alternative when soft crowd control tactics prove ineffective.

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**8.5 SETUP SPECIALIZED FORCE IN EVERY STATE TO DEAL WITH PROTESTS**

The indiscriminate use of force by the police during an event can negatively impact upon crowd dynamics to increase the risk that a crowd poses to public order. In order to achieve proportionality in policing crowd, there should be strategic focus upon facilitation and a graded, differentiated and information led approach to the use of force. This can only be achieved through a trained and specialized force for public order policing.

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The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary in Canada has always maintained a crowd control team. In 2004 the team was restructured into what is now called the Public Order Unit (POU). The POU is the largest specialized unit within the RNC, consisting of over 40 officers including commanders and a Deputy Chief of Police. It also consists of 4 horses, 3 dogs, and members of the Tactics & Rescue Unit. All members of the POU assume this role as a secondary duty and are situated within the RNC North East Avalon jurisdiction. The POU is responsible for crowd control management for large public gatherings. Their main priority is to maintain public order and ensure public safety. They have been effectively trained on how to interact with different types of crowd and diffuse volatile situations.53

In UK, Police Support Unit or PSU is a unit of police officers who have undergone specialist training in public order policing. PSU units spend considerable time training with other specialist police teams as well as certain military units. A PSU consists of: 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants, 18 Constables plus 2 medics and 3 drivers.

The police officers of Delhi Police in the workshop, states in their response to the questionnaire seeking their suggestions and MHA Task Force in their recommendations have suggested that every State/CPO engaged in law & order duty should earmark some battalions of Armed Police (as per requirement) specifically for law & order duty. Alternatively or additionally, States may designate one or more companies in every battalion exclusively for law & order duty and be kept on training round the clock (MHA Task Force recommendations and recommendations of Delhi Police workshop). In this regard the structure of battalion and the equipment to be provided to such a battalion as per RAF specifications for law and order duties is attached at Annexure-O.

As per MHA Task Force recommendations, in a contingent of platoon strength (20 heads) which has to deal with the dispersal of crowd should normally have the following equipment/arms :-

- 50% with normal lathis/shields depending upon the strength of the contingent of which half of them would have full protective gears.

53 http://www.rnc.gov.nl.ca/whatwedo/POU.html
2-4 persons with tear smoke guns/grenades, depending upon the strength of the contingent.

2-3 persons with non-lethal weapons.

2 persons with firearms who will remain always with I/C law and order contingent during mob violence.

Avoid as far as possible use of outside force- Officers from other locations may differ in philosophy, training, or ability to work together during a conspicuous event. External resources could lack soft crowd management experience or community knowledge. It was also felt that in dealing with mass agitations, invariably, Central Paramilitary Forces are deployed, depending on their availability and location. Very often, they have recently moved out from anti-insurgency operations, as a part of rotation policy, from the disturbed areas. Such exposure makes them ill-suited to handle/react to crowd handling situations where different kind of response is expected from police force. Police from other cities and locations usually do not have the training or ability necessary to work in local conditions. Most of them do not have soft crowd management experience or knowledge of local conditions, nor could they be as responsive as the local police to directions given, leading to coordination and adjustment problems.

Therefore, a demilitarizing course for civil police and Central Paramilitary Forces officers, who have returned from a stint from terrorist infested areas for general (riot/election related) Law and Order duties, should be made mandatory. Only those officers, who have undergone the soft skill training course and training program for induction to law and order duties at their academies, may be approved for deployment for public order duties in cities for handling agitations (Suggested training program schedule attached at Annexure S & T). Continuous briefing at the time of deployment and during the deployment should be given to all the officers of outside force and units, to sensitize and inform them about the instructions, developments and nature of agitation.

8.6 IMPROVE PROCEDURES FOR REGISTRATION OF CASES

Cases must be registered promptly, investigated impartially and prosecuted successfully under the close supervision of Inspectors and SDPOs. If need be, a separate investigation team should
be formed during the period of riots. If there is a shortage of manpower, special police officers can be appointed under the Police Acts. Police Station level information about anti-social elements should also be taken into account. The persons arrested during the mob violence need to be classified as: 1. Minors 2. First time law breakers and 3. Hard Core Criminals. The minors should be immediately segregated from rest of the arrested persons and should be lodged in Juvenile Jails/Correctional Home. The first time arrested persons should be dealt with appropriately and hard-core criminals need to be dealt effectively under law (MHA Task Force recommendations). Cases against protesters that are registered should not be withdrawn politically and the legal course of action should always be adopted and followed. Video footage should be sent to court along with the FIR (if case is initiated) and copy should be kept in DM’s and SP’s office. (Recommendation from States).

In 2013, Delhi police handled 1,467 demonstrations, 683 rallies, 1,183 dharnas and around 6,500 other arrangements which required electronic surveillance and in more than 50% of cases, cops need to conduct a post-event analysis during an enquiry. Many such protests witness violence and require us to identify people who are either hurt or engaging in violence. If all goes well, the drones will be used to keep an eye, real time, on protesters and general public during events involving crowds, and the footage used for post-incident analysis. Police currently use private cameramen or borrows footage from TV channels in most cases. The drone cameras would provide images and videos with enough clarity to enable cops to zoom in on an individual suspect in a crowd from a distance of more than 100 meters. The videos will be simultaneously relayed to the control room. The machines would be able to fly up to a height of 100 meters, accessing corners where the police cannot reach.  

8.7 ENACT NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES

Mass agitations, besides inflicting heavy damage upon public and private property, also lead to indirect loss through road or rail blocks that bring essential services to a halt. Such protests, irrespective of the motive or cause, cannot be allowed.

The report submitted by Justice K.T. Thomas Committee in SC WP no 77 of 2007 has made the following recommendations:

(i) The PDPP Act (Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984) must be so amended as to incorporate a rebuttable presumption (after the prosecution established the two facets) that the accused is guilty of the offence.

(ii) The PDPP Act to contain provision to make the leaders of the organization, which calls the direct action, guilty of abetment of the offence.

(iii) The PDPP Act to contain a provision for rebuttable presumption.

(iv) Enable the police officers to arrange videography of the activities damaging public property.

To this end Punjab has brought in The Punjab Prevention of Damage to Public and Private Property Bill, 2014, that will hold organizers of such violent demonstrations and perpetrators of the damage among the participants responsible, making them liable to pay a fine, compensate for the loss, and even a jail term. While laws already existed under the IPC to deal with any act of violence, what is new is holding the organizers responsible and making them pay. "Damaging act" means an act, agitation, strike etc. that results in damage to any public or private property. Anyone committing a "damaging act" will be punished with imprisonment up to one year and fine up to Rs. 1 lakh. Commission of a "damaging act" using fire or explosive substances will be punished with imprisonment from one to two years and fine of up to Rs. 3 lakh. Any offence under the Bill will be non-bail able and a video graphic version of the "damaging act" will be considered sufficient evidence. The guilty will also be liable to make good the loss caused to the property and the amount to be paid will be decided by the competent authority. The amount will be recovered as arrears of land revenue, which means it can be recovered by selling the immovable or moveable property of the guilty.

However, there are certain provisions regarding bail, assessment of damage, and the identification of 'organizer(s)' or individual(s) causing the damage that are open to misuse. While most victims of failure or excesses of government machinery have to go to appellate authorities that are not easily accessible, the power to carry out an arrest under this law has been given to even the head constable.

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56 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140723/punjab.htm#1
8.8 AUTHENTIC LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATORY DECISION MAKING

It was observed by the full bench of Supreme Court of India in CWP No. 77 of 2007 in para No.7 of the judgment that-

‘The person in charge to supervise the demonstration shall be the SP (if the situation is confined to the district) and the highest police officer in the State, where the situation stretches beyond one district.’

The police tactics in dealing with the demonstration is dependent on the police assessment of imminent disorder and reaction by demonstrator, political directives and their own perception of the legitimacy of the protesters making the interaction of these variables fluid during the course of a protest. The force commander in charge of handling the agitation should lead from the front. During high-profile demonstrations, police command officers need to be visible, communicative, and willing to take charge. This provides an excellent opportunity to assess the mood of the crowd and reinforce the police outlook and crowd management tactics. The message received from top-level management greatly influences the behavior and mind-set of frontline officers.

In case of Baba Ram Dev episode, the field Police officers carried the feeling that they were not taken into confidence, when critical decision to disperse such big gathering of public, while they were sleeping at night, was taken. Following events proved that the decision was an operational blunder. There should invariably be proper coordination among top decision makers/planners, the negotiating team and the ground level officials in planning and executing the police approach to deal with any mob protest/agitation.

Decision makers should take the views and feedback from the officers deployed at the agitation site and the negotiators and major stakeholders before taking critical decisions. Sometimes single minded pursuit by the police agencies can lead to avoidable disasters of unforeseen magnitude. What appears to be a logical step in run up to the planned operations by the officers of the law enforcement agencies may look unjustified from other stakeholders’ point of view resulting into major situational complexities. As far as possible the decision taken should also be conveyed to the protesters so that there are no surprises and protesting group gets sufficient time to comply with the decisions. The command center and the commander should be as near to the agitation site as possible in order to get the realistic picture of the situation on ground.
Among the suggestions received from the protesters, in the Public Perception Survey, there were views that the police leadership handling the agitations should be honest and trustworthy. Undoubtedly, police leader’s credibility enhances legitimacy of police actions. Police actions and decisions that are on sound ethical ground help in winning the trust of the crowd and loyalty of subordinates. Authentic leadership is an approach to leadership that emphasizes building the leader’s legitimacy through honest relationships with followers which value their input and are built on an ethical foundation. Generally, authentic leaders are positive people with truthful self-concepts who promote openness. By building trust and generating enthusiastic support from their subordinates, authentic leaders are able to improve individual and team performance. Only such leadership and not the authoritative style of functioning would be suitable for winning the confidence, of both the policemen managing protest and the crowd, critical for successful management of peaceful agitation.

8.9 DEAL ROBUSTLY WITH POLICE MISCONDUCT-

The findings and directions, point no. 15 & 16, of the SC in WP 122 of 2011 state-

‘(15) This is not a case where the Court can come to the conclusion that the entire police force has acted in violation to the Rules, Standing orders and have fallen stray in their uncontrolled zeal of forcibly evicting innocent public from the Ramlila Maidan. There has to be a clear distinction between the cases of responsibility of the force collectively and the responsibility of individual members of the forces. I find from the evidence on record that some of the police officers/personnel were very cooperative with the members of the assembly and helped them to vacate the Ramlila Maidan while others were violent, inflicted cane injuries, threw bricks and even used tear-gas shells, causing fire on the stage and total commotion and confusion amongst the large gathering at the Ramlila Maidan. Therefore, these two classes of Police Force have to be treated differently.

(16) Thus, while directing the State Government and the Commissioner of Police to register and investigate cases of criminal acts and offences, destruction of private and public property against the police officers/personnel along with those members of the assembly, who threw bricks at the police force causing injuries to the members of the force as well as damage to the property, I issue the following directions:

a. Take disciplinary action against all the erring police officers/personnel who have indulged in brick-batting, have resorted to lathi charge and excessive use of tear gas shells upon the crowd, have exceeded their authority or have acted in a manner not permissible under the prescribed procedures, rules or the standing orders and their actions have an element of criminality. This action shall be taken against the officer/personnel irrespective of what ranks they hold in the hierarchy of police.

b. The police personnel who were present in the pandal and still did not help the evacuation of the large gathering and in transportation of sick and injured people to the hospitals have, in my opinion, also rendered themselves liable for appropriate disciplinary action.

c. The police shall also register criminal cases against the police personnel and members of the gathering at the Ramlila ground (whether they were followers of Baba Ramdev or otherwise) who indulged in

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authentic_leadership
damage to the property, brick-batting etc. All these cases have already been reported to the Police Station Kamla Market. The police shall complete the investigation and file a report under section 173 of the Cr.P.C. within three months from today.’

Evidence based facts/information SC in WP 122 of 2011

“The Police itself admit use of water cannon and tear gas but denies lathi charge “No lathi charge even ordered on public, no organized lathi-charge by Policeman; but evidence shows that lathis being used; Police beating people with Lathi’s also in CD @ 47 minute shows lathi-charge”.

Very often individual acts of misconduct by a policeman get highlighted out of proportion and threaten to undermine the credibility of entire force dealing with the situation. At times the police reaction is to coverup and denial of any misconduct by its members. This should not be the way to handle these matter, such misconduct should be looked into promptly and a message should also go in the force that individual acts of misconduct by the members of the force would not be tolerated and swift and robust action should invariably be taken in such matters by the officers in command.

It should also be ensured that all officers display their names and badges prominently at all times during public order operations so that Police officers assigned to handle crowd duty are to be easily identifiable. Avoid any measures or practices that reduce the police to be anonymous agents. While anonymity or any depersonalization of police conducting crowd management encourages negative crowd behavior, it can also lead to unaccountable behavior on the part of the police.58

8.10 COMMUNICATION IS CRITICAL

8.10(a) Improve dialogue with protesting groups-

When the police become the hate object of protesters and there is trust deficit, communication with protest groups — the single-most important element to prevent violence and standoffs — is the first casualty. The police should invariably seek to improve dialogue with protesting groups in advance whenever possible to gain a better understanding of the intent of the protesters and the nature of the protest activity. This can greatly facilitate the protest and ensure a proportionate policing response.

The two agitations, Ramdev agitation and Anna Hazare agitation, contrast in the way communication was maintained between the police and the agitators and it is not surprising that the outcome also, in these two cases, was starkly different. While in police action, during Ramdev agitation, the agitators were caught unawares by the midnight police action and there was no dispersal plan in place, in Anna Hazare movement there was a constant dialogue going on and the organizers were repeatedly advised by police in writing that police was unarmed and they should deploy volunteers to control the rowdies. The entire plan for contingency removal of Anna Hazare was rehearsed several times and the organizers were kept in confidence that they will be informed before that would be done. The Anna Hazare movement handling is remembered today as a success story, while the handling of Ramdev agitation ended in a fiasco.

The disproportionate and indiscriminate threat or use of force can create psychological processes in the crowd that draw into conflict those who had come to the event with no prior conflictual intention. Police legitimacy can be critical in avoiding the production of these processes during crowd events. One of the key factors for enhancing and actively creating perceptions of police legitimacy among crowd participants is dialogue and communication with those within crowd before, during and after the event.

This also highlights the importance of negotiations in dealing with such protests. Trained and dedicated negotiators, deployed by the police at the protest site, can play a big role in successful handling of agitation and bridge the trust deficit between police and agitators. They can also improve communication by providing a channel of constant dialogue between the two. Officers must negotiate, educate, and maintain continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members. Police personnel initially must state that they defend the public’s right to demonstrate, but cannot allow the crowd to hurt others or destroy property. Whether officers support the crowd’s position or if the group holds an unpopular view, law enforcement agencies must remain neutral and prevent physical injuries or property destruction. Good negotiation skills of some of the experienced police officers deployed at the Anna Hazare agitation proved to be very useful in handling the agitation. Negotiation management tactics may be developed and professional/trained negotiators may be a part of negotiating team. Trained government employees can be used as inter-face between different classed of agitator and local administration. South African Police in their policy have emphasised the importance of liaising with protest organisers, a practice that was stopped years ago. The new public order
protest policy approved by the ministry of police will bring back negotiates with protest leaders.

8.10(b) Develop Effective Plans to Communicate with Public and Media

Law enforcement agencies play a major role in responsibly reporting accurate information quickly and continually for the benefit of officers, the public, and the media. As per the Public Perception Survey, 55.5% respondents felt that it will help a lot and 26.5% felt that it will help to some extent if there is better coordination among police and media. The development of effective plans to communicate with public and media, directly or indirectly, is an essential element of modern public order policing. Having an effective media relationship is becoming very important to police when addressing crowd management incidents. We need to put greater emphasis on communication and media strategies. To improve the level of communication with the public, the police should develop a strategy to effectively communicate with the media before, during and after protests, to convey a policing perspective of events.

As per Public Perception Survey, news channels ranked first, as 50% respondents considered them as most trusted source of getting information. Therefore, it would be advisable to appoint a press briefing officer who is authorized to hold regular press briefing from media room specifically designated for this purpose and well fed by latest information and supported by sufficient and efficient drafting staff. By such permanent appointment, professional jealousies towards police spokes-person by their own colleagues and senior officers can also be suitably tackled. As was seen during the one agitation in Delhi, initially there was no daily official briefing by Delhi Police on the ongoing events, and when one A.C.P. rank officer was handling media briefing, the officer was transferred as the A.C.P was frequently appearing on media channels and perceived to be becoming popular.

For media management, only designated officers should brief the media persons regarding law and order, so that correct picture is brought before the general public to counter the rumours. However, media needs to be kept away at a suitable distance from the places of mob violence during action (MHA Task Force recommendation). For the coverage of agitation site the police should make a media enclosure from where media can view the protesters as the police see them and not from where the protesters see the police.
Police may invite media to accompany officers managing agitation situations. Such outreach gives the impression that the authorities have nothing to hide and it provides an opportunity to media men to see the police’s side of an event. Tactically, this way police view of protest is projected to the people viewing the news channels. The officers should also be trained in giving media bites by being able to present their view within 30 seconds.

8.10(c) Restore the Credibility of Police Briefings/Information Dissemination Channels-

The Public Perception Survey indicated that 52.6% public felt that it will help a lot and 33.6% felt that it will help to some extent to restore confidence of public and counter misinformation if police provides regular briefing on the situation. In the absence of availability of authentic information from official channels, misinformation can add fuel to the fire as it happened during the Ramdev agitation. In disseminating information, the effort should be to minimize surprises from the police to the public to avoid inconvenience and for the protesters to avoid panic reaction in the face of police action. Rumour mongering should be stopped and the press publishing the news tendentious to arouse passions should be prevented from publishing such news by (a) advice, (b) persuasion, (c) prohibitory orders and as a last resort by prosecution. Un-authorized publication of this type, which violates the code of conduct, can also be reported to the press council for necessary action.

As per the survey, police briefing/ police website/ control room figured as the least trusted source of getting information on mass protest by the public. Suitable procedures need to be evolved for management of the media, updating of information on police websites, sending tweets and loading of police videos on YouTube before, during the operation and after the operation. The police should also inform and warn the protesters and the public in advance that restrictions may be placed on protesters and the nature of arrangements in place to reduce disruption and the threat of disorder. In the survey overwhelming majority of public 67.1% felt that it will help a lot, 24.6% felt it will help to some extent to manage the situation in mass agitations if police informs about arrangements in advance to public.
8.11 IMPROVE TRAINING & GUIDANCE

The most effective means for achieving proportionality in the policing crowd is through a graded, differentiated and information led approach to the use of force which can only be achieved thorough reform of public order training and training to increase police capability for ‘dialogue’ and communication with the crowd in mass agitations.

Findings on Incident of Midnight of 4th/5th June, 2011 and the role of Police and Members/followers of Respondent No.4, para 140, SC WP 122 of 2011-

‘The Standing Order 309 contemplates that there should be display of banner indicating promulgation of Section 144 Cr.P.C., repeated use of Public Address system by a responsible officer-appealing/advising the leaders and demonstrators to remain peaceful and come forward for memorandum, their deputation etc. or court arrest peacefully and requires such announcement to be videographed. It further contemplates that if the crowd does not follow the appeal and turns violent, then the assembly should be declared as unlawful on the PA System and the same should be videographed. Warning on PA system prior to use of any kind of force is to be ensured and also videographed. I find that there is hardly any compliance to these terms of this Standing Order.’

The police training centers should lay more stress on teaching the trainees about various methods to effectively control mass agitations/public protests. Police officers should become well versed with the SOPs on the use of force during the training. Modern techniques and latest methods to deal with the mass agitators should become part of the syllabus in the training institutes so that the Police officials could learn such methods/tactics during initial training courses. Special emphasis during training should be laid on crowd control and handling/use of equipment during the mob dispersal with effectiveness and minimum collateral damages and avoidance of loss of human lives. (MHA Task Force recommendation)

8.11(a) Suggestion on Training from States Police -

i. Hands-On Training -

Training should include basic formation of anti-riots drill and specialized formation of anti-riots drill to tackle different situations. There should be more practical hands on training for the trainees in addition to the academic aspects. Trainees could also be sent to different mass agitations and public protests apart from conducting mock drill. They should be put to many
situations, reaction tests to enhance their psychological ability to handle the agitation/protests. They should be taught about the leadership qualities and restraint required in such situations.

New police tactics may be developed to control aggressive protesters. After observing the recent modus operandi of rioters, Rapid Action Force of CRPF, revisited its riot drills and formations and introduced new drills and formations like: - Pierce through the crowd or Piercing Drill - Turtle Drill - Tactical Retreat need to be introduced.

**ii. Developing Soft Skills**

Mass agitation is also a means of ventilation of public mind which needs to be understood by the Police. The Police personnel have to be trained and sensitized periodically through in service training for updating the knowledge about mob operation, handling of crowd in an emergency situation and to study the mind of the agitators, collection of intelligence, soft skills including developing public contacts and earning the public confidence. There is a need of well qualified trainers especially in field of Social Science & Psychology to teach how to tackle the situations by peaceful and tactful methods. The training academies of Paramilitary Forces should particularly develop soft skill capsule courses for officers and ORs to be deployed for law and order duties. A suggested soft skills training program is attached as Annexure-S.

Suggested training durations for some specialized courses on handling mass agitations are:

1. 2 weeks for course on riot control training to State Police and Other Central Police Organizations (CPOs);
2. 2 days’ workshop for public order management for Executive Magistrates and Police CPOs Officers;
3. 4 weeks course for training of trainers in riot control public order.

**8.11(b) Focus on Improving Police Behaviour with Protesters**

When public was asked to comment on police behaviour with public during the protest, 52.6% people felt that they need a lot to improve, 20.9% felt that police do not interact and only the remaining 26.4% felt that police are helpful. The Delhi police officers in the workshop were candid to accept that the behaviour and approach of police personnel towards public like communication, body language etc. need to be improved. In the survey that was conducted during the research work the protesters suggested that police officer should maintain cordial
relation with protesters using decent & polite language without use of habitual abuses/obscene words. They should be caring, lenient to public and should listen to public to prove that they are with the public. The police should be good at human relations and humble. And honest police officers should come forwarded to defuse the crisis as appeal of honesty always carries weight. Police officers with clean image and maturity should handle such protests. Protesters felt that the system can change by bringing about awareness and motivation among policemen.

8.11(c) Training in Districts and other MHA Task Force (2011) Recommendations -

Training to the police force regarding how to control riots/Mass agitations/Public protests should be imparted at District level also. States may also constitute District reserves for this purpose. Specialized training may be imparted to them to deal with unlawful assembly. This trained component should be employed first to deal with law & order problems and in case of further requirement, other police components may assist/complement them. A suggested one week training program that can be conducted in districts is attached at Annexure-T.

Superintendents of Police should ensure that Sub-Divisional Police Officers and Station House Officers organize demonstrations of mob dispersal by the District Armed Reserve from time to time during their visits to the District Headquarters. Mock drill should be arranged in the District as it is generally aimed at ensuring/ checking preparedness & proper response in any emergency. Such mock drill is meant to coordinate response of all agencies involved in law and order management. These drills should be held at district police station levels with an aim to effectively deal with and with any law and order situation (MHA Task Force recommendations).

Training needs for dealing with agitations has also been dealt with in a section devoted to training in MHA Task Force report attached at Annexure-K. Some important recommendations of the MHA Task Force are as follows:-

- Training of the trainers to be conducted at selected Training Schools/Colleges at National level under the supervision of MHA, GOI.
- Sufficient knowledge of Substantive/Procedural Law to be imparted during the training.
• Trainers to be made aware about the working of judicial system.
• Stress during training to be on respect for Human Rights/Values.
• Ladies components should also to be identified and trained in riot control.
• Basic training modules at different levels need to be reviewed to put more stress on anti-riot drills with more time (at least 4 weeks) allotted for this with emphasis on simulated/mock exercises and use of non-lethal methods.
• Training resources, in terms of infrastructure, manpower etc., may be shared between different States/Police forces, for optimal use, in an organized manner to train personnel in the field.
• Select personnel may be imparted specialized training at various centers of excellence in the world or through their instructors brought to India by way of ‘training of trainers’ so that they may later train others.
• Short duration refresher course on anti-riot drills should be imparted to all field officers, on rotational basis, who may be required to deal with law and order problems.
• Sufficient number of trainers should be identified and deputed for special training in riot control to the leading training centers. They, in turn, would train the policemen in their State/District.
• Sufficient anti-riot/crowd control equipment to be made available at the training centers.
• The introduction of Audio-Visual training will have an effective impact on the trainees.
• Mock and virtual training modules be introduced in the curriculum.

8.11(d) Review the Current Public Order Training

The best officers to use in crowd situations are officers who are specially selected and trained for this kind of work, and who have the personality to use a soft approach under sometimes trying circumstances—self-control is essential. There is an urgent need to review the current public order training imparted to police officers deployed for law and order duties. This should also include an examination of current tactics employed by the police forces, such as the use of shields and batons, rubber bullets, water cannon and tear gas shells to ensure that these are subjected to medical assessment. Training on the use of force should not be abstract but should consider the practical application of the use force in the public order context, for example, by instructing officers that the use of particular tactics, such as the edge of a shield or a baton strike to the head may constitute potentially lethal force.
There is a requirement to sensitize the police personnel to changing scenario of public order policing. There is a need to change their mind set and old stereotypes so that they can serve with greater sensitivity. Training should also be given to officers to exhibit restraint even in the face of provocation by protesters and the tactics to deal with individual use of force such as distraction, in collective action such as public order operations. These practices would ensure that minor localized incidents do not develop into flash points in precarious situations. In the new policy on public order South African government felt that it is also necessary to ensure training is improved, especially regarding the use of force with due respect to human rights. They realized the importance of having a strong line of command and control, negotiation skills and the ability of public order policing units to undertake crime prevention activities when not tasked with Public Order Policing activities\textsuperscript{59}.

In UK, apart from training on Use of Force & Public Order Training, there are three courses in Public Order Command Training for the strategic, tactical and operational commanders. Useful details of these courses have been included in chapter Literature Review\textsuperscript{60}. Similar command course- operational course for officers of the rank of DSP/SP, tactical and strategic courses for officers of the rank of SSP/DIG/IG/ADG should be conducted at the national level.

**8.11(e) Recommendations for Training in Public Order for Indian Police Officers**

Public order training should also include dealing with peaceful protests, as the present training curriculum only focuses on handling unlawful assembly and protests. Such training should incorporate and emphasize relevant human rights principles, human values, conflict management, negotiation skills, stress management skills, communication skills, use of protective riot control gear by member of force, use of non-lethal weapons and new drill formations.

Following courses are recommended for Indian Police Officers.

**i. Training on the Use of Force**

The training on the use of force, for the officers(ORs/NGOs) to be deployed to handle agitations, must include:-


\textsuperscript{60} (See 2.5(d) Training in Public Order Policing in UK)
1. SOPs for use of different force- lathi charge, tear gas, water cannon.
3. Command and control training.
4. Practical use of different non lethal weapons like lathis, tear gas & water cannon with practical application of the use of force in the public order context, for example, by instructing officers that the use of particular tactics, such as the edge of a shield or a baton strike to the head may constitute potentially lethal force. Similarly tear gas shells should not be fired into a closed space & should not be directed to fall in between the protesters.

5. Soft Skills Training
6. Training on self restraint in the event of protestors abusing or pushing a police officer. Inculcate recognition that police officers have the right in law to use force in self defence or the protection of others but they remain individually accountable for any use of force.

**ii. Public Order Training.**

The following elements are important considerations to include in the public order training for police officers(NGOs/GOs up to the rank of DySP):-

1. Training on the use of force, familiarization with different SOP’s.
5. Comprehensive scenario & contingency planning.
6. Understanding of crowd dynamics and police action in dealing with homogeneous mass rather than individuals.
7. Dealing with different situations.
   i) Stone pelting mobs.
   ii) Attack against officers/motorcade/vehicles.
   iii) Attack against Govt. buildings/Police buildings.
   iv) Law & Order problems created by women/children.
   v) Stone pelting in narrow streets.
iii. Command Training:-

This training should be imparted to officers of the rank of SSP & above and should include:-

2. Communication strategies before, during and after public order event.
3. Understanding & managing crowd dynamics.
5. Negotiation as a tactical option for managing agitation.
6. Various elements in successful management of mass agitation- Intelligence, Communication, Negotiation Training, Technology, Participatory decision making, contingency planning and scenario building and, community involvement measures.
7. Use of social media for monitoring, analysis & informing the public.

Course on Use of Force and Public Order Training may be conducted in the States, while the command course may be conducted nationally at NPA.

8.12 HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR COMMUNICATION AND EQUIPMENT

Technology, which till now has been the bane for police forces in managing mass protests, can serve them too. The protesters’ mobile internet access can be technically throttled. Activities over social networks can be easily monitored by the police and can forewarn it of impending law and order situation, besides also helping them in identifying the main troublemakers. Footage available on Internet sites like the YouTube provides authorities with visual records of those who attended and violated law during the protests. Although as a countermeasure, YouTube has already introduced a face-blurring tool.

Some lessons from other global practices can be considered. The police in Brazil is using head-mounted face-detection cameras which the authorities claim can capture up to 400 faces a second. Cheap drones are available in the market today to monitor the crowd activity, covering a wide range of area. The police forces in the US have a kit capable of recording the identifying code of all mobile phones within a given area. This can help in establishing the identity of the
protesters. Video recording of protests has helped the police in deterring protesters from indulging in unlawful activities in Bihar.

8.12(a) Devise Strategies for Proactive Social Media Engagement

While social media and internet news sites play an important role in diffusing information and for this reason are highly influential in motivating people and framing their protest claims though they are not in themselves mobilizing. Protesters were far more likely to join-in if they were accompanied by a friend or family member, and were more likely to use information coming from a trusted source. Specifically, the strength of ties was important in providing protesters with a sense of security, when making the decision to join in. Thus social media and social networks have a compounding effect on mobilization. Specially, social media helps to set the agenda and frame protest claims, unlike mainstream media.

At the Pittsburgh G-20 summit, protesters used cell phone cameras to record and relay information on police movements. Protest organizations such as the Ruckus Society operate websites where demonstrators can download training manuals. Facebook and other social networking outfits let protesters share information and mobilize quickly. Online petition sites make it possible to collect thousands of signatures.

With 24-hour news, cell phone cameras, Facebook, Twitter, and hundreds of other social media connections, it becomes important to prevent potentially dangerous rumors from appearing as facts. Because of erroneous witness statements and other misleading or false information, justifiable use of force has triggered riots. Social media allows information, including visuals, to spread rapidly and supporters arrive more quickly than the police can organize itself to manage the situation. As the crowd swells, it can no longer be dispersed merely by the use of force. Moreover, videos of any police excess or mishandling spreads like wildfire, leading to a flash point. A video circulated during protests in Brazil guided ‘citizen-journalists’ to adopt military formations to capture government wrongdoing from every angle. For coordinating protests, several hundred social-media pages advertised demonstrations across Brazil and offered tips on dodging water cannon.
As per the latest statistics available, there are 243 million internet users in India and the total users may increase to 500 million by 2018. Facebook is the most-browsed social network on social media, with a large base of 100 million users, total Twitter users in India are 33 million, LinkedIn has 26 million India users and Pinterest has 5.5 million users from India.

In the Public Perception Survey, social media ranked second after news channels and above newspapers and official police briefings as trusted source of getting information on mass agitation. The effective use of electronic communication and social media can enhance police efforts related to reaching out to the public and in other strategic initiatives Social media serves as an excellent way to directly communicate department messages and obtain information on events. Police approach to every mass agitation should be carefully planned involving suitable pro-action inputs on the basis of the public mind analysis on the basis of indicators from social media.

**Suggestions for proactive social media engagement during mass agitations suggested during the Delhi Police officer’s workshop are** -

- Social media needs to be carefully monitored and necessary intervention need to be planned by the police in every major Mass agitation/Public protest. The social media analysis can serve as effective police strategy. Use of Facebook and Tweeter needs to be encouraged among police personnel, this will enable them to realize the potential of these applications.
- Use social media as a means of community engagement and not just for information collection and dissemination.
- Special Branch/ Intelligence Unit of the Police Headquarters can start social media monitoring unit. The unit can monitor print media, audio visual, internet, Facebook, YouTube, twitter and WhatsApp for tracking the emerging trends, especially concerning the youth on social media.
- Explore the possibility of hiring of Social Media experts on the pattern of London Metropolitan Police.
- Regular technological updating of police by providing latest gadgets to police officers. Especially providing smart phones to officers deployed to deal agitation with provision of internet, GPS, WhatsApp for minute to minute reporting with visual/recordings at Command Police Room.
- Training Module on engagement of Social Media for officers.
- Counter/proactive social media initiative by police during the mass agitations. Proactive media engagement at regular intervals of time to disseminate required information to the citizens.
Additional recommendations from literature review:-

- Focus on the content, update regularly and do not abandon efforts.
- Have a strategy to plan, implement, and manage the social media programme.
- Formulate a department social media policy for internal coordination and control.
- Assign manpower and resources and train the staff on how to use the tools effectively.
- Identify benchmarks to measure outcomes.

8.12(b) Improve Availability and Up-gradation of Non-lethal Crowd Handling Equipment.

Public Perception Survey conducted during the research revealed that majority of public do not favour police firing in mass agitations (69.4% are never in favour & 25.9% in favour sometimes), Lathi charge by police to disperse crowd is never favoured by 34.9% of respondents, 51.6% favour it sometimes and only 13.5% favoured it. As for Tear Gas- 28.9% never favour it, 57.5% are in favour sometimes. And for use of Water Cannon by police- 22.5% favour it always and 52.6% favour its use sometimes.

With growing public awareness about their rights, and with increased media coverage and judicial oversight, not only the police action but the equipment used by police is under constant scrutiny. There is a strong case for examining the latest equipment available today, for their inclusion in police armory. Sometimes, simple innovations can do wonders, as can be seen by looking at a 1932, British era ‘padded’ baton which was used by police men in Amritsar district of Punjab, to deal with women protesters (Baton picture attached as Annexure-P). In view of very high unpopularity of current lathi used by police, reintroduction of padded lathi in police armory is strongly recommended.

A Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), which emits a piercing sound and was originally used by the navy to disperse pirates, will soon be used to chase away the protesting crowd in Delhi. The idea behind using the device, powerful enough to make a person temporarily rattled, is to make them leave the place without the use of violence. The device, which creates an irritating noise unbearable for humans, weighs between 6.8 and 150 kg and can emit sounds of up to 152 decibels. One such device will cost around Rs 35 lakh. LRAD can be used to dispel the crowd...
in the range of 100 m-2 km, depending upon the size of the device. The device that the Delhi Police will be ordering has a range of 1-2 km.61

Research into weapons that are more effective for riot control continues. Netguns are non-lethal weapons designed to fire a net which entangles the target. Netguns have a long history of being used to capture wildlife, without injury, for research purposes. A netgun is currently in development for non-lethal riot control. Pepper-spray projectile launchers are projectile weapons that launch a fragile ball which breaks upon impact and releases an irritant powder called PAVA (capsaicin II) pepper. The launchers are often slightly modified .68 calibre paintball guns. Stink bombs are devices designed to create an extremely unpleasant smell for riot control and area denial purposes. Stink bombs are believed to be less dangerous than other riot control chemicals, since they are effective at low concentrations. Sticky foam weapons are being tested, which cover and immobilize rioters with gooey foam. Low frequency sound cannons are weapons of various types that use sound to injure or incapacitate subjects using a focused beam of sound or infrasound. Active denial systems (ADS) are a non-lethal, directed-energy weapon developed by the U.S. military. The ADS directs electromagnetic radiation, specifically, high-frequency microwave radiation, at a frequency of 95 GHz, which causes the water in the upper epidermis to boil, stimulating a "burning" sensation in the nerve endings and generating intense pain. Dazzler lasers are directed-energy weapons that use intense light to cause temporary blindness or disorientation of rioters.62

MHA Task Force report attached at Annexure K gives following list of equipment and the effectiveness and drawback of the individual equipment/ situations in which a particular weapon should not be deployed.

- Water Canon
- Regular Tear Gas Shells
- Stingers and dye- marker Grenades
- Plastic Bullets for Mob Dispersal
- Various Forms of Teaser
- Pepper ball Launchers
- The LRAD
- Laser Dazzlers
- Net Guns
- Stink Bombs

List of existing and proposed equipment in police armory, compiled from the replies received from the States is given in the table A below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Equipment</th>
<th>Proposed Equipment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Various kinds of Tear Smoke Ammunitions</td>
<td>1. Use of trained Horses and Dogs in crowd management incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Video Recording Cameras</td>
<td>2. Electronic Disabling Device.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Tear Gas Squads</td>
<td>5. Portable Laser Dazzler.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Multi-Purpose Belt.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Improved version of Body Protector, Helmet and shield.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. Aluminum Stairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Electronic Sensor System</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. A good fleet of water canon fitted on light motor vehicles (like Tata 607)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. C.C.T.V. van fitted with audio video Transmitter, which would be further connected to the office of chief of police in Districts/Range/Zone and State.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Stretchable fencing wire used to stop moderate crowd.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. A mobile Jammer can be used to jam the agitator’s cell phones during the agitations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Pepper spray/ ball launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Various forms of Taser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. Stingers and dye- marker Grenades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A – List of existing and proposed equipments.
8.13 INVOLVE COMMUNITY AND PROTESTING GROUPS MEMBERS

Involving the community and members of protesting groups in managing the agitation can be a very useful step. Some suggestions, received from the states, regarding this are-

- Community stakeholder involvement is critical for effective police response to crowd management events. Police should actively embrace collaboration with community stakeholders when planning for and responding to public assemblies and gatherings.
- As large demonstrations and mass gatherings have the potential to tax the resources of any police force, therefore multi-agency co-ordination is crucial to success.
- Public Private Partnership in handling with such mass agitation/public protest required should be ensured.
- Police Station level public committees to be given due importance. The concept of Friend of Police can be useful for handling mass agitation.
- Volunteers from the agitating groups should be included along with plain clothes policemen to regulate the crowd inside and they should be regularly briefed by the police to handle anti-social elements who try to mix up with the crowd.
- There are many voluntary organisations working in the field of promoting peace and national integration. Such organisations usually have committed and well-intentioned volunteers and workers. The district administration should maintain comprehensive database on such organisations, and should mobilize support of, and encourage, such organisations, in their efforts to maintain communal harmony, and diffusing tension if a communal situation arises63.
- Large commercial organisation, whether in public sector or in private sector, have transport, hospitals, doctors, trained staff and protected space. On different occasions district administrations do seek their cooperation in managing situations. The resources available with all such units in a district / sub-division should be recorded. Relative strengths of the different units, where there are more than one, should be discussed in a joint meeting in order to decide which unit will be expected to give what type of support to riot management operations. With their roles defined, the PSUs / PSOs may be asked to prepare their own standard procedures so as to minimise the response time.

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63 Seen on 07.05.2015 at http://upsdma.up.nic.in/sdmplan/FINALDMP-%20Civil%-20Disob%20&%20Mass%20Agit.pdf
8.14 CONCLUSION

Mass protest is a new phenomenon in public order that has been observed world over quite frequently in the last couple of years. India too witnessed some large scale agitations in Delhi and some other parts of the country, during the years since 2011. Use of traditional methods of dealing with the agitators is mostly ill-suited for the public protests today. Police mishandling of these events gets captured by media and is relayed repeatedly on the channels, creating antipathy for police, eroding faith and credibility of the government, jeopardizing the possibility of reconciliation between the agitators and the authorities. With this background in mind, the present study has been conducted by the investigators with a focus on Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare incidents through an analytical review of the ground level perceptions taking into account a sizable population drawn from different segments of the society.

The public order policing today poses a big challenge to police forces around the world. Police forces have adopted different strategies based on varying public order policing philosophies from time to time. It was the ‘paramilitary model’ or the ‘hard hat’ model from 1960 to 1990’s, wherein police operated under a philosophy of ‘escalated force’ in which the militancy of protesters was met by increased militancy by the police. Any show of force or violence by the protesters was met by bigger force in return by the police. However, changes in world polity and public awareness also led to shifting of policing philosophy, of strongly supporting stability of the government or the state, to treating demonstrations more leniently, treating them as legitimate part of the democratic process. Ultimately, it is not just the internal philosophy that decides the police response to the agitation. In mass agitations with political fallout and involving political leaders in negotiations, as was the case in Ramdev and Anna Hazare agitation, it is the directives from civilian political leaders to either repress on permit a particular protest, because of larger political considerations, that often triumph normal police assessments.

The two agitations, Baba Ramdev and Anna Hazare, presented two diametrically opposite public order policing strategies used by police in the end. These two contrasting police strategies were studied as a part of this project to evolve a model for public order policing for managing mass protests by police in India. It was ‘paramilitary model’ or the ‘escalated force’
response to repress the Ramdev agitation at midnight in Ramlila ground by Delhi Police. In this agitation, on the night of 5th June, 2011, force was used by police to disperse the agitators which resulted in violence and loss of human life and destruction of property. The police action involved used of tear gas, water cannon and lathi charge to disperse crowd, arrest of leaders and protesters. The police action lacked adequate planning and uncoordinated uses of force which led to ‘police riot’. Police action came under severe criticism from public, media and courts. Supreme court took suo-moto notice of the wide spread media reporting of the incident, passed directions against the police for the arbitration in passing orders promulgating section 144 Cr.P.C., lack of planning in dispersing the sleeping crowd, use of force including its limiting methods and the misconduct and behaviour of individual police officers.

On the other hand, in Anna Hazare agitation dated 16th to 28th Aug, 2011, police exhibited greater cooperation with agitators after they were permitted to hold their agitation at Ramlila ground. The police strategy in response to this agitation was what is termed as ‘negotiated management’ in public order policing. Police exhibited greater tolerance to agitators, acceptance of rights of agitators, toleration of community disruption, ongoing communication between police and demonstrators, use of volunteers from protesting group for managing crowd, informing the organizers about police plans and arrangements and avoidance of arrests. The police strategy worked well in this situation and was appreciated by public and media.

Adopting paramilitary model of using high level of force against passive crowd is not only in direct conflict with the continuum of force doctrine64 that guides other policing activities, but also has negative consequences for police community relations. Collective conflict can emerge during crowd events as a consequence of the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of police force. This occurs because of the unanticipated impact that policing can have upon crowd psychology and dynamics. There is now compelling evidence that the most effective means for achieving proportionality in the policing crowd is through a strategic focus upon facilitation and a graded, differentiated and information led approach to the use of force. To achieve such changes it is proposed that it will be necessary to a) undergo a thorough reform of public order training in order to develop greater conformity with scientific knowledge and evidence; b)

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64 A use of force continuum is a standard that provides law enforcement officials & security officers with guidelines as to how much force may be used against a resisting subject in a given situation.
increase police capability for ‘dialogue’ and communication with crowd and formally recognise these as primary tactical options for public order policing.\(^{65}\)

Therefore, in today’s scenario, while the paramilitary model of policing is no longer effective, other approaches, like the ‘negotiated management’ or ‘toe-to-toe’ British model of policing and the ‘command and control model’\(^{66}\), are considered relevant for public order policing. Each agitation is different and in reviewing the strategies for dealing with mass agitations police must attempt to balance the interest of residents and business with the right of demonstrators to express their views, which is a dynamic equation that remains fluid during the protest. In doing this police must take a common sense approach. The British policing model sets of police amongst the people without recourse to some specialised separate force or unit and only in exceptional circumstances resort to water cannon or baton guns. This situation has prevailed even in circumstances where the model is infinitely more difficult to apply, where crowds are large and provocative or violent, or where large scale frustration and discontent are vented on the police themselves. Today, these are the models of public order policing that police in India need to look at.

The recent experiences of police, in handling the mass agitations like Ramdev and Anna Hazare agitations, in Delhi, highlight the need in public order policing in India to upgrade force preparedness by develop Standard Operating Procedures for handling protests and use of force, so that every policemen adheres to minimum standard of public order policing in such events. There is also a need to raise specialized battalions to deal with agitations in all the states. Even in the districts, special units should be trained for public order policing and the personnel to these units should be able to undertake crime prevention activities when not tasked with public order activities.

The skills of policemen in public order policing also need to be improved by reviewing the current public order training. This would include training in Use of Force, Public Order Training and Public Order Command Training. Wherein, the frontline officers should be imparted hands on training on use of force along with soft skills training to deal with peaceful crowd and should be trained to show restraint in the face of hostility from crowd, such as verbal

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\(^{65}\) Alex S. Viatle, 2005.

\(^{66}\) There are five general elements to the “command and control” style of public order policing. These are \textit{aversion to disruption, controlled access, divide and conquer, shock and awe, and zero tolerance}. Police micro-manage all important aspects of the demonstration from the granting of permits to the dispersal of demonstrators. Alex S. Viatle, 2005.
abuse, or a push from protestor. Senior officers need to be trained in communication strategies and in understanding & managing crowd dynamics. There is also a need to leverage technology by inducting new non lethal weapons in police armoury and use of Social Media in managing mass agitations.

In the event of a mass agitation, police should develop prior intelligence to identify key stakeholders, organizers & those opposing, the public support, mobilization, commitment of participants and their intentions & potential. Police should demonstrate explicit consideration of the facilitation of peaceful protest in planning and during the operations. Police tactics should be adopted depending on the peculiar nature of each situation, taking a common sense approach, striking the right balance between the rights of agitators and other citizens, with the duty to protect people & property from the threat of harm or injury. Police plans should also include contingency plans for managing variety of outcomes in different operational scenarios.

Communication and dialogue with protesters should be used as primary tactical options to preempt and contain violence or disorder during protest. Police should communicate and negotiate with the agitators prior to, during and after the agitation to obtain undertaking, assess the force requirement and regulate the crowd & the proceedings. A negotiating team of trained negotiators should be constituted to conduct negotiations from start to the end. In deployment, police should begin by deescalating the tension by deploying local policemen to interface and mingle with the crowd. However, an officer protection plan should be ready and team always prepared for that. All officers should display name badges prominently and any misconduct by police should be dealt with robustly. Use of outside forces should be avoided as far as possible and the units of paramilitary forces should be pressed into protest handling duties only after they have undergone public order training refresher course.

The message received from top-level management greatly influences the behavior and mind-set of frontline officers. Assuming authentic leadership, the force commander should be honest and transparent in police dealings, actions and decisions, lead from the front, avoid ivory tower planning and take decisions by involving as many stakeholders as the situation permits. In operational matters, the commander should definitely consider the views of tactical officers and the negotiating team. Surprises for public should be avoided in police operations. This would instill confidence and build trust in the crowd and enhance loyalty of the force, all critical for
favourably influencing crowd dynamics which is essential for successful management of mass protests.

In executive decisions regarding the cancellation/denial of permission, promulgation of order u/s 144 Cr.P.C. and the use of force, Police should observe the principles of ‘care perception’ of protesters and ‘least invasion’ with the constitutional and legal right of protesters. In police conduct equity and fairness should reflect at all times so that legitimacy of police actions is not compromised in the eyes of public. Extensive videography of the protests should be conducted that could meet the legal requirements in cases against violators & departmental requirements for analysis and disciplinary proceedings.

The protest should be allowed to be held at pre identified locations so that agitation is contained with least disruption to activities of citizen & business. Arrangements of drinking water, medical aid and dispersal plan should be ensured there during protests. Members of community and volunteers, from among the organizers, should be encouraged to assist police in arrangements and crowd regulation. Strict enforcement of minor/traffic laws should be ensured at other parts of the city to send a strong message that police administration is in control.

Response to any violence should be graded, differentiated and information led use of force by police with strict adherence to SOPs and circulars on use of appropriate force. FIRs should be registered promptly and evidence should be collected based on extensive videography of the agitation, to ensure convictions in incidents of violence during the agitation. Temporary jails that can hold large number of people should also be designated for that period.

Social media and internet news sites play an important role in diffusing information and for this reason are highly influential in motivating people and framing their protest claims though they are not in themselves mobilizing. Police should also restore the credibility of police briefings and other official dissemination channels, like websites and YouTube videos, by routinely updating them and uploading quality material which is not outdated. A media cell should be set up to inform public through newspapers, social media, news channels and official briefing/website. A nodal officer to brief media should be designated in such events. Social media should be provided regular police updates and it should be monitored and analysed for effective police interventions in all agitations.
Only by such a paradigm shift in police strategy, planning, tactics, procedures, training & behavior, towards a negotiated management and control model, can police present itself as a force capable successfully managing peaceful mass agitations in future.

8.15 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The recent experiences of police, in handling the mass agitations like Ramdev and Anna Hazare agitations, in Delhi, highlight the need to:

- **Gather prior intelligence on the proposed protest to plan and mobilize;**
- **Demonstrate explicit consideration of the facilitation of peaceful protest in planning and during the operations;**
- **Striking the right balance, between the rights of agitators and other citizens with the duty to protect people and property from the threat of harm or injury, in dealing with this dilemma, depending on the peculiar nature of each situation, take a common sense approach;**
- **Develop new SOPs to ensure that every policeman adheres to minimum standard of public order policing in such events;**
- **Raise specialized battalions to deal with agitations in all the states;**
- **Prepare contingency plans;**
- **To de-escalate begin and interface with a soft approach;**
- **Avoid anonymity by ensuring that every police officer displays name batches prominently;**
- **Deal robustly with the cases of police misconduct during the agitation;**
- **Display honesty & transparency in police dealings, actions and decisions;**
- **Avoid ivory tower planning, lead from the front and adopt participatory decision making in such events by involving all stakeholders, as far as possible, and in operational matters, definitely consider the views of officers deployed at the agitation site;**
- **Adopt ‘Containment’ tactics by restricting the protest within an identified location and strictly enforce traffic and order in other parts of the city;**
- **Promptly register FIRs backed by videography as evidence and ensure conviction in incidents of violence during the agitations;**
- **Consider new legislative measures to check damage of public/private property;**
- **Consider negotiation as a tactical option and Constitute a team to negotiate with leaders of protesters;**
- Communicate and negotiate with the agitators prior to, during and after the agitation to obtain undertaking, assess the force requirement, and regulate the crowd and proceedings;
- Develop effective plans to communicate with media and public;
- Set up media cell in Police Department & designate an officer for press briefings;
- Adopt social media, treating social media as a tool of social engagements and not just as means of information, collection and disbursement;
- Build the credibility of police briefings/information dissemination channels;
- Involve the community and members of protesting groups in managing protests; Review the current public order training;
- Focus on improving police behaviour with protesters by training them in soft skills;
- Encourage public order training in the districts to ensure force preparedness and use only trained officers avoiding use of untrained officers from outside forces;
- Harness new technology for use of new non-lethal equipment and for proactive social media engagement.

Table B, gives the paradigm shift in public order policing required for successfully handling peaceful mass protests in India. Only by such a paradigm shift in police strategy, planning, tactics, procedures, training & behavior can police present itself as a force capable of winning the confidence of public and policy elites in handling peaceful mass agitations in future.

Chart II summarises in a model the key elements, essential in public order policing for managing peaceful mass agitations in India today.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>b) Police Approach/Attitude</strong> - Antipathy towards agitations.</td>
<td>Facilitate peaceful protest &amp; respect for protesters rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c) Police Deployment</strong> - Show of police strength &amp; special units/equipment for intimidation.</td>
<td>De escalation by putting local policemen among people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>f) Communication &amp; Dialogue with Protesters</strong> - Mainly for coordinating the police arrangements.</td>
<td>Negotiation as a primary tactical option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>g) Communication with Public</strong> - Limited.</td>
<td>Regular information of police plans and tactics to avoid any surprises and inconvenience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>h) Engagement with Media</strong> - Media shy.</td>
<td>Proactive, Media cell for regular updates &amp; a designated media officer for press briefings, media enclosure for protest viewing from police deployment side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>i) Leadership</strong> - Authoritative.</td>
<td>Authentic leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>j) Decision Making</strong> - Top-Down.</td>
<td>Participatory decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>k) Use of Force</strong> - Indiscriminate and uncoordinated.</td>
<td>SOP’s for graded differentiated &amp; information led use of force, strong line of command &amp; control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>l) Police Misconduct</strong> - Efforts to cover up acts of police misconduct.</td>
<td>Display of name badges, transparent &amp; robust action on police misconduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>m) Training</strong> - Only in handling of unlawful assemblies.</td>
<td>Training also for handling peaceful agitations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n) Technology</strong> - Outdated equipment, Utilization of social media and mobiles effectively by protesters.</td>
<td>Leveraging of technology &amp; internet by Police.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table B- The paradigm shift for Indian Police for successful management of peaceful mass agitations.*
Chart II – Model for Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations
9. References

- Anna Hazare agitation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Hazare seen on 20.08.2014
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Annexures

Annexure-A: Questionnaire Public Perception Survey

Sr.No. __________ Dated: - __________

Note: - This questionnaire is for public perception survey purpose only to study police response in mass agitations (like Anna Hazare, Rape case protests in Delhi).

Your identity is not required in this questionnaire.

Please feel free to give your opinion/responses regarding the questions we have asked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex :</th>
<th>Age :</th>
<th>Educational Qualification :</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) Male</td>
<td>i) Less than 20 Years</td>
<td>i) Matriculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Female</td>
<td>ii) Age 20 to 30 Years</td>
<td>ii) 10+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii)</td>
<td>iii) Age 30 to 40 Years</td>
<td>iii) Graduation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv)</td>
<td>iv) Age 40 to 50 Years</td>
<td>iv) Post Graduation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v)</td>
<td>v) Age 50 Years above</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please Answer Following Questions:

1. Please tick the category to which you belong -
   i) Public.
   ii) Media.
   iii) Retired Police official.
   iv) Any Protester Group (participated in any protest till now).

2. Use of force is justified by police when protesters -
   A. Verbally abuse a Police Officer.
   B. Pushes a Police officer:
   C. Uses physical violence against a Police officer:
3. Type of force used by police to disperse crowd:
   A. Police should use Lathi-charge:
   B. Police should use Tear Gas:
   C. Police should use Firing:
   D. Police should use Water Cannon:

4. Holding of Protesters in a controlled area for a number of hours when public order is under threat is justified:
   A. When Protesters disrupt day to day activities of the general public:
   B. When Protesters threaten to damage public and private property:
   C. When Protesters threaten public safety and could harm the public:

5. Communication of police with Public:
   A. Do you think situation can be managed better if police informs about arrangements in advance to public:
      Ans: i) Yes, it will help a lot.
      ii) It will help to some extent.
      iii) It does not matter.
   B. Do you think police need to provide regular briefing on the situation to counter misinformation & restore confidence?
      Ans: i) Yes, it will help a lot.
      ii) It will help to some extent.
      iii) It does not matter.
   C. There should be better coordination between police & Media:
      Ans: i) Yes, it will help a lot.
      ii) It will help to some extent.
      iii) It does not matter.
6. Rank the following in order you trust them to get information on mass protest (Rank – 1, 2, 3 or 4)
   - News Channels
   - Internet (Social Media YouTube)
   - News Papers
   - Police Briefings/Police website/Control Room

7. Give your comments about the police behavior with public during protest:
   Ans:  i) They are very helpful.
          ii) Need a lot of improvement.
          iii) They do not interact with public.

8. How confident are you that Police will effectively manage large scale public protests in the future?
   Ans:  i) Very confident.
          ii) Little confident.
          iii) Not confident.

9. Any additional Information or suggestions to improve Police response in handling public protests:
   Ans:  ______________________________________________________
          ______________________________________________________
          (Please use reverse side of page in case required)
Annexure-B: Questionnaire for State/Paramilitary Police Force.

(Separate sheet may be used whenever required)

Name of the State/Paramilitary Police Force ..................................................

1. Police Methods/Tactics to deal with Mass Agitations/Public Protests:

Existing.........................................................................................................................

Proposed......................................................................................................................

2. Equipment/Technology used for effective handling of mass agitations/public protests in the State:

Existing.........................................................................................................................

Proposed......................................................................................................................

3. What up gradation of training curriculum/methodology has been done/proposed to be incorporated to sensitize the State Police force to deal with mass agitations/public protests in an effective manner?

Existing.........................................................................................................................

Proposed......................................................................................................................

4. Any changes/new Legislation/Govt. order which is required to be done in order to strengthen policing capabilities to handle mass agitations/public protests more effectively:

.............................................................................................................................................

5. Any other observations/suggestions (including community participation measures, use of new technology etc.) to improve Police response to effectively deal with mass public protests/agitations:

.............................................................................................................................................
Annexure-C: Standing Order No. 72: Unlawful Assemblies

INTRODUCTION: For the maintenance of public order & tranquility law authorities any executive magistrate or officer in charge of a Police Station & in his absence any Police officer not below the rank of ASI to Command any unlawful assembly or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause disturbance of public peace to disperse and it shall there-upon be the duty of the members of such assembly to disperse accordingly. If on being commanded, such assembly does not disperse or if without being so commanded, it conducts itself in such a manner as to show a determination, not to disperse, any Executive Magistrate or Police officer referred to above may proceed to disperse such assembly by force & may require the assistance of any male person not being an officer or member of armed forces and acting as such for the purpose of dispersing such assembly & if necessary for arresting & confirming the persons, who form part of it, in order to disperse such assembly or that they may be punished according to law.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES:

Situations requiring dispersal of such assemblies differ from place to placed & time to time. It is therefore necessary for the Police officers of all ranks to be fully acquainted with the legal provisions contained in sections 129 to 132 of Cr.P.C. and to act with utmost restraint and patience, taking care at the same time that the situation does not take an ugly turn & that there is no loss to life & property. The handling of such situations demands intelligence, alertness and coordination of various agencies particularly intelligence & law enforcing agencies and thoughtful anticipation of events to come. Hence much will depend upon the personal capability of the officer in-charge of the situation. However, following guidelines are issued for the information of and compliance by all concerned including gazetted officers:-

The various functions required in dealing with a riot can be carried out by accustomed drill movements with modifications necessitated by the situation. For example, if a single line is required, it should be formed in the usual way and not by endeavoring to get individual men to adopt the formation.

There is a tendency from G.Os. to ASIs to give orders for a concerted movement to men individually instead of in the proper manner and through the proper channel. For example if a gazetted officer is required to form a cordon with four reserves, it is useless for him to endeavor to give orders personally to the one hundred constables involved. On the contrary, he should first explain to two or more upper subordinates at this disposal, the nature of the operations to be effected and they should then issue appropriate drill orders to their commands, which are usually small enough to hear the orders and carry them out. This initial briefing should be ensured so that the staff down the line is aware of their roles.

It is essential that units should be kept together and that formations should be preserved. For example, it is extremely dangerous for men armed either with rifles, muskets or tear smoke guns to open fire unless they are in lines. Again foot or mounted Police seeking to disperse a crowd must maintain a line. Failure to maintain line may result in individuals being isolated in the crowd and severely hurt by its members, or in the heat of the movement by their own comrades. Further, a disciplined movement by a few men has far more greater effect than individual efforts by a large number in a heterogeneous way.

Individual members of the force may, when excited by provocation or injury, start shouting thereby causing confusion and preventing the orders of responsible officers from being heard. It is therefore necessary that when dispersal action is on, no one should open his mouth except the officers who are required to give orders.

The principle of minimum force to be used shall be kept in view, but whenever force has to be used it should be used with determination and firmness. The instructions laid down in PPRs 14.56, section 28(1) (p) and section 29 of D.P. Act read with the Delhi (Control of Processions, Assemblies and playing of music in public places) Regulations, 1980, notified vide No. 3218/Spl. Cell dated 7.10.1980, should be followed.
Whenever Police force is expected to go into action they should wear steal helmets, carry cane shields & other defensive equipment. The tear gas squad and the force which supports the tear gas squad shall wear duty and service respirators respectively. Tear gas guns and grenades shall be fired only by the officers/men trained in their use.

The force shall always be divided into small sections and placed under the charge of action and platoon commanders in order to have effective control on them. In no case the strength of force used for dispersal of such assemblies shall be less than on section (commander and 5 constables) and they shall work under their own officers. This, however, shall not deter Police officer of authorized rank to act for controlling situations likely to take an explosive turn in the circumstances mentioned in para 1 above till the arrival of reinforcements.

Whenever it is decided to use gas or open fire, all Policemen present in between the procession and the gas squad or armed squad must be withdrawn forthwith by the sounding of a bugle or making a suitable announcement.

For every major arrangement a suitable signal for withdrawing/ recalling the force shall be arranged and included in the briefing.

This supersedes old S.O. No. 72 issued vide this Hdqr. No.21916-22016/C & T dated 27.09.1967.

Annexure-D: Standing Order No. 152 - Use of Tear Smoke

INTRODUCTION

This Standing Order aims at laying down Principles for the use of Tear Smoke in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies and processions.

OBJECTS

The use of force by the Police is regulated by the provisions of Section 129(i) & (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The main principles to be observed is that minimum necessary force should be used to achieve the desired results and its use regulated according to circumstances. Apparently the object of use of force is to prevent disturbance of peace, or to disperse an unlawful assembly which threatens such disturbance and has shown a determination not to disperse. No punitive or repressive considerations shall be permitted to become operative while using the force and every attempt will be made to disperse a crowd by persuasion and warnings before force is used to dispersed it. The warnings administered shall be clear and distinct. It shall be specifically indicated that the crowd has been declared unlawful and should disperse within the stipulated period. Once an order to disperse has been defied and the attitude of the crowd is obviously threatening, the senior Police officers, not below the rank of an ACP/Inspector (SHO) may proceed to disperse the crowd by force.

The effectiveness of the force depends mainly upon the determination with which it is applied, its directions and its absolute control. It is not possible to lay down any definite weapons should be used. The officer responsible is required to decide this in each case, depending upon considerations of the strength of the force available for its dispersal. As far as possible use of Tear Smoke or Lathi charge or both should be made before resorting to the use of fire arms.

COMPOSITION

A Tear Smoke Squad shall consist of 1 H.C. and 4 Constables. Each squad, when in action will be supported by a lathi squad of 2 Head Constables and 20 Constables and an armed reserve of 1.

SCALE OF MUNITION GAS

The Tear Smoke Squad shall carry the munitions on the following scale:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPIRATORS SERVICE</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAS GUN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG RANGE SHELLS CN</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RANGE SHELLS CN</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLITE RITE SHELLS CN</td>
<td>3 (with I/C Squad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAS TORCH</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT CARRIER/IRON BOX</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S. RESPIRATORS (WITH I.E. TYPE MK-VI CONTAINER).</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELL CARRIER/IRON BOX- GAS GUN CASE.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUD HAILER.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.S. FIRST-AID KIT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-III GRENADES CN(INCLUDING RESERVE)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-WAY GRENADES</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRENADE CARRIER (LEATHER)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations by Police

The under mentioned Lake Eric Steel Non-bursting ammunition will be kept in reserve to be used against stone throwers on house tops:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Munition Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FULL PROPELLANT CHARGE SHELLS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 PROPELLANT CHARGE SHELLS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 PROPELLANT CHARGE SHELLS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4 PROPELLANT CHARGE SHELLS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whenever the tear smoke squad moved out, a pick-up shall accompany it. This pick-up will hold all the ammunition of the squad and will be guarded by an armed section of 1 H.C. and 4 Constables. The photographer of the Crime Branch should also be informed to reach the place of occurrence simultaneously. A loud-hailer, a placard giving notice in English/Hindi/Urdu to the Public to disperse and First-aid equipment should also be sent with the squad.

**RANGE OF MUNITION**

The range of under mentioned types of munitions used is as under:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I) Grenades</td>
<td>10 to 50 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II) ¼ charge lack shell</td>
<td>Eric 60 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III) Flite rite shells</td>
<td>80 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV) Short range shells</td>
<td>1” thick wood-100 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V) ½ charge lake Eric</td>
<td>100 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI) Full charge lake. Eric shell.</td>
<td>150 yards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII) ¾ charge lake Eric shell.</td>
<td>120 yards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Long Range Shell</td>
<td>rds.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPLOYMENT OF STRENGTH**

The strength of the gas squads of all the DAP Bns is posted in the Districts as per Appendix ‘A’ which may be reviewed by PHQ from time to time. As the gas squad has been provided in each District, the DCP of the District will ensure that their own squads are put into action first before the demand is placed on the DCP/1st Bn. N.P.L.

**MODE AND PATTERN OF USE OF TSM**

General preparedness
- The Tear Smoke Squads in NPL as well as in District shall remain in constant practice under the supervision of ACP/Kot and SI/Gas respectively. The members shall not be utilized for any other duties.
- One squad of NPL and all the squads of districts shall always remain alert to meet emergencies.
- Periodical disinfections of respirators should also be carried out. Periodical checking of respirators must be done by & Gas Chamber Test method. Turning over to Tear Smoke Munitions back to the office of issue, be carried out in every five years or as per instructions, laid down for the change of munition from time to time.
- At the place of action: Before tear smoke action is commenced, a suitable position should be selected for the squad, if circumstances permit, forty yards away from the crowd.
- Regular warning by the officer ordering the use of tear smoke and display of warning placards should be carried out impressing on the crowd the necessity to disperse. First-Aid should be alerted.
- Each and every action should be started with approval and the order of the senior Police officer ordering such use.
- The following points must be considered before the use of tear smoke equipment:-
• Direction and speed of wind. Area occupied by the crowd. Temper of the crowd. Outlet channels for the escape of the crowd.

• Kind and supply of munitions available for action. All the members of the party including the officer ordering use of T.S.M. and drivers should be equipped with the respirators. Necessary precaution should be taken to eliminate ‘Fire Hazard’ completely. Whether conditions must be considered as they effect gas action.

• Note of caution often the tear smoke squad is found guilty of excessive use of munitions given to it. This indicates the extreme need for the squad to be under effective control of a supervising officer present on the spot. It need hardly be reiterated that a judicious and controlled use of the tear smoke munitions can achieve the desired result with much less quantity.

AFTER THE ACTION IS OVER:

After the action is over, the squad officer shall collect empty shells and grenades etc. if possible under the circumstances, with the help of supporters. The squad officer then shall submit a report to the DCP of the area in the prescribed forms, containing the following details:

• Mane in which tear smoke munitions was used. Type and quantity of munitions used, number of rounds of tear smoke ammunition used. Distance from which used. Purpose and extent to which used. Difficulty, if any, experienced.

• Over-all effect of the operation mentioning specially the quantity of the munitions used. This will be necessary for a review of not only the action taken but also of the quality of the munitions received whether their effectiveness was blunted because of improper use, due to lack of knowledge control or improper storage arrangements etc. The DCP concerned, to who the report is submitted, shall forward the same with his own observations to the Commissioner of Police, and Addl. Commissioner of Police(P) and DCP/1st Bn. DAP. A proper record of all such report shall be maintained at Hqrs. by C & T Branch/PHQ under the direct supervision of DCP/HQ (II) for answering Parliament and other related questions.

STORAGE, ACCOUNTING, REPLENISHMENT AND BUDGETING:

DCP/1st Bn.DAP shall make arrangements for the proper storage, accounting and replenishment of Tear Smoke Munitions and equipment for the entire Delhi Police in consultation with the DCP/Prov. & Lines, Delhi. Funds for the purpose shall be provided for, under the appropriate head of DCP/1st Bn. DAP.

MISCELLANEOUS

This Standing Order supersedes Standing Order No. 152 vide PHQ No.4180-4330/AI dated 17.3.1979 and all other instructions on the subject.

Addl. Commissioner of Police (AP), Delhi.

No. 139-239/A-I PHQ, dated, New Delhi, the 4 Jan. 1989.
## Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF DISTT.</th>
<th>PLACE OF POSTING.</th>
<th>STRENGTH.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEW DELHI DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td>HC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PS Pt. Street</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PS Tuglak Road</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>STF Ch. Puri (2 Shift)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>P.M. House (-do-)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>P.P.G. Lines (-do-)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PS Defence Colony</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PS Houz Khas</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>P.S. Lajpat Nagar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>STF Houz Khas</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>PS Kalkaji</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>PS Mehrauli</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH WEST DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>PS Delhi Cantt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>PS Patel Nagar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>PS Rajouri Garden</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>PS Punjabi Bagh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>PS Tilak Nagar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>PS Sadar Bazar</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>PS Kotwali</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>PS Sabzi Mandi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>PS Civil Lines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH WEST DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>PS K.W. Camp</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>PS Ashok Vihar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>PS Tilak Vihar</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>PS Saraswati Vihar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>PS Pahar Ganj</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>PS Jama Masjid</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>PS Hauz Qazi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>PS Chandni Mahal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>PS Kamla Market</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>PS Gandhi Nagar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>PS Vivek Vihar</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH EAST DISTT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>PS Shahdara</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>N.E. Distt. Control Room</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P. RESERVE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Vijay Ghat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Where HC is not posted, the senior most Constable will work as I/C of the Squad.
Annexure-E: Standing Order No. 256: Strikes and Lock-outs

Introduction

 Strikes, processions and demonstrations constitute the principle methods adopted by labour to ventilate their grievances against the Management or Government or for securing the acceptance of their demands. The role of the Police in industries and labour strikes is to maintain law and order and not to interfere in inter labour management matters, unless the strike is declared illegal by the Government. It is thus essential that the Police conduct themselves in such a way that no impression is conveyed to either party of any partiality. Peaceful picketing to prevent non-strikers by persuasion from resuming work as distinct from the use of force or intimidation, may not necessarily call for Police intervention. For breaking the strike, management quite often infiltrate workers loyal to them among the strikers to incite acts of violence etc. so as to discredit the strikers and to justify Police intervention for legal action. Police should, therefore, be cautious of such tactics of management before initiating legal action against peaceful strikers so that their conduct not be interpreted as partisan.

Legal Provisions

The law on the subject is incorporated in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. All offences under it are non-cognizable and no prosecution can be filed without the order of the State Government or an officer authorized under section 34 of the Act. This however, does not mean that the Police are prevented from taking action against strikers for infringement of other laws. It is the prime duty of the Police to ensure that loyal workers are not obstructed or intimidated and that no violence takes place or damage caused to property by the strikers or their sympathizers. ACsP & SHOs concerned should visit places of labour trouble, watch strike situations and keep in touch with the developments to ensure prompt, proper and adequate Police action whenever required. Advance information about the plans and designs of the strikers should be collected and suitable Police arrangements made to guard against any mischief. Often the Police have and can serve as an impartial instrument of negotiations to defuse situation.

Guidelines for dealing with typical situations

Some typical situations in a strike by the industrial, labour and the legal implications are explained below:-

When a strike continues for a long time and the management decides to start work by recruiting new labour or with loyal workers, a critical situation develops. During this period, cases of intimidation, assault, stone-throwing, wrongful confinement, etc. increase. Suitable mobile patrols in the vicinity of the concerns should be maintained and Police arrangements reinforced especially when shifts change and workers enter or come of the mill/factory etc. While mobile patrolling in the affected area is permitted, no actual escorts should normally be provided by the Police either for the loyal workers or to the vehicles carrying the goods of the management.

Picketing/Gherao

Offices or factories are often picketed by strikers. So long as the picketing is orderly and peaceful, it is unobjectionable but if the picketers indulge in intimidation of loyal workers, legal action can be taken against the offenders. Often loyal workers and/or officers of the management are prevented/restrained from going about their normal job or the management is prevented from removing goods from factory etc. In all this, there is an element of criminal intimidation and action under section 506-IPC, 341/342-IPC and/or section 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act can be taken. The latter has a very extensive range and covers not only intimidation and violence but also obstruction, interference with workers property and even trailing of loyal workers or loitering with intent to deter loyal workers from going on duty.

Stone-throwing and assault: Loyal workers and factory premises are often stoned by strikers in order to intimidate the loyal staff. Such acts would constitute offences under section 336, 337 or 338-IPC depending on whether an
injury is caused or not and the nature thereof; they would also attract the provisions of section 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act.

Cases of violence against individuals should be dealt with under section 324, 325, 326, 307 or 302 IPC depending on the nature of injury and sections 147, 148 & 149 where five or more persons take part in the assault.

Similarly loyal workers are sometimes locked strikers, in which case, the offence would be one of wrongful confinement under section-342 IPC.

Students

The Youth and students of India play a very important role in all spheres in the country. The infiltration of political parties in the activities of educational institutions including college and Universities has also created a great impact on the minds of the youth and students. The impressions carried out by the younger generation have an important bearing on the future of the country.

Constitution of India guarantees freedom of speech and expression to all its citizens. People are free to form associations and groups to raise their voice against any injustice. Various organizations and institutions, political, religious and trade unions have been adopting this method for redressal of their grievances. Youth especially students are not lacking behind and don’t hesitate to hold agitations and strikes to fulfill their demands. Political wings of various national and regional parties have also started patronizing student associations. Generally agitations by students are organized whenever; there is a feeling of discard and injustice meted out to them. As students are in their youth and couldn’t foresee the consequences sometimes these agitations turned violent cause law and order problem. Even slight provocation such as hiking of fees, hard marking in examinations and discontinuation of transport facilities for students result into such agitations. Agitations by students have become a common phenomenon across the country and needs very careful and tactful handling by the Police.

CAUSES OF STUDENTS AGITATIONS

Over increase in school/college fees or transport charges. Politicizing issues related to the institution such as transfer or dismissal of a teacher or head master/principal. Over demand for increase in educational facilities. Number of failure students approaching the university to re-declare their results as pass only. (Maharashtra University).Agitation by students and youth for constituting legally elected students union. Separate educational institutions for particular caste and lowering the percentage of marks for admission up to 30 percent. Again as retaliatory measures as adopted by students of Nalanda University against the treatment meted out to students of Bihar in Maharashtra. For obtaining SC/ST status. Against shutting down of any educational college or institution. Disputes in buses over purchase of tickets. Disputes in Cinema halls over concessions.

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING AGITATIONS

Develop maximum information from all sources. Senior officers be informed and obtain specific instructions. Anticipate the pattern of trouble and start preparation to deal it. Identify the trouble spots and deployment of manpower be determined. Force so deployed to handle the agitation should be briefed and their role should be made clear. Adequate staff should be deployed with anti-riot equipment’s. Strong barricades tied up with ropes should be installed to stop the agitators from marching towards prohibited area. Procession and demonstration should be given escort.PCR and Traffic unit be informed to make necessary arrangements. Initiate dialogue with leaders to know their plans and demands. Be courteous but firm as inept handling may lead to serious law and order problem. Keep strict vigil over crowd to identify mischief mongers. In case of confrontation the exact time of intervention has to be decided. The action taken should be swift to prevent escalation of trouble. Action should be taken strictly according to guidelines mentioned in previous chapter “Control of Lawful and Unlawful Assemblies”.
Communal agitations

Rumors have to be immediately attended to and nipped in the bud. Involve Peacekeeping Committee/Area Defense Committee consisting respectable of various communities. All places of worship falling on the route or around the demonstration place be kept under guard to prevent mischief. The Police must adopt a secular and unbiased approach and a will for effective action.

Labour agitations

Police should adopt a neutral attitude and help in working out a rapprochement between both the factions. The gates of concerned institution/unit should be kept free from agitators to facilitate ingress or outgress of loyal workers. Industrial property be protected in case agitators become violent. Supply of essential commodities be maintained. Suitable mobile patrolling be effect in the vicinity of concerned unit.

Student’s agitations: Act patiently with utmost restraint. Teachers and principals be involved as they have some influence on students. In case of road block traffic should be diverted to avoid clash. Generate a sense of closeness and deal emotionally. Use method of persuasion and discussion. Blind students should be dealt sympathetically and use of force should be avoided. Force deployed should be without lathi and any other weapon.
Annexure-F: Standing Order No. 325: Duties, Responsibilities and Modalities of the Use of water Cannon for Crowd Control.

Objective

Although water cannons have been available to the Delhi Police from the year 1991 and have been used on many occasions for law and order purposes, detailed instructions with regard to their operation are now laid down being in this Standing Order.

Legal Provisions

The provisions contained in Cr.P.C. and the PPR regarding dispersal of unlawful assemblies/crowd by use of civil force are as follows:

Section 129 of the Cr.P.C. empowers “any Executive Magistrate or officer-in-charge of a Police Station or, in the absence of such officer-in-charge, any Police officer, not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, who may command any unlawful assembly, or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace, to disperse, and it shall thereupon be the duty of the members of such assembly to disperse accordingly.

Rule 14.56 PPR lays down principles for use of force against crowd.

The Highlights of these are: “The main principle to be observed in that the degree of force employed shall be regulated according to the circumstances of each case…. No ulterior object, such as punitive or repressive effect, shall be taken into consideration.”

“….the method by which force shall be applied and the degree of force to be used shall be decided by the senior Police Officer present….”

“….The degree of force used shall be the minimum which the responsible officer, with the exercise of due care and attention decided to be necessary for the effective dispersal of the crowd and the making of such arrests as may be desired. The degree and duration of the use of force shall be limited as much as possible.”

“….The officer responsible is required to decide this in each case on consideration of the strength and attitude of the crowd to be dispersed, and the strength of the force available for its dispersal.”

Obviously, there is no mention of water cannon in PPR. There is a provision under Rule 14.56 (e) that prior to the issue of firearms, the Magistrate or a responsible Police officer should “warn the crowd that if they do not immediately disperse, fire with live ammunition will be opened upon them”. Likewise, prior to the use of water cannon, an appropriate senior officer must, after giving the requisite warnings declaring the assembly to be unlawful and giving directions to disperse etc. also give a clear warning that in case they do not disperse, water cannon will be used against them.

Model of Water Cannon

Currently two models of water cannon i.e. Fire Engine type Model & DRDO Model are available with the Delhi Police.

Fire Engine type Model

The red (fire engine type) vehicle was manufactured by Cooverji Desai and Company, Mumbai. The water cannon has a capacity of 14,700 liters and can discharged up to 1,500 liters Per minute, which means that it would expand its water in approximately 5½ minutes. Through an NDMC tanker a further 4,000 liters are made available. The spray of water is directed manually with the help of a lever. In this vehicle the staff can pick out an individual
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations
by Police

member of the crowd and target him. It is effective up to 40 feet in range. It is also sturdy and can withstand the stones and physical attacks of the crowd which take place during every operation. The water cannon can move 360 degree around and 20 degree to 55 degree up and down.

DRDO Model

The other vehicle available is of DRDO design and is manufactured by the Vijay Fire Company, Valsar, Gujrat. The machine has a capacity of 12,500 liters and twin turret water cannons capable of expending 2,200 liters per minute if both are used simultaneously or 1,100 liters per minute if only one is in operation. The two turrets move from minus 15 degrees to plus 195 degrees.

The role of the driver, cannon operator and officer-in-charge of the water cannon shall be as indicated below:-

**DRIVER**

The driver shall be responsible for the maintenance and servicing of the vehicle. Whether or not the vehicle is required for operations, it will be started and driven for a short distance every day to ensure that the batteries do not run out and all parts are in working order. He should also ensure that the water is stored to the maximum capacity. During operations, the driver will start the vehicle and position it at the directed location. On being ordered to start crowd control operations, the driver will start the vehicle and switch on the pump. He will also move the vehicle closer or farther away from the crowd as directed. In case the mob surrounds the vehicle or tries to cause damage, the driver shall reverse the vehicle and try to maintain a distance from the crowd so that in case of need the minimum distance is maintained and the water cannon can be again used at the desired angle and strength.

**OPERATOR**

The operator will control the direction of the water jet. In case the available water is expended, the operator will leave the cabin and climb the vehicle and with the help of the second operator will connect the pipe to the reserve NDMC Tanker (capacity 4,000 litres), refill the tank and again take up position for further operations.

**OFFICER-IN-CHARGE**

As and when, it is decided to use a water cannon, an officer not below the rank of an SI should personally direct the use of water cannon i.e. he shall give direction to regulate the strength of water and the direction of the water jet etc. The composition of crowd has to be kept in mind to ensure that undue force is not used or injury caused to senior citizens, ladies or children.

In case the vehicle is deployed for operations in different localities such as for demolitions etc. the vehicle should not be sent into an area where it will not be able to retreat easily. Care should also be taken not to obstruct the area/street behind the vehicle by parking of other vehicles or collection of demolished material etc.

Commissioner of Police, Delhi.

No. 38292-379/C&T (AC-VI) PHQ, dated, Delhi, the: - 3.08.2006.
Annexure-G: Circular No. 35/2011 of Delhi Police- Conduct of rallies, processions etc.

1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the Delhi High Court has issued detailed guidelines regarding the conduct of rallies, processions, demonstrations & protests etc. The onus of maintaining peace during the protest has been laid on the organizers.

2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the organizers will meet the Police to discuss the conditions in which the protest can be organized and will give an undertaking that they shall maintain peace during the event and have also been banned from carrying any kind of weapon. These guidelines are:
   i) The organizer shall meet the Police to review and revise the route to be taken and to lay down conditions for a peaceful march or protest.
   ii) An undertaking is to be provided by the organizers to ensure a peaceful march with marshals at each relevant junction.
   iii) All weapons including knives, lathis & the like shall be prohibited.
   iv) The Police and State Government shall ensure video graph of such protests to the maximum extent possible.
   v) In the event that demonstration turns violent, the officer-in-charge shall ensure that the events are properly video graphed through private operators and also request such further information from the media and others on the incidents in question.
   vi) The Police shall immediately inform the State Government with reports on the events, including damage, if any, caused.

3. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in its decision of 1996 has clearly directed that permission should be obtained for taking out a rally, public procession, holding of meeting etc. from the district DCP. The Hon’ble Court has also directed that the organizer shall obtain permission from the land owning authority, comply with all lawful directions given by Police and keep members of the procession under proper control.

4. These two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Delhi High Court crystallize the powers of Police to direct and regulate assemblies and processions in specific terms and the guidelines laid down in these judgments have been incorporated in the enclosed Terms and Conditions which have to be served on the organizers during the meeting to negotiate arrangements for the proposed rally/protest etc.

5. Therefore, it is imperative that in order to bind down the organizers, a copy of the terms and conditions (enclosed) quoting the relevant orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Delhi High Court, be served on them along with the meeting notice as well as the permission.

Commissioner of Police, Delhi.

No. 3573-3672/Record Branch/PHQ/, dated: 22.06.2011.

Terms and Conditions for Taking Out Rallies/Processions/Dharnas: The permission for taking out a procession/rally/dharna is subject to the following terms and conditions, which are based on the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 77 of 2007 read with WP (Criminal) No. 73 of 2007 in the matter of “Destruction of Public and Private Properties Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.”,
and the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Civil) No. 2208/1996, Chandni Chowk Sarv Vyapar Mandal Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors.:-

The organizer shall meet the Police to review and revise the route to be taken and to lay down conditions for a peaceful march or protest.

An undertaking is to be provided by the organizers to ensure a peaceful march with marshals at each relevant junction.

All weapons including knives, lathis and the like shall be prohibited.

The organizer shall also obtain “No Objection Certificate” from the land owning agency with regard to holding rally/meeting etc.

The organizer shall carry the permission granted in original to be shown to a Police officer on demand.

They will depute a person with whom the Police can liaise for various purposes.

Organizers would make adequate arrangements for drinking water (by providing tankers) and First Aid/Medical Aid in consultation with the civic/local bodies at the site and also during the procession.

The procession will proceed in an orderly manner along the sanctioned route keeping to the left and will not halt on the way or cause impediment to the normal flow of traffic.

The organizers shall allow cross traffic at intersection as prescribed by the Police.

The organizer shall keep more volunteers at these crossing to help the Police.

No procession would normally occupy more than one fourth of the width of the road. Traffic should be allowed to flow on the road in both directions during any procession. The organizers would keep adequate number of volunteers to help the Police to keep flow of traffic. At road crossing, the precisionists would stop to allow any cross traffic to be cleared before proceeding further. In case a road is not sufficiently broad, the local Police should regulate the procession suitably.

No demonstration/rally/meeting etc. would be allowed on road and road crossings. Except at places especially earmarked for such a purpose by the Police authorities, meeting should be held on grounds or on footpaths only.

Organizer of processions will be responsible for ensuring that the route permitted to them by the Police authorities is strictly followed.

No procession should take more than a maximum of four hours from start to finish. The tail of any procession shall reach the finishing point within four hours of start positively.

The participants in the procession will not carry any lathis, firearms, spears, swords and other articles likely to be used as a weapon of offence. Besides the carrying of imitation firearms, resembling sten gun, SAF, Carbine or AK-47, pistol, rifle or any other firearm is also not allowed as it is likely to cause danger to human life or safety or disturbance of public tranquility or a riot. The participants may carry flags, banners, etc. on sticks purely for display purposes.

No participant shall make provocative speeches or use language calculated or likely to inflame passions of the crowd or incite them or promote enmity between different groups or ground of religion, race, place or birth, residence language etc. or act in any manner which prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups or disturb public tranquility.

The participants of the procession/rally shall comply with all lawful directions given to them by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi or any other Police Officer on duty.
No participants shall act in a manner as to result in damage to public property, assault on Govt. servant, arson, etc.

No participant shall destroy, damage or defile any place of worship or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting any religion or any class of persons.

No inflammatory slogans etc. would be raised within 200 meters of any place of religious worship.

No shamiana etc. would be erected on any road for any function including public meetings.

No loudspeaker or public address system shall be used in the venue of the rally/procession without specific permission from the DCP in whose district the procession/rally is being taken out. Loutspeakers shall be used only between 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. as provided in the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and in compliance of Supreme Court orders.

The license shall be responsible to keep his followers under control, failing which he will be prosecuted under the law.

No animal like horses, elephants, camels, etc. would be allowed in a rally/procession.

Crackers, firing by weapons, etc. are prohibited in any procession.

In the event of non-compliance of any of the above conditions/restrictions, the procession/meeting/gathering/religious procession/religious functions shall be declared as unlawful and prosecution would be launched against the violators. Regarding use of loudspeakers, action would be taken as per provisions of Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
Annexure –H: Circular No. 12/2012 of Delhi Police

In view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of SUO MOTO W.P. (Crl.) No. 122 of 2011, Ram Lila Maidan incident dated 4/5-06-2011 Versus Home Secretary, Union of India & Others, the following directions are issued:

Whenever an officer/Executive Magistrate/Police Officer of the rank of ACP or above issues an order u/s 144 Cr.P.C. it should be well reasoned and justified. It must be ensured that all the facts have been considered and brought on record, so that it is a speaking order. The order must be issued only after proper application of mind and considering and the facts and circumstances of the case placed before the officer concerned.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the order “Section 144 Cr.P.C. deals with immediate prevention and speedy remedy. Therefore before invoking such a provision, the statutory authority must satisfied regarding the existence of the circumstances showing the necessity of an immediate action. The sine qua non for an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. is urgency requiring an immediate and speedy intervention by passing of an order. The order must set out the material facts of the situation. Such a provision can be used only in grave circumstances for maintenance of public peace. The efficacy of the provision is to prevent some harmful occurrence immediately. Therefore, the emergency must be sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave.”

Whenever any arrangement is issued for maintenance of law & order in connection with big assemblies/gathering, it must be ensured that a proper dispersal plan is also envisaged in the arrangement order, to ensure orderly, peaceful and smooth dispersal of the crowd from the place of assembly. In the written undertaking submitted by the Organizers to the local Police/DCP/Addl. CP of the District concerned, it must also be taken in writing that “The organizer(s) will cooperate to carrying out the lawful orders passed by an competent court/Authority/Forum at any stage of the commencement of an agitation/dharna/procession and/or period during which the permission granted is enforced, whenever the Police officers direct the organizers/participants to leave the premises, it will be the responsibility of organizers along with the participants to leave the premises without delay and without making and protest. They must leave the premises peacefully in shortest possible time.”

Proper announcement be followed for dispersal of crowd. Use of any kind of force for dispersing a crowd should be preceded by proper warnings such as announcements from a Public Address System or Loud Hailers, proper display of Banners etc. declaring the assembly unlawful and directing the crowd to disperse. Sensitization of staff at all levels should be ensured by the Supervisory staff through repeated briefings, training, roll calls etc. The S.O. No. 72/2009 must be strictly adhered to by all field officers.

All procedural requirements for implementing the orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. should be complied with by the Police officials on duty before dispersal of unlawful assembly.

Commissioner of Police, Delhi.

No. 1885-1900/Record Br/PHQ/, dated: 06.03.2012.
Annexure – I: Circular No. 20/2012 of Delhi Police

Detailed instructions have been issued by PHQ for the grant of permission for taking out processions/rally/Dharna/Demonstration etc. within the jurisdiction of Delhi. The guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 77 of 2007 read with Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 73 of 2007 and Delhi High Court Judgment in W.P. © No. 2208/96 Chandni Chowk Sarar Vyapar Mandal Vs LG & Ors were incorporated in Circular No. 35 issued vide No. 3573-3672/Record Branch/PHQ dated 22.06.2011. Similarly, written Undertaking is taken from the organizers of the Rally/Dharna that they would abide by the terms and conditions and maintain peace. The format of the Undertaking was circulated vide No. 119-37/SO/Spl. CP/L & O dated 30.06.2011.

2. Now the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in W.P. © No. 122/2011 while taking Suo-moto action into Ramlila incident of dated 4/5th June 2011 has issued certain directions which have already been circulated to all Spl. CsP, Jt.CsP/Ranges, Addl.CsP, Distt. DCsP vide circular No. 19/12 issued vide No. 1801-1900/Record Branch/PHQ dated 16.03.2012.

3. In view of the latest judgment of the Apex Court in W.P. © No. 122/11, the Undertaking to be submitted by the organizer for holding rally/dharna/processions etc. has been re-drafted and is enclosed herewith. The Undertaking must be taken on the new format under the proper signature of the concerned officer of the organization.

Deputy Commissioner of Police,

Police Headquarters, Delhi.


UNDERTAKING BY THE ORGANIZER

| Date......................... |
| Venue of Procession/rally/dharna/demonstration......................... |
| Time w.e.f......................... Hours to......................... Hours |
| No. of Participants.................. No. of Volunteers.................. |
| Route of Procession from............... to............................ |

I, ........................................... (Name & designation of the Organizer) of the ........................................... (Name of the Organization) do hereby undertake that our organization shall abide by the following terms & conditions based on the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.77 of 2007 read with WP (Criminal) No. 73 of 2007 in the matter of “Destruction of Public and Private Properties Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.”, the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Civil) No. 2208/1996, Chandni Chowk Sarv Vyapar Mandal Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors. And the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Writ Petition (Crl) No.122 of 2011 Vs Home Secretary, Union of India & Others for conducting the above programme :-

“No Objection Certificate” from the land owning authority with regard to holding rally/meeting etc. is enclosed.
I shall carry the permission granted in original to be shown to any Police officer on duty on demand.

I shall depute a responsible person with whom the Police can liaise, ............... (Name, designation and telephone number of the liaison person deputed by the organizer).

I shall make adequate arrangements for drinking water (by providing tankers) and First Aid/Medical Aid in consultation with the civic/local bodies at the site and also during the procession.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that the procession will proceed in an orderly manner along the sanctioned route keeping to the left and will not halt on the way or cause impediment to the normal flow of traffic.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that sufficient number of volunteers are deployed at the crossing to assist the Police.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that processionists would not occupy more than one fourth of the width of the road. The traffic will be allowed to flow on the road in both directions during the procession. Sufficient number of volunteers will be kept to assist the Police to maintain flow of traffic at road crossing and the processionists would be stopped to allow any cross traffic before proceeding further.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that no demonstration / rally/meeting etc. is held on roads and road crossings, except at .................... (places). The meeting shall be held only on grounds or on footpaths leaving the road clear for other users.

I shall be responsible for ensuring that the route permitted by the Police authorities is strictly followed.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that procession will not take more than a maximum of four hours from start to finish. The tail of the procession shall reach the finishing point within four hours of the start positively.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that the participants in the procession will not carry lathis, firearms, spears, swords, brickbats and other articles likely to be used as a weapon of offence. Besides, the carrying of imitation firearms, resembling Sten gun, SAF, Carbine or AK-47, pistol, rifle or any other firearm will also not be allowed as it is likely to cause danger to human life or safety or disturbance of public tranquility or a riot. The participants may carry flags, banners etc. on sticks purely for display purposes.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that no participant shall make provocative speeches or use language calculated or likely to inflame passions of the crowd or incite them or promote enmity between different groups or ground of religion, race, place or birth, residence language etc. or act in any manner which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups or disturb public tranquility.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that the participants of the procession/rally shall immediately comply with all lawful directions given to them by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi or any other Police officer on duty at any stage of the procession/rally or Dharna.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that no participants shall act in a manner as to result in damage to public property, assault on Govt. servant, arson, etc.

I & the other participants shall ensure that no participant shall destroy, damage or defile any place of worship or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting any religion or any class of persons.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that no inflammatory slogans etc. would be raised within 200 meters of any place of religious worship.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that no shamiana etc. is erected on any road for any function including public meetings.
I & the other organizers shall ensure that no loudspeaker or public address system shall be used at the venue of the rally/procession without specific permission from the Addl. CP/ DCP of District. Loudspeakers shall be used only between 0600 hours to 2200 hours as provided in the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and in compliance of the Supreme Court orders.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that no animal like horses, elephants, camels, etc. would be brought in the rally/procession.

I & the other organizers shall ensure that no crackers will be lit nor firing by weapons, etc. will be held.

I shall be responsible to keep the followers under control, failing which I along with other protesters may be prosecuted under the law.

Date---------------- Place---------------

(Signature)

(Name in Capital letters)

(Name of the Organization) Mob. No. ---------

Any other telephone No.-------
Annexure –J: Control of Lawful and Unlawful Assemblies:

Meaning of lawful assemblies: According to article 19(1) (B) of the Constitution of India “All citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms” such assembly have the right to hold meeting and take out processions. By virtue of this article peaceful and unarmed assemblies are bonafide and lawful assemblies. Where above two conditions are not fulfilled, persons forming the assembly cannot claim the protection of the Constitutional rights of assembly.

It is also true that all the rights and freedoms under constitution are not absolute and subject to certain restrictions. As such for holding of such lawful assemblies legal formalities are to be followed. The organizers of such assemblies must take permission of concerned district DCP. Specific instructions are given while granting permission and organizers are bound to follow them. In even of non-compliance of any of the prescribed instructions the assemblies/gatherings shall be declared as unlawful and prosecution would be launched against the violator.

Guidelines for handling lawful assembly:

Application for demonstrations and assemblies should be received in the office of DCP and permission be obtained for the same.

Information from other sources i.e. IB/Spl. Branch/newspapers etc. be collected to get more details.

Contact with the organizer be established to find out more details.

Permission with specific terms and conditions prescribed to be accorded to the applicant and it should be ensured that permission is received by the organizers.

Elaborate Police arrangements must be issued for each demonstration with complete details of deployment.

Arrangement at the place of demonstration should include barricading and positioning of staff. Barricades tied up with ropes should be installed to stop the demonstrators from further marching towards prohibitory area. Adequate staff should be deployed depending upon the number and nature of demonstrations. They should be properly equipped with anti-riot equipment such as sticks, body protectors, helmets, cane shields etc.

Water cannons tear gas shell section and videographer should be positioned at the spot. Party displaying banner indicating promulgation of Section 144 Cr.P.C. with loud hailers should be available on the spot.

Proper briefing of staff before deployment is necessary to show utmost restraint.

Constant liaison with the leaders/organizers must continue when they reach the venue and address the gathering and control them.

Message to Control Room on all the important activities of demonstrations/assemblies etc. from time to time.

Repeated use of PA system by a responsible officer appealing/advising the leaders and demonstrators to remain peaceful and come forward for memorandum/deputation etc. or court arrest peacefully. Announcements should be video graphed.

If they do not follow appeal and turn violent declare the assembly unlawful on PA system & video graphed.

Warning on PA system prior to use of any kind of force must be ensured and also video graphed.

Even after the demonstration is over, proper liaison with the leaders especially political leaders be ensured to maintain cordial relations.
Details of peaceful demonstration/detention u/s 65 D.P. Act details be mentioned in the daily diary.

Sec. 28 D.P. Act : The Commissioner of Police have powers to make regulations for regulating traffic and for preservation of order in public places, etc and by way of notification in official gazette form regulations to provide for the matter mentioned in this section.

Sec. 29 D.P. Act : Power to give directions to the public- The Commissioner of Police and, subject to the orders, if any, made by the Commissioner of Police, every Police officer not inferior in rank to an Inspector, may from time to time as occasion may arise, but not so as to contravene any regulation made under section 28 or any law, rule or bye-law referred to in sub-section (4) of that section, all such orders either orally or in writing as may be necessary to –

Direct the conduct of, and behavior or action of persons constituting processions or assemblies on or along streets;

Specify the routes by which and the times at which any such processions may pass or shall not pass;

Prevent obstruction –On the occasion of all processions and assemblies; and

In the neighborhood of all places of worship during the time of worship; and

In all cases when any street or public place or place of public resort may be thronged or liable to be obstructed;

Keep order on, and in, all streets, and at, and within, public bathing and washing places, fairs, temples, mosques, gurudwaras, churches and all other places of public resort or public worship;

Regulate and control the playing of music, singing or the beating of drums, tom-toms and other instruments and the blowing or sounding of horns or other noisy instruments in, and near, any street or public place;

Regulate and control the use of loudspeakers in residential areas, streets, near any public places and places of public amusement or public entertainment; or

Make reasonable orders consequential to, and in furtherance of, any order made under this section.

Unlawful Assembly:

141 IPC:- According to this section- An assembly of five or more persons designates as an “Unlawful Assembly” if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is:-

To overawe by criminal force or show of criminal force the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; Or

To resist the execution of any law or of any legal process or any assembly an unlawful assembly intentionally joins that assembly or continues in it is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly.

142 IPC: - Whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly or continues in it, is said to be a member of unlawful assembly.

Handling of unlawful assemblies: - The principle of minimum force to be used shall be kept in view, but whenever force has to be used it should be used with determination and firmness. The instructions laid down in PPRs 14.56, section 28(1) (p) and section 29 of D.P. Act read with the Delhi (Control of Processions, Assemblies and playing of music in public places) Regulations, 1980, notified vide No. 3218/Spl. Cell, dated 7.10.1980, should be followed.

After verbal warning if members of unlawful assembly does not disperse and crosses the barricades then mild cane charge be used under the supervision of SI/SHO/Inspector and other senior officers present on the spot.
Police action to be taken on the specific orders of the SHO/ACP/DCP or the senior officer present at the spot. Leaders to be protected from injury particularly. Separate party to be made for this.

Use of controlled cane charge only for dispersal- no action on retreating crowd.

Logbook of Control Room by properly maintained (briefing of Control Room staff).

Water canon be used in case the demonstrators fail to disperse after cane charge.

Tear gas should be used in case members of unlawful assembly continue their illegal actions and keep on causing damage to life and property.

Firing should be resorted to in rare and grave situations all Policeman present in between into demonstrators should be withdrawn and firing party should remain in the front. Firing should not be random and only after obtaining specific instructions.

When fire is opened, the aim should as far as possible be kept low.

There should never be firing with live cartridges over the head of crowd or towards the flanks as a warming because of the danger of innocent persons, even quite far from the place of the incident, being killed.

The use of force must cease immediately after the objective has been attained and under circumstances should more force than absolutely necessary be used.

There should be no intention to take repressive action to teach the crowd a lesson.

Police should be ready to render first aid to the injured and should make arrangements for the speedy transport action of such injured persons to Hospital.

Announcement for injured to take them to hospital for medical aid, use of stretchers to carry the injured up to the vehicle/ambulance also video graphed.

Send the Police personnel injured during the assault by demonstrators, for medical opinion and treatment.

In case of arrest/detention of MPs, MLAs, MLCs, information to be given to concerned department, Speaker Lok Sabha, Chairman, Rajya Sabha, Speaker Assembly, by quickest means both in writing and on wireless.

Special attention be paid while dealing with women’s demonstrations and only as far as possible women Police should be deployed to tackle them.

During registration of case-evidence regarding use of stones, lathis, dandas etc. to be video graphed and taken into possession from the site.

Staff detailed at govt. hospitals should be briefed in advance to ensure proper record of the injured and keep the hospital staff ready to ensure timely treatment.

In case MPs, Central Cabinet Ministers, State Ministers and former PMs are leading the demonstrations, specific group may be detailed to ensure their personal safety in the event of any Police action. Besides, such leaders would be available with the Police to control the violent mob.

In the event of any demonstration turning violent and force in the form of lathi charge or teargas is resorted to in which people get injured, an incident report must be sent by DCP/District addressed to Jt. C.P./concerned with a copy to SO to C.P., Principal Secretary (Home), Govt. of NCT, Joint Secretary (UT), MHA for information of the Govt. without any loss of time, particularly when the Parliament is in session.

It is essential that units should be kept together and that formations should be preserved. For example, it is extremely dangerous for men armed either with rifles, muskets or tear smoke guns to open fire unless they are in
lines. Again foot or mounted Police seeking to disperse a crowd must maintain line. Failure to maintain line may result in individuals being isolated in the crowd and severely hurt by its members, or in the heat of the movement by their own comrades. Further, a disciplined movement by a few men has far more greater effect than individual efforts by a large number in a heterogeneous way.

Individual members of the force may, when excited by provocation or injury, start shouting thereby causing confusion and preventing the orders of responsible officers from being heard. It is therefore necessary that when dispersal action is on, no one should open his mouth except the officers who are required to give orders.

Whenever Police force is expected to go into action they should wear steel helmets, carry cane shields & other defensive equipment. The tear gas squad and the force which supports the tear gas squad shall wear duty and service respirators respectively. Tear gas guns and grenades shall be fired only by the officers/men trained in their use.

The force shall always be divided into small sections and placed under the charge of section and platoon commanders in order to have effective control on them. In no case the strength of force used for dispersal of such assemblies shall be less than on section (commander and 5 constables) and they shall work under their own officers. This, however, shall not deter Police officer of authorized rank to act for controlling situations likely to take an explosive turn in the circumstances mentioned in para 1 above till the arrival of reinforcements.

Whenever it is decided to use gas or open fire, all Policemen present in between the procession and the gas squad or armed squad must be withdrawn forthwith by the sounding of a bugle or making suitable announcements.

Provisions for Punishment:

143 IPC: -Whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with, imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six month or with fine or with both.

144, 145 IPC:- Whoever joins the unlawful assembly armed with lethal weapon or joining or continuing is an unlawful assembly knowing that it has been lawful commanded to be dispersed, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both.

Restriction imposed under the Indian Police Act of 1861.

Under section 30 of the Indian Police Act: Public assemblies and processions can be regulated (but cannot be prohibited) by the issue of license in the following manner:-

The Deputy Commissioner of Police (District) may, as occasion requires, direct the conduct of all assemblies and processions on the public roads or in the public streets or thoroughfares, and prescribe the routes by which and the time at which such processions may pass.

Section 30-A of Indian Police Act empowers the stoppage or dispersal of a procession or assemblies which violate the conditions laid down by the Police to regulate them:-

Any Magistrate or District Deputy Commissioner of Police or Superintendent of Police or Assistant District Superintendent of Police or Inspector of Police or any Police officer in-charge of a Station, may stop any procession which violates the conditions of a license granted under the foregoing section, and may order it or any assembly which violates any such conditions as aforesaid to disperse.

Restrictions under the Cr.P.C. on assembly.

Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. - District Magistrate, Sub Divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate being specifically empowered by the State Government, by a written order, to direct any person to abstain from any act if in such Magistrate’s opinion such an act is likely to promote disturbance of the public tranquility or a riot, or an affray. Any violation of an order passed U/S 144 Cr.P.C. is an offence U/S 188 IPC.
By virtue of section 20(5) Cr.P.C. the powers of an Executive Magistrate are conferred upon Commissioner of Police, Delhi, being a metropolitan area and such powers are further delegated to Deputy Commissioners of Police.

Use of force for dispersal of an unlawful assembly:-

Section 129 and 130 of the Cr.P.C. empowers an Executive Magistrate or an officer in-charge of Police Station to disperse an unlawful assembly by the use of force. In Delhi as commissioner system is prevalent the Special Executive Magistrate also enjoys the powers mentioned in above sections. The Cr.P.C. has not defined the various methods or means by which the force is to be used.

PPR 14.56 contains the instructions regarding use of force against crowd which are as under:-

Force should be applied and regulated according to the circumstances of each case with an object to suppress a disturbance of the peace, or to disperse an assembly which threatens such disturbance and has either refused to disperse or shows a determination not to disperse; no ulterior objects, such as punitive or repressive effect, shall be taken into consideration.

Any officer in charge of a Police or Police officer of higher rank has power to call upon an unlawful assembly to disperse and to use force to disperse it. If a gazetted Police officer is present, he shall act independently in ordering an assembly to disperse. In other circumstances the senior Police officer present, having the powers of an officer in charge of a Police Station, shall act on his own responsibility. Once the order to disperse a crowd has been given, the method by which force shall be applied and the degree of force to be used shall be decided by the senior Police officer present.

All attempts to disperse a crowd by warnings, exhortation, etc., shall be made before it is declared an unlawful assembly and, as such, ordered to disperse. Once an order to disperse has been defied, or when the attitude of a crowd is obviously defiant, force shall be used without hesitation. The degree of force used shall be the minimum which the responsible officer, with the exercise of due care and attention, decides to be necessary for the effective dispersal of the crowd and the making of such arrests as may be desired. The degree and duration of the use of force shall be limited as much as possible, and the least deadly weapon which the circumstances permit shall be used.

The effectiveness of force depends mainly upon the determination with which it is applied; its direction against the most defiant section of the crowd to be dispersed and its absolute control.

When the responsible Police officer considers that the use of firearms is necessary, he shall unless circumstances make such action impossible, warn the crowd that if they do not immediately disperse, fire with live ammunition will be opened upon them.

In order that the decision to open fire may be promptly acted upon without loss of control or confusion, the responsible Police officer shall, as soon as it appears likely that the use of firearms will be necessary, tell off a detachment of armed Police to be held in readiness. When fire is to be opened, the responsible Police officer shall decide the minimum volume necessary to be effective in the circumstances and shall give precise orders accordingly, as to the particular men or files who are to fire and the number of rounds to be fired; and whether volleys or independent aimed shots are to be fired, and shall ensure that his orders are not exceeded and that no firing contrary to or without orders takes place. Whatever volume of fire is ordered, it shall be applied with the maximum of effect; the aim shall be kept low and directed at the most threatening parts of the crowd; in no circumstances shall firing over the heads of or at the fringes of the crowd be allowed.

While the disposition of the Police must be left to the Police officer in command, every precaution should be taken that a force armed with firearms is not brought so close to a dangerous crowd, as to risk its either being overwhelmed by numbers or being forced to inflict heavy casualties. If the use of firearms cannot be avoided,
firing should be carried out from a distance sufficient to obviate the risk of the force being rushed and to enable strict fire-control to be maintained.

Relevant sections of law to deal with unlawful assemblies:

Preventive action by the Police. Section 23 of Indian Police (Act-V) 1861. Section 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 107 of the Cr.P.C.

The person so arrested has to be proceeded u/s 107 Cr.P.C. which empowers a Magistrate to obtain, security for keeping peace from any person. In Delhi an ACP is designated as Special Executive Magistrate in each Police distt. who is empowered to exercise this power.

Punitive action by the Police. Section 143 IPC, 144 IPC & 145 IPC. Collective action against the unlawful assembly:-


Agitations: Constitution of India gives to its citizen’s freedom of speech, expressions right to form associations and to assemble peacefully. Before independence father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi adopted the path of peaceful agitations and non-violence. The similar practices have been exercised in other parts of the globe by the people to raise their voice against any alleged discrimination and injustice meted out to them. Sociologically, whenever a section of society feels neglected come together and agitates to voice their grievances. Initially agitations were purely localized and confined only to a particular issue but slowly agitations were controlled and mobilized on various levels by interested groups. As people have become more conscious and aware about their rights the holdings of agitations have increased tremendously. Teachers, Doctors, Students, Political Parties, Labour Unions and even religious organizations resort to agitations to attain different goals.

Broadly agitations can be classified as under: - Political, Communal, Linguistic, Agrarian, Labour, Student, and Political.

The most usual feature of a political demonstration is strike or hartal during which a bandh may be organized with the objective of showing to the government the extent of public support behind it. Meeting, processions are also part of demonstration.

Political parties often express their disapproval of certain Government measures by holding demonstration. Demonstrations are generally well advertised in order to get public support and increase the gathering. Such demonstrations are also organized by traders and other associations, against the income tax or sales tax, transport departments, increase of prices of petrol, gas, etc.

The easiest way to disrupt life in a big city is to disrupt the transport services. Consequently, during a strike the bus services are the first target of attack. Sometimes the government may decide to run the services with Police escort. This may eventually lead to a clash because it is not possible to adequately guard every bus and the demonstrators could have their way in his and run attacks. A clash between the Police and the demonstrators could lead to disturbance and the services could be closed down in any case.

Communal: Communalism is generally understood in the context of acrimony and conflict between the two communities. The major form of communal disturbance in India has been seen with respect to the two prominent communities i.e. Hindus & Muslims. With the passage of time, we have witnessed violence and other frictions on the basis of religion, caste, language, regions etc. Whatever may be the root cause, the end result is devastation which may be both material as well as cognitive.
Communalism in a society spreads because of historical reasons, socioeconomic imbalances and psychological fear of insecurity. Due to these factors members of certain society or groups seek solace and security from its own group. This has resulted into consolidation of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims identities. These sectarian forces pose a threat to social solidarity and national integrity. Keeping in mind the level of threat to peaceful existence of the society the Police should develop a balanced view and broad spectrum to fight communal agitations and mitigate communal tension and disharmony.

Causes of Communal Tension and Riots: Personal disputes between individuals or parties which may be of a civil or criminal nature. Encroachment on places of worship or on land adjoining such places. Music before a mosque.

On the occasion of processions by one community passing through the majority area of the other community or by a place of worship. Conversions. Teasing of girls. Inter community marriages. Cow slaughter. Throwing of color during Holi. Extraneous factors such as issues pertaining to other districts, states or even countries.

Nature of Disturbances: Communal disturbances may take the following shape.

Assaults and murders. Arsoning, Looting, Defacement of places of worship, Rape and abduction of woman.

This may be due to mob action or by individuals with an intention to take revenge or inflame passions. It is the duty of all Police officers to take timely preventive action to prevent breach of peace and order and to take immediate and effective measures, to handle the trouble.

Linguistic: Most of the states have developed specific political identities based on language. Agitation in state of Andhra Pradesh in 1950s, resulted in the reorganization of state boundaries along linguistic lines. Agitations in the state of Tamil Nadu in the 1960s resulted in domination of the state by parties dedicated officially to Tamil nationalism.

In the northeast, regional struggles have centered around tribal identities having different languages, leading to the formation of a number of small states based on dominant tribal groupings.

The regional movements most threatening to national integration have occurred in the northwest. The state of Punjab was divided by the Indian government twice after independence- Haryana and Himachal Pradesh were sliced off- before it achieved a Sikh majority population in what remained of Punjab. In India’s state of Jammu and Kashmir where Muslims constitute the majority of the population, regional struggle takes a different religious form. Difference of language and dialect also contributed in continuation of these agitations and has created intense security problems.

Some of these agitations ultimately resulted into formation of new states on linguistic basis and have weakened the national fabric. For gaining political mileage and local support small regional parties have been playing linguistic card. An agitation in Bundelkhand for separate statehood is recent example.

Though, these agitations take place in different states, yet all the groups come and agitate in Delhi to further plead their cause at central level. These agitations need proper attention and dealing by Police.

Agrarian: Agriculture is the main profession in India. Agrarian unrest is a common sight in India and dates back to Mughal Empire. The farmers had been suppressed and exploited by the big landlords and rulers. The faulty systems of land and revenue arrangements led to agrarian unrest.

During reign of Muslims, the Indian economy was of exclusively feudal character. Agrarian unrest was simply crushed. Later on the establishment of British Rule tried to improve the situation but the rural India continued to remain under the influence of feudal or semi-feudal atmosphere. “The permanent settlement” by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 strengthened the empire but village communities perished. The Zamindars of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa became ostentatiously rich. In British Empire there were hundreds of princely states with feudal system. The agrarian unrest was less conspicuous as rulers supported by British had strong administration. The agrarian unrest
caught the sight of political parties and agitations were organized with their support under the leadership of congress party riots in Oudh and famous Chaparan Satyagrah took place. In 1935 Kissan conference was held at Allahabad advocating abolition of Zamindari system and other pro peasant resolutions. But it could not stop big agrarian unrest in Telangana.

After attaining independence agrarian reform committee was formed to look into the grievances of the peasants. The situation improved but movements in Telangana and Naxalbari (W.Bengal) continued up to late 70s when they lost credibility among people and para military forces were deployed to contain these unruly agitation. Taking lessons, from the past experiences, more land reforms were enacted which resulted in decline in such agitations.

Presently, although a number of agricultural and land reforms have been made but the international recession and industrial globalization has become the major cause for farmers agitations. The lower minimum support price of food grains and acquisition of agriculture land for industrial development have dominated the scene. With the support of political parties, the famer agitations have taken place in Maharashtra and Singur (W. Bengal). Due to heavy appreciation of land value the farmers in NCR have also been agitating against acquisition of agricultural land by the concerned governments.

Delhi being the capital of India, peasant groups and associations from various states hold their agitations to air their grievances before the central government and as such the agrarian unrest is one of the serious problems for Delhi Police to tackle. Delhi has witnessed many unruly farmer agitations, particularly staged by outfits like Bhartiya Kissan Union at Boat Club.

States like Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat, and U.P., West Bengal, have witnessed such agitations against the government on the issue of land acquirement, electricity rates, and pricing of agricultural produce etc. The prominent among these agitations are placed below:-

With the abolition of the Zamindari system and the implementation of ceiling law this problem is gradually dying out. However, the spectra of violence raises its ugly head now and then, due to the tardy implementation of land reforms. In such cases, extremist elements amongst the leftist have tried to capitalize on the situation, as in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh currently, by organizing the landless and the tribal against the landlords, which has led to bloody clashes. Often these have been along caste lines.

Forcible possession of agricultural land. Second problem is that of the possession of land allotted to the landless. Often the land owners prevent the allottees from taking possession of surplus land allotted to them, or grab such land back. This leads to breach in tranquility. However, such matter can be effectively handled by immediate action under preventive section of law and the laws framed for the abolition of the Zamindari system and implementation of Land reforms.

Sometimes a peculiar problem arises in reverie areas due to the changing course of rivers. After some years a river flows over new areas and leaving dry areas aside. This leads to clashes over the right of usage of land that has emerged. The Police should be vigilance and resort to preventive measures and bring the matter to the notice of the land revenue authorities for the settlement of the dispute.

Agitations against the Government: Low procurement prices for crops and other farm products. Protests against high tariff rates, for power and water. Acquisition of agricultural land for industrial development. Demand for Land reforms.

Labour - Industrial agitations are generally due to real or imaginary economic grievance of workers, and generally follow after the failure of negotiations. Other factors which often spark off such agitations are disciplinary action against a worker, demand for better working conditions and political consideration such as a tussle between two unions to gain the support of workers. These take the form of rallies and demonstrations to popularize the call and enlist support for a strike or cessation of work. The object is to pressurize the management. Often the strikers will picket the gates to prevent entry of loyal workers or damage industrial property.
Important features of Essential Services Maintenance ACT 1981:

Certain services have been declared essential in section 2 of the Act.

Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government to prohibit strikes in certain employments, by a general or special order which will have force for six months.

A penalty of dismissal from service and other penal provisions have been fixed vide section 4 for commencing, participation or instigating a strike declared illegal under the Act.

The Act also empowers the Government to prohibit lockouts and layoffs in establishments essential to public service.

Industrial Dispute Act, 1947

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a special legislation intended for the benefit of weaker sections of society comprising workmen who require special protection. To enable them to get relief expeditiously, the Industrial Dispute Act created parallel forum for adjudication of the rights of workmen. The forums created are the Industrial Tribunals, Labour Courts etc. Industrial Disputes Act cuts free the shackles of rigid rules of procedure prescribed under Civil Procedure Code, and enable the special forums, the prescribe their own procedure, subject to the Act and the rules made there under.

Among other things, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, recognized the workers right to go on strike except in the case of public utility services where 14 days’ notice was required before going on strike.

Article 19 (1) © of the Constitution of India, guarantees the Citizens Rights to form association or Unions, which is interpreted to include the right to form Trade Unions.

The relevant legal provisions under Industrial Disputes Act:

Section - 3 - The works Committee
Section - 4 – Conciliation Officers
Section - 5 – Boards of Conciliation
Section - 6 – Courts of Enquiry
Section - 7 – Labour Courts
Section - 7A – Industrial Tribunals and National Tribunals.
Annexure-K: Standard Operating Procedures to deal with Public Agitations with Non-lethal Measures (MHA Task Force Report)

Report of Sub Group-I

OBEJECTIVES: - The objective of the SOP is to provide guidelines for dispersal of an unlawful assembly with minimum necessary force with minimum possible collateral damage.

PART-I

A –

- India at the time of its independence has adopted democratic set up. The constitution provides right of assembly to its citizens to express their grievances peacefully. These assemblies may be subject to such restrictions as notified by the competent authority.
- The laws/instructions for dispersal of an unlawful assembly are laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code, Police Acts and Police Manuals of the States. An unlawful assembly may be ordered to disperse by a Magistrate or officer-in-charge of a Police Station/Sub-Inspector present, and when so ordered, it is the duty of the members of the unlawful assembly to disperse. If they do not disperse, minimum necessary force may be used normally in a graded manner, to disperse them. Any Police Officer may, without warrant, arrest the members of an unlawful assembly and disperse the assembly.
- Police/Public meets should be conducted regularly and Police should try to involve the common people by organizing such programs so as to dilute the problem situations.
- Magistrate/senior most police officer on the spot to decide type and quantum of force.
- The objective of use of force is to disperse the unlawful assembly and not to punish them.
- Action must stop after the dispersal of the unlawful assembly is achieved.
- Legal action must follow against those involved in the unlawful assembly.
- As far as practicable, the strength of the police party deployed for dispersal of an unlawful assembly should not be less than a Platoon. The Platoon Commander will be responsible for the manner of utilization of the manpower in consultation with the senior most police officer present on the spot.

B – TRAINING

- Training of the trainers to be conducted at selected Training Schools/Colleges at National level under the supervision of MHA, GOI.
- Special emphasis during training should be laid on crowd control and handling/use of equipment during the mob dispersal with effectiveness and minimum collateral damages and avoidance of loss of human lives.
- Sufficient knowledge of Substantive/Procedural Law to be imparted during the training.
- Trainers to be made aware about the working of judicial system.
- Stress during training to be on respect for Human Rights/Values.
Superintendents of Police should ensure that Sub-Divisional Police Officers and Station House Officers organize demonstrations of mob dispersal by the District Armed Reserve from time to time during their visits to the District Headquarters.

Mock drill should be arranged in the District as it is generally aimed at ensuring/checking preparedness & proper response in any emergency. Such mock drill is meant to coordinate response of all agencies involved in law and order management. These drills should be held at district police station levels with an aim to effectively deal with and with any law and order situation.

C- UPGRADING OF TRAINING OF POLICEMEN REGARDING RIOT CONTROL

- Every State/CPO engaged in law & order duty should earmark some battalions of Armed Police (as per requirement) specifically for law & order duty. Alternatively or additionally, States may designate one or more companies in every battalion exclusively for law & order duty and be kept on training round the clock.
- States may also constitute District reserves for this purpose. Specialized training may be imparted to them to deal with unlawful assembly. This trained component should be employed first to deal with law & order problems and in case of further requirement, other police components may assist/complement them.
- Ladies components should also to be identified and trained in riot control.
- Basic training modules at different levels need to be reviewed to put more stress on anti-riot drills with more time (at least 4 weeks) allotted for this with emphasis on simulated/mock exercises and use of non-lethal methods.
- Training resources, in terms of infrastructure, manpower etc., may be shared between different States/Police forces, for optimal use, in an organized manner to train personnel in the field.
- Select personnel may be imparted specialized training at various centers of excellence in the world or through their instructors brought to India by way of 'training of trainers' so that they may later train others.
- Short duration refresher course on anti-riot drills should be imparted to all field officers, on rotational basis, who may be required to deal with law and order problems.
- As far as practicable, every district should hold simulation/mock exercise for tackling law & order situation once every month.
- Sufficient anti-riot equipment with emphasis on non-lethal equipment need to be made available to the Police so that they could tackle law & order situations through non-lethal methods to the extent possible.
- Provision of sufficient number of anti-riot 'gears/vehicles would enable the Police Force to deal with unlawful assembly more confidently reducing civilian causalities due to panic reaction.
- Sufficient number of trainers should be identified and deputed for special training in riot control to the leading training centers. They, in turn, would train the policemen in their State/District.
- Sufficient anti-riot/crowd control equipment to be made available at the training centers.
- The introduction of Audio-Visual training will have an effective impact on the trainees.
- Mock and virtual training modules be introduced in the curriculum.
• Special incentives in the form of rewards should be provided to those performing well in training centers as well as in the field on this count for boosting their morale.
• Training capsules can be conducted in the District Police Lines also and the policemen identified for the purpose can be put to shorter duration courses.
• A pool of trainers of all the forces can be deputed for training on rotation basis.
• Forces such as BSF/SSB/ITBP/AR which have limited experience in dealing with crowd control and are not having any riot control equipment should not normally be used for mob dispersal. They can be used for flag marches etc. to restore the confidence among the general public.
• All the District SSPs should devise a system so that all information pertaining to law and order situation is immediately and continuously shared with all concerned, including Police Control Room, on real time basis.
• On receipt of information of a Law & Order situation, the PCR should function as a Nerve Centre of all the activities and pass on the information to all the Senior Officers and senior functionaries of the Government concerned with law and order.
• As far as possible arrange for videography of mob violence to identify the culprits for legal action.
• Depending on the assessment of the local terrain, topography, situation and nature of the mob, suitable use of mounted police may also be considered.
• Use of helicopters, if possible for aerial recce, to identify the areas where there is spontaneous violence and crowd movement on a large scale for effective and better coordination among forces to be deployed to curtail the mob violence.
• Suitable procedures need to be evolved for management of the media both during the operation and after the operation. For media management only designated Officers should brief the media persons regarding law and order immediately after dispersal of the mob without losing any time so that correct picture is brought before the general public to counter the rumors. However, media needs to be kept away at a suitable distance from the places of mob violence during action.
• It has been observed that during large scale violence the protestors block roads especially main roads by creating obstructions to stop vehicular movement. For removal of these vehicles at least one Recovery Vehicle or suitable modified vehicle with Crane needs to be provided to every district.
• The persons arrested during the mob violence need to be classified as:
  o 1. Minors
  o 2. First time law breakers and
  o 3. Hardcore Criminals.
• The minors should be immediately segregated from rest of the arrested persons and should be lodged in Juvenile Jails/Correctional Home. The first time arrested persons should be dealt with appropriately and. Hardcore criminals need to be dealt effectively under law.
• Proper documentation, records and videography of the events should be maintained.

D – EQUIPMENT
• In a contingent of platoon strength (20 heads) which has to deal with the dispersal of crowd should normally have the following equipment/arms :-
• 50% with normal lathis/shields depending upon the strength of the contingent of which half of them would have full protective gears.
• 2-4 persons with tear smoke guns/grenades, depending upon the strength of the contingent.
• 2-3 persons with non-lethal weapons.
• 2 persons with firearms who will remain always with I/C law and order contingent during mob violence.
• Riot flags, display banners, bell hailers, video-camera etc., as far as possible, should be taken along by the police party being deployed for dealing with an unlawful assembly. Before use of force for the dispersal, these banners etc. should be utilized to warn the unlawful assembly. The banners/flags should be used in such a manner that what is written on them is clearly visible and can be read or clearly understood by the unlawful assembly.
• The policemen used for dispersing the unlawful assembly should wear the prescribed uniforms and the protective/anti-riot body gear.

PART- 2: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)
A – TACTICS
• As far as practicable, efforts should be made to disperse the unlawfully assembly without using force i.e. through persuasion, negotiations, mediations etc.
• If they persist with their illegal act, their assembly should be declared unlawful.
• The crowd may have gathered without any overt violent activity but there may be intent to cause violence which should be prevented.
• Consequently, they should be ordered to disperse, if they do not, they should be arrested using minimum necessary force.
• If this doesn't work, they should be cautioned that force shall be used.
• If the unlawful assembly still persists, then force should be used to disperse them.
• Force is to be used by first using non-lethal means followed by harsher ways, if required till the situation is brought under control. Use of lethal means should be the last option, only when everything else fails.
• Before the decision to use lethal weapon is taken, the unlawful assembly should be again warned as far as practicable.
• As far as practicable, attempt should be made to fire below the waist, when resorting to firing becomes necessary to disperse unlawful assembly.
• Proper briefing should be done by the officer in-charge conveying the instructions in clear terms before the deployment is made.
• Efforts should be made to carry out videography/photography of entire dispersal exercise.
• To restore confidence among the public, the administrative machinery should get activated in their areas and establish contact with the respectable of the area and address the problems responsible for any Law & Order situation.
B-PROCEDURE

- An Executive Magistrate should be deputed by the Administration as far as possible where a breach of the peace necessitating use of force is anticipated. The Executive Magistrate on Suo-moto information or requisition by police should be present at the spot. In order to ensure availability of appropriate number of magistrates/officers specially empowered by the State Government to meet the requirements of emergent law and order situations it would be desirable to periodically assess such requirement and train them.

- When the methods of persuasion, advice and warning by District Police/Administration fail and the mob is bent upon violence then the Senior most Police Officer present at the spot must assist the Magistrate by mobilizing the available police force (including women component if necessary and available) and utilizing them as best as possible. Following the orders of Magistrate or senior most police officer present on the spot, the Police may use the minimum force as is necessary to disperse the unlawful assembly by resorting to Lathi Charge, Water cannons and tear smoke shells and other less lethal/non-lethal weapons.

- In case an officer of SI rank is not available on the spot, senior most Police officer I policemen present should disperse the unruly mob using minimum necessary force.

- The deployed personnel should remain intact in Sections/Platoons and should not act individually.

- If the unlawful assembly persists with defiance and the use of tear gas, Lathi charge etc. is ineffective to disperse the unlawful assembly, use of firearms may be resorted to. The Magistrate/senior police officer on the spot will be responsible for taking a decision as to when an unlawful assembly has to be dispersed by force and also the kind of force to be used.

- After such a decision is taken, magistrate/senior police officer present on the spot will be responsible for deciding the type and the quantum of the force to be used and the manner of using it.

- Non-lethal weapons should be used to avoid loss of human life. Aim should be taken at the lower limbs of protesters to avoid causing injuries to the vital parts.

- All commands to the policemen are to be given by the officer in command of the police party. The police should not open fire except by orders of the Magistrate or the senior police officer present on the spot.

- Even after being warned, if the unruly mob does not disperse, the order to fire may be given by the Magistrate or the senior police officer present on the spot. The Magistrate/senior police officer present on the spot will decide who in the party will use firearm and what should be the number of rounds to be fired. The firing, if ordered, will be in single shot mode. After firing Magistrate/senior most police officer on the spot will assess the impact of firing on the unlawful assembly and further use of any other force will be decided accordingly.

- The force should be used when it is absolutely necessary. It should be minimum and proportional to the situation and should be stopped/discontinued, the moment mob violence stops.

- Firing should cease if the unlawful assembly shows signs of dispersing in the opinion of Magistrate/senior most police officer present on the spot. After dispersal, the police party should extend all help to immediately evacuate the casualties to the hospital.

- Attempt should be made to contain and isolate the disorder to the smallest area possible and subsequently area be cordoned, as necessary, to prevent the spreading of violence to other areas.

- While dealing with unlawful assemblies care should be taken to ensure that public property and vital installations existing in the affected area are safeguarded.
The policemen should not pursue the members of an unlawful assembly for immediate arrest where there is an apprehension that it may lead to desperate acts endangering the life of rioters/policemen.

PART-3

3.1 STONE PELTING MOBS

- While any unruly mob resorting to violence resorts to Stone pelting on Police contingent, in such situation, the force deployed should be committed to disperse the stone pelters by following the SOP as under:
- It is very important that proper briefing is given by the officer in-charge before the deployment is made conveying the instructions in clear terms.
- At the very outset announcement for dispersal should be made through PA system or other available means.
- Riot flags and display banners, as far as practicable should be taken along and should be hoisted at conspicuous spots.
- The senior most police officer present on the spot dealing with the stone pelters should assess the feasibility of charging at the unruly mob with lathis and shields first. The assessment would depend upon the relative strength of the unruly mob and police force and whether the police party is equipped properly with anti-riot gear so that police personnel do not suffer disproportionate injuries.
- If stone pelting from the unruly mob persists, the Police contingent should, as far as practicable, use water cannon and tear smoke shells and attempt should be made to avoid hitting directly on vital parts of their body by the shells to minimize causalities.
- If use of tear smoke is not effective, other non-lethal and less lethal means should be used exercising caution and discretion. Attempt should be made to keep the line of fire, when required, below the waist of the target to reduce fatalities.
- However, it is advisable that fire be directed towards most violent sections of the stone pelting mob only.
- When all above options turn unsuccessful and use of firearms becomes necessary, the procedures envisaged in Criminal Procedure Code are to be followed. At the outset, the unruly mob be warned through P.A System/loud hailers. etc. About the use of firearms. When unruly mob does not respond positively and use of firearms becomes unavoidable, it is advisable that the initial round of firing be made in air. If despite this the unruly mob does not disperse, Magistrate/senior police officer present on the spot may decide to order firing by using single shot mode. The police personnel (individuals/sections) who may be called on to fire should be identified in advance and briefed accordingly. Maximum restraint should be observed to ensure minimum necessary use of firearms ensuring minimum causalities.
- The firing should cease the moment the unruly mob, in the opinion of the Magistrate/senior most police officer present on the spot, shows signs of dispersal.
- Prohibitory orders, if imposed by authorities in an area, should be strictly enforced.
- Use of helicopters for surveillance/guidance to ground forces and for anti-riot actions using non-lethal methods may be considered. Senior officers should make assessment about the use, as per the requirements.
3.2 ATTACK AGAINST OFFICERS/MOTORCADES/VEHICLES

- The local jurisdictional Police Officers (SDPO/SHO) should be informed well in advance by the concerned authorities regarding the movement of VIPs/Senior Civil/Police/Pvt. Officers and other protected persons.
- Proper briefing of the force should be done by the officer-in-charge before the deployment is made conveying the instructions in clear terms.
- In the situation where any officer/motorcade/vehicles are subjected to stone pelting, the officers/vehicles should try to reach the nearest police station/security force camp/picket to avoid civilian causalities and possible injury to the VIP/officer and damage to the vehicles. Priority should be given to evacuation and rescue including immediate shifting of the VIP/officer, in case of injury, to the nearby hospital. The accompanying in-charge of the police party should have the contact numbers of the concerned/ nearby Police Stations, which can provide immediate help to the motorcade to take it out of troubled/danger area.
- The officers should avoid moving in long convoys in areas affected by violence on account of law & order problems and should necessarily carry riot control component with adequate riot control equipment/gears. Personal Security Officers (PSOs), who are deployed with weapons, should be advised not to directly come in contact and deal with the unruly mob. They should be clearly briefed to resort to firing only in exercise of right to self-defense, when there is an imminent danger to the life of the VIP/Officer or PSOs himself.
- The escort vehicles of VIPs/Protected Peron should also carry with them some non-lethal weapons so that in case the VIP/Protected happens to be confronted by unruly mob, these non-lethal weapons could be used till reinforcement reaches there. DRDO has developed rubber bullets for use in AK rifles. These rubber bullets carried in an identifiable colored magazine should be carried along by the escort party for use in exigencies and to avoid the use of live ammunition by mistake.
- In case immediate withdrawal is not feasible, rioters should be kept engaged till reinforcements arrive. PCR/nearby Police/SF Units should be contacted without losing time for the purpose.
- The Provision of medical/first-aid facility should always be available with the motorcade/in the vehicles of officers.

3.3) ATTACK AGAINST GOVT. BUILDINGS/POLICE BUILDINGS:

- In no case should the Police installations be left unattended while dealing with the law & order situation. Smooth and un-interrupted functioning of communication system should always be ensured.
- Contingency Plans should be worked out locally for the security of all the Government/police buildings in case of an attack by the unruly mob. The plan should also identify the various units/locations from where reinforcements are to reach for security of particular building. All police personnel should be made aware of their roles and the responsibilities in these plans. Proper communication needs to be ensured for execution of these plans.
- When the unruly mob shows signs of violence, the force contingent should try to take over the Govt. Buildings located at the site. As a first step, people inside the building be rescued by evacuating them from the safe exit.
- However, in case violent rioters target any Govt. building, minimum necessary force should be used to disperse them so that Govt. Property is saved.
- The movement of fire tenders should be facilitated towards the affected buildings.
• The Police contingent should requisition the fire control system/fire tenders whenever there is an apprehension or advance intelligence of such situations developing at any place. A prior coordination with the concerned departments would be required.
• Proper static guards should be deployed at Police Station buildings backed by a well-equipped QRT.

3.4) LAW AND ORDER PROBLEM CREATED BY WOMEN/CHILDREN
• Unruly mob of women/children needs to be lacked with restraint and sensitivity.
• Women/children demonstrators as far as practicable should be dealt by women police only. Women protesters should generally be persuaded to disperse. In case persuasion fails, water cannons and tear smoke can be used. If required, stun grenades can also be used to disperse the women demonstrators.
• Quantum of force should be commensurate with the reaction from such crowd.
• Methods such as use of water cannons, poly carbonate lathis should be resorted to.
• 3.5) Stone pelting in narrow streets:-
• Proper briefing should be done by the officer in-charge before the deployment is made conveying the instructions in clear terms.
• As far as practicable confrontation with the stone-palters in narrow streets should be avoided.
• It should be ensured that a minimum of one section strength of policemen is deployed together at a place to avoid getting trapped individually. There should be coordinated action instead of individual action.
• Chasing of violators by Police should always be to a limit and following the rioters deep inside the by-lanes & streets be avoided to prevent causalities on either side.
• Every effort should be made to restrict the rioters from assembling at vital spots to avoid blockade to emergency services and the consequent action.
• Dealing with law & order problems at night time from stone pelting mobs needs lot of discretion and proper supervision to avoid allegations against the policemen and to avoid casualties.
• The withdrawal should be in a tactical manner. The last line of defense of the Police Component side should take utmost precautions while physically withdrawing from the scene. The withdrawal should be in a phased manner i.e. third line of defense should retrieve first, second line should give support to the party directly facing the unruly mob and finally when the entire situation is brought under control, the officer in charge on the spot should withdraw the rest of the force component thereby minimizing the chances of provocative/retaliatory attacks from the mob. Once the entire withdrawal is made, appropriate debriefing at pre-determined places be done by the officer-in-charge at the end of the day to plug loopholes for the future and for enquiring about and looking after well-being of the policemen.

PART-4

• Debriefing of the force should be done at the end of the day to ascertain lessons learnt and for enquiring about and looking after the well-being of the policemen.
• A strategy has to be chalked by the I/C of the contingent at the end of the day about withdrawal of force which should be done in a systematic manner in phases. It has been
observed that mob sometimes attacks the force personnel at the time of withdrawal at the end of the day. Sufficient care has to be taken during withdrawal of forces so that no confrontation with the public takes place at that time.

- The Senior Police officers entrusted with the duty of maintenance of law and order should give proper briefing to the personnel to be deployed for the task and on the return of the deployment a debriefing session should be held to assess the performance of the force and identify deficiencies, if any, and issue necessary instructions accordingly.
- iv. The officer in-charge of the deployment should keep proper account of the rounds fired and subsequently DySP District Armed Reserve of the respective districts should consolidate the statements.

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION/ COUNSELLING CENTERS

- Since law and order problem are generally short-term problems having certain genesis and reason/grievances, it would be appropriate to involve public through counseling so that issues can be understood by them. Permission for rehabilitation/correctional centers should be made by the State Governments in order to prevent the juvenile delinquents getting mixed up with hardened criminals/ AN Es in the jails.

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

- Stratification of unlawful assembly I unruly mob needs to be made immediately and be analyzed regarding its composition and structure i.e., government employees, businessmen, social groups/organizations etc. Suitable stringent administrative actions are required against these depending upon their level of involvement. District SSP in coordination with District Magistrates (DM) have to initiate exercise to apprise Government for action.

OTHER MEASURES

- To diffuse the situation including addressing the causes:- An all-out multi-pronged strategy involving all the stake holders need to be devised well in advance by addressing the basic causes leading to law and order problems by providing situational sensitive and responsible administration to the people.

Report of Sub Group-II

List of Equipment:

Water Canon, Regular Tear Gas Shells, Stingers and dye- marker Grenades, Plastic Bullets for Mob Dispersal, Various Forms of Teaser, and Pepper ball Launchers, The LRAD, Laser Dazzlers, Net Guns, Stink Bombs,

The effectiveness and drawbacks of the individual equipment and situations in which a particular weapon should not be deployed.

WATER CANON:

- A water cannon is a device that shoots a high-pressure stream of water. Typically delivery rates of 15 L/s are common. The water can be delivered as a continuous stream, or in pulses; through a hard jet or as a spray.
• The main problem with the water cannon is that the tanker is ponderous and as such it cannot go in small lanes. It is required that small water cannons which may be mounted on LMVs with a little modification in the chassis, if necessary may be done.
• Water cannon has low range of less than 50 yards and does not hurt even if taken head on. Tank of 8000 liter runs out in just 8 minutes and refilling on the spot may be difficult.

REGULAR TEAR GAS SHELLS
• The C.S. gas which causes tears or general irritation in eyes, nose etc. is used in various types of normal, electric and dual shells. Its effect compels subjects to run away for cover.
• The tear gas devices in general require the following modifications:
  • Rapid firing launchers that may quickly saturate an area with small shells of any caliber that is found suitable and feasible should be attempted. It is understood that it may not be easy to design launchers that will be able to fire the existing 38 mm shells in automatic mode hence the need of smaller calibers shells is there.
  • Mortars firing parachute tear gas shells that let a cloud of tear gas/smoke descend smoke descend upon the rioters should be fabricated.
  • Shells in which the combustion is faster thereby making it difficult to throw them back.
  • Pending the development of rapid-firing launchers stated above, multi-shot launchers may be developed so that the rate of fire may be increased.
  • Shells with plastic heads/bodies that hit softer than shells with metal! Bodies must be attempted. Shells if they hit human body directly it must cause least damage.
  • Shells or grenades which have substances with greater irritant capacity—whether capsaicinoids or CR or whatever—the idea is that it must have proven effect on actual riotous mobs and not on volunteers.
  • Effectively of tear gas is highly limited in open spaces and depends greatly on prevailing winds. People have learnt protective tricks like use of wet cloth to evade its ill impacts. As such experienced rioters do not take it seriously. The shells are either smothered with a wet gunny bag or thrown back. Throwing back is facilitated by the fact that TSI If burns and does not explode. Individual shells do not produce a sufficient volume of smoke/sound and the rate of burning is also slow—due to this the rioters throw the shell back.

STINGERS AND DYE MARKER GRENADES
• Dye is sprayed over members of crowd thereby creating a psychological impact on mob and it starts running hither thither out of fear and confusion. Stinger grenade pellets do not go beyond 30 feet and do not cause harm more than rubber bullets. For stinger and dye-marker grenades to be more effective, these may be developed after incorporating irritants. It should be used from a very safe distance.

PLASTIC BULLET FOR MOB DISPERSAL
• Bullets made of plastic which are fired from the regular rifles. At present the plastic bullets can fire on individual mode. The basic requirement is that it should be possible to fire them in semi-automatic mode from the regular rifles (AK and INSAS) and that the effective range must be about 50 yards.
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations

by Police

• It has not yet been field tested. 303 version was tested in Kerala and not found to be capable of dispersing a mob. In real life, under stress it is unrealistic for the police man to be able to judge range correctly. It should not be used from a close distance.

VARIOUS FORMS OF TASER

• Taser is an electro shock. Weapon though: uses electric current causing instant/temporary neuro muscular incapacitation. There are various forms of Tasers like X-26, X-3, X-12, Taser shock wave,
  o Taser X-26 - It fires a single shot and hence cannot be used on mob. It is a weapon for controlling an individual with very low, range of just 35 feet.
  o Taser X-3- It has three barrels and still cannot deal with a mob.
  o Taser X-12- It fires a projectile without the wire attached to it to produce shock of 500 volts.
  o Has range up to 100 feet and has not yet been field tested by us.
  o Taser Shock wave- It mounts several wire bound Tasers together. The problem with the device is that because of the projectiles coming out, it cannot have any wire mesh protection, hence it is vulnerable to stones.

• The basic limitations of the Tasers are their low range and usually single-shot nature. If Tasers are to be used with any effect in dealing with mobs, the following modifications are required:
  • It should be possible to fire the prongs or the projectile (XREP- Extended Range Electronic Projectile) to at least 30-40 yards. It should simultaneously be possible to fire the prongs or the projectile in rapid succession for dealing with multiple targets.

PEPPER BALL LAUNCHERS

• Pepper ball Launchers launches small balls filled with pepper powder with irritants on the mob. It has been extensively field tested. It has a very low range of just about 30 yards in comparison to tear gas, hence it is risky in front of mobs throwing stones. The accuracy becomes quite poor after 30 yards.
  • It requires at least 6-10 rounds to cause real discomfort which is difficult in real life. It is not effective to disperse the mob. It sounds very feeble and has no psychological impact like tear gas shell.
  • They have not been found effective with the given formulation. However, should the DRDO succeed in developing an irritant which is much more powerful, pepper balls can be designed incorporating that chemical.
  • The irritant effect is not adequate in open spaces and is vulnerable to winds and drizzles.

THE L.R.A.D (LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVISe)

• LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device) produces a loud sound which can be delivered in a particular direction. In the current design, the LRAD is not found to produce instantaneous effect even at low ranges of 70 yards.
  • It can be considered to use sonic weapons if they use such frequencies and/or such amplitude that they produce instantaneous nausea, vomiting, dizziness or stomach ache--strong enough to compel a man to leave the place immediately. It should not be used from a close distance.
LASER DAZZLERS;

- A device with both short and long ranges producing flashing light which causes discomfort to the mob. It comes in both hand held and vehicle mounted versions.
- Laser Dazzlers can be used effectively on a mob only if at a range of 50 yards or so, the beam diameter is about 40 inches. The idea is that it should be possible to affect two-three people at a time and also to make it difficult for them to shield the eyes or dodge them. A fine well-collimated beam with a spot with the diameter of an inch or so would not do. Further, it will have to be tested on riotous situations, especially on:
  - How they react to it the second time when the novelty effect is no longer there.
  - How effectively they counter it with color filters; avoiding looking in front; and physical shielding of eyes etc. Its effect may be reduced by wearing Goggles of glasses tinted with some other colour. By using mirrors it can be thrown back to the Police men.

Net Guns

- These guns fire nets on the target and ensnares up to one person at a time. It can entangle one individual and has a low range.
- If Net Guns are to be used with some effect:
  - Range and area of the net has to be increased so as to ensnare up to four-five people at a time. Range has to be at least 40-50 yards.
  - It should not be used for a larger crowd.

STINK BOMBS

- Stink Bomb contains chemicals of foul smell which compels people to leave the area to protect themselves from the intolerable stench.
- DRDO should also develop stink bombs based on f0_e~captons-they can try and develop any chemical. The stink of the chemical must not linger more than a few hours. Stink Bomb can run into legal problem if used in market/residential areas.

Cost and source of procurement of the equipment;

The cost of the equipment is not available with the CRPF. However it may be obtained from the internet. Many items like tear gas shells/stinger and dye marker grenade/plastic bullets are being procured from TSU BSF, Kanpur.
### Annexure-L: Reply to Queries on Anna Hazare Agitation by Delhi Police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.NO</th>
<th>INFORMATION REQUIRED</th>
<th>REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Force deployment details for handling Anna Hazare Agitation.</td>
<td>The local Police deployed 06 Addl. DCsP, 09 ACsP, 30 Inspectors, 60 Upper subordinates, 117 HCs, 240 Constables and 40 women Police personnel for handling the Anna Hazare agitation. Although outside for i.e. 55 companies were deployed from time to time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Policing methods/tactics used (with all details) related to the Anna Hazare Agitation.</td>
<td>Before the deployment of force, staff was briefed properly and they were directed to remain calm &amp; composed while dealing with the agitators and to handle the situation tactfully under the overall supervision of senior officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Details of all complaints received by the Police/ documents related to the Anna Hazare incident.</td>
<td>A details of complaints received on occasion of Anna Hazare agitation were received whose details may be seen at Annexure-‘A’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>All enquiry report related to the said incident.</td>
<td>No such enquiry was conducted in this regard. However, a case vide FIR No. 72/11, u/s 34/363/323/427/332 IPC and 3(1) PDPP Act was registered at PS. Kamla Market against the supporters of Sh. Anna Hazare, as they had broken the glass of a PCR Van and quarreled with Police. 3 persons were arrested in this connection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tear Gas Use Rules being followed by Delhi Police.</td>
<td>No Tear Gas was used during the Anna Hazare agitation. However, a copy of S.O. No. 152/89 regarding use of tear smoke in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies and processions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sequence of events related to the incident as recorded in the Police record.</td>
<td>The agitation of Anna Hazare started on 19.08.11 and it was called off peacefully on 28.08.2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Any action initiated (if any) by Delhi Police against Police officials for any reasons related to the said incident.</td>
<td>No action was initiated against any Police official by Delhi Police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Contact details of Delhi Police officers who were at the forefront of handling the said agitations.</td>
<td>Entire deployment was made as per the directions of senior officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Existing Standard Procedures Standing orders related to handling of public peaceful agitations/protests.</td>
<td>Full proof and detailed law &amp; order arrangements were issued as per the directions of senior officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Details of training schedules (including training modules/ inputs) being imparted to Delhi Police Training Institution for sensitization of Police personnel regarding handling of peaceful public protests.</td>
<td>This District has not organized any such training programs. Further details may be had from Principal/PTC, Jharoda Kalan, Delhi as they are organizing the training/courses on various topics for the entire Delhi Police Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Number of Delhi Police personnel who have undergone any such training programs concerning handling of peaceful public protests.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Any identified lessons learnt as per Police records.</td>
<td>Patience and co-operation with the agitators are required to handle such agitations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any identified future Police plan towards handling peaceful public protests in Delhi with special reference to training in this regard.</td>
<td>PTC/PHQ may comment, as such policies are being framed at PTC level or PHQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Media reporting at that time to find out the public perception of the role of Police in handling these agitations.</td>
<td>PHQ may comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ideas/suggestions from eminent officers, legal experts and prominent citizens.</td>
<td>No such suggestions received in this office.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 16 | As per Police record, number of Prominent Public Protests (both peaceful and violent) held in Delhi in last five years. | 2008 – 82  
2009 – 33  
2010 – 21  
2011 – 26  
2012 - 23 |
Annexure – M

SAMPLE DELHI POLICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AGITATION AT RAMLILA GROUND.

GENERAL

Information has been received that Bihar Pradesh Janta Dal (United) has decided to organize a rally at Ramlila Ground on 17.03.2013, to demand ‘Special Status to Bihar’. 18 MPs and 200 MLAs of the party from Bihar state are likely to participate in the rally. Shri Sharad Yadav, President Janta Dal United and Shri Nitish Kumar, Chief Minister of Bihar will address the rally. Shri Sanjay Jha, Ex-member of Legislative Council of Bihar r/o 149, Vidhaya Flat, Vir Chand Patel Path, Patna, Bihar (Mobile No. 09811029064) will be the organizer. As per the organizers, the expected gathering would about 30,000. Participants will reach by 500 buses from Delhi and nearby states. In order to maintain law & order during the procession, we have to make proper law & order arrangements at & around Ramlila Ground. The arrangements for rally at Ramlila would be as per APPENDIX “A”.

ASSESSMENT

The report of intelligence agencies indicates the presence of terrorists in Delhi. During the function, various terrorists’ outfits may try to do something spectacular to hog publicity. Terrorists may throw bomb on the crowd or plant bomb at convenient places to cause damage to the persons coming to attend the rally.

Serial bomb blasts in Mumbai on 13.07.2011, bomb blast in Delhi High Court on 07.09.2011 and recent bomb blast in Hyderabad should be kept in mind while briefing the staff and executing the arrangement. Utmost vigil and close watch at and around place of rally should be ensured. The buildings, Lanes, By-Lanes falling on both sides of the place of function need special attention. Extreme vigil should be kept at Ring Road, Netaji Subhash Marg, JLN Marg, Asaf Ali Road, Turkman Gate, Guru Nanak Chowk to R.S. Fly-over and in the walled City etc. by the local police.

Besides, the law and order arrangements, ACsP/SHOs/Insprs. concerned will concentrate on minority belts at and around place of rally. Strict vigil will be maintained on mischief mongers, rumor mongers, criminal elements who may try to create trouble. ACsP/SHOs concerned will be responsible for any lapse in this regard. However, officers on the spot should be tactful and firm in dealing/channelizing the persons during the rally and should not hesitate to take appropriate action as per law.

OBJECTIVES

1. All the persons will gain entry through DFMDs.
2. Every person will be searched/frisked thoroughly to ensure the security of VIPs/high dignitaries, Govt. property and general public etc.
3. To ensure clear passage to VIPs and their vehicles with the assistance of traffic police.
4. To ensure that the function is held without interruption.
5. To keep the crowd in check and not allow them to disturb the function by way of standing over the chairs.
6. To keep an eye on persons moving in suspicious circumstances.
7. Brief-cases, lighters, matches, bags, umbrellas, tiffin-boxes etc by prohibited to be taken by the audience inside the ground. Special attention will be paid on minor crackers, inside the ground.
8. To maintain law and order during the rally.

ANTI-EXPLOSIVE CHECK

ACP/SHO/Kamla Market with their anti-terrorist staff will make anti-sabotage and anti-explosive checks with the help of B.D.S. (N.R.) before the deployment of force inside/outside the ground.
COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE
DCP/Spl. Branch, Delhi is requested to develop intelligence and pass on any information of concern to Central Distt as early as possible. Staff in adequate Nos. may also be deployed.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARKING LOTS
Extreme vigil should be exercised in parking lots to ensure that no unauthorized person gains entry into such areas. All officers/men posted at the parking lots should be briefed to be careful about explosion in the parking lots.

TRAFFIC ARRANGEMENTS
DCP/Traffic (CR) is requested to make suitable arrangements on the day of rally. Sufficient number of cranes may be deployed to remove any parked or defective/break-down vehicles.

PROVISION OF INVERTED MIRRORS
ACP/Kamla Market & SHO/Kamla Market will provide inverted mirrors to the officers/men deployed in parking lots.

OUTSIDE FORCE
DCP/Ist Bn, DAP Delhi is requested to send the approved outside force with the direction to report to SHO/K. Market at Ram Lila ground as per scheduled date and time of duty.

LOCATION OF P.C.R. VANS
Addl. CP/PCR is requested to provide 1 PCR Van in each of the following points. He is also requested to provide one Ambulance van to SHO/K. Market as per scheduled date and time of duty.

1. Rajghat Chowk.
2. Delhi Gate Chowk.
4. Minto Road R/A.
5. Hamdard Chowk.
6. Ajmeri Gate Chowk.
7. Turkman Gate.
8. Ranjit Singh Flyover.
9. Minto Bridge Red Light.

QUICK REACTION TEAM
There will be five Quick Reaction Teams. Each team will be consisted a force of 1 HC & 2 Cts. All HCs deployed in QRTs will be issued WT Sets by the Inspr. Communication. Staff deployed on QRTs will perform duty with SAF. The position of QRTs will be as under :-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Staff deployed</th>
<th>QRT vehicle from PS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Guru Nanak Chowk</td>
<td>0-1-2</td>
<td>I.P. Estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minto Road Chembry</td>
<td>0-1-2</td>
<td>Kamla Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turkman Gate</td>
<td>0-1-2</td>
<td>DBG Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hamdard Chowk</td>
<td>0-1-2</td>
<td>Pahar Ganj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Delhi Gate</td>
<td>0-1-2</td>
<td>Darya Ganj</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MOTOR CYCLE PATROLLING

Motor cycle attached to PSs Kamla Market, Darya Ganj, Chandni Mahal & I.P. Estate will be on patrolling around the Ramlila Ground as per scheduled date and time of duty with an Upper subordinate with W.T. Set.

WIRELESS ARRANGEMENTS

DCP/Communication, Delhi is requested to provide wireless sets to all Zonal/Sector officers. He is also requested to provide WT sets to the Upper/ Lower subordinates who have been detailed with WT sets. All wireless sets will be issued by C.D.C.R.

PHOTOGRAPHER/VIDEOGRAPHER

I/C Crime Team, Central Dist. will detail one photographer who will report to SHO/Kamla Market as per scheduled date and time of duty at Ram Lila ground. The Videographer of Central District, Delhi will also report to SHO/Kamla Market as per schedule date and time of duty. All ACsP/SHOs Central District will also carry the video cameras issued to them in their vehicles. One constable shall be deployed on video camera and maximum recording be done.

TEAR GAS EQUIPMENTS, ROPES & BARRICADING

SHO/Kamla Market will make necessary arrangements of sufficient nos. of ropes and barricades at the appropriate places to control the mob and access control etc. All ACsP/SHOs/Inspr on duty will carry tear gas equipments and sufficient number of ropes with them.

PLAIN CLOTH ARRANGEMENTS

SHO/Kamla Market will deploy sufficient Police personnel inside the Ramlila Ground between sitting enclosures.

DFMDs/HHMDs.

SHO/Kamla Market will also arrange sufficient number of DFMDs in proper working condition and install them at the entry gate of the ground. He will also arrange HHMDs for the checking of the public before allowing them to enter the ground.

OBSERVATION POSTS/MACHAN

ACP/SHO/Kamla Market will locate strategic locations/places inside/ outside Ramlila Ground, erect ‘Machans’ and deploy sufficient staff with binocular/weapon to keep an eye on persons moving under suspicious manner.

FIRE TENDER

Fire tender must be alerted so as to be called at short notice in case of any emergency. SHO/Kamla Market will ensure it.

WATER CANON

SHO/Kamla Market will ensure the positioning of Vajra in front of Ramlila Ground.

UNIFORM
All officers/men must be smartly dressed in neat and tidy uniforms. U/Ss will carry their service revolvers/pistols and L/Ss will carry their lathies. The U/S and L/Ss will display their identity cards.

P.A. SYSTEM

SHO/Kamla Market will arrange a P.A. system at Ram Lila ground to brief the force as per scheduled date & time of duty. For the information of participants coming to attend the rally, it has been decided to install P.A. Systems at the following locations:-
1. Rajghat Chowk
2. Delhi Gate
3. Main Gate of G.B. Pant/JPN Hospital
4. Guru Nanak Chowk
5. Gandhi Market
6. JLN Marg between Guru Nanak Chowk and Minto Road
7. Minto Road chembry
8. Hamdard Chowk
9. Turkman Gate

Inspr. Communication will get these P.A. Systems installed at the above mentioned points. SHOs/Kamla Market, IP Estate, Chandni Mahal and Darya Ganj will liaise with Inspr. Communication and get these P.A. Systems installed well in time.

PROVISION OF CHANNELIZERS

To control the movement of crowd, SHO/Darya Ganj & I/Cs of concerned Sector will make temporary channelizers from Rajghat Chowk to Guru Nanak Chowk. They will ensure that the movement of participants coming to attend the rally at Ram Lila ground should be on the pavements through these channelizers. They will keep 20 Ropes and 35 Barricades each with them.

CCTV SYSTEM

ACP/SHO/Kamla Market shall ensure to get installed CCTV cameras at all strategic points including entry exit gates, stage and sitting enclosures with recording facility, monitoring system and CCTV control Room.

BAGGAGE SCANNERS

SHO/Kamla Market will ensure to get install atleast 2 baggage scanners at the entry points to scan the bags and other articles to be taken inside the place of rally by the participants.

LOUD HAILER

All ACsP/SHOs will kept adequate number of loud hailer with them in readiness.

STRUCTURE STABILITY CERTIFICATE

ACP/SHO/Kamla Market will ensure to obtain the structure stability certificate of the stage to be erected at Ram Lila ground for the rally before starting the rally. Limited number of persons should be allowed at the stage and under any circumstances this must not exceed beyond its holding/load bearing capacity.

NIGHT ARRANGEMENTS AT RAM LILA GROUND

The participants would be accommodated in the Ramlila Ground in the night intervening 16/17.03.2013. SHO/Kamla Market will detail strength of 1-2-5 from his own resources at Ramlila Ground during the night of 16/17.03.2013 from 20.00 hours till the main arrangements takes over to prevent any sabotage. Besides,
Night G.O. Checking Officer of Central District assisted by Night Checking Officer of Kamla Market Sub-Division will supervise/check at least twice the whole arrangements at Ramlila Ground every night and log a report in respect thereto at CDCR.

DISPERAL PLAN

The staff on duty will not abandon their duty till complete dispersal of the crowd. Further, if it is necessary to remove the spectators from the Ramlila Ground due to any reason, proper drill should be followed for dispersal of crowd. Use of any kind of force for dispersing a crowd should be preceded by proper warning such as announcements from a Public Address System or Loud Hailers, proper display of banners etc declaring the assembly unlawful and directing the crowd to disperse. Sensitization of staff at all levels should be ensured by the Supervisory officers through repeated briefing. It has also been observed that when the Police party comes under attack by brick batting, pelting of stones by the protesters, the Police personnel to resort to brick batting, which is totally illegal, not desirable and unwarranted. Under no circumstances shall the Police personnel resort to brick batting/stone pelting etc. In such situations, the Police party must strategically retreat to safer locations, reorganize, call for reinforcements, make new strategies and then advance in a systematic manner to control the unruly crowd/protesters with minimum use of force.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. All the staff deployed for Roof Tops will perform duty with W.T. Sets and Binoculars. I/C CDCR will issue W.T. sets and RI/C will provide Binoculars and flags (Red and White) to staff.
2. Concerned SHOs will collect the keys of all such high-rise building falling around the Ramlila Ground in advance so that necessary deployment of force on the roof tops may be made easily.
3. C-I & C-2 Reserve will report to SHO/Kamla Market as per schedule date and time of duty.
4. All Sector Officers under whose sectors vehicles will be parked will bring inverted mirrors with them from their concerned Police stations. If any short coming is noticed, RI/C will provide them inverted mirrors.
5. SHOs/Darya Ganj, Kamla Market and I.P. Estate will keep a close vigil in their areas to maintain law & order during the arrangement. They will deploy sufficient staff from their own resources at vulnerable points in the jurisdiction of their respective Police stations.

TIME OF DUTY

All the local Police/Outside force will report for duty at 08.00 hours on 17.03.2013.

ASSEMBLY POINT: RAM LILA GROUND

BRIEFING AND DEPLOYMENT OFFICER

ACP/Kamla Market will be the overall in charge of these arrangements in his sub-division and will brief the staff. SHO/Kamla Market will be the deployment officer.

SUPERVISION

All ACsP/SHOs/Insprs will supervise these arrangements in their respective areas under the control of Addl. DCsP/C and over all supervision of the undersigned.

Sd/- (D.C.SRIVASTVA),IPS,
Addl. Commissioner of Police,
Central Distrist, Delhi.

No. 8509-68/Arrgt/Central, dated Delhi, the: 15.03.2013.
Copy to all concerned.
### Annexure-N: Details of Complaints received by the Police in connection with Anna Hazare Agitation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.NO.</th>
<th>NAME OF THE COMPLAINANT.</th>
<th>GIST OF THE COMPLAIN.</th>
<th>CONCLUSION.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ram Pal Saini</td>
<td>The complainant had criticized the Police action regarding arrest of Anna Hazare and his team.</td>
<td>Neither Anna Hazare nor any person of his team was arrested under the jurisdiction of this District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pradeep Mohan</td>
<td>The complainant had criticized the Police action regarding arrest of Anna Hazare and his team.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>N. Bhanu Raja</td>
<td>The complainant had criticized the Police action regarding arrest of Anna Hazare and his team.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Arvind Sharma</td>
<td>The complainant has represented a memorandum to Hon’ble President of India in support of agitation of Anna Hazare.</td>
<td>During the enquiry no cognizable offence was found to be made out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Manoj Purohit</td>
<td>The complainant had criticized the Police action regarding arrest of Anna Hazare and his team.</td>
<td>Neither Anna Hazare nor any person of his team was arrested under the jurisdiction of this District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Farid</td>
<td>The complainant had alleged that at the time of Namaz, the supporters and followers of Shri Anna Hazare created loud noise to disturb the prayers.</td>
<td>During the enquiry no cognizable offence was found to be made out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Avdesh Tiwari</td>
<td>The complainant had criticized the Police action regarding arrest of Anna Hazare and his team.</td>
<td>Neither Anna Hazare nor any person of his team was arrested under the jurisdiction of this District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>M.K. Gupta</td>
<td>The complainant had requested to arrest the person who threatened Anna Hazare and attacked on other members.</td>
<td>During the enquiry no cognizable offence was found to be made out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Darpan Thakur</td>
<td>The complainant had supported Anna Hazare and planned to march from India Gate to Ram Lila Maidan.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Salman Farooqui</td>
<td>The complainant had alleged that at the time of Namaz, the supporters and followers of Shri Anna Hazare created loud noise to disturb the prayers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Vijay Vij</td>
<td>The complainant had requested for the grant of permission for demonstration against Shri Anna Hazare.</td>
<td>The complainant wants demonstration against Anna Hazare. No cognizable offence was found to be made out in the matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Vijay Vij</td>
<td>The complainant had requested for the grant of permission for demonstration against Shri Anna Hazare.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Complainant</td>
<td>Request/demand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Darpan Thakur</td>
<td>The complainant had requested for the grant of permission for demonstration against Shri Anna Hazare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bal Mukund</td>
<td>The complainant had criticized the fast protest of Anna Hazare and requested to punish him.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Dilbir Choudhary</td>
<td>The complainant had supported Anna Hazare and compared him as like Gandhi. During the enquiry no cognizable offence was found to be made out.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Gowthanan</td>
<td>The complainant had criticized the Govt. in support of the fast protest of Anna Hazare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Bijender</td>
<td>The complainant had demanded the space for Dharna in support of Anna Hazare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Narender</td>
<td>The complainant had wanted to organize Dharna in support of fast protest of Shri Anna Hazare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Subhash Chandra Aggarwal</td>
<td>The complainant had asked to reveal the truth or sack the Delhi Police Commissioner for mishandling of Anna Hazare Agitation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Vijay Vij</td>
<td>The complainant had stated that the demonstration of Shri Anna Hazare is for unconstitutional demands, misleading the people and creating panic among the people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ashu Kumar</td>
<td>The complainant had supported Anna Hazare’s hunger strike.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>The complaint had criticized the Police action for illegal arrest of Anna Hazare.</td>
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<td>P.H. Parmar</td>
<td>The complainant had appreciated the efforts of Anna Hazare and also supported the Lokpal Bill.</td>
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<td>The complainant had appreciated the efforts of Anna Hazare and also supported the Lokpal Bill.</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Ravinder Saini</td>
<td>The complainant had appreciated the Police arrangement during the agitation of Anna Hazare.</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>R.K. Gupta</td>
<td>The complainant had supported Mr. Anna Hazare and requested to extend the period of his Anshan.</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Arun Saxena</td>
<td>The complainant had supported Anna Hazare and wanted to impose Section 144 around the P.M. Office.</td>
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<td>Vijay Vij</td>
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Annexure-O: RAF Model
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### (A) TEAR SMOKE MUNITION

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Annexure-P: Old Batons (Lathis)
Annexure–Q: Kettling tactics to handle public protest

A Scenes of the Police Kettling Tactics to Control Public Protests

Kettling is a tactic used by police to control street protesters. This is how it works: police officers wearing riot gear use their bodies to form a “cordon” around a group of protesters. The area inside the cordon is called a “kettle” and the process of enclosing protesters in this way is called “Kettling.”

When they are setting up a kettle, the police advance slowly, moving in formation, sometimes banging their shields and grunting to intimidate the “enemy.” Once the protesters are inside a kettle they are forcibly held there. No one is allowed to leave without special permission, and this is not often given. Inside the kettle, the protesters are given nothing to eat or drink, and they are not able to use toilets. Often, after a group of protesters has been kettled, the police tighten the cordon, and push the protesters into a smaller and smaller space until they are packed very closely together; if the protesters push back, the police retaliate by hitting them with their shields, their batons, or their hands. Sometimes police officers go inside the kettle and roughly pull out someone they suspect of having committed a crime — or someone who is shouting, or holding a sign, or taking photographs. Sometimes, over a period of several hours, all or almost all of the people inside a kettle are arrested and taken away by the police. On other occasions, kettled protesters are simply released.

Because they wear riot gear, move in formation, and use shields and batons to fight their “enemy” the specially trained riot police who are used for kettling, look more like soldiers than ordinary police officers. The military look of kettling fits in well with the history of the tactic and with the history of the word itself.

The basic meaning of the very old English word “kettle” is “a large metal container for cooking food or boiling water.” The word is most commonly used today, however, to refer to a “tea kettle” a metal container with a handle and a spout that is used to boil water for making tea or coffee. “Kettle” comes from the Latin word “catillus.”; the German word “Kessel” comes from the same source and has a similar meaning. However, German, unlike English, has a cognate verb, “einkesseln” which has the meaning of “encircle” or “surround,” and it seems that both the verb and the noun have been used for a long time to refer to military surrounding. Certainly, it is used in
German in reference to the Battle of Stalingrad in which, in 1942 and 1943, the German army was surrounded and eventually defeated by the Red Army of Russia. In German, this battle is known as the “Stalingrad Kessel.”

During the Second World War, however, the word was also being used to refer a practice that is more similar to the contemporary police tactic than to large-scale military action. At about the same time as the Battle of Stalingrad was underway, the German armed forces in Warsaw, the capital of occupied Poland, were — in accordance with their government’s policies — attempting to concentrate all the Jews living in the Warsaw ghetto into a very restricted area so it would be easier to “deport” and then to kill them. This area, which was cordoned off with ropes, was nicknamed “the Kettle.”

The first well-known modern use of Kettling — not as a tactic of war or as a tool for facilitating genocide but as a way of responding to political dissent — took place in Hamburg, Germany in 1986 when 800 anti-nuclear demonstrators were kettled in a field for an entire day. Kettling has been used against street demonstrators in many places since then, but it is in Great Britain that the police have been most enthusiastic about the practice. Because the British police are so ready to kettle protesters and because the English language seems to have borrowed the name from German, it is natural to imagine that the idea of Kettling also came to England from Germany. It is not possible to say for certain whether or not this is so but at least one British scholar thinks that it did. David Mead, of the University of East Anglia, an “expert in public order policing” has suggested that a group of British police who attended a football championship in Germany in 1988 and had there an opportunity to observe the crowd control methods of the German police brought the idea back to Britain.[2] He does not say whether or not they also brought back the word, but it seems likely that the German police, having impressed their British colleagues with their Kettling technique, would have told them what they called it and that the British, noting the similarity in sound and meaning to English, would have adopted it in translation.

If the British police did bring the word home, however, they eventually lost their affection for it: Since the word has become common English, the police themselves have refused to use it. They prefer, instead, to speak of “containment.” Presumably, they find this less metaphorical label more dignified. Certainly it avoids giving any support to a popular but probably fanciful idea about the derivation of “Kettling” which has often been suggested by opponents of the tactic: that Kettling is called “Kettling” because, just as water is put in a tea kettle to boil, protesters are put in a police kettle to make them “boil” with anger. Naturally the police do not like this idea because it implies they are Kettling not — as they insist — to protect public order but to provoke violence from the protesters and in that way to give themselves an excuse for being violent in return.

Whether or not there is any truth to the idea that the word “kettling’s a metaphorical reference to a boiling tea kettle, a group of students in the UK have taken advantage of it to come up with a clever name for anti-Kettling software they have invented. The software, called “Sukey,” uses social networking sites and smart phones to enable protesters in different parts of a city to provide each other with instant information about police movements and so avoid being kettled.
### Annexure- R: Recommendations from Nurturing the British Model

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<tr>
<th>Rec 1</th>
<th>Use of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMIC makes the following recommendations on the police use of force.</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Training on the use of force.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public order training for commanders and public order units should fully incorporate training on the use of force which reflects the six principles set out above and includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Legal tests for the use of force (reasonableness; absolute necessity); the principles of necessity and the minimum level of force and the 'continuum of the use of force' model (from communication and negotiation to escalation and back to de-escalation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Recognition that police officers have the right in law to use force in self defence or the protection of others but remain individually accountable for any use of force;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Consideration of the impact of individual uses of force in a collective operational environment. Bronze commanders must consider the necessity of levels of force that can be reasonably foreseen, e.g. the response of individual officers to a command to disperse an unruly crowd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Existing requirements on the proper recording and reporting of all uses of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training on the use of force should not be abstract but should consider the practical application of the use force in the public order context, for example, by instructing officers that the use of particular tactics, such as the edge of a shield or a baton strike to the head may constitute potentially lethal force.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rec 4</th>
<th>Public Order Training</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMIC recommends that the Association of Chief Police Officers and the National Policing Improvement Agency work together to identify how best to achieve consistency of content and accreditation of public order training programmes across the police service. The following elements are important considerations to include in the public order training curriculum to achieve a consistent approach to police action:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Explicit training on the public order legal framework, including:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) The starting point of facilitating peaceful protest.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Police public order powers.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii) Human rights obligations of police.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Integrated training on the use of force, including:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Legal tests for the use of force (reasonableness; absolute necessity).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Principles of necessity and minimum level of force.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(iii) Continuum of the use of force model.
(iv) Individual uses of force in a collective policing environment.

(c) A clear and definitive link between officer safety training (OST) and all levels of public order training (generalist, specialist and command) so that officers are well versed in the minimum use of force and necessity principles and the continuum of the use of force model.

(d) Comprehensive scenario and contingency planning: public order commanders must be competent to routinely identify and assess a range of possible operational scenarios and manage a variety of outcomes.

(e) Consideration of the relationship between crowd dynamics and police action and tactics and the complexity of crowd membership and development of a more discriminating approach to crowd management: dealing with individuals rather than an homogeneous mass.

(f) Consideration of appropriate and proportionate police tactics and levels of force in relation to a range of scenarios, for example:
   (i) Mass peaceful protest on a national basis, eg a Climate Camp;
   (ii) Protest and counter-protest in contested space.
   (iii) Sporadic, disruptive activities with low levels of criminal damage.
   (iv) Running disorder: looting and criminal damage to property.
   (v) Small determined group attacks on iconic sites such as statues.
   (vi) Attempted mass trespass of private land housing critical national infrastructure, such as power stations.
   (vii) Protests resulting in serious violent disorder.

Rec 5
Command Training
HMIC recommends that public order command training should be significantly enhanced to provide explicit guidance to officers on:

(a) communication strategies before, during and after public order policing events which should include the following:
   (i) A community engagement strategy should be prepared at the early stages of planning for a public order operation, identifying key stakeholders or influencers within the protest community, the wider community and any group(s) opposed to the protest event. Police commanders should seek the views, expectations and concerns of all key stakeholders and affected communities regarding the event and the related policing operation.
   (ii) No promises should be made by police officers engaging with protest communities which are unsustainable or give unfair advantage or accommodation to a particular protest group, or are contrary to law. All police engagement should accord with the standards of professional behaviour set out in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008, in particular, the principles of confidentiality, equality, honesty and integrity, as well as the Human Rights Act 1998.
   (iii) A no surprises communication philosophy should be adopted: ongoing communication should be maintained with all relevant stakeholders throughout the operational planning stages and during the event itself. Protesters and the public should be made aware of likely police action in order to make informed
choices and decisions.

(iv) A media strategy should be developed in advance of the operation. Relevant media personnel should be invited to a briefing to ensure an accurate understanding of the police operational approach and style.

(v) A clear audit trail should be maintained of all communications with the protest community, the media and the wider public as part of the Event Policy file.

(vi) Following the operation, the community engagement and media strategies – and actions and decisions taken in relation to both – should be reviewed to identify learning for future events.

(b) understanding and managing crowd dynamics which should include the following:

(i) Prior to a crowd event, police should seek to inform themselves about the culture and general conduct of particular protest crowd. Planning for an operation should include gathering information on the underlying intent of the protest group.

(ii) The information regarding the general protest culture of the group should be considered in the local context and an assessment made as to how the policing operation can be designed to facilitate the legitimate intentions of the protesters.

(iii) Police strategy or tactics should not be oriented exclusively towards the control of the crowd through the threat or use of force but should ensure the effective facilitation of the legitimate intentions underpinning the protesters’ action. This should be effectively communicated to protesters, together with an indication of what conduct will and will not be tolerated by the police.

(iv) Initial contact with the protest group at the commencement of the policing operation should be characterised by low impact visibility, information gathering and should engage with crowd members to gather information about their intentions, demeanour, concerns and sensibilities.

(v) Depending on the nature of the risk, escalation in police deployment may be necessary. A graduated tactical approach should be characterised by firm but targeted communication of tolerance limits and some increased visibility of the police capability to use force. Critically, police should seek to communicate to those posing the risk that they are creating the potential for police action.

(vi) Any targeted intervention by police should be informed by an accurate intelligence assessment about the source of the risk or factors causing the problem and ensure that any police response accurately reflects and is proportionate to the actual level and sources of risk.
### Annexure – S
**SUGGESTED SOFT SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CONSTABLES TO INSPECTORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day/Date</th>
<th>10.00 – 10.15</th>
<th>10.15 – 11.00</th>
<th>11.15 – 12.00</th>
<th>12.00 – 12.45</th>
<th>12.45 – 13.30</th>
<th>15.00 – 16.30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-1</strong></td>
<td>Registration &amp; Orientation for the Subject</td>
<td>Introduction to Soft Skills</td>
<td>Importance of Soft Skills in Police Working</td>
<td>Barriers to Communication</td>
<td>Stress Management</td>
<td>Understanding Body Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-2</strong></td>
<td>Learning gains</td>
<td>Dealing with Public (Women, Children, Senior Citizens &amp; Victim)</td>
<td>Team Building</td>
<td>Conflict Management &amp; Negotiation Skills</td>
<td>Communication Skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-3</strong></td>
<td>Learning gains</td>
<td>Dealing with Media</td>
<td>Public dealing Skills</td>
<td>Motivation &amp; its impact on performance</td>
<td>Developing Healthy Interpersonal Relation</td>
<td>Negotiation and Conflict Management Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-4</strong></td>
<td>Learning gains</td>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>How to Improve The Police Public Relation</td>
<td>Officer Like Qualities-Building A Positive Personality</td>
<td>Etiquettes, Manners and self restraint on provocation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-5</strong></td>
<td>Learning gains</td>
<td>Behavioral Aspects of Policing</td>
<td>Gender Sensitization &amp; Mindset of Police</td>
<td>Human Rights &amp; Right of Protesters</td>
<td>Understanding &amp; interacting with crowd &amp; leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-6</strong></td>
<td>Learning gains</td>
<td>Experience Sharing</td>
<td>Feedback &amp; Valediction</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- 6.00 – 7.15 A.M. Morning Exercise – Yoga, Pranayam & Meditation (for stress relieving)
- 5.00 – 6.00 P.M. Evening - Team Games (for team building)
### ANNEXURE – T  
**TRAINING PROGRAM FOR INDUCTION TO LAW AND ORDER DUTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day/Date</th>
<th>10.00 – 10.15</th>
<th>10.15 – 11.00</th>
<th>11.15 – 12.00</th>
<th>12.00 – 12.45</th>
<th>12.45 – 13.30</th>
<th>15.00 – 16.30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-1</strong></td>
<td>Registration &amp; Orientation for the Subject</td>
<td>Procedure of dispersal crowd SOPs (Unlawful Assembly)</td>
<td>Introduction to all Type Tear Smoke Munitions &amp; Plastic Pellets/Ballistite Carts/Rubbers Bullets and continue of Force Model</td>
<td>Introduction and Handling of Gas Mask</td>
<td>Wearing of RAF Protective Gears and Video recording of use of force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-2</strong></td>
<td>Learning Gains</td>
<td>Platoon Formations</td>
<td>Human Right &amp; Rights of Protesters</td>
<td>Introduction of Water Cannon (Varun) Vehicle and its use in Mob Dispersal SOPs</td>
<td>Introduction of Vajra Vehicle, Important Techniques for Firing of Shells in Multi Barrel Launchers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-3</strong></td>
<td>Learning Gains</td>
<td>Preventive provisions for keeping Peace and Good Behavior</td>
<td>Aid to the Magistrate and Police</td>
<td>Strike and Other Agitation</td>
<td>Public safety and use of force and Individual accountability of police officer.</td>
<td>Anti Riot Drill SOPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-4</strong></td>
<td>Learning Gains</td>
<td>Maintenance of public order &amp; peace</td>
<td>Latest court directives</td>
<td>Crowd psychology and agitations</td>
<td>Conversation with Crowd &amp; Leaders</td>
<td>Creating panic &amp; its effect on Mob. Role of police restraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-5</strong></td>
<td>Learning Gains</td>
<td>Introduction of GAS Gun</td>
<td>Handling of Gas Gun SOPs</td>
<td>Action of rescue party</td>
<td>Communication of the police with ilaka Magistrate</td>
<td>Handling of Anti Riot Gun SOPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Day-6</strong></td>
<td>Learning Gains</td>
<td>Control &amp; co-ordination (with Control room)</td>
<td>Dispersal plan and First Aid</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** - 6.00 – 7.15 A.M. Morning Exercise - Yoga, Pranayam & Meditation (for stress relieving)

5.00 – 6.00 P.M. Evening - Team Games (for team building)

The objectives of a DMP on Civil Disobedience and Mass Agitation would be: to maintain law and order, to provide information on time, to the people about the danger, to shift those at risk to safer places, to ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people, to protect vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services, to provide protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to the government, and to minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are undertaken immediately.

However, details of these activities would form part of the District Riot Plans. At the State level the plan needs to be strategic – it should anticipate the resource requirements and logistic supports needed by the districts in their response actions. State Plan should also aim at preventing the such agitation programmes as may turn violent, and to this end should explore the reasons behind such disobedience / agitation movements and what can be done to counter the forces that give rise to them.

This Plan sets out a roadmap in line with statutory provisions of the Acts, guidelines and executive orders issued by MHA, GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GOI and GoUP. The Plan aims at five strategic goals: 1) Professionalising the disaster management process; 2) Making preparedness, risk reduction / mitigation parts of their normal processes by concerned departments / organizations; 3) Strengthening institutional mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of coordination; 4) Strengthening emergency response systems to ensure that responses are prompt and effective; and 5) Strengthening rehabilitation and recovery structure.

The Plan sets out the following intermediate objectives: Identification of risk reduction / mitigation activities; Classification of necessary activities for effective preparedness for different Departments / Organizations; Identifying emergency responses; Situation analysis to understand and identify factors encouraging civil disobedience and mass agitations and to set in place an institutional mechanisms for curbing such factors; Creating appropriate structure for seamlessly providing relief and humanitarian assistance; and Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and capacity building for risk mitigation, prevention and response.

67 (Seen on 07.05.2015 at http://upsdma.up.nic.in/sdmplan/FINALDMP-%20Civil%20Disob%20&%20Mass%20Agit.pdf)
Civil disobedience & Mass agitations: Disobedience, if civil – in the sense gracious, well mannered, courteous etc - can never give rise to disaster. If civil is used in the sense of “non-military”, civil disobedience becomes the non-military equivalent of a coup and may well lead to chaos and loss of order. Mass agitation will mean the same as civil disobedience if the masses are agitating against the government or against the order. Masses may agitate against a specific target, for example farmers agitating against a sugar mill. Such agitations, though not aimed against order, if sustained long enough, may lead to chaos and breakdown of social order. The causes of mass agitations often lie deep. There is much evidence to suggest that economic and social factors are major causes of civil unrest. Globally, most civil unrest examples are seen to be associated with political reforms.

Civil unrest has often been linked to inequality. Inequality, economic or otherwise, is understood to breed feeling of being deprived, which in turn gives rise to frustration-aggression syndrome leading to protests. However inequality may not always result in social disorder. Deprived sections take to agitations only when they see their situation worsening or when they see possibility of improvements in their situation. Even the relatively privileged may resort to agitation if they feel their relative situation is worsening. Some common factors giving rise to civil disobedience are:

- Changes in the established pattern of sharing of some natural resources
- Influx of migrant labour beyond the capacity of the host community to absorb

Even the ongoing economic liberalization of India has been cited by some as a cause for social unrest in some quarters. The causes can be complex, but their understanding gives means of forecasting the frequency of such agitations.

Measuring Potential for Social Unrest (PSU): Based on two factors, a) division(s) in the community; and b) at least one section feeling deprived, social scientists have developed two indices to measure the PSU: Polarization index (PI), and Total relative deprivation index (TRDI). Polarization is taken to arise when members of a group sense strong within-group identity and simultaneously between-groups alienation. If income is assumed to be the key factor, the intensity of the within-group identification can be measured by the number of individuals who share the same level of income (A). And, the feeling of alienation of one group towards another can be measured by the difference in mean incomes between the two groups (B). The product $A \times B$, added for all groups gives a measure of polarization. “Relative Deprivation” is a measure of dismay the community
members may suffer from. Total Relative Deprivation of a community is obtained by summing up the “relative deprivation” of all individuals. To estimate TRD, first RD of each individual is estimated by multiplying the fraction of people earning more than the individual with their mean excess income and then adding it up for the community. TRD can serve as a proxy for the “aggregated degree of discontent” and could thus be used to measure potential for social unrest. Indices could serve as possible advance warnings of looming social unrest. Both PI and TRDI need to be estimated since it is seen that in some situations one becomes a superior predictor of PSU.

**Hazard risk assessment and vulnerability mapping**
HPG report defines risk as “the expected loss (casualties, damage to property, and disruption of economic activity or livelihood) caused by a particular phenomenon”. Risk, thus, is product of likely loss in case of the occurrence of the hazardous event and the probability of the occurrence of the event itself. While it is not possible to accurately estimate the losses arising from a potential social unrest at any place, a rough assessment of likely loss can be made with the following indicators: Density of population, Geographical and social isolation, Accessibility of a location, Existence of properties. Probability of occurrence of a violent disorderly situation can be linked to PSU – potential for social unrest. With this framework, it is possible to map hazard risk with income distribution statistics of different towns / cities.

**Some Probable Causes**: These are the *causative factors*, which either give rise to the iniquities or provide a medium for their violent expression breaching public order. Four major factors are: Agrarian problems, Group Conflicts, Extremist activities, and Industrial Disputes.

**Crowd dynamics**: Crowd does not act as one entity. Crowds are heterogeneous entities and crowd participants are often not unanimous in their motivations. Crowds are largely made up of small groups of people who are acquainted with one another and thus individual members do not normally get the benefit of anonymity that the crowds are supposed to offer. Finally, crowd participants seldom act in unison. Thus, a crowd may display markedly different behaviors at different stages (of the process). Crowds have a beginning, middle and an ending phase. This process is reflected in the chart:

![Crowd Dynamics Chart](image-url)
Agencies controlling a crowd (police / para-military) focus on the end phase—dispersal. However, they must also consider how people assemble and interact during the course of the gathering. These aspects of a gathering are likely to affect how it disperses.

Crowds are assembled by prior activities by a few leading actors. Occasionally, crowds may even assemble impromptu, when the process develops mostly by word of mouth. In such cases participants are people, who are already close to the venue. On the other hand, organized mobilization efforts are centrally planned, organizers have lists of names, and they contact potential participants, and even at times arrange transportation for participants.

Dispersal of a crowd can occur in various ways. Routine dispersals are specified in advance, emergency dispersal occurs when people evacuate an area as the result of some unexpected crisis, such as a fire, explosion, etc. Dispersal may be coerced by crowd controllers by use of force to disperse gatherings. Quite often now crowds are dispersed through negotiation. For a negotiated management to be successful the demonstration leaders must be available and willing to participate.

Most demonstrations and protests do not result in riotous mobs, but protest can evolve into violence causing damage to lives and properties. There are no clear cut cues on the personality types of participants. The social networks and organizations, to which they belonged, appear to be better predictors of participation than any socioeconomic or demographic characteristics.

It is difficult to predict violence by crowds. Personal experience may be the best means of forecasting potential violence. Experienced police officers often perceive that a particular incident in a given area might result in community violence. They can sense the ebb and flow of events in a familiar community and pick up cues. They, of course, also receive intelligence, which they match to their perceptions. As a result, such officers can intuitively assess a situation. There is no substitute for this experience.

Guidelines for Crowd Control
Police is the PA for civil disobedience and mass agitation. In fighting criminals, police forces fight and eliminate / capture opponents, who are combatants. In a mass agitation, police deal with crowds that consist largely of non-combatants. The rights of non-combatants must be respected while maintaining public order. This calls for decisions regarding the degree of force to be used against a large group that is (mostly) unarmed. To guard against unnecessary use of excessive force and to ensure that mission is accomplished, it will be useful if the police follow a standardized decision-making procedure. (We understand, the police have such internal guidelines, but cannot be shared with public.) The standard decision making process on managing mass agitations should address four major points: Pre-incident Planning, Background Information and Intelligence, Encouraging Relationships and Ownership, and Acceptability.

Planning begins before the incident and is initiated at the strategic level. It includes strategic guidance on crowd control as well as addressing responsibilities, training, organization, operating procedures, and rules of engagement. The planning should be aimed at avoiding confrontation. Most agitations don’t turn violent. The police may, therefore, at times help the crowd accomplish their goals within the law even consider conceding some violations for the sake of avoiding confrontation. This is a strategic level decision and there should be clear guidelines on it to help the operational staff engaged in crowd management. Even if it is decided to concede some violations of law, police must maintain a presence in adequate strength to restrain the demonstrators from going beyond a certain limit.

Further, planning needs to focus on – “what are we trying to accomplish?” Process can sometimes drive the mission. This can easily occur in organizations that are trained to fight and overcome opponents; unless they focus on what they are trying to accomplish they may lose the perspective. Police must seek to know as much as they can about the protesting groups well in advance of a demonstration / march etc. With better knowledge about the organizers one can anticipate their actions. Thus the questions that the police must ask are: Who are they? What are their goals? What are they capable of doing? What are their traditional behaviors? When and where will they assemble? Where will they go? What are the possible targets of violence? What is the worst case scenario? And when and where will they disperse?
Police must also guard against generalizing about a crowd based on the behaviour of a few. Such generalizations are usually incorrect and dangerous. Generally only a few individuals engage in destructive behavior. Police should identify the violent individuals and restrain them. Intelligence plays a key role here. With background information police will be able to target the key persons respond to their behavior, rather than the crowd as whole. There are five psychological factors for understanding and assessing individual behavior in a crowd: Motivation, Confidence, Stress, Focus, and Emotions. Understanding of these factors permit the police to intervene at different levels for controlling the crowd behaviour.

With working relationships between police and leaders of the agitation programme in many cases it is possible to follow the negotiated management model. The relationships allow group leaders to share with the authorities what they want to accomplish and authorities to convey to the group leaders what they are prepared to do. Such communications if started well in advance of an event can do much to prevent violence. Communication also means persuasion to “win over” demonstration leaders by encouraging them to protest in an acceptable way. It must be noted that negotiations require expertise. Police may identify and maintain lists of skillful, persuasive negotiators.

Winning a pitched battle against a largely unarmed crowd may portray police as oppressors and give opportunities to agitators to claim martyrdom. Thus winning is about controlling a crowd and getting a favorable image. Police may invite media to accompany officers managing agitation situations. Such outreach gives the impression that the authorities have nothing to hide and it provides an opportunity to media men to see the police’s side of an event.
In crowd situations, the use of weapons is a crucial factor. This force should also appear to be “self-triggering.” This non-lethal weapons hierarchy might occur as shown in the picture. Finally, maintaining a crowd is, at times, more important than dispersing a crowd; as forced dispersal can result in a crowd breaking up into groups that would scatter over a vast area, posing even greater public order problems.

**Alert mechanism:** In most cases the alert should come from the intelligence wing, unless violence erupts from spontaneous trigger. A major agitation programme is a planned activity; the planning may take place over weeks and cannot come as a total surprise. Intelligence, coupled with the experience of the local officers can predict violence during a demonstration. At times indications of violence may be received from central or state intelligence sources. Thus the alert mechanism may entail information flow from State to district or from district to State.

**Level definition:** District will activate the warning phase of its DRP and keep SCR informed. If the situation is not diffused and violence erupts, the SCR will define the level of the disaster keeping in view the report of the intelligence wing and of the scale of violence eruption(s). If the violence and its ramifications can be brought under control by the district administration, it is an L1 situation. If the scale of violence is such as would warrant intervention from the State level, it would be an L2 situation and in L3 situations. At the early stages level assessment exercise will mostly be prospective in nature. Reports of large scale violence will almost always be accompanied with requests from district administration for units of PAC. Such situations, as they require State level interventions should be considered as L2. Required measures will depend on the level of the situation. Whereas L1/L2/L3 situations require response measures, L0 situations require normal times activities to be taken up with greater vigil. This being an SDMP, only State level activities/measures are described in the following sections.
1.0 Activities

- Monitoring situation: This essentially relates to the district police. At State level, Directorate will ensure that the normal times activities are carried out and their outputs are constantly evaluated.

- Intelligence: State level intelligence agency will collect physical data from districts and analyse on aggregate level to look for significant fluctuations suggesting an imbalance in any particular area.

- Manpower planning: Realistic manpower planning in regular police, coupled with full activation of the old Chowkidari system with Chowkidars acting exclusively for police departments. Manpower planning also covers regular trainings, at times jointly with Army and / or para military forces to ensure better understanding of their respective roles.

- Logistics planning: It goes beyond anticipating and fulfilling the required weaponry and transport. It must also include personal protection and communication equipment; and ensuring proper rest and food for the operating forces in sustained operations. Logistics should also cover rescue equipment, particularly for the high rise buildings coming up in towns. At times policemen combating riot situations receive grievous injuries and may need to be shifted immediately to larger hospitals.
  - Department of Revenue (Scarcity) (in charge of Disaster Management) may consider acquiring helicopters earmarked for use during emergency operations.
  - Health Directorate will need to ensure that each district has at least two fully functional cardiac care ambulances and sufficient trained emergency medical technicians to accompany police forces engaged in managing violent crowds. Directorate may make necessary arrangements special care for the weak, aged, lactating mothers and pregnant ladies as also for treatment of shock and trauma.
  - Department of Food & Civil Supplies must have ready arrangements for supplying food and other essentials to the poor and weak affected by agitations. It may get into pre-purchase agreements for supply of food grains, tents, blankets, plastic sheets, and firewood etc with reputed suppliers for urgent purchases during riots.

- Contingency Planning & Drills: PA may check the workability of riot plans by organising drills from time to time. These drills may also include units of PAC.
and of Army. Drills should involve Home Guards unit too as using them for routine works like traffic control would free more policemen for operations. The drill may also incorporate establishment of the command structure for L2/L3 situations.

- Monitoring preparedness: The Plan gives a detailed (but by no means exhaustive) check list for monitoring preparedness measures by PA and SAs.

**L2 Responses**

At State level responses would be strategic, essentially monitoring the situation and making men and material available for operations. Immediately on declaration of L2/L3 the SCR will be upgraded into EOC and SDMA will appoint an IC. If army or para military forces units are also deployed the incident command system may need to be expanded into a Unified Command (UC) structure with "Commanders" from all major organizations involved in operations for an effective response. Whether a unified command is created or not, the essential command structure of EOC will remain the same, as depicted in the graphic.

IC/UC will have two types of staff - General Staff and Command Staff. General Staff Sections will be directly involved with containment of riot and restoration of order. Command Staff Sections will assist the IC/UC in other necessary functions. The General Staff Sections are: Operations Section, Planning Section, Logistics Section, and Finance and Administrative Section. The Command Staff is responsible for effective use of the information environment, health and safety of people affected and of those engaged in response operations, and liaison activities. Its sections are Liaison Section, Information...
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations by Police

Section, and Safety Section. The Plan details major tasks of the Command, viz. containment of trouble, ensuring preventive measures at other vulnerable centres, ensuring firm decisive action, ensuring relief to citizens, exploring and initiating dialogues at State level and keeping the media apprised.

In its initial meeting the command will come to consensus on priorities, the tactical objectives, and an overall strategy to carry out the response. In L3 situation the command structure and response mechanism shall remain the same as in L2, except that the UC may have a representative from MHA. (L3 situations may have implications transcending state borders and many critical decisions may come from centre.)

The two Schematics depict the process flow under two situations:

a. Perception of threat to public order— either by district intelligence or by State level intelligence agencies

b. Flaring up of violence

In both cases the processes are to fulfill three types of functions:

a. Control functions

b. Strategic support functions

c. Support functions

- Threat perceived

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCR</th>
<th>District</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alert PAC</td>
<td>Close regulation of areas prone to riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert identified Incident Commanders</td>
<td>Alert the policemen who can identify the anti social elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilize interlocutors</td>
<td>Close monitoring of movements of known anti social elements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inform DIFR | No action | Initiate talks |
| Ready to respond to media reports |  |  |

- Close monitoring of movements of known anti social elements
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations
by Police | 252

Project Report

Violence / riot flares up

SCR

Is it an L2 situation?
SCR evaluates with Intelligence reports

SDMA declares L2

SCR elevated to EOC

Alerts:
Dept of Revenue (Scarcity);
PAC, Army, Dept of F&CS;
Dir of Health; DIPR;
Power, Telecommunication

Support functions
1. Search & rescue - Fire services
2. Temporary shelter: Revenue (Scarcity), F&CS, PHED
3. Medical aid: Dir of Health, Voluntary agencies
4. Temp free kitchen: Revenue (Scarcity), Voluntary agencies
5. Essential services: Power, Telecommunication

Control functions

Assembling tactical experts
Creation of Command Structure
Situation assessment
Deciding on priorities
Finalisation of strategy
Resource mobilization

Assessment of reserve requirement
Alert reserve forces / commanders
Identify resource requirements on Dir of Health and Dept of F & CS,
Power and Telecommunications

Strategic support functions
1. Monitoring media & information dissemination: DIPR
2. Involving community leaders - SDMA level initiative - in consultation with incidence command

Preparedness measures
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations by Police

These consist of Preparations for pre-determined responses and centre on ensuring the availability of required resources – both in manpower terms and in terms of other physical resource. PA may prepare the list of National and State resources that will be available during a riot situation. The resources may come from government, private, and civil society. It is important to track the resources available from corporate sector during emergencies – these can range from vehicles, men trained in first aid, safe premises for sheltering vulnerable people from affected areas, hospital beds, pharmacies etc. The Plan envisages to constantly maintain availability of the following from different sources:

- Tear gas
- Rubber bullets
- Water cannons
- Sniffer dogs
- Search and rescue teams
- Bomb diffusers
- Loud speakers
- Armed police force
- Communication equipment
- Videographic equipment

- Transport
- Tentage
- Civil supplies
- Drinking waters
- Ambulances
- Mobile hospitals
- Life saving drugs
- Blood - plasma/ platelets
- Doctors / paramedics

Civil Society Organisations, particularly Red Cross can augment available resources. The details of resources available from them can be obtained from the Department of Revenue (Scarcity) who are the Primary Agency for ESF Donations.

State must be prepared attending to the special needs of the weaker sections – aged, lactating mothers, pregnant ladies etc. during riot situations. This will call for sensitization programmes on the needs of the weaker sections for medial and paramedical staff. While shifting populations from vulnerable areas to safer locations, these needs must be kept in consideration. In curfew bound areas, the system for passes for pregnant ladies going to hospitals must be made more sensitive.

**Capacity building is a major preparedness activity.** Capacity building has many aspects - Training the manpower, Acquisition of proper equipment, and Changing the legal/procedural environment to increases the capacity of the regulatory framework to deal with riot situations. The Plan covers training needs in Section 4.5, equipment in Section 5.4.4, and the need for strengthening the regulatory environment in Sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7. This Plan envisages an ICS or UC structure for management of an L2 or
Managing Peaceful Mass Agitations by Police

L3 situation. The LBSNAA Mussoorie has been designated as the nodal training institution. At state level, UPAAM has been organizing programmes related with disaster management. Senior officers from police and administration should be exposed to such programmes at UPAAM or at LBSNAA. Further the powerful reach of media needs to be used more imaginatively during normal times to foster nationalism and patriotic fervour. (The Plan also suggests some guidelines on information dissemination during armed operations and for media presence at operation sites. The objective is to make the best use of the information environment for managing emergencies.)

Partnership with Other Stakeholders

For making any DMP more effective, it is imperative that it should identify the areas where partnerships with other stakeholders can be strengthened. Apart from the communities – the largest stakeholders, the Plan suggests developing partnerships with Academic institutions to commission researches on crowd behaviour and with Armed forces to get most from their involvement in emergency management. Similarly, the ties with voluntary organizations working in the field of promoting peace and national integration need to be strengthened during peace times as they usually have committed and well-intentioned volunteers and workers. Large commercial organisation, in public sector or in private sector, have transport, hospitals, doctors, trained staff and protected space which can be of great use during emergency operations. With their roles defined, the PSUs / PSOs may be asked to prepare their own standard procedures so as to minimise the response time.

Financial arrangements: Disaster Management Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Thus, resources from CRF are not available for mitigation activities. However, there is a provision that 10% of the annual infusion into the CRF can be used for the procurement of search and rescue (SAR) equipment and communication equipment. This provision can be utilized to acquire rescue tenders for fire services, to begin with, at potential centres. Further, DMF is now a statutory requirement for all States even though there is no unanimity on what should constitute DMF. Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each Ministry/Department be earmarked for NDMF. State may consider the workability of Planning Commission’s suggestion.

Adoption, Review and Updation:
After the Plan is approved, PA and the SAs will need to ensure that they reach the desired level of preparedness. They must confirm the actions taken for this purpose or they may confirm that no particular actions are required and they are capable of discharging all responsibilities arising from this Plan.

DRS, being in charge of disaster management, may need to coordinate the approval / review process and ensure that concerned agencies determine whether the issues related to them are adequately addressed on a continuing basis by reviewing the relevant parts. They may also like consider the issues not addressed in the document, i.e. such issues which are noted as requiring structural measures.

Plan must provide proof the PA and the DRS have approved the document and should carry the dated signatures of designated officials every second year or whenever the incumbency changes. Similarly, the review should be confirmed by PAC, Fire Services, and the Director of Health at periodicity stipulated in the Plan.

PA may consider holding riot drills at all centres considered vulnerable in view of existing factionalism in local level politics, intelligence reports, agrarian problems and industrial disputes. The drills will involve all agencies named in the Plan and the Plan should be reviewed after each drill.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Vision Statement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Evolution of this Plan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Themes &amp; underlying currents</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Objectives of the State Plan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Overview of the State</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Civil Disobedience, Mass Agitation and Social Disorder</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Why do Mass Agitations occur</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Measuring Potential for Social Unrest</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1</td>
<td>Polarisation Index</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2</td>
<td>Total Relative Deprivation Index</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3</td>
<td>Use of Indices</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Hazard Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Mapping</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
<td>Extent of likely loss</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2</td>
<td>Probability of occurrence</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Probable causes</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1</td>
<td>Agrarian problems</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2</td>
<td>Group conflicts</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.3</td>
<td>Extremist activities</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.4</td>
<td>Industrial disputes</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Crowd dynamics</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1</td>
<td>Assembling process</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.2</td>
<td>Dispersing process</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.3</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.4</td>
<td>Predicting violence by crowds</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Preventive Measures</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agencies involved in managing civil disobedience / mass agitations</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>Precautionary measures</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.a</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.b</td>
<td>Riot Scheme</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.c</td>
<td>Regulating agitation venues</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.d</td>
<td>Preventive arrests</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.e</td>
<td>Countering rumours and monitoring media</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2.a</td>
<td>Intelligence – industrial disputes</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence – agrarian problems</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2.c</td>
<td>Intelligence – extremist activities</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3</td>
<td>Control room</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Structural measures</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1</td>
<td>Mock drills</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2</td>
<td>Transfer and Postings</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.3</td>
<td>Investigations of offences reported during mass agitations</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Training needs and Knowledge Management</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1</td>
<td>Training through case studies</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.2</td>
<td>Knowledge management – lessons learnt</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.3</td>
<td>Training durations</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.4</td>
<td>Training needs</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Decision making guidelines for control of agitation programmes</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Pre-incident planning</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Background information &amp; intelligence</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Encouraging relationship and ownerships</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Acceptability – redefining what it means to win</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Alert mechanism</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Criteria for level definition</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Recommended measures</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>L0 Activities</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Monitoring situation</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.2</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.3</td>
<td>Manpower planning</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.4</td>
<td>Logistic planning</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.5</td>
<td>Contingency planning &amp; drills</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.6</td>
<td>Monitoring developments and preparedness</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>L2 Responses</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.1</td>
<td>Up-gradation of SCR to EOC and Command Structure</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.2</td>
<td>Different sections of the command</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.3</td>
<td>Major tasks of the command</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.4</td>
<td>Initial command meeting</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.4.1</td>
<td>Setting priorities &amp; objectives</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.4.2</td>
<td>Developing tactical objectives</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.4.3</td>
<td>Adopting overall strategy</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>L3 Responses</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Schematics of the Process Flow</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7.1</td>
<td>Threat perceived</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7.2</td>
<td>Violence flares up</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Preparedness Measures</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Preparations for predetermined responses</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.1</td>
<td>Resource availability</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.2</td>
<td>Attending special needs of weaker sections</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1</td>
<td>Incident command system</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.2</td>
<td>Strengthening fire services</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Use of Media</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1 Information Dissemination during Armed Operations</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.2 Media Presence at Operation Sites</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Partnerships with other stakeholders</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Communities</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Academic institutions</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Armed forces</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 NGOs</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 Public Sector &amp; Private Sector Organisations</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Financial arrangements</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Review and Updation</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1 Action Taken Report &amp; Review of the Plan</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.1 Approval &amp; Review Process</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2 Schedule of Drill</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexure – V  Chronological Activity Log.


1) Letter received by SVP/NPA vide No. 27011/5/2012-Estl ® dated 20.06.2013 invitation to make presentation before the Selection Committee.


3) Letter issued to Sh. Neeraj Kumar, IPS, C.P. Delhi vide No. 139/PA dated 17.07.2013 for nominating Nodal Officer to provide inputs.


6) Letter received by SVP/NPA vide No. 27011/5/2012-Estl ® /CSS dt. 14.08.2013 reg. allotment of project.


8) Letter issued to Sh. Rajesh Deo, Addl. DCP/Sec. New Delhi vide No. 195- 97/PA dated 3.09.2013 for meeting to get information/reports reg. these agitations.

9) Endst. No. 13173-176/Con. SA-4 (i) dated 6.09.2013 received by DGP/ Punjab (sanction order of the project).


16) Security arrangement by Delhi Police No. 8509-68/Arrgt./Central dated 15.03.2913 alongwith other relevant papers received by Delhi Police.


28) Mail received from Sh. Anil Shukla, IPS, Joint C.P./Traffic, Delhi reg. workshop.

29) Mail received from Sh. Robin Hibu, IPS, Joint C.P./ Trg. New Delhi for confirmation of workshop.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38)</td>
<td>Letter No. 5/PA dated 2.01.2014 to Sh. B.S. Bassi, IPS, C.P. Delhi alongwith 25 copies of questionnaire for assessment for project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40)</td>
<td>Invitation sent to Sh. B.S. Bassi, IPS, C.P. Delhi vide No. 4/PA dt. 2.01.14.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/A.P./HRD vide No.9/PA dt. 6.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Bihar, Patna vide No.8/PA dt. 6.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Goa, Panaji vide No.11/PA dt. 6.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Chhattisgarh, Raipur vide No.7/PA dt. 6.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Uttarakhand/Dehradun vide No.22/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Jharkhand, Ranchi vide No.13/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Karnataka, Bangalore vide No.17/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/M.P, Bhopal vide No.19/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/West Bengal, Kolkata vide No.19/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram vide No.20/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Maharashtra, Mumbai vide No.21/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56)</td>
<td>Letter issued to DGP/Gujarat, Gandhinagar vide No.16/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar &amp; information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57)</td>
<td>Mail received by Prof. Anil K. Saxena reg. details for the proposed seminar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
58) Letter issued to DGP/Rajasthan, Jaipur vide No.24/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
59) Letter issued to DGP/Tamilnadu, Chennai vide No.27/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
60) Letter issued to DGP/Odisha, Cuttack vide No.26/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
61) Letter issued to DGP/Punjab, CHG. vide No.25/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
62) Letter issued to DGP/Haryana, Panchkula vide No.15/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
63) Letter issued to Commissioner of Police, Chennai vide No.29/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
64) Letter issued to Commissioner of Police, Mumbai vide No.30/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
65) Letter issued to Commissioner of Police, Kolkata vide No.28/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
66) Letter issued to IGP/RAF, New Delhi vide No.31/PA dt. 10.01.2014 reg. nomination for Seminar & information in prescribed proforma enclosed with letter.
67) Letter issued to IGP/RAF, New Delhi vide No.35/PA dt. 17.01.2014 reg. purposed visit for RAF Academy, Meerut.
68) DGP/A.P./Hyderabad sent nomination vide No. 24/Trg. 1/2014 dated 18.01.2014.
69) DGP/Punjab, CHG. informed vide letter No. 42/PA dated 21.01.2014.
70) IGP/RAF, New Delhi for change of visit date vide No. 43/PA dated 21.01.2014.
71) DIGP/RAF, New Delhi sent information in prescribed proforma vide letter No. MV-I/13-RAF-EC-V dated 22.02.2014.
72) Sh. Manoj Abraham, IPS, IGP/Police Hqrs No. Y3-4577/2014/PHQ dated 27.01.2014 reg. nomination for seminar.
73) Letter sent to Smt. Malini Aggarwal, IPS, DIGP/RAF, New Delhi vide No. 44/PA dated 27.01.2014 reg. detailed information on raised points.
74) Information/report received by IGP/Zone-2, Jalandhar vide No. 985/A-2 dated 24.01.2014.
75) Information/report received by DGP/Haryana vide No. 956-59/T-1 dated 29.01.2014.
76) Letter sent to DGP/Assam, Guwahati vide No. 10/PA dated 6.01.2014 for nomination & information.
77) Letter received by DGP/Tamilnadu, Chennai vide No. 7991/Trg.1/2014 dated 30.01.2014 reg. seminar.
79) Information/reply received by SSP/TTN vide No. 3070/S dated 4.02.2014.
82) Mail received from Sh. J.K. Basu, IPS, IGP/Trg, West Bengal on 12.02.2014 alongwith information provided by Bengal Police.
83) Letter sent to IGP/RAF, CRPF, New Delhi vide No. 64/PA dated 18.02.2014 to obtain more details/information reg. RAF.
84) Letter received from Dr. Nikhil J. Gupta, Dy. Director (Estl & SC) vide No. AO/Misc/2014/Trg. Dated 20.02.2014 reg. seminar.
85) Letter received from DIG/RAF, New Delhi vide No. M.V.1/13-RAF-EC-V dated 22.02.2014 reg. information in prescribed proforma.
86) IGP/Bathinda Zone, Bathinda sent information vide No. 287/PA dated 26.02.2014.
87) Information received by IGP/Training, Jharkhand, Ranchi vide No. 210/Trg dated 5.02.2014 received on 6.03.2014.
88) Nominated officers from Hyd, HYN, UP & Kerala were informed that the seminar is postponed vide No. 80/PA dated 10.03.2014.
89) CP/Kolkata sent information vide No. 5622/FRC/F/343/2014 dated 10.03.2014.
91) Letter received from Sh. Mohinder Kumar, Dy. Comdt. (Genl), CRPF, New Delhi vide No. IX-4/2013-14-ADM(FOM) dated 13.03.2014 reg. seminar.
92) Letter received from Sh. K. Ramanujam, IPS, DGP/Tamilnadu vide No. 7991/Trg-I/2014 dated 12.03.2014 reg. information in prescribed proforma.
93) Letter received from SSP/ASR vide No. 5344/SB dated 17.03.2014 reg. information/report.
94) Progress report sent to Sh. Anil K. Saxena, SVP, NPA, Hyderabad vide No. 93/PA dated 25.03.2014.
95) Information/detail report received from Comdt (Staff), RAF, New Delhi vide letter No. MV-I/2014-RAF-EC-V dated 31.03.2014.