Role of Police in Combating Insurgency/Militancy/Low Intensity Conflicts in the North-East

POLICE FELLOWSHIP SCHEME 1999

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## CONTENTS

**Foreword**

**Acknowledgements**

**Chapter-1** Evolution of Insurgency in the North East – An Introduction  
1-14

**Chapter-2** Research Design of the Study  
15-22

**Chapter-3** Insurgency/Militancy in Nagaland  
23-105

**Chapter-4** Insurgency/Militancy in Mizoram  
106-117

**Chapter-5** Insurgency/Militancy in Tripura  
118-174

**Chapter-6** Insurgency/Militancy in Manipur  
175-251

**Chapter-7** Insurgency/Militancy in Assam  
252-360

**Chapter-8** Insurgency/Militancy in Meghalaya  
361-390

**Chapter-9** Insurgency/Militancy in Arunachal Pradesh  
391-412

**Chapter-10** Role of Police in Combating insurgency  
413-424

**Chapter-11** North-East Arena for Pakistan (ISI) sponsored Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)  
425-440

**Chapter-12** Analysis and interpretation of data  
441-472

**Chapter-13** Summary Findings/Recommendations  
473-492

**Appendices**

*Appendix 'A': Questionnaire on insurgency in North East*

*Appendix 'B': Structured interview schedule/ Questionnaire for experts*

*Appendix 'C': Observation Schedule*

*Appendix 'D': Hyderi Agreement between NNC and Governor of Assam*

*Appendix 'E': 16 Point Agreement between Naga Peace Council and Govt. of India*

*Appendix 'F': 'Yezabo' (Constitution) of the Naga Federal Govt. (NGF)*

*Appendix 'G': Shillong Accord of 1975*

*Appendix 'H': Manifesto of NSCN*

*Appendix 'I': Mizoram Accord*

*Appendix 'J': Joint Declaration between UNLF/PLA/ PREPAK*
Maps
1. Map of India with North-East marked giving names of Insurgent Organizations operating in each state along with acronyms
2. Map of Nagaland giving names of insurgent organizations and their area of operations.
3. Map of Mizoram giving names of insurgent organizations and their area of operations.
4. Map of Tripura giving names of insurgent organizations and the area of operation of major insurgent organizations.
5. Map of Manipur giving names of insurgent organizations and the area of operation of major insurgent organizations.
6. Map of Assam giving names of insurgent organizations and the area of operation of major insurgent organizations.
7. Map of Assam showing percentage of Muslims to total population.
8. Map of Meghalaya giving names of insurgent organizations and the area of operation of major insurgent organizations.
9. Map of Arunachal Pradesh giving names of insurgent organizations and the area of operation of major insurgent organizations.
10. Map of Arunachal Pradesh showing places frequented by major insurgent groups for camping/shelter.
11. Map of North-Eastern States showing illegal migration (approx.) from Bangladesh and Nepal/Myanmar.
12. Map of Meghalaya showing routes used for exfiltration to and infiltration from Bangladesh by UG groups in the North-East.
13. Map of North-East showing routes used by insurgent groups for going to and coming from Myanmar NSCN(K) camps and (2) No. of camps and names of places in Bangladesh where UGs of North-East have their camps.

Bibliography
FOREWORD

With independence India had to face a plethora of problems but none was as stubborn as the insurgency in the North-East of India. It is a mini-India and a pluralist matrix of a society with various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups abounding about 200 in all.

Initially Nagaland was the only State to fall a victim to the insurgency fever but soon other States in the region contracted the contagion in quick succession. Barring Mizoram, termed a garden of peace all others viz. Assam/Nagaland/Meghalaya/ Manipur/ Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh were writhing under its fury in some form or the other.

The insurgents were well trained and well armed with sophisticated weapons and were a committed lot initially but with passage of time they got disengaged from ideological moorings and resorted to promoting personal/group interests as it brought easy money in the name of insurgency. Unfortunately insurgency paid in all ways, economically and politically as well. This paved the way for mushroom growth of militant outfits including criminal syndicates bereft of any ideology or principle leading to bitter internecine squabbles, group clashes etc. in which hundreds were killed.

Instead of taking the insurgency movements by the horns and goring them to death, political patronage was extended to them by various political parties which added a new dimension to the problem. What had been started as liberation struggles therefore receded to the level of political expediency dictated by terrorist groups to safeguard vote banks.

Security Forces had to be inducted in large numbers, the estimated strength was around 2 lakhs to contain about 15,000 terrorists. The States of Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura where they ran parallel governments stood out as special cases but Tripura was worst where the terrorists struck with impunity. With insurgency, money flow from Central
allotments increased manifold, but administration remained weak leading to all-round corruption.

One silver lining was that the National Socialist Council of Nagaland outfits viz. NSCN(Isac-Muivah) and NSCN (Khaplang) had declared a cease-fire presenting a glimmer of hope that peace would finally smile on Nagaland.

Insurgency had emaciated North-East economically, politically and in all conceivable ways. The area abound in untapped natural resources like coal, oil, minerals, forest goods and offered good scope for highly lucrative tourism industry. If people could be awakened to the real potential, North-East would make economic progress by leaps and bounds in a very short time and would prove to be a source of immense strength to the whole nation. What however lacked in the area was charismatic leadership to lead the people to economic prosperity.

It became all the more glaring because it was taking place in a poor country like India and in an area like the North-East where poverty, unemployment, drugs, undernourishment, illiteracy, health hazards, deprivation and inequalities haunted the people day in and out. Their cries were for ever silenced by the gun shots ricocheting through the hills and plains let loose by the insurgents in the name of their liberation and by the S.F in the name of protecting them. The world outside however remained blissfully ignorant about it all taking place in a system eulogized as democracy where the people ruled through their elected representatives. We are a nation with hundreds of millions denied of basic amenities of life where 70-100 million slogged it out outside schools, where child labour was an order, where 30 million lived without a roof over their head, where over 50 million unemployed lived and where more than 1000 million remained illiterate. We have the resources and the required skill but rot in a self-imposed negativism. What lacked was proper leadership and the ‘will’ to achieve the best for the country first, for the people next and oneself thereafter. Given will, India, this great country, would be in the forefront of nations of the world carrying the flag of a super power.
Insurgency has trapped the North-East in a catch-22 situation. If development has to take place insurgency has to end, and if insurgency has to end, development has to take place. The North-East stood destroyed in all conceivable ways, politically, economically, socially, culturally and how to redeem it remained a mute question.

In this imbroglio another much trumpeted but equally neglected cause for insurgency was the unabated demographic invasion by the Bangladeshis. The growth of Islamic Militant Fundamentalism encouraged, aided and abetted by the Pakistan Intelligence Outfit, the I.S.I., with wide ranging ramifications, was also a matter of serious concern. Almost all insurgent outfits, big and small alike, were held in the vice grip of the ISI by offering them sanctuaries, weapons and other forms of assistance, deprived of which the movements would have died a natural death. The outfits were acting like stooges of the ISI. They targeted the mainlanders much to the glee of the ISI but were unaware that the noose thrown around their neck by the ISI was also getting tightened to the same extent of their attacking/killing mainlanders.

The political parties instead of solving the problems, with all the seriousness required, had come to adopt a soft line approach keeping an eye on the continuous and increasing budget allocations and on the votes of the infiltrators. The issues had slipped to the level of threatening the very security of the North-East and thereby the nation itself.

The bulk of the data has been collected from the Government and security forces. The historical facts came from books, journals, newspapers, magazine, documents, reports of local Chief Ministers, Governors, etc. whereas empirical data came from samples, structured interviews, interactions with a wide spectrum of people including political leaders, educationists, other luminaries, serving officials of the police Army, BSF, CRPF, serving/retired bureaucrats who were at one time or the other at the helm of affairs and had dealt with insurgency.

The report is structured into thirteen chapters:
Chapter-I deals with evolution of insurgency in the North-East - an introduction. It gives an insight into the definition, reasons and evolution of the movement in the seven States of the North-East.

Chapter-II deals with the Research design of the study and contains (i) need and importance of the study (ii) procedural dimension of the study (iii) data gathering instruments/technique (iv) de-limitation of the study etc.

Chapter III deals with insurgency in Nagaland.

Chapter-IV deals with insurgency in Mizoram.

Chapter-V deals with insurgency in Tripura.

Chapter – VI deals with insurgency in Manipur.

Chapter – VII deals with insurgency in Assam

Chapter – VIII deals with insurgency in Meghalaya.

Chapter – IX deals with insurgency in Arunachal Pradesh.

Chapter – X deals with Role of Police in combating insurgency/militancy in North-East.

Chapter – XI deals with Pakistani ISI connection and Low Intensity Conflict.

Chapter – XII deals with Analysis and Interpretation of data. It also contains opinions of experts.

Chapter – XIII deals with Summary findings and Recommendations.
The study has been able to prove that the insurgent movements had been clay footed on ideology and degenerated into terrorist movements for protecting group/partisan interests because of political patronage, that more than insurgency the influx from Bangladesh was the impending danger which continued unabated "without fuss, without tumult" and had been edging to threaten the very existence of the locals in the whole of the North-East, that neither the intelligentsia, nor the political leadership nor the insurgents who were fighting for liberation were apparently aware of the lurking danger, if not they were playing the blind, that the ISI, the Pakistani Intelligence outfit has been able to launch a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) without much ado and has been able to squarely blunt any opposition to its spreading the net by neutralizing all the insurgent outfits of the region by providing them base camps in Bangladesh, weapons and advice so much so that it has been able to convince the locals and the insurgent groups that the nemesis of the North-East was the mainlanders of India and they were fit to be gunned down leading to their brutal killings at places allegedly by the ULFA, in spite of the fact that North-East sustained because of the poor mainland tax payers money. If allowed to continue I.S.I. would be successful in creating a Bosnia like situation in the North-East in not too distant a future which would even make Kashmir look like a pale shadow.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At the outset, special thanks are due to the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy, Hyderabad, for awarding me the Police Research Fellowship under which this Research Project has been undertaken.

Sincere thanks to:-

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2. Shri P.S.V. Prasad, IPS, Additional Director, S.V.P. N.P.A

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I owe special gratitude to Shri Giridhari Nayak, I.P.S., Deputy Director (Admn.), SVP NPA for the expert guidance rendered by him, which helped me in avoiding pitfalls and shortcomings in the preparation of the report.

Dr. A.K. Saxena, Reader (T.M.), N.P.A., Hyderabad was the nominated guide. I am deeply indebted to him for the valuable guidance and constant assistance rendered by him.

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Thanks are also due to senior Officers and men of the Army and C.P.M.F posted in the six States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura for their unstinted cooperation which made the study all the more easy.

Sincere thanks to the secretarial staff of the S.V.P. N.P.A for typing the manuscript and rendering all other assistance.

My sincere thanks are also due to a number of institutions/organizations and prominent individuals such as bureaucrats/ex-bureaucrats/ex-Chief Ministers/Governors/Editors of leading newspapers/magazines/leading reporters/human rights activists, functionaries of NGOs and many other important persons of the society of the North-Eastern States. I cannot thank them enough for the generosity and helping attitude that they had displayed.

To err is human. If any error has crept into these pages, in spite of my best efforts, I alone am responsible.

N. Padmanabhan
Police Fellowship Scholar
I. NAGALAND
1. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isac-Muivah) NSCN(IM)
2. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) NSCN(K)
3. Naga National Council NNC

II. MIZORAM
1. Bru National Liberation Front BNLF
## INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NORTH EAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Tripura</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. All Tripura Bengali National Police</td>
<td>ATBNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. All Tripura Tiger Force</td>
<td>ATTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bru National Liberation Front</td>
<td>BNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. National Bengali Volunteer Force</td>
<td>NBVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. National Liberation Front of Tripura</td>
<td>NLFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tripura National Volunteers</td>
<td>TNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. United Bengali Liberation Force</td>
<td>UBLF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chin-Kuki Revolutionary Front</td>
<td>CKRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hmar Peoples Convention-Democracy</td>
<td>HPC-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hmar Revolutionary Front</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ireibak Khnna Lup</td>
<td>IKL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kanglei Yawol Khnulup</td>
<td>KYKL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kangleipak Community Party</td>
<td>KCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kangleipak Liberation Organization</td>
<td>KLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kuki Defence Force</td>
<td>KDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Kuki National Army</td>
<td>KNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kuki National Organization</td>
<td>KNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Kuki Security Force</td>
<td>KSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Manipur Peoples Liberation Front</td>
<td>MPLF (combination of UNLF, PLA and PREPAK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Meitei State Army</td>
<td>MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isac - Muivah)</td>
<td>NSCN(IM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)</td>
<td>NSCN(K)</td>
</tr>
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<td>17. North Eastern Council Army</td>
<td>NECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. North Eastern Minority Front</td>
<td>NEMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Peoples Liberation Army</td>
<td>PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Peoples Republican Army</td>
<td>PRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak</td>
<td>PREPAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Peoples United Liberation Front</td>
<td>PULF (Muslim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Revolutionary Peoples Front - Kangleipak</td>
<td>RPF(K)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Revolutionary Peoples Front (Political Front of PLA)</td>
<td>RPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Special Sacrifice Force (Kuki)</td>
<td>SSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Thangjal Hill Area Defence Council</td>
<td>THADDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. United Islamic Liberation Army</td>
<td>UIILA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. United National Liberation Front</td>
<td>UNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Vaiphei National Organization</td>
<td>VNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Zomi Reunification Organization</td>
<td>ZRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Zomi Revolutionary Army (Armed Wing of ZRO)</td>
<td>ZRA</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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<td>ATF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dima Halam Daoa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rabha National Security Force</td>
<td>RNSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. United Liberation Front of Assam</td>
<td>ULFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kamatapur Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Bodo Volunteer Force</td>
<td>BVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hindu Security Force</td>
<td>HSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kamatapur Liberation Army</td>
<td>KLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kamatapur Liberation Organization</td>
<td>KLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Karbi National Volunteers</td>
<td>KNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Karbi Peoples Front</td>
<td>KPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Koch Rajbongshi Security Force</td>
<td>KRSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. North Eastern Guerrilla Army</td>
<td>NEGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. United Bodo National Liberation Front</td>
<td>(UBBNLF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. United Peoples Democratic Solidarity</td>
<td>UPDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Santhal Group</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Adivasi Cobra Force of Assam</td>
<td>ACFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Adivasi Suraksha Sena</td>
<td>ADISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Adivasi United Liberation Front of Assam</td>
<td>Adi-ULFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Birsan Commando Force</td>
<td>BCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim Militant/Fundamentalist Organizations of Assam</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Assam Minority Liberation Army</td>
<td>AMLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>MNVF</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Muslim United Liberation Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>MULFA</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Students Islamic Movement of India</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2. Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>2. Arunachal Dragon Force</td>
<td>ADF</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NLFA</td>
</tr>
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<td>National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Patriotic Revolutionary Army of Arunachal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Peoples Liberation Army of Arunachal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>United Liberation Army of Arunachal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Arunachal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>United Liberation Tigers of Assam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>United Peoples Volunteers of Arunachal</td>
</tr>
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Chapter 1

EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH-EAST – AN INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Insurgency is an "insurrection against an existing government usually one's own". In the contemporary world insurgency has many names and takes many forms. It can in fact be traced back to 3000 years to the admonitions and instructions on war of the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu who in turn based most of his writing on earlier Chinese military experience. It originated as armed groups countering larger and stronger opponents by evasive action rather than direct military action with an inevitable and disastrous outcome. It is a method of war that gradually inverts the traditional strengths of large armed forces from an advantage to disadvantage. It is a "warfare on the cheap".

America referred to insurgencies in the 3rd World as Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) to distinguish it from High Intensity Conflicts (HICs) like strategic nuclear war. Others preferred different terms including 'guerilla warfare' (small warfare) or partisan war, proxy war and lately as Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs), Operations Other than War (OOTW) and Non-military Modes of Conflict (NMC).

To understand insurgency in the North-East we have to look into the societies in which it emerged and the reasons for the same. It usually emerged where societal misery prevailed. Other contributing factors were (1) economic deprivation (2) social divisions along racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious lines (3) absence of a political tradition to include legitimate centralizing values and structures that transcended parochial loyalties (4) group antagonisms, distrust and suspicion.

As a strategy it attempts to wear down and weaken a militarily superior foe over times.
It can serve political ends viz. (1) to repel a powerful enemy (2) to promote revolutionary war internally to overthrow a govt.

An insurgency pre-supposes continuous unstinted co-operation/support of the whole of the masses without which the insurgents would stray into activities inimical to the overall interest of the society for which it had embarked on insurgency.

Insurgency thrived where (1) the geographical setting is ideally suited for guerilla war (2) Where there are common borders with inimical neighbours (3) Where people of the same ethnicity lived across the borders (4) Where people had faced neglect for years (5) Where there is easy availability of weapons (6) Where people are psychologically resigned to insurgency and willingly supported it (7) Where there is a common cause to pursue. (8) Where there are leaders to take up the cause and (9) Where the administration is weak. While North-East had everything, the common cause was the alleged failure of the Central Govt. to economically uplift the region.

The North-Eastern part of India comprising the States of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Mizoram, euphemistically called the ‘Seven Sisters’ has been in the grip of insurgent terrorism for a long time now. It covers an area of 255037 sq. kms. and has a population of 3.15 crores divided into a number of ethnic, linguistic and religious tribal groups estimated roughly around 200 belonging to Mangoloid, Dravidian and Aryan streams, ethnically the most diverse. This part is strategically located from nation’s security point of view as it has common borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar, China and Bhutan, all either aiding or abetting insurgency.

The North-East even during the British period, had to live with two main challenges viz. (1) the question of natural integration, and (2) the question of lack of economic development.

One had to admire the British genius in hoisting the Union Jack even in the inhospitable remotest corners of the North-East like the then North-East Frontier Agency
(NEFA), now Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland, etc. either by conquest or strategies. In the bygone centuries however the 'Eastern Sentinel' Assam was the corridor linking Indian and Chinese civilization. "A Chinese explorer and soldier of fortune Changkien (2nd Century BC) mentions a trade route from Assam to South West China. Silks were exported from China to the then Western world by that route. The British closed it fearing Chinese expansionist ambitions”. Their real greatness was not so much in ruling them but in metamorphosing a whole lot of aborigines into finest of gentlemen who discarded their traditional head hunting tribalism by embracing British way of life and becoming subjects of the British empire and feeling proud in doing so. They achieved the feat not by wounding their native tongue but by converting it into Roman script, by extending Christian love without barriers, spreading English education with missionary zeal and thereby uplifting their jungle valour and treating them as equals, all the same, conveying the unmistakable message that they were the masters.

The British exploited all the resources but the locals did not feel bad about it, they did not start industries for their economic development conversely even the church expenses were met by the locals without grouse. Yet the British left behind a legacy and a religion to which they held steadfast preached its values and participated by propagating it and today Nagas are fighting for a Nagaland for Christ as if there is no other land for Him.

When independence came they feared the inevitable collapse of that very system so assiduously and painstakingly built. Ironically the British had contributed much to this distorted view more by design than by accident. Lack of integration was a natural corollary of social divisions along racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious lines. In the absence of a political tradition in India that included legitimate centralizing values and structures that transcended parochial loyalties group antagonisms distrust and suspicion was innate which eventually gave way to insurgency terrorism, ethnicism and the like and there was no turning back.
The obstacles to economic development went far beyond the field of national cohesion to encompass factors such as dearth of requisite human capital (that is where Bangladeshis filled the vacuum) psycho-cultural resistance to change, widespread corruption, bureaucracy exploiting situation for personal aggrandizement instead of leading from upfront to ensure development of the area, lack of adequate communication network, and transportation infrastructure, disadvantageous competitive position, operation of the criminal syndicates with politician-bureaucratic-criminal-nexus, conflicts with regional rivals that devoured scarce resources, frustration among youth over unemployment, engendered by political leaders who failed to make good promises that they would improve the standard of living of the people. Such failures had also one or more causes such as leaders were incompetent, looked after their own power bases as threatened by needed changes or were simply overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problems and were lacking resources. The clustering of causes that gave rise to insurgencies however varied from State to State. Violent situations arose where social division were sharp cumulative and were combined with economic and political disparities.

1.2 Nagaland

Naga Insurgency was the first of its kind in the North-East and could be called mother of all insurgencies. Others had drawn inspiration from the movement to launch liberation struggles. The movement of each State however had invariably one primordial reason with which they lighted the candle of insurgency. The Naga National Council (NNC) of Nagaland was at the vanguard demanding independence. It became strident by the time India was to get independence. It is open to question whether Naga insurgency should have at all been launched had there been no person by name Angami Zapu Phizo (A.Z. Phizo) to lead the NNC. He just came (1946), saw and conquered and left (1956) the movement orphaned for others to take the cue and pursue all within a span of 10 years. His followers however lacked the aura associated with Phizo. He proved a messiah in urgency to finish a task allotted to him. He was meticulous in his approach and formulated a system of Govt. both civil and military which were named as Naga
Federal Govt. (NFG) and Naga Federal Army (NFA). He could carry the people of Nagaland with him by sheer propaganda. Those who opposed him were simply annihilated. Unknown to him he was setting an example for future insurgents of the North-East.

Phizo declared Nagaland’s independence on August, 14, 1947 and later conducted a referendum in which he claimed that 99% of Nagas had voted for independence. He had also sought and received help from the then East Pakistan by way of weapons etc. and then violence started.

The Naga insurgency movement however had a checkered history. Fearing retaliation, Phizo left for London never to return. Others who took over groped for some time and in the face of army action and positive role played by the church a section came around which resulted in the signing of the Shillong Accord (1975). With this insurgency was to have ended but from then on it was a story of missed opportunities. A gang of insurgents under the leadership of Isac Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Thangkhul Muivah who were in China then refused to give up the fight as they were influenced by communist ideology. They repudiated the Shillong Accord, severed all relations with the Naga National Council (NNC) and formed a separate organization styled as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) with the active support from the then Burmese insurgent group headed by the Hemi Naga Khablang and set up camps there. Isac Muivah however failed to get active support from China due to a shift in stand but could establish contact with and get support from the Kachin and Karen rebels. The NSCN could thereafter forge unity with a myriad militant outfits in the North-East right from Arunachal Pradesh to Tripura so as to establish a Pan Mangaloid fraternity. It also took initiative in reopening channels of communication with Bangladesh and was successful in establishing camps and later contacting the ISI of Pakistan.

NSCN suffered a major split in 1988 due to an inter-tribal clash over alleged attempt by Isac and Muivah for a sell out to Govt. of India. The two groups came to be known as NSCN (Isac-Muivah) and NSCN (Khablang). NSCN(IM) moved inside
Nagaland – Manipur for regrouping and set up a parallel govt. with civil and military wings and had a well laid out procedure for tax collection. It also maintained a number of camps in Bangladesh with a separate command (Alee Command) there. Both the NSCNs had well apportioned areas of influence in Nagaland. Besides these two groups others like NFG (Naga Federal Govt.), NFA (Naga Federal Army) were also operating in Nagaland.

NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) had agreed for a cease-fire from August, 1997 to July 31, 2001 and from February, 1999 respectively. The NSCN(IM) was however insisting on extending the cease-fire to all Naga inhabited areas which invited opposition from all quarters.

1.3 Mizoram

Mizoram had to use the whip of insurgency to make its voice being heard. In early sixties neither the Assam govt. nor the Central govt. could go to its aid in the face of an acute famine (1959-60) occurring in a cycle of 50 years called ‘Mautam’ due to phenomenal increase of rodents which ate away the standing crops, an evil ingrained in the eco-system. The leadership was given by a dynamic leader named Laldenga and the organization Mizo National Front (MNF) formed (1961) by him. It wanted secession from the Indian Union and launched an armed insurrection in February/March 1966 leading to army action. MNF continued its activities for nearly two decades. During the period it had sought Chinese and the then East Pakistan help. The high water mark of MNF activities was the notice given (1974) to all non-Mizos to leave Mizoram and the merciless attacks unleashed against them. After signing the Mizo Accord (30.6.1986) peace was restored and in the same year it was granted Statehood. Today Mizoram is termed as a ‘garden of peace’ and as a reward received a ‘peace bonus’ from the Govt. of India. Three issues viz. the Chins, the Reangs (Brus) and the foreigners were however gnawing at the Mizo Govt. Unless checked this may disturb peace in Mizoram.
1.4 Manipur

Seeing the developments in Nagaland and later in Mizoram the Manipuris took up cudgels from 1964. The nature of insurgency movements launched by various organizations was such that a few movements were development based, a few ethnic and still others had political connotations. In general, the Manipuri insurgents can be divided into (1) Valley Stream, fighting for a separate country, (2) Naga Stream, its character is essentially that of Nagaland with NSCN(IM) orientation (3) Kuki Stream, a divided lot, though mostly identified with Kuki insurgents as it started with Kuki-Naga inner contradictions demanding a Kuki State.

These movements were also marked by bitter intra-mural clashes leading to killing and counter-killings and they had lost the character of a liberation struggle. Of late, however three major organizations, viz., (1) Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), (2) United National Liberation Front (UNLF), and (3) Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), all of Valley Stream, had come together to form the Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF). It could be a formidable outfit if fully formed. All had very close relationship with NSCN groups.

There were also a number of other minor organizations which were either splinter groups or were formed for collecting easy money or by politicians to protect their own interests. Such outfits emerged and eclipsed on their own.

The threat to life and properties of the people from these organizations were real. They were ruthless in their dealings. Each organization operated in the field of extortion, tax collection, kidnapping and indulged in activities of their choice unhindered so much so the whole of Manipur was declared a disturbed area.

Corruption, appeasement of UG groups for existence, unconcealed fear of the UG bullet had shaken the faith of the people in Manipur govt. In such a situation, economic development was a distant dream. In the North-East, Manipur was one State where UGs operated with impunity.
Between 1992-1997 the Kukis fought a bitter battle with Nagas (mostly Thangkhuls) over the issue of NSCN(IM) imposing tax on Kukis and their refusal to pay in which hundreds were killed. Though it got subsided the bitterness continued. From then on, however, Kukis got organized but was characterized by groupism and clashes. They had a dozen or more organizations fighting for their cause, prominent among them were Kuki National Army (KNA), Kuki National Front (KNF), Kuki National Organization (KNO). In the North-East, nowhere the ethnic divide is more pronounced than in Manipur. In this scenario many of the organizations had given up their ideology.

1.5 Tripura

While the whole of North-East was a simmering cauldron of woes the worst was Tripura, the ‘land of fourteen Gods.’ The reason for insurgent movement by the Tripuri Tribals was unchecked migration of outsiders, more particularly Bengalis and their unplanned settlement in different tribal areas. While murmuring of protest among the Tribals were heard right from 1948 they were brushed aside as of no consequence. Finding no other alternative, an organization viz., Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) took to arms (1978) and then onwards there was no looking back. Today, two organizations viz. All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) operate unbridled. Ironically both were the products of political manipulations of CPM and Congress respectively. They had sought help and assisted by the NSCN and were under the hold of the ISI of Pakistan. The Tripuris were made non-entities in their own land by sheer exploitation by the strong over the weak. Subsequently, other issues such as rising expectations, failure of govt. to remove poverty, activities of groups at the behest of political parties, corruption at all levels, etc. added colour to the movement. For, far too long matters that were crucial to the well being of the people of a multi-ethnic society did not get importance from any of the power centres in the way required either due to political considerations or simply because of failure to properly comprehend the developing insurgent scenario. What was shocking was in the Tribal areas schools had stopped functioning with the killing of many teachers
by UGs. School dropouts were operating as surrogates of UG outfits to kidnap innocent victims for paltry sums. In turn the UG outfits demanded huge amounts.

Even though SF was posted in strength the demand was for redeployment of Army that was withdrawn during Kargil war. Law and order machinery had come to a grinding halt. Both ATTF and NLFT controlled interior of the State. Instances were not rare when they ventured into the capital area made collections and safely got away. The areas declared “disturbed” where the AFSPA was said to be effective were allegedly the worst affected. In short, a few insurgents were holding the State in a vice octopus grip because the State was behaving like a recluse.

1.6 Assam

Assam was afflicted with the contagion of insurgency from 1979 when an outfit viz. United National Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) came in the open declaring that an armed rebellion was needed to establish a ‘Swadhin Assom’ (independent Assam). As compared to Naga/Mizo insurgencies, however Assam had only a set of leaders but none had the charisma comparable to that of Phizo or Laldenga. It was agitated over the unabated inflow of foreigners (mainly Bengali speaking) to Assam over which the All Assam Students Union (AASU) was already exercised. It sought and received help from the NSCN and the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) and later resorted to all types of terrorist activities including Bank robbery, extortion, kidnapping for ransom killing, etc. For a time, though ULFA earned a Robinhood image, it had to face two Army operations and a big split and a surrender, which humbled it and the remaining cadres/leaders had to flee for shelter to Bangladesh and Bhutan. It was down but yet not out as it had repeatedly proved its resilience. It was trying to take the leadership from the NSCN groups as they had already agreed for a cease-fire and come to the negotiation table.

Seeing the ULFA harping on ‘Swadhin Assom’ the Bodos under the auspices of two different organizations viz., the National Development Front of Bodoland (NDFB) demanding an independent Bodo land and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) demanding a
separate Bodoland within the Indian Union came into being. While the latter had agreed for a cease-fire, the NDFB was continuing with its activities. Initially both NDFB/BLT and ULFA were targeting each other, but subsequently an agreement was reached not to do so.

Faced with threat of ethnic cleansing and neglect, almost all minority communities of Assam started forming militant outfits. Thus organizations like the Dima Halam Daoga (DHD) formed by the Dimasa Tribes in Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills, having close links and working relationship with NSCN(IM), Bengali Tiger Force (BTF) formed by the Bengalis after Bengalis became targets of NDFB, Rabha National Security Force (RNSF) formed to protect interests of the Rabha Community, Koch-Rajbongshi Security Force (KRSF) of the Koch-Rajbonsis demanding Kamatapur State, a ‘Barak Land’ for people living in the Barak Valley, consisting of Cachar, Karimganj and Hailakandi districts, fundamentalist Muslim outfits like Muslim United Liberation Army (MULA), Muslim Liberation Tiger Force (MLTF), Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) and a number of other Muslim outfits (about 13) sprouted vitiated the ethnic relationship. All of them possessed weapons of destruction. Had it not been for the lack of vision, and realization on the part of ULFA that Assam was a pluralistic matrix of a society in which much of Assamese identity had got diluted and literally lost, there should not have been demands for splintering of Assam. After having perpetrated a crime on Assam and crushed Assam economically, ULFA paradoxically relented and reversed its stand to state that the people from East-Bengal had become an inseparable part of the toiling people of Assam and even blamed the AASU “for not giving political directions to the anti-alien agitation”. It was not surprising to hear the ULFA’s statement as its leaders were in Dhaka at the mercy of Bangladesh Govt. It might have also realized that with no local work force Assam’s fields would go dry if Bangladeshis were to be sent away. The contributions of ULFA to highlight were a lot of bitterness, economic destruction, and paving the way for further inevitable splintering of Assam. Submerged was also the problems arising out of migrant Bangladeshis becoming majority in districts pushing locals to the background. It would end in inescapable conversion of Assam in particular and the North-East in general into another Kashmir if
one went by the statistics of Muslim settlements right from pre-independence days which picked up at convenient/congenial atmosphere in the North-East where vote politics played. Bangladeshis moved searching for ‘Lebensraum’ (living space).

1.7 Meghalaya

With almost all the insurgent outfits in the NEI, big and small like the NSCN groups of Nagaland, PLA/UNLF/REPAK of Manipur, ATTF/NLFT/UBLF of Tripura, ULFA/NDFB/BLT of Assam using Meghalaya-Bangladesh border for their transborder movements from and to Bangladesh and as a shelter/hideout Meghalaya contracted the fever of insurgency and the outcome was birth of organizations like HNLC, ANVC and MPLF which besides striking terror were indulging in activities like bank robbery, kidnapping etc. in association with NSCN groups and the NDFB. MPLF was allegedly composed of only criminals. As a result, more than any other State, Meghalaya had become a hot bed for insurgent activities.

1.8 Arunachal Pradesh

Arunachal Pradesh was lured to insurgency by force of circumstances and it was an extension of Naga insurgency. It was earlier limited to only two districts, viz. Tirap and Changlang but subsequently there was a mushroom growth of militant outfits in other districts more to earn easy money but most of them ebbed away. Compared to other States, Arunachal presented a milder picture of insurgent terrorism.

Insurgency in the North-East India was backed and bolstered by outside forces like China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. While China had rendered all help to the Nagas and Mizos in the initial stages, the task was taken over by the then East Pakistan subsequently. After the birth of Bangladesh, there was a break but with the killing of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the thread was once again picked up, this time with added vigour by the ISI of Pakistan. Almost all the insurgent outfits were having their well established camps in Bhutan and Bangladesh. One command (Alee Command) of NSCN
was placed in Bangladesh. Of late, China’s role in supply of unmarked Chinese weapons has also come to notice. Insurgents of NEI were also getting weapons from South East Asian countries through Bangladesh. Thus what we see in North-East is a united action between China and Pakistan.

As the UG movement progressed the leaders were able to extend international contacts over and above the neighboring countries. NSCN had links/offices in Thailand. It gained admission into the Unrepresented Peoples Organization (UNPO) in 1993 (UNPO is a Holland sponsored non-Govt. organization). It presented its case before a U.N. Body viz. the Working Group on Indigenous Population at Geneva where it stated that “we were never Indians and will never be Indians. Even after more than 40 years India has not been able to crush us”.

The Bodos followed suit and presented their case before the UN Working Group at Geneva in July, ’99. Other groups also maintained such contacts which were done through the Human Rights Organizations taking up their causes. The international perception about North-East went even farther than this. “As early as 1966 reports were circulated in the International Press Service (Agencia Internacional de Prensa) datelined Dacca that there were reports to create a “United and Independent Bengal” comprising East Pakistan, West Bengal, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Sikkim, Bhutan. The report read “The separatists are counting on USA and other western powers to give them necessary assistance. They are confident that these powers would be interested in establishing an independent State in South East Asia which could help to normalize conditions there and which could provide shield against the Chinese aggression…” It is in this context that the circular from the United States International Communication Agency issued in June, 1979 entitled “Project Brahmaputra” is significant. The circular was sent to all its branches in Delhi and Calcutta informing that the special research cell of George Washington University with the approval of the State Department had detailed several teams of investigations to conduct research in the North-Eastern States, Sikkim and Bhutan. The purpose of the research was “to throw light on the public opinion in the
region to establish in what measure the present status of these States remain acceptable or whether there are indications that the formation of a 'new state' is a current problem.

The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 and the rapprochement between USA and China changed the geographical scenario in this region. And the western perception of the Union of the predominantly Christian tribal areas of North-East with India as unnatural and inherently unstable persists. Such a perception has had a negative effect on the 'psyche' of rebel outfits and indirectly encourages separation”.

In fact, the move for separating the North-East was mooted by the British even prior to independence in the idea of creation of a “crown colony” consisting of the Hill areas of Assam and Burma. There was also a move to carve out an autonomous State consisting of the Lushai Hills (now Mizoram) and a portion of Chin Hills of Burma to remain as a "protectorate of the British" on the premise that “tribals were not Indians, neither in origin nor in language nor in habits nor in outlook and that it will be unfair to allow this great body of non-Aryan animists and Christians to be drawn into the struggle between the Hindus and Muslims…”

In the face of it, group politics using terrorism were being played by politicians to the detriment of the people of the States and the nation. Even though the NSCN outfits had come to the negotiating table after a cease-fire, the demands of NSCN(IM) to extend the cease-fire to all the Naga inhabited areas smacked of motives. This would imply recognition to the right of Nagas for a 'Nagalim' or Greater Nagaland for Christ. It was also unlikely that the two groups, viz. NSCN(IM) and (K) would finally bury the hatchet and sit across the table to thrash out a common formula given the degree of hatred between the two. The NSCN(IM) demand to extend cease-fire to all Naga inhabited areas was staunchly opposed by neighbouring States and if pursued beyond a limit more ethnic killings and its attendant evil effects would be a distinct possibility.

Militants had come to possess latest technologies. Money-wise they were on sound footing. NSCN(IM) was running a parallel govt. in Naga inhabited areas of
Nagaland and Manipur so also the PLA/UNLF of Manipur and ATTF/NLFT of Tripura. Insurgents of the present day belonged to the third generation who did not subscribe to any ideology and killed just for the sadistic pleasure in it even though the leadership mostly remained in the first generation thereby implying that the aged had succumbed to the whims of blood hounds as was seen in Tripura and Manipur and at times in Nagaland and Meghalaya. It was not therefore surprising that criminal terrorism by criminal syndicates had come to operate in the North-East and the elected representatives had no other alternative than to be an integral part of the system in the creation of which they had a major role to play.
Chapter – 2

RESEARCH DESIGN OF THE STUDY

In this chapter, the following aspects are covered –

➤ Need and importance of the study.
➤ Statement of the study.
➤ Objectives of the study.
➤ Sample
➤ Data gathering instrument and techniques.
➤ Procedural dimensions of the study.
➤ Definition of important terms.
➤ Delimitation of the study.

2.1 Need and importance of the study

The North-East is strategically located from India’s security point of view with common borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar, China and Bhutan and has become synonymous with insurgency. This region had been seething with discontent for long leading to insurgent movements in one State after another right from 1950s with no containment. They invariably blamed the Central Govt. for all ills afflicting them and came forward with irreconcilable demands such as secession, autonomy, etc. No amount of induction of security forces, no amount of palliatives in the form of increased budget allotments, etc. were able to satisfy them. Instead of stemming the rot such extra favours saw mushroom growth of militant outfits which became cheaper by the dozen and they indulged in extortion, kidnapping for easy money with even major groups deviating from ideological moorings. To make matters worse they enjoyed political patronage which gave a new twist to the already deteriorating atmosphere.
One of the major reasons attributed for insurgency was the unabated influx of Bangladeshis right from independence days which threatened to make the locals a minority in their own place. Added to this was the involvement of the ISI of Pakistan and its launching a proxy war through the insurgent outfits all of which were at its beck and call and had their camps in Bangladesh. ISI plan was reportedly to destabilize the region by creating a Kashmir like situation so as to pin down bulk of India’s security forces in the region and thereby ease the Kashmir sector.

There was therefore need to study in depth such a serious problem facing the nation in its entirety. No serious study covering the whole gamut of the problem appears to have ever been made, though general articles abound.

From all indications it was clear that the insurgency movements had come to be overshadowed by the issue of unchecked overflow of Bangladeshis and the ISI moves to prepare the ground for a ‘Jihad’ through a proxy war using the very insurgent groups fighting against India without even their knowing that they were, while receiving the ISI help, digging their own grave. Ironically the influx problem was treated on a positive note as a vote provider by political parties, both big and small alike. No agency was alive to the danger of locals becoming a minority in their own land as has already happened in some districts of Assam. The change was perceptible. This along with ISI activities were enough to ring the warning bells which also made a study all the more important.

2.2 Statement of the Study

The study was worded as under:-

"Role of police in combating insurgency/militancy and Low Intensity Conflicts in the North-East."
2.3 Objectives of the Study

Following were the objectives of the study –

Obj.1: To identify the genesis/reasons for insurgency in the North-East.

Obj.2: To study the organizations involved in insurgency movements in each of the seven States.

Obj.3: To study the recruitment/training/supply/quantity/quality of weapons, financial resources/sources of income of insurgent groups.

Obj.4: To study crime rates.

Obj.5: To explore means of communication of insurgents groups.

Obj.6: To know the publications.

Obj.7: To comprehend relationship with similar organizations within the State and outside.

Obj.8: To assess the extent and nature of external support.

Obj.9: To examine Counter Insurgency measures taken by the government.

Obj.10: To study the role of Pakistan in North-Eastern affairs.

Obj.11: To study the issue of infiltration from Bangladesh and its impact.

Obj.12: To assess the future of insurgency and to offer findings and recommendations.

2.4 Sample

Stratified random sampling procedure was adopted for data collection from among CPMF/Army and Police.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Distributed</th>
<th>Sample Received</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers – 290</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men – 710</td>
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The response to the questionnaire was poor. This was because majority of the officers and men of CPMF, Army, Police and Administration serving in the region were not willing to give their views in writing, while other targeted sections were scared in giving their comments.
2. 12 experts having knowledge about insurgency and inter-related fields were selected for interview (interview results incorporated in Chapter-12).

The samples belonged to (1) Arunachal Pradesh (2) Assam (3) Meghalaya (4) Nagaland (5) Manipur (6) Tripura (7) Mizoram.

2.5 Data gathering instruments and techniques

2.5.1 Questionnaire on insurgency in the North-East (Appendix-A)

Through literature survey and discussion with experts in the field of insurgency, 15 items were identified by the investigator. The respondents were required to rate the value on the following 5 point 'Likert Model' scale. The questionnaire contained 15 closed and 12 open-ended questionnaires.

5 - To the fullest extent  
4 - To a considerable extent.
3 - To some extent 
2 - To a little extent 
1 - Not at all.

The questionnaires were of the following type:-

Q.1. To what extent the state has been affected by insurgency/militancy in the following aspects?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SLNO</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a certain extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Law &amp; Order</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Everyday life</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>Supply of essential commodities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
Q.2 To what extent police had been successful in combating insurgency?
2.1 Your reaction/suggestions.

2.5.2 Observation Schedule (Appendix – B)

This was prepared by the investigator on the basis of his long experience in the field of insurgency and after extensive literature survey and detailed discussions with experts. The investigator identified 32 domains of knowledge associated with insurgency in the schedule. The schedule covered the following aspects:-

1. Genesis of insurgency.
2. Reasons for insurgency.
3. Organizations involved in insurgency, their growth, weapon position, communication network, external support, etc.
4. Counter-Insurgency operations launched, role of police in combating insurgency, surrenders by insurgents, role of media, NGO organizations and Human Rights organizations.
5. Conclusions drawn.

2.5.3 Structured interview schedule/questionnaire for experts (Appendix – C)

From experience of the investigator, literature survey and after discussion with experts, the investigator prepared following points for seeking opinions of experts:-

1.5 Important festivals

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<tr>
<th>1.6</th>
<th>Relationship between communities</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Developmental activities</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>Political activities</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>Movement of Police</td>
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<td>1.10</td>
<td>Movement of VIPs</td>
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19
1. Genesis of insurgency and the reasons.
2. Visible effects on governance of people.
3. Future repercussions, if the problem is not solved.
4. Whether a national consensus was necessary. If so, what should be the nature of the policy?
5. Whether the problem was out of control of the State administration?
6. Whether there was genuine coordination between Govt. agencies and how it could be improved?
7. Re-organization of police.
9. Intelligence function/media role/NGO role.

2.5.4. Literature Survey, Information Interviews, Discussions and Observations

The investigator conducted a thorough literature survey, held interviews and discussions with a cross-section of public, intellectuals, educationists, leading politicians, Press men and other luminaries in the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Mizoram for ascertaining their views on the insurgency in the North-East. The results have been included in the study report.

2.6. Procedural Dimension of the Study

Following procedural steps were adopted by the investigator for completion of the study:

Step-1: Literature survey for better comprehension and brain storming sessions with experts in the field.
Step-2: Preparation of observation schedule.
Step-3: Selection of sample.
Step-4: Data collection – visit of investigator to the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura.
Step-5: Issue of questionnaire to CPMF/Army/Police Officers and men.
Step-6: Interview of experts.
Step-7: Information interviews, discussions with cross section of society and observations at the place of visits.
Step-8: Scoring and tabulation of data by using SPSS package.
Step-9: Analysis and interpretation of data.
Step-10: Preparation of report.

2.7 Delimitation of the Study

The study was focussed in the six North-Eastern States viz., (1) Arunachal Pradesh (2) Assam (3) Meghalaya (4) Nagaland (5) Manipur (6) Tripura. Mizoram was touched only from the historical point of view of insurgency.

The areas selected were insurgency prone mostly declared as ‘disturbed’. Both rural and urban areas were covered extensively but centre of activities were mainly urban with rural areas experiencing the impact.

Details on insurgent organizations, data on their activities over the years and other connected developments of insurgency in each State were available only with the Government agencies such as Police, CPMF, Army, Assam Rifle/ Tribal Organizations and therefore, the backbone of the study of the insurgency/militancy/low intensity conflict in the North-East is the information collected through observation schedule. Other surveys had helped in substantiating the information collected through the method. The urban people were more or less forthright in their comments, whereas the rural people were scary, while giving their views on insurgency. They lived in constant fear of the unknown.
2.8 Definition of Key-Terms

For the purpose of this study the definition of the following terms are as follows:-

1. **Role**: has been used in normal sense as “The behaviour expected from a group in society as determined by social position”.

2. **Police**: That wing of the govt. established to maintain order, enforce law and prevent and detect crime and thereby make life of the people in society happy and worth living.

3. **Combat**: To fight against (insurgency).

4. **Militancy**: The act of vigorously pursuing a cause, (e.g., insurgency).

5. **Low intensity conflict**: Low intensity conflicts are war of attrition launched in an unconventional manner aimed at wearing down an enemy that are protracted, localized and often ending in use of regular forces against bands of irregulars.
District of Nagaland

INSURGENT ORGANISATIONS OF NAGALAND

NSCN (IM)
NSCN (K)
NNC / NFG / NFA
3.1 The State

Along with independence India inherited a number of problems but none was as intractable and protracted as the Naga insurgency. This can rightly be called the mother of all insurgencies in the North East as all other insurgencies in the region had drawn inspiration from and emulated the Nagas in giving shape to their movements.

Nagaland inhabited by the Nagas once dreaded for the cult of head hunting but otherwise known for their qualities of truth, honesty, simplicity and spotless innocence was driven to the inexorable ways of insurgency by the machinations of an “unscrupulous but energetic” individual who contrived the people to believe that by getting “independence” from the “clutches” of “Hindu” India he could provide them a “Nagaland for Christ” on earth. It however soon turned out to be a dramatic irony as the person after leading the Nagas to the dark pit of insurgency retired to the cozy confines of a London home never caring once to return home and cast a glance at his own deeds. His successors instead of venturing to regain the lost glory led the Nagas, with ulterior motives, to perpetual doom. With a plethora of insurgent outfits operating there was no hope of retrieval. For this group insurgency had become a necessity as it proved to be a hot brew to hoodwink and exploit the people of Nagaland and India to advantage.

The Nagas were presumed to be immigrants from Tibet. They inhabited not only in Nagaland but also in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Myanmar. There were thirty Naga tribes of which sixteen were in Nagaland. There was a demand to constitute a ‘Greater Nagaland’ by amalgamating all Naga inhabited areas and name it as ‘Nagalim’. It did not augur well for the future as it had the potential to arouse ethnic passions and set the North East afire with claims and counterclaims.
Nagaland lies between latitude 25°6' N and 27°4' N and longitude 93°20' E and 95°15' E. It covered an area of 16527 sq. kms.

The Nagaland State was formally inaugurated on 1.12.1963 which was earlier a part of Assam. It is bounded by the Assam Plains on the west, Myanmar on the East, Arunachal Pradesh and part of Assam on the North and Manipur on the South. The State consisted of eight administrative districts.

The Nagas belonged to the Indo-Mongoloid stock and spoke the Tibeto-Burmese dialects of the Sino-Indian family. Each tribe is distinct in character from the other in terms of customs, language and dress. It is a land of folklore passed down the generations through the word of mouth. Music is an integral part of life, folk songs eulogizing ancestors the brave deeds of warriors and traditional heroes, gospel songs that touch one’s soul. Each tribe can be easily distinguished by the colourful and intricately designed costumes, jewellery and beads that they adorn.

The traditional ceremonial attire of each tribe is in itself an awe inspiring sight to behold which included the multi-coloured spears and daos decorated with dyed goat's hair the head gear made of finely woven bamboo interlaced with orchid stems adorned with boar’s teeth and hornbill’s feathers and elephant tusk armlets.

The State is covered with ranges of hills which some times break into a wild chaos of spurs and ridges and sometimes descend with gentler slopes. Most of the villages stand at three to five thousand feet though some hills rise above them to six thousand feet and the highest peak is Saramati at 3841 metres above sea level. The main concentrations of population are on the hilltops and at the higher elevations. There is still a great deal of forest left but much has fallen to the axe of the Jhum (shifting) cultivator and most of the wild game has been lost. Nearly 70% of the population depend on agriculture. The insurgency has played havoc with the Naga’s life.
The main rivers are (1) Dhansiri, (2) Doyang (3) Dikhu (4) Milak (5) Zungki and (6) Tizo.

The Languages spoken are (1) English (2) Hindi (3) Nagamese besides local dialects.

The total population of the State as per 1991 census was 12,09,546. The religion-wise breakup was:

- Christians: 10,57,940
- Hindus: 1,22,473
- Muslims: 20,642
- Sikh: 732
- Jains: 1,202
- Buddhists: 581

The names of the districts, area and the population are given below:

**Table-I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Name of District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area in Sq.Kms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kohima</td>
<td>2,23,000</td>
<td>2520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dimapur</td>
<td>1,63,580</td>
<td>1521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Wokha</td>
<td>82,612</td>
<td>1628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zunheboto</td>
<td>96,218</td>
<td>1255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mokokchung</td>
<td>1,58,374</td>
<td>1615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Phelk</td>
<td>1,02,156</td>
<td>2626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mon</td>
<td>1,49,699</td>
<td>1786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tuensang</td>
<td>2,32,909</td>
<td>4228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The tribe-wise population and their area of influence are given below:

**Table-II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name of Tribe</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percentage to Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Ao</td>
<td>Mokokchung</td>
<td>14.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Konyak</td>
<td>Mon/Tuensang</td>
<td>14.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Angami</td>
<td>Kohima</td>
<td>13.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Sema</td>
<td>Zunheboto</td>
<td>12.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Lotha</td>
<td>Wokha</td>
<td>7.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Sangtam</td>
<td>Tuensang</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Imchinger</td>
<td>Tuensang</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Phom</td>
<td>Tuensang</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Chang</td>
<td>Tuensang</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Khiamungan</td>
<td>Tuensang</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chakhesang</td>
<td>Phek</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Kuki</td>
<td>Phek</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pochury</td>
<td>Phek</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Zeliang</td>
<td>Kohima</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Rengma</td>
<td>Kohima</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kachari</td>
<td>Dimapur</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Spreadout</td>
<td>16.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"The derivation of the world "Naga" is obscure. It has been explained as "Hillman" from the Sanskrit word "Naga", a mountain. It has also been linked to Kachari ‘Naga’ a young man or warrior. In Assamese they were called Noga (naked) as Nagas were wearing only limited raiment on them. The most likely derivation could be from the word “Nok” meaning “people”. It is common throughout India for Tribesmen to call themselves by words meaning ‘man’ an attractive habit which suggested that they looked on themselves simply as ‘people’ free of communal and caste considerations".
The description of Nagaland would not be complete without a mention about the cult of ‘Head hunting’ for which Nagas were feared. “The taking of human head was not held among the older generation of Nagas to be an act of savagery”. They believed that “the vital life force of the community was supposed to reside in the human skull. When therefore the crops failed or their wives were slow in conceiving they assumed that the vital life force of the village was ebbing and needed replenishment. It was at this juncture that the village elders would take counsel and decide on the scale and manner of replenishment. If the crop failures and other misfortunes were considered grave enough there would be no alternative but to carry out a surprise raid on a neighbouring village and capture as many heads as possible for preservation as their ‘life force reserve’. If the misfortune had been sporadic a mere handful of heads would suffice to restore the equilibrium. The taking of heads therefore was an act of patriotism and honoured as such. A village’s storehouse of skulls was its most treasured possession and in times of war every device was employed that it should not fall into enemy hands. Instances were not rare when skulls were placed on a platform at the rear of a house overhanging a precipice so that in the last resort the skull might be rolled over the precipice in the hope of being recovered later rather than fall to the enemy”.

With the spread of Christianity and spread of education, there had been rapid advancement in the life style of Nagas. With the advent of insurgency however all that were Indian came to be despised. Even then it could not be denied that the inside of a Naga had reached a far advanced stage of evolution than any other civilized mainland and it was a grave mistake to imagine that because their customs were different from others they were backward in every sense. Nagas throughout the decades had grown in knowledge and freedom of heart “A belief in the importance of loyalty, a hardness of moral and physical fibre, courage before impossible living conditions, the love of adventure and exploration, a fresh, candid, simple attitude to life’s problems, bestowal of an honoured position to women are qualities that the Nagas have to give” to the people of India.
3.2 Genesis of Insurgency

“Separation and isolation are dangerous theories and strike at the root of national solidarity. Safety lies in unity and not in isolation”. Despite being lodged in the same physical confines of Assam the ethnic groups, of which Nagas were a part, enjoyed complete freedom even under the Ahom Rule (1228 A.D.). They were allowed to retain their linguistic sociological and cultural characteristics. The reasons could be attributed to (1) lack of communication (2) economic and (3) sociological rigidity. Economically the Nagas sustained themselves by natural resources which separately catered to their needs. Since barter system was in existence they did not go far beyond the confines of their villages. Communication was hampered because of natural physical features such as steep slopes, spurs and re-entrannts, cascading rivers and streams which sheltered their habitats. This also minimized inter-tribal contacts and helped to ensure the purity of different tribes. In the process the sociological pattern of each group got strengthened. The policy of Ahom rulers was also to allow free play of their customary mode of regulations of their affairs. This made them static and rigid. There was no social concourse to linguistic and cultural changes.

The British also followed the policy of the Ahoms and laid emphasis on the ethnic personality of the hill tribes and wished to keep them as “museum pieces”. As far back as 1873 it introduced the system of Inner Line Permit (ILP) “as a two fold attempt to protect both the tribal people and the settlers in the plains. On the one hand it prevented encroachment to tribal land, on the other, by checking irritations that might incite the tribesmen to rebellions and raids it protected the tea planters of Assam and their labour. It had nothing to do with ideological policy of isolating the tribal people and did not affect the sovereignty of the areas lying beyond it. It was clearly defined as being merely for the purpose of jurisdiction and the practical convenience of the administration”.

There was a recognition on the part of the administration, whether of British or of India, that the “tribal areas required special arrangements for their administration and development and that some of them should not fall within the normal legislative
provisions". The Scheduled District Act of 1874 made special provisions for underdeveloped tracts. Under the Act a number of 'Scheduled Districts' were established and empowered govt. to notify what laws should be enforced in them. The Frontier Act Regulation-II of 1880 provided that certain areas should be excluded from the operation of laws which might be considered unsuitable for them. As such the Cr.P.C. and I.P.C were never enforced in hills. It was arranged that petty cases both civil and criminal should be dealt with by village councils presided over by the local chiefs and headmen chosen by the people themselves.

The Govt. of India Act of 1919 empowered the Governor General in Council to declare any territory in India to be a backward tract. The Nagas came under these regulations which gave them a feeling of separation. Then came the Simon Commission (1929) by which time Naga clubs were already in existence in Nagaland. A delegation of Nagas met the Commission and had then demanded separation. At that time the British were one with the Nagas. The then Deputy Commissioner of Assam, Dr. J.H. Hutton had stated thus "The interests of the hill tracts would not be served by including them in the reforms. On the contrary they would suffer on account of being tied to the politically more advanced plain districts. At the same time, the latter was also likely to suffer in future with people of irreconcilable culture in an unnatural union which could ultimately only entail discomfort for both parties. Culturally hill men had been neither part nor lot in Hinduism or Islam".

Following recommendations of the Simon Commission the hill areas were classified as "Excluded" or "partially excluded". Nagaland was an "unadministered area" "The policy was a reminder of the white man’s burden and committed the more assertive of the administrators to preserve the identity of the tribes in the prevailing circumstances."

The Govt. of India Act of 1935 went a step further. According to Dr. Verrier Edevin "the general tone of the debates in British Parliament suggested that if the tribal areas fall under the control of elected Indian legislators they would be ruined. Speeches
contained such provocative statements as these “The only chance for these people is to protect them from a civilization which will destroy them and for that purpose, I believe, British control is the best. It is not fair to put these tribes into the unrestricted hands of the people whose objects must be to exploit their labour and to sell them cheap goods at prices they are not worth. They must not declared. Col. Wedgewood be converted from good Nagas or whatever they are to bad Hindus. Prominent Indian politicians have never displayed the slightest interest in this subject as compared to Europeans who had a natural and strong sympathy with these people. We are treating these backward tribes as though they are chattels who would be handed over either to the Indians or Princes. If they were taken away from direct British rule they would be alienated and they would be recruited for the tea plantations and elsewhere. There was altogether too much of this sort of thing which not only offended Indian opinion in general but also, I suspect, filtered down to the tribes and specially the Nagas reinforced the idea that they would not get a square deal under the Govt. of India.” There was also an opinion expressed in the House of Commons that “Nagas had a very shrewd suspicion that something is being done to take away from them their immemorial rights and customs”. Nothing more was needed to arouse hidden sentiments of a simple folk like the Nagas. The real turning point was the establishment (1945) of the Naga Hills Dist. Tribal Council (NHDC) on the initiative of the then Commissioner of Assam, Sir Charles Pawsay “with the aim of repairing some of the damages done during World War-II”. The NHDC had powers to collect taxes. This organization provided the political springboard for Naga insurgency. It adopted a political posture by putting forth a 4-point memorandum demanding (1) unity of all Nagas (2) separate electorate for Nagas (3) safeguarding their interests (4) grant of autonomy within Assam province of free India. This was submitted before the Cabinet Mission in 1946. NHDC subsequently (1946) became the Naga National Council (NNC) to which were amalgamated all Naga Tribal Councils. “The NNC was intended to be a government – even though ‘tribal’ or more accurately an ‘inter-tribal’ one. The Naga was not one Tribe and they claimed to be a nation”. NNC also published a newspaper named ‘Naga Nation’ for a few years. At first NNC had not talked of separation from India but its temper began to change rather quickly by June, 1947 when it issued an ultimatum that the Naga Hills would cease to be part of India when
independence was attained. The direct result of this special arrangement was that the Nagas became even more removed from the plains people and "they viewed themselves as exclusive subjects of the British Power as if they had no relationship with the Assamese counterpart. It was therefore not strange that at the end of British rule in 1947 they demanded a break from the post independence State of Assam. The seeds of hills – plains divide were laid both by the Ahoms and the British. This divide and rule policy took the shape of inexorable political demands and when refused ended in armed resurrection for constitutional separation only that Nagas in the Naga Hills were the first to strike."

If others in the North East region followed suit they had seen what was done to Nagaland. In future it would not be a surprise if such parochial tendencies rear their heads and demand special treatment. Has anyone heard the pampered listening to sound reason?

Table-III

3.3 Reasons for Insurgency

![Diagram of Reasons for Insurgency]

- Failure of Central Govt.
- Ethnic oneness across border
- Emergence of Phizo
- Anxiety, suspicion and fear of change
- Concept of a Naga nation
- Naga nature
- Machinations of Missionaries
- Geography
- Inimical neighbours
- Impact of World Wars
- Propaganda by N.N.C
- British Policy of Divide and Rule
- Availability of weapons
Naga insurgency can be segregated into two phases. Phase-I can be said to have commenced from 1946 when two factors viz. (1) formation of NNC (2) emergence of Phizo on the horizon of Nagaland took place and ended in 1975 with the signing of the Shillong Accord when Phizo ceased to be a factor except for an unseen and namesake remote control through his relations.

The 2-nd part commenced in 1975 when one section of UGs then in China repudiated the Shillong Accord and continued the struggle.

There were a plethora of causes that helped the Naga political consciousness to crystallize into concrete aspirations for an independent Nagaland. The most important single factor among them which made all other issues come to life was the emergence of Angami Zapu Phizo (A.Z. Phizo) on the Naga scene and his concept of a Naga Nation. All other factors would have paled into insignificance had Phizo not taken up the cudgels to whip up a frenzy over the issue of nationhood.

After 1975 Naga insurgency was said to have lost its moorings and degenerated into personalized movements without a binding ideology. Their support bases both domestic and foreign also underwent “qualitative and quantitative changes”. Ideology was sacrificed at the altar of self-aggrandizement even at the cost of own followers. People wished for peace and tranquility and sought benefits of development. Whereas UG groups wanted support bases for sustenance. The “emphasis therefore shifted from the earlier aim to protect ethnicity and Naga Nationhood to influence events for which they sought clandestine support of politicians and their parties”. The help was mutual. UGs influenced electoral outcomes in Nagaland and had influence at all levels of administration. Extortions were reportedly done with political connivance. Insurgency had lost its original luster and receded to a play with life of people for existence. This was pregnant with dangerous portends as the unemployed youth were taking to insurgency.
3.3.1 Emergence of A.Z. Phizo on the Nagaland Horizon

The history of a nation or a State usually rested on the shoulders of a towering personality, a charismatic leader. The rest simply followed him like a herd of sheep, with, more often than not, no contribution at all. Phizo emerged in Nagaland at a momentous phase of Naga history. He came to conquer but failed but left his imprint for others to follow and the nation to grieve and the legend lived on. It would be ideal to study him in depth as Naga insurgency was literally his creation and owed much to him.

Phizo was born in Gwizantsu clan of Angami tribe in Khonoma (near Kohima) village in 1902. Phizos early life was scrappy except that he had the habit of doing strenuous walking and undertook journeys along hills where fierce tribesman lived. After high-schooling at Shillong he was for a time at Dimapur doing a retreading business borrowing money on loan but often failed in repaying it. When pressed by anybody he would vanish from the scene. He was anti-British in his early ages and when he developed liking for them was not known. His utterances against them had earned their displeasure and when Naga Hills became hot for him he joined one of the thousands of immigrants from India to Yangon (then Rangoon). For some time he worked as a Stevedore in the docks. Later he tried his hand in various vocations before starting a company known as Universal Credit and Commercial Co. He had picked up a number of friends among the Kachins and Karens then. The company was destroyed in the Rangoon riots in 1939. Later he started a medical agency which he called Gwiz Sc Laboratory derived from his clan name ‘Gwizanizu’. When war came everything changed.

“It was not known as to when he turned rebel and fathered a movement which was phased and daring. He was neither ominous nor prodigious but restless”.

During his sojourn in Burma, Phizo established some contacts with Burmese nationalist leader Bojok Aung San and communist leaders like Thakin Tham Tun and
Thakin Soe. He came under the influence of INA and believed to have collaborated with the legendary General Renya Mutaguchi during Japanese thrust into eastern India.

Between 1942-1945 there was ethnic revival in Burma and Indians were asked to leave. Phizo had apparently learnt a lesson here. Until June, 1946 when he returned to Nagaland after a seven months interment in a Rangoon jail under the British he was not known to have expressed any political ideas.

3.3.2 Formation of Naga National Council (NNC)

His plunge into Naga politics was momentous. It saw Nagaland in ferment. "Those who thought that Phizo was a mere crank or show-boy was soon piqued for the mystic in him as he unleashed an aggressive propaganda to launch a popular movement" for independence of Nagaland. He moved like ard with the speed of a panther. His mentor was reportedly Rev. Michael Scott, who literally steered the Naga movement. Arrival of Phizo coincided with the formation of the Naga National Council (NNC) and he could visualize that gaining control of NNC would give him a wide field to operate and that was vital. The idea of separation was already given birth to by the Nagas with the formation of Naga Hills Dist Council (NHDC). What Phizo had done was adding teeth to it, to bite. Phizo therefore got his men into the NNC and thus could control it from outside. With Indian independence certain there were discussions in the NNC about future of Nagaland. Groupism started brewing up in NNC by February, 1947 the group headed by Phizo demanded total independence. Another group wanted integration of contiguous areas of Naga Hills, NEFA Manipur and Burma and formation of a crown colony or a Trust/Mandatory territory. Yet another group preferred retention of some relationship with India till such time Nagaland was able to gain experience to govern on its own. A fourth group wanted to continue with India as an integrated but autonomous entity. In May, 1947 however, NNC made matters very clear to a sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly that visited Kohima that "Nagaland belongs to the Naga people and will be inalienable" and demanded full legislative, executive and judicial powers for the "interim Naga Government". To meet their
requirements of defence and internal emergency the “Guardian Power” was expected to maintain a force within Nagaland that owed responsibility to the NNC. The result was the signing (June, 1947) of the 9-point ‘Hydari” agreement signed between the NNC and the then Assam Governor Sir Akbar Hydari (Annexure-D). This agreement had given the Nagas “everything short of Constitutional Independence”. It gave monetary powers to the NNC “that the Naga National Council will be responsible for the imposition, collection and expenditure of land revenue and house tax and of such other taxes as may be imposed by the NNC”. It was stated that “no areas should be transferred out of the Naga Hills without the consent of the NNC”. It however had a controversial clause viz. clause-9 “The Governor of Assam, as the agent of Govt. of Indian Union will have special responsibility for a period of ten years to ensure due observance of this agreement; at the end of the period the NNC will be asked whether they required the above agreement to be extended for a further period or new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at. This clause generated considerable controversy during the Negotiations and became a bone of contention later. Many NNC leaders interpreted the term “new agreement” as a bestowal of the right of self-determination for complete independence while in reality as clarified by the Governor and the Deputy Commissioner it merely granted them the freedom to suggest mere modifications.

Sensing that a large number of the members were satisfied with the explanation, the then D.C. Charles Pawsay had persuaded the members to put the issue to ballot and the proposition was carried through by a marginal majority. “The extremists under Phizo having failed to cajole and intimidate the doves, declared the Agreement null and void”. Following this, Phizo in the presence of his supporters including some moderates of NNC declared independence of Nagaland on August, 14, 1947 to coincide with Indian Independence.

Earlier during July, 1947, however, the extremists had despatched a delegation (6) to New Delhi to discuss the Naga issue once again but nothing came out. It also met Mahatma Gandhi at Bhangi Colony in Delhi. Gandhiji after trying unsuccessfully to argue with them reportedly said that “The Nagas have every right to become independent.
We did not want to live under the domination of the British and they are now leaving us. I want you to feel that India is yours. I feel that the Naga Hills is mine just as it is yours. But if you say that it is not mine the matter must stop there. I believe in the brotherhood of men but I do not believe in force and forced unions. If you do not wish to join the union of India nobody will force you to that”. This gave Phizo a boost to further his aim in Nagaland.

Phizo was able to make a dent on the Naga mind regarding usefulness of the Hydari agreement the acceptance of which would have in reality given the Naga everything short of constitutional independence. He showed complete contempt for moderates and their tardy deliberations on Nagas independence. Unable to tolerate opposition and weary of peaceful means he formed the Peoples Independence League (PIL) the word “independence” leaving no doubt about his goal. Phizo was later interned for his secessionist activities. As the founder of PIL he advocated for violent means for achieving independence of Nagaland.

3.3.2.1 Phizo as N.N.C President

Phizo was released in 1949 and he became President of NNC without much trouble as his men were already there. With this his theory of a separate Naga Nation started winning more and more supporters. Having secured full control of NNC he wound up PIL. Since NNC had financial powers he did not feel shy to use it to advantage. He brought all village and Tribal Councils subservient to his diktats. “The web was spun so well that even the officials and church functionaries found themselves entangled”.

Gradually the extremist group under Phizo gained more and more control over the Naga people through the NNC. As a result the Naga officials withdrew from it while some NNC members joined Govt. service. This left the field fully clear for NNC to operate and Phizo hit upon the idea of a referendum on Naga Independence which was held on May 16, 1951. He claimed that 99% of the Nagas had opted for independence of
Nagaland when results were announced even though he was claimed to have visited only two places viz. Kohima and Mokokchung. Another mass protest in the form of civil disobedience was organized by him during elections to the Assam Assembly and Parliament during 1951-52 when neither any Naga filed nomination nor anyone turned up for voting. Phizo was then at his manipulative best and behaved like Hitler of Nagaland.

On October, 18, 1952 the alleged torture of a Naga boy by the Assam Police at Dimapur gave the extremists the long awaited opportunity for a show of strength. In the massive rally taken out in this connection a Naga pedestrian was run over by a police motor cyclist. This incident triggered a full-scale violence which was exploited by extremists to paint the authorities as oppressive and anti-Naga.

On March 30, 1953 when Naga tempers were still running high Nehru paid a visit to Kohima to express his sorrow and regret. He was given a tumultuous welcome but when he rose to address the Naga gathering departed leaving only some officials. This was typical display of Naga anger. This year became the dividing line between the political and military phases of the Naga insurgency movement. Phizo had scored a victory and there was no looking back. Hereafter the “history of Naga area was marked by a policy of direct action and known by a carefully organized violent resistance”.

While this was so, the VIth schedule considered the best bet for development of Tribal areas which laid down a series of “provisions for the administration of Tribal Areas in Assam” became a law in 1949. It had taken care to incorporate the provisions of the Hydari agreement. In fact many educated Nagas came to acknowledge that Tribal interests and culture had been adequately safeguarded. This was however repudiated by Phizo and his men.

The irony was that the Nagas had no real grievance but only demands. Many of the educated found little content, value and meaning in purely local appeals for violence. But yet they did not react. It was here that Phizo displayed his full potential. In the absence of any major contradictions to exploit he invented one and that was the common
enemy – India. There was no symbol of authority from outside. Nagas enjoyed full protection under all laws, none suppressed them rather they were treated as darlings of India though none had realized it. The few knowledgeable maintained silence and often misled people either out of fear or for glorifying oneself. The Church instead of being a guiding light for welfare of Naga stoked the fires of separation.

3.3.2.2 Phizo attempts to contact Burmese Friends but fails – Naga Insurgency begins

During 1952-53 Phizo visited Burma incognito but was apprehended and repatriated. During this period he was believed to have established contact with some of his erstwhile communist friends. “Frustrated in his efforts to get independence by Constitutional means and foiled in his attempts to cross border to seek foreign help Phizo announced (September, 1954) formation of the Hongkin Government. It was called Khunak Kautang Ngeukhum (Peoples Sovereign Republic of Free Nagaland). Hongkin (probably Phizo himself) was proclaimed Head of the State with fifteen Kilonsers (Ministers) under him. On March, 22, 1956 the Hongkin Govt. was substituted by the Naga Central Govt. A document issued on the occasion declared Nagaland to be a sovereign republic and it was claimed that “this had been so from time immemorial”. Simultaneously an armed wing was also raised. Phizo had organized armed gangs in Tuensang area during the second half of 1954 and on March, 22, 1956, announced the formation of Naga Home Guards (NHG) (earlier one of his lieutenants Kaito Sema had already organized the Naga Safe Guards (NSG). The formation of these two parallel organizations led to a tussle and as a result they were merged and made Naga Country Guards (NCG). In 1957 the old expression NHG was again adopted for UG armed wing. On January 3, 1964 the armed wing was further re-organized and designated as the Naga Army. Keito Sema was appointed Defence Minister and Mowu Angami Chief of the Naga Army. The Naga Central Govt. was placed on a surer footing on July 13, 1956 in a meeting which was attended by representatives of all Tribes. On October, 6, 1959 the NCG was refashioned as Naga Federal Govt. (NFG) with Scato Swu taking charge as Kedahge (President). To mobilize young men and women Phizo also organized the Naga Youth Movement (NYM) and the Naga Women’s Society (NWS). All these – the Naga
Central Govt., The Naga Home Guards, the Naga Youth Movement and the Naga Women’s Society – meant a formidable organization for a society which had hitherto been atomized into feuding clans and warring tribes”. As a person Phizo was known for his thoroughness and pertinacity. He usually carried “serialized copies of all documents relevant to the Naga problem and gave the impression of carrying single handed in his little brief case the destinies of the entire Naga people. Everything had to be documented nothing left to chance and as soon as the discussions were concluded he insisted on having the minutes drawn up while the proceedings were still fresh in mind. He had no small talk and when his business was done he was seen no more”. “Phizo has been rightly credited with having given a sense of political unity to the Naga tribes and introduced the concept of Naga Nationhood.”

There was something magical about Phizo. His physical stamina, obstinate nature and capacity to undertake any hazardous task set him a class apart. He staggered along leach infested mountains, united tribals as never before, developed in them an intense sense of Naga pride which in a way accelerated economic development of Nagaland. Phizo knew Nagaland thoroughly unlike other Nagas. His histrionics and gesticulations put the listeners into a trance. He was a good father and a Messiah for the Nagas. “His exhortations became law utterances gospel and invocations godly”. Even Nagas swore about Phizos divine power and his capacity to be present at different places at the same time. He gave leadership at a crucial time and he was the only leader of his type produced by Nagaland. With no military background even he planned and implemented an insurgency operation. He controlled the bases, managed administration transacted financial matters disbursed justice and conducted diplomacy. He was known for his dress and for ruthlessness even to his own close colleagues. All this he had done in spite of the fact that he was a man suffering from partial paralysis (since 1942).

For a time Phizo was arrested but released due to ill health in 1953. His organizational set up consisting of civil, military, judiciary and intelligence etc. having become operational he wanted to have NNC’s seal of approval. Many were giving vent to the strong opposition to Phizo’s views. One person was T. Sakhrie, one time Secretary
and President of NNC. In the December, 1955 meeting of NNC at Khonoma Sakhrie attacked Phizo vehemently. Phizo realized that unless checked his position in NNC would be weakened as Sakherie was respected for his intellectual brilliance. There were indications that Phizo would be unseated in the next meeting of NNC in January, 31, 1956. On January 18 therefore his trusted followers caught hold of Sakherie and brutally murdered him after a disgusting torture and put the blame on Govt. of India (later in London he admitted that the murder was committed by his men).

Sakhrie’s murder signalled unrestrained murder and terror throughout Nagaland. In one case 48 people were chopped off for refusal to take an oath of support. Those who refused to part with weapons were beheaded. “Almost overnight the NNC became the overlord of Naga Hills and Tuensang”.

He however had to leave Nagaland fearing vengeance of the associates of those liquidated. The first major setback came when opposition started building up after the murder of T. Sakherie. All important leaders who preferred peace came on a single platform. Certain that he would be landing in Jail if apprehended and tired of shuttling from place to place out of fear, Phizo left his men and crossed over to the then East Pakistan on December, 6, 1956 with three assets viz. (1) a copy of the NFG constitution (2) 1951 Plebiscite results and (3) Rs. One lakh. He succeeded in getting some small arms and ammunition for the Naga Army. In 1960 he left for London giving a hope that he would return “at the head of friendly forces.” In London his host was Rev. Michael Scot, who was his mentor in Nagaland. Even after a long period when he did not return, Phizo’s ability to arrange foreign help came to be doubted.

Mowu Angami, Commander in Chief and Kaito Sema, Defence Minister of the Naga Army clandestinely visited Karachi where Phizo had been flown in July 1962 and they went to London for further discussion on the question of strategy and foreign aid. Lack of credibility of Phizo was thus exposed. Both Mowu and Kaito on return explained the position to the Nagas and there was setback to the UG movement. Even with that what harm Phizo had done for Nagaland could not be undone by other leaders.
but instead some of them even after knowing the futility of the movement continued with it more in pursuit of self-aggrandizement.

3.3.2.3 Phizo’s Meeting with Prime Minister, Morarji Desai

Phizo’s exit from Nagaland had left his creation orphaned. He however often wrote to his colleagues. When the peace loving Nagas accepted the idea of formation of a separate Nagaland State Phizo made it known that an agreement should be made only with those “persons who are true representatives of the Naga people”. In 1967 Phizo made a trip to the USA to present the Naga cause before the UNO and other American lobbies little realizing that his position had gone down in the eyes of the Nagas. The Phizo legacy had by then ebbed away and veiled forms of Tribal loyalties had reared their heads. Again in June, 1977 Phizo(by then 73) had a meeting with Morarji Desai, the then Prime Minister of India in London. The Prime Minister took the stand that he was speaking to Phizo as an individual and not as a representative of the Nagas. When Phizo asked for a “final settlement of the Naga problem!” Morarji retorted “what is there to settle? I will show absolutely no leniency to rebels. If you want to persist on independence I will have nothing to talk about. I will certainly exterminate the rebel Nagas. I have no compunction about that”. The P.M. then refused to have any further discussion.

3.3.3 Anxiety, Suspicion and Fear of Change

The causes of the Naga insurgency movement widely differed from those of other parts. The Nagas were free as a bird. Their areas were never colonised by outsiders none interfered in their customary system of administration, none expropriated their land, no forest right was interfered with, there was no commercial exploitation and except in the case of head hunting no official interference was done “but psychological anxiety and suspicion can be as tormenting as actual wrong and can be as strong an incentive to revolt”. What accentuated it was fake propaganda at its best about their future if joined India and utter failure of govt. machinery to counter it effectively.
The tribals realized painfully that the Britishers with whom they were at home were leaving for sure. What was ahead of them they were not aware. They had heard only what the UGs had told them. The English were leaving them after having done much. The situation was described eloquently by T. Sakhrie who was Secretary of the NNC. "Upto the time of Japanese invasion in 1944 the Nagas had lived in an age of almost uninterrupted continuity with the past. The Naga made a leap as it were from a distant past into the glare of the present century with the advent of the Japanese and found their world greatly changed. They looked about with uncertainty and pinched themselves to be reassured that all this was really true. Prior to the war, except in the case of the Aos school going was still unpopular and looked upon as a necessary evil which had to be put up with some how. Suddenly they found themselves clamouring for more and more schools in which they saw social progress and where govt. could not build them they went ahead to build their own. Existing schools were filled to overflowing. People became suddenly restive with the existing state of affairs. There was social unrest, economic unrest, and political unrest. Everywhere there were cries for better, bigger and nobler things. Things that were considered a luxury became the standard of the day. Trade received a new impetus as indeed the era brought in a new impetus to all fields of human endeavour. Two hundred miles of motorable roads were added to those which had existed from before the war.

Standards of value and taste often changed. Foreign dress which before the war had been considered a luxury but in good taste had to yield place to artistic native dress on which the new nationalism had stamped its approval. Foreign culture had to make way for the native culture. The clans which used to emphasize their differences hastened to patch them up and forge their unity. The clash of imperialistic interest had given birth to the new era – full of opportunities and hopes for a glorious future”.

3.3.4 Naga Nature

The Nagas, by nature, were free and independent, intolerant of control and impatient of criticism. Nearly every one of them “had behind them a long history of life
in a village at war with neighbours a tradition of adventure and courage”. They adopted a man to man attitude and fear was unknown. They faced death smilingly, willingly. “The tillers of the soil who had grown and lived on the land knew the precious value of the land to which they were affectionately attached. Living their lives in their mystic mountain homes the villagers had felt a threat to their old way of living, their freedom, their valued traditions, their customary laws, their land and their very existence. They wanted to preserve their race, their land, their freedom and everything that was theirs but began to wonder if in the changing context of things it would be possible anymore”.

3.3.5 Concept of a Naga Nation

The idea of a Naga Nation was the major contribution of A.Z. Phizo. “The war had something else besides plummeting the Mongoloid groups into the 20th century. By briefly occupying the region Japan had willy nilly transformed the once docile millions of South East Asia into freedom fighters. Japan had historically speaking touched the chords of ethnicity”. A tidal wave of nationalism or ethnic regeneration swept North Eastern India and Burma. According to Hokishe Sema one time Chief Minister of Nagaland “The process of ethnic-cum-territorial awareness was nothing but “local nationalism”. Phizo created an emotional ferment on the principle of tribalism. “We were actually talking of sub-nationalism like Assamese, Bengali, Punjabi, etc” “The liberal federal system of India permitted full scope for the “flowering and flourishing of sub-nationalism which is a multi-dimensional phenomenon”. This view however clashed with the “nationalism” of the Phizo variety. He spoke of Naga nationalism as the dividing line rather than the cementing factor in the Indian context. He did not enter into a public debate on the issue. He had declared that “the Mongoloid races and the inheritors of the Ramayana, Mahabharata tradition were destined to sit at separate tables”. The Naga insurgency was fuelled and sustained by deep seated fears of the Indian specially the Hindu psyche.

The Japanese invasion also gave Nagas ideas. “He saw for one thing that the armies of the govt. were not always invincible. The Nagas also played a conspicuous
part in assisting the British army to repel Japanese invader. They were beginning to feel their strength and to think in terms now, of helping themselves for a change. They had not made sacrifices in life and properties, for the British, to be lorded over by anybody else. For preference they would wish to run their own affairs, and if there had to be a link with India, they would prefer it should be with Delhi. Delhi was far away and there was less likelihood of interference in their internal affairs from the remote rule of Delhi than from irredentist Assam”.

3.3.6 Machinations of Missionaries

If the foetus of insurgency was planted in the womb of Nagaland, it was fathered by the British and Midwifery was provided by the Missionaries at its delivery. Certain Christian missionaries had provided the intellectual and political direction to the movement. Rev. Michael Scott one of the mentors of A.Z. Phizo in the initial stages later became his host and representative in the discussions on ensuring peace in Nagaland but in between he changed tack became a spokesmen for the UG and even attempted to raise the issue in the U.N. As a result, he had to be ejected out from India. The Baptist Missionaries had entered Nagaland even before the Sepoy Mutiny and converted some Ao Nagas into Christianity. The real proselytisation however started in 1870s when an enthusiastic missionary by name Rev. Clerk made his entry into Nagaland. By early 19th century nearly 60% of the Nagas were converted. The missionaries brought the Nagas under the portals of the Church and turned them into disciplined citizens and took care not to change traditional customs but ensured that everything functioned under the canopy of Christianity. Slowly a sea change was effected without even the Nagas knowing it. Nagas went to the extent of crying “Nagaland for Christ” as if Christianity was confined only to Nagaland.

Englishmen were rulers and they knew where the shoe pinched. To achieve the feat in Nagaland Englishmen did not spend any money. In fact, the expenses in connection with spread of Christianity were borne by the Nagas themselves suo-moto. Nagaland was otherwise rich in forest products like several fibres, oak, sal, dyes, poultry,
piggery etc. Yet Englishmen did not exploit it. Oil seepage were there but were not explored. North East is a field of black gold (coal) but not explored. The British could get what they wanted without Nagas being a burden on the exchequer. Nagas had a golden mind but the Indian miners did not extract the raw gold and refine it to make it glitter.

Missionaries taught the Nagas to look to the West and not to India for inspiration and seeds of separation were sowed more by the missionaries. These missionaries had indeed "devoted their entire lives at tremendous personal sacrifice to service among the tribal people. It should not cause surprise therefore if the tribal people are found, even today, to look to the missionaries for advice and guidance. The missionaries have through generations of dedicated service earned their confidence. There is no reason why others should not enjoy their confidence in equal measure, but they will have to earn it too, and in the same way by dedicated service. The financing of development plans, however grandiose, a show of military strength, however, impressive does not earn peoples confidence. It is often the imponderables that count the more".

Those who know the work of the Christian Missionaries from close quarters would not disbelieve that they were not behind Naga insurgency While praising the missionaries for their good work, even Nehru had remarked that "politically speaking they did not particularly like the change in India. When a new political awareness dawned on India there was a movement in North Eastern India to encourage the people to form separate and independent States".

"The theme of a "Christian Nagaland" or a "Nagaland for Christ" or a "Christian Democracy" or the "First Christian State in Asia" underlined the deep religious conviction of the hill tribes (not merely Nagas). It is equally apparent that the tribes were influenced by the foreign missionaries who created a bias against the plains men (synonymous with the Hindus) with his gods and goddesses, idolatrous worship and taboos. The bias did come about as a matter of policy, it was unavoidable".

45
When the insurgency began the hostiles were highly successful in getting the help of the church. Many pastors took active part in the movement, though in some cases the church had suspended them. The Naga Army had ordered that every company should have a pastor and every marching song carried a Christian motif. An order by the Chief of the Naga Army stated that “God ought to be included in every practical field of Nagas and therefore as many pastors as possible should be appointed to prepare the war affairs”. Services were regularly held in various hideouts and there were propaganda that “since Nagaland was to be the first completely Christian State in Asia (today Churches in Nagaland are placarded with posters saying Nagaland for Christ) it was the duty of Christians to fight the ‘Hindu Government’ in order to preserve their religion”.

Some of the leading pastors like Kenneth Kerhu, Longri Ao etc. took action to undo the damage and many withdrew from it. Unfortunately however the S.F had destroyed some churches as the hostiles were staying in them but it had provided funds to reconstruct such churches.

The negative side though bad in itself the Christian missionaries had played a great role in the field of education. The church introduced the Roman Script for local language and got introduced English as the State language. They were a party to peace accord also. But yet one would agree with Van Furer – Haimendorf the famous anthropologist. He stated that “It is a pity that the American Baptist Mission had little sympathy with the aims of the Govt. and even less appreciation for the valuable elements of Naga culture. Many of its aspects conflicts in no way with some of the old feasts and ceremonies – certainly at the agricultural festival – could have been adopted to the new faith – given a new meaning and retained by the Christian Council. Where the Ao prays to a supreme deity who sends him happiness and misfortune and watches over the doings of men an appropriate Christian prayer might have been substituted and there seems to be no reason why at the first sowing or at harvest the Ao Christian should not pray for the prosperity of his crops. No one will question the good faith and admirable enthusiasm of the missionaries. They were doing great work in the medical field and have made thousands of Naga children literate. But may be that with a little more understanding and
sympathy for Naga culture they might have brought more happiness to their flock and avoided many of the more unfortunate results of a sudden clash of culture”.

3.3.7 British Policy of divide and rule

In Indian history Lord Canning was known for introducing the infamous “divide and rule” policy after having learnt a bitter lesson from the 1857 Sepoy mutiny. He brought the policy to make the Indians fight among themselves by favouring some to the distress of the other. He saw that the native govt.s provided the low-pressure points for the storm of 1857 which was to have swept the British edifice in one great wave. He visualized that only a divided India could permit the continuous British rule. He could create a protective wall to the rule of Britain through the Princes, Rajas, Nawabs, Sahebs, etc. and the aspirations of the people. Indians came to be known as British Indians and Indian Indians, and religious and caste differences were highlighted and strengthened. Indians were made to look down upon Indians. Recruitment to Army was restricted to martial races to the exclusion of others so that class-consciousness got into the Indian bloodstream. As a follow up subsequently Indian territories were made buffer zones, backward tracts, excluded areas, inner-line territories and tribal areas etc. and their residents were not allowed to join the mainstream. Only selected officers were posted to administer them. Unfortunately these policies were followed even after independence and perpetuated. Nagaland was brought under Inner-Line in 1873. In 1919 it was made a backward tract. In 1929 it was made an ‘excluded area’. In 1945 it was brought under the Naga Hills District Council (NHDC) with even financial powers. By this process the concept of an independent Naga Nation got idealized in the minds of the Nagas. The discussion in the House of Commons on the Naga issue while debating the Govt. of India Act of 1935 clearly highlighted the attitude of the Englishmen towards India. “Far from being of immediate benefit to the primitive tribes, the establishment of British rule in India did most of them much more harm than good”.

3.3.8 Impact of World Wars

There were enough reasons for the British to side with the Nagas. The relationship was borne out of mutual respect as the Nagas had always felt that it was only
the British who had defeated them and therefore with the British rule ending they were independent. The Nagas had also contributed much to the British cause during the two world wars.

The first world war had not much impact on the Nagas. Even then a 2200 strong labour force of Nagas was sent to France. The volunteers came from following tribes:-

1. Semas – 1000
2. Lothas – 400
3. Aos – 200
4. Rengmas – 200
5. Changs and others – 200

By the time second world war came much water had flown through the Dikhu river and the relationship between the British and the Nagas had grown and solidified into unbreakable bondage. The war had a devastating effect on the Nagas. The Japanese had reached Kohima, the heart of Nagaland and fought with the allied forces a bitter battle. This battle came to be known as the famous “battle of Tennis Court”. The Japanese after over-running the allied garrison defences around Imphal (Manipur) made their further advance in three columns through thick jungles and encircled Kohima town except the hill features overlooking the highway leading to Dimapur, the rail head being their next destination. On this hillock was located the Bungalow of the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, which had a Tennis Court.

It was here that a handful of the Allied Troops of the Kohima Garrison decided to dig in and give the final battle to the finish to the much superior Japanese forces outnumbering the defenders. While on the one side of the Tennis Court were the trenches of the British troops on the other were those of the Japanese. For three weeks this tennis court witnessed some of the bloodiest fighting of the Burmese campaign. With the two groups lobbing hand grenades at each other day and night but refusing to surrender an inch of land till siege was lifted by the reinforcements brought in through the jungle
tracks around the Khonoma village (village where Phizo was born) moving across some of the thickest jungle countryside. Only the locals knew the routes to some of the caves in some of the most difficult mountainous terrains. "It was a battle of grit, wits and dogged determination which proved the turning point in the second world war since it was from here the imperial Japanese forces rolled back" and the allied forces clinched the war. Had it not been for the valiant Nagas the allied forces would have faced serious difficulties. On the other hand, if the Nagas had sided with Japanese the result should have been definitely different particularly because Phizo was then a friend of the Japanese and was sojourning in Burma.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim in his book ‘Defeat into Victory’ paid a fine tribute to them. According to him "the gallant Nagas loyalty even in the most depressing times of the invasion had never faltered. Despite floggings, torture, execution and the burning of their villages they refused to aid the Japanese in any way or to betray our troops. Their active help to us was beyond value or praise. They guided our columns, collected information, ambushed enemy patrols, carried out supplies and brought in our wounded under heaviest fire – and then being the gentlemen they were, often refused all payment”. He concluded "many a British India soldier owed his life to them and no soldier of the 14th Army who met them will ever think of them but with admiration and affection".

The relationship between the British and the Nagas was bonded by blood and that too in war. Their mutual adoration and respect had stood the test of time.

In the tennis court is located one of the prettiest and best-maintained war cemeteries in the entire East. Their only ‘prize’ are beautifully inscribed words at the gate of the cemetery which immortalized the bond:

“When you go home
Tell them of us and say
For your tomorrow
We gave our today"
Nagas were proud to copy the British and live by what was taught by them. The British had commanded respect by sheer display of valour without being harsh, extended love without being stingy, respected Nagas as they respected themselves for their qualities. In this scenario Indian mainlanders were no match who imposed their authority on them with impunity committed atrocities on them and derived pleasure and then blamed them and above all injected them with the virus of corruption which once for all spoiled the fine Naga society. It was no surprise that the Nagas looked to the West for inspiration and guidance.

3.3.9 Availability of Weapons

If the Nagas had sided with the British during 2nd world war and most of them did not demand payments for their services they were rewarded by issue of guns and almost all those who had participated had received the trophy. In addition great dumps of arms and ammunition were left behind by the Japanese after the 2nd world war most of which the nagas had hidden. When they became politically motivated to fight India they started procuring arms from across the border from Burma also. It was no longer a question of villager’s spears and daos versus the Army’s firepower. “With political motivation there was all the making of a guerilla insurgency on virtually equal terms in the jungle”. The insurgents had procured arms and ammunitions from Manipur also. It was also captured in raids on police stations in far-flung areas. The Konyak Nagas had long been manufacturing guns in their smithies and two-three inch mortars were manufactured so that captured three-inch ammunition could be used. When insurgency began the rebels forcibly took away all guns available with the villagers and those who refused were beheaded in the old head hunting fashion. After 1970 Naga gangs started visiting China for training. On their return the gangs brought home quantities of arms and ammunition depending on their capacity to carry. Slowly sources of arms supplies were spread out and it got extended to Thailand and Malaysia. Today Cox Bazar in Bangladesh provided all varieties of weapons for a price and there was no dearth of weapons. Nagaland was also being flooded with small arms through various channels.
3.3.10 Propaganda

In conditioning the reflexes and anatomy of revolt Phizo as an individual played the key role. For him everything was grist to the mill. The ground was fertile for planting his style of fake propaganda which the simple minded Nagas mostly unexposed to education and incapable of separating chaff from the paddy, blindly believed.

Since known times Naga Hills were run on a democratic basis in accordance with the village public opinion. The village elder’s council controlled usually by chiefs administered the villagers and took decisions which were implemented. The British did not tamper with them. The Nagas practiced the traditional customary law which was effective. To this scenario Phizo descended with a vision of an independent Nagaland when British left which swept them off their feet. The method used was simple false propaganda which none dared to challenge for such was his modus operandi. He undertook long journeys through the jungles as if the future of Nagaland rested on his shoulders. When the British were to leave he did not want Nagaland to remain under India. In fact Naga insurgency was fuelled only by a deep-seated fear of the Indian, specifically the ‘Hindu Psycho’. According to Lieutenant General (Retd) Vaz, ‘the overwhelming sense of isolation, neglect and the fear of being swamped led to the insurrections which were not strictly anti-colonial or wholly communist inspired, they were essentially secessionist, caused by deep seated conflicts between the tribal ethos and modernizing forces’.

Till end of 1955 the NNC headed by Phizo had an expert publicity department under the able hand of T Sakhrie, Secretary of NNC. After his brutal killing, the reigns were taken over by others but the real work was done by Sakhrie. The publicity department at first tickled the chord of deep-rooted natural Naga love for free and uncontrolled life. It was the time when Tuensang area was brought under the administration. It was therefore not difficult to rouse the people. The word “independence” was too strong a heady brew for the Naga mind which they enjoyed
undisturbed. That it was going to be lost if the Nagas did not fight unified them more than ever before. A charmingly beautiful picture removed from reality was presented. The NNC method of propaganda took a similar pattern in Nagaland. It ran “true we are a peculiar people. We are all equals. Men and women have equal social status. We have no caste distinctions, no high or low class people. There is no communal feeling neither are there religious differences to disturb our harmony with our conditions. There is no minority problem. We believe in that form of democratic government which permit the rule not of the majority but of the people as a whole. We govern ourselves by a government which does not govern at all.

In the life of the village the family is a permanent living institution, a conscious unit in the national polity. Every family is proud of its own, no family has ever been left by their fellowmen to the mercy of circumstances. Possessing its own house built on its own land no family ever pays any tax. Forests and woodlands, rivers belong to the people for their exploitation without paying taxes. We cultivate as much land as we need or desire and there is no one to question our rights. We have food to eat and drink to drink exceedingly above our needs. Truly god has been good to us. Three square meals a day and ‘Zu’ (rice bear) without measure. We have no beggars.

Every family lives in its village in its own right. It has no landlords to harass it and no revenue collectors to knock on its door, for the family is the master of its own affairs.

And wonder of wonders we have no jail. We do not arrest nor ever imprison anyone. Our civil authority is god in the matter of life and death. And murder is very rare.

We fear nobody, individually or collectively. We are a healthy people and fear corrupts the health of man. What peace we have, no police and no CID. We use no locks, no guard is ever needed for there is no one to steal from them. We travel as we like and it costs nothing. Wherever we go it is our home. If by ill-fortune man falls sick or dies he is borne home to his family without counting the cost.
We talk freely, live freely and often fight freely too. We have no inhibitions of any kind. Wild? Yes, but free. There is order in the chaos; law in this freedom. If I were to chose a country it would be Nagaland, my fair Nagaland again and again”.

The propaganda laid much stress on the subject of taxation and had issued a booklet on the topic in 1953. It stated “in the plains unlike our Naga country land belongs to the State and the people are to pay taxes for land, for house sites and buildings too, for fisheries and even for forest products. They have a water tax, latrine tax, entertainment tax, and road tax. Everything has to be paid if they want to live in this world. We Nagas pay no tax. We have fisheries over 400 miles of river in which the people catch fish throughout the year paying nothing”. It warned “that the Govt. of India would soon be taxing their land, livestock and income and that the former happy state of affairs would soon disappear”.

In advanced areas NNC played upon religion of Christianity stating that the “Hindu govt.” would soon put an end to Christianity and would force Nagas to become Hindus”. As a result many who were ignorant about religious freedom in India got alarmed and joined the UGs.

Nagas being fond of beef it was told that India would stop their beef eating and their rice beer would also be stopped through prohibition even though the VIth schedule was clear that it would not be interfered with.

In Konyak area the village chiefs were told that their powers would be taken away. Being hereditary and were venerated by the villagers this propaganda set villages of Tuensang and Mon districts dead against the Indian govt.

The rebels also played with the activities of the S.F. It was propagated that the Govt. of India “had introduced their Indian armed forces to rape Naga women whenever and wherever possible”. In fact during S.F. operations when some churches were
destroyed for sheltering UGs the propaganda of NNC was proved correct which confirmed their suspicion. The propaganda was repeated year after year with systematic regularity and it took years for Nagas to realize the truth when they termed it “as un-Naga as they were borne warriors and we know that when we go to fight we are likely to get hurt. If we are, a true Naga will not whine about it” a typical Naga comment indeed. The reaction of the Central Govt. was that Nagaland was an integral part of India and had considered the future of Nagaland with “great sympathy”. It also made efforts to broadcast special services on Sundays in English and many languages with hymns, psalms and readings from the Bible so that there should be no doubt in anybody’s mind about India being in reality a secular State as enjoined in her constitution with freedom for all to practice the religion they chose.

The govt. however suffered from serious handicaps. “Barring a few officers of the Assam cadre the post independence recruits had a little or no experience of tribal administration particularly in the Naga Hills. The British policy of keeping Nagaland in Purdah was largely responsible for the criminal neglect of their socio-economic advancement. Phizo’s revivalist movement applied break on impetuous change but the awareness of political power among the Nagas had taken a virulent form and the security forces were entrusted with counter insurgency operations”.

While this was so the general impression given about Nagaland situation was that the demand for “independent sovereign Naga State was raised by a few handful leaders mostly Christians”. Assam Tribune dated 3.12.1953 published the following “Assam Chief Ministers’ warning to the simple minded Nagas”…. I cannot think of any demand for independent sovereign Naga State raised by a few handful leaders mostly Christians. And probably this demand was raised by interested foreign missionaries to keep them isolated from the rest of India. The British administration also during the pre-independence days were greatly responsible for giving this idea of independence among a handful of Naga leaders under the influence of foreign missionaries”. In the Hindustan standard of same date the then Chief Minister stated “A strong policy was called for. The Nagas should be told plainly that the government was not going to budge an inch from its
policy and the demand for independent Nagaland would never be conceded. I would not see any deputation sponsored by the Naga National Council to discuss anything."

The statement of the then Chief Minister (Bishnuram Medhi) had apparently indicated the height of political naivety and administrative incompetence to correctly gauge the situation then obtaining in Nagaland as by 1953 Phizo was in full command of the situation and no agency could do anything. Barely two years later (22.3.1956) the NFG was formed. A report on Army deployment then stated "There was nearly one security troop for every adult male Naga in the Naga Hills Tuenseng area (the worst affected) but there was never a time when it could be claimed that the Naga guerillas had been broken into submission. They (Nagas) had few odd varieties of arms, muzzleloaders for example. They suffered terrible privations and casualties but did not give in" This was typical of the Naga indefatigable spirit.

By 1953 the Indian Frontier Administrative Service was constituted. "The officers were conscientious, earnest and competent but there were not many among them who would happily reconcile themselves to a protracted tenure of 5 or more years in a single dist. New and alluring openings were in the offing all over the country and they felt entitled to have their share of the spoils. The service was losing its esprit de corps as a team of frontier officers". Perhaps this had much more to do with the deteriorating situation in Nagaland.

3.3.11 Geography

Geographic location played a crucial role in any insurgency. A place with mountain ranges and thick jungles offered one of the best places for a guerilla. No better place can be there on earth than Nagaland for an insurgent. The whole of Nagaland except in the North is covered with continuous mountain ranges that have steep slopes and waterfalls. The serrated ridges, valleys, spurs and reentrants gave rise to numerous springs, rivulets and streams that formed rivers like Dhansiri, Diyang, Dikhu, Disai and Tijit which joined the Brahmaputra. The river Tizu and its tributaries however joined the
Chindwin by flowing east. The unending forests usually restricted visibility severely and at higher altitudes with fog the situation was worse. The Naga guerillas knew the hills and tracks as his backyard. Two major difficulties were faced by an outsider. (1) the lay out of the area, and (2) no outsider could move in the area without the knowledge of the villagers as the tracks led the way to the villages only.

The Barail range of mountains entered Nagaland in the west and attained a height of 3048 meters at Japvo in south of Kohima. The Arakan Yoma separated Nagaland from Manipur in south which ultimately ended in the valley of Imphal. In the east come the Patkai ranges with the highest hill Saramati which separated Nagaland from Burma.

The Naga tribes usually had their habitats on mountaintops and were expert climbers. The guerillas invariably preferred river to jungle routes to avoid detection.

The border areas of Nagaland both national and international were not properly demarcated and it was open to question whether even the local officials had ever ventured to visit all the areas in their respective jurisdictions as only the committed and adventurous would have dared to. The undemarcated boundaries were a bone of contention with neighbouring States and Myanmar. The mountain ranges extend to the Myanmar area which made matters easy for the insurgents.

Added to this advantage for the guerillas were the settlements of ethnic relations across the border in Myanmar extending to long distances of mountain ranges.

Guerilla fighting was an inborn habit of a Naga. Every youth had to learn the arts of warfare right from childhood as he anticipated head hunting forays by other neighbouring tribals at any time. Therefore when insurgency started the initial advantage had gone to the Nagas.

To suit the natural setting there also existed an in-built system of administration in which the relationship was man to man. This system laid importance on customary and
democratic values and had political, executive and judicial arms under a chief. The villages were divided into ‘Khels’ each with a Gaon Bura. The villages had also a Head Goanbura. After the British came it adopted a system of Dobashi and Head Dobashi who had even judicial powers. Each village came under a village council. In konyak area there was a system of ‘Ahng’ whose authority was never questioned. Clan/tribal loyalty ran deep which was one reason why insurgency persisted.

### 3.3.12 Failure of Central Govt.

The Central Govt. had gone awry in squarely dealing with the developing insurgency situation in Nagaland from the start which ipso-facto culminated in unending crisis. While the avowed objectives of the policies and programmes meant for preserving, protecting and developing tribal traditions customs and culture in the hill areas in their pristine form were highly laudable the outcome proved that there was wide gap between the cup and the lip. Had it not been for the machinations of a lone individual in Angami Zapu Phizo who could not be neutralized initially the Nagas should have waded through the right course and Nagaland should have been even the harbinger of peace and prosperity in the North Eastern region. In spite of the fact that the leaders of India immediately after independence were highly able and were genuinely interested in seeing Nagaland develop in its own way Nagaland was destined not to savour such most favoured treatment but go for a blood bath pulling along with all other six sisters as the subsequent events had amply proved. To quote Murkot Ramunny “an able and exuberant commissioner” of yesteryears in Nagaland who had a share in evolving policies for the North Eastern region “The Nagas were persuaded by an unscrupulous energetic leader to believe that their traditions, culture and system of land ownership would be destroyed. They would be taxed. They would lose their way of life under the new independent Indian Govt. On the other hand they had their own younger leaders who realised that this was not true and led the people to statehood through peaceful negotiations. The culture, traditions and land ownership were protected by the Constitution”.
In fact the Central Govt. was then more interested in Kashmir problem then and
Nagaland being remotely located was also remotely placed in the priority list. "The
tragedy was that the Naga problem did not exercise the public mind as Kashmir did.
Gundevia (ICS) recalls complaining to the veteran parliamentarian H.N. Kunzuru about
the lack of priority for Nagaland where the situation was becoming ugly and being told
that "no one is going to listen to you as long as they have Kashmir on their hand".

Another factor that had an unsettling effect was inability of the Central leadership
to ensure continuity in implementation of Govt. policies. According to Nari Rustomji,
then advisor to the Governor of Assam "it was unfortunate that during the crucial period
when far reaching decisions were to be taken regarding the future of the Hill areas (of
Assam) there were as many as five changes in the office of the Governor and almost as
many in the office of the Secretary responsible to the Assam govt. for the administration
of the Hill dist. There could be little continuity or consistency of policy and there was a
tendency to allow things to drift in the fond hope that they would solve themselves rather
than risk taking any radical action". If this was the case then the situation had only
deteriorated further in subsequent years.

There was another school of thought then, a very strong one at that, that the Govt.
of India was "too soft" in the handling of the Naga situation. "A little more action by the
Army and Air Force" and a little less talk by "Sympathizers" would have brought
everything right quickly. In Nagaland however it was more a psychological problem and
Army had to face stiff resistance from the Nagas. Solution to Naga problem was to have
been found not in a surgeon's knife but in a loving approach to the mind and to the heart.
Christianity had won their heart and mind through Christian love which the Army and the
Central Govt. failed to realize. Firmness was of course necessary but the panacea of
psychological approach if properly applied should have won many a heart and crumbled
the edifice of insurgency like a house of cards.

In general, there was no appreciation of low level conflicts such as breakdown of
law and order in a State and high level developments such as insurgencies at Central
Govt. level. Threats from Pakistan, etc. were better appreciated and National Security planned. Both Central and State Govts. however started actions when matters reached a stage but that too as a fire fighting exercise without concrete planning by concerned offices. A review of the actions taken in Nagaland would prove that the initial action in Nagaland was taken in a casual manner but slowly the tempo picked up. Initially the State police was reinforced by police from other States. When they were found insufficient, either "extra units were raised or Central forces rushed. In the additional S.F. units raised moles of insurgents usually got recruited which compromised the moves for controlling insurgency. Army was called only when insurgents were fully established. When situation went fully out of control the usual measure was imposition of President’s rule. Even then basic problems were left untouched and if at all touched there was no sincerity of purpose in solving the problem in its entirety.

The State insurgent groups had come to the definite conclusion that insurgency paid. Allotment of more funds once insurgency started had set a bad precedence. The Centre treated such States as a special category indirectly prompting other States to do the same. No doubt the North Eastern region was underdeveloped and required help but with corruption rampant insurgency had come to be the money spinner for unscrupulous elements.

"The situation has been wrongly handled by successive Indian Govt. mainly because of failure to appreciate the facts and take effective steps in the right time. National leaders have been too distant and unaware of realities. The complexity and intensity of feelings in major issues have not been understood. Adhoc reactions, lack of an overall policy and joint strategy and planning led to complex problems being tackled piece meal as law and order situations. People took to arms when their demands were not even understood”.

The inertness of the Central Govt. was aptly explained by Murkot Ramunny, once an administrator in Nagaland, “The experience of the first armed insurgency shows that for about 17 years since the violent activities of the Naga National Council there had
been no way of convicting those who indulged in organized violence in pursuance of secessionist policies. The Nagas had their own underground Govt. with a well-defined hierarchy from President to sub-divisional officer. They had their armed wing. They had Generals and all the ranks that go with a regular army. They had their political set up too.

When they were captured in uniform the only punishment that could be given was two to three years imprisonment under the Arms Act. After completing their prison term they went underground again and carried on from where they had left off. One outstanding example was Mowu Angami who after serving his term went underground and became a “General” of the Naga Army. He later took large groups to China for training. From China he visited many countries. Finally when returning from China with a gang of about 1500 he was captured again.

It is difficult to prove murders, kidnapping, extortion, forcible recruitment etc. by extremists in a court of law. No proper evidence will be available to get them convicted. Reprisal against those who give evidence is very severe and few would risk it. There were many exceptions but they had to be protected. The slightest chance would see them liquidated. The Indian Penal Code has sections (Sec. 12 onwards) which deal with those who “wage war against the State”. But independent India was not prepared to use these sections against any Indian citizen. The prolongation of Naga insurgency for decades was in some ways due to the Government’s incapacity severely to punish those who were arrested and due to years of cessation of operations to help negotiations”.

3.4 Organizations involved in Insurgency

1. Naga National Council (NNC)
2. Naga Federal Government (NFG)
3. Naga Federal Army (NFA)
5. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) (NSCN-K)

60
Since inception of insurgency in Nagaland the Naga National Council (NNC) had been playing a significant role. In April, 1945, C.R. Pawsay the then Deputy Commissioner of Assam established an institution which was called the Naga Hills District Tribal Council (NHDTC) with the aim of uniting the Nagas and repairing some of the damages done during World War-II. In March, 1946 its name was changed into the Naga National Council (NNC). Its aim was to foster the welfare and social aspirations of the Nagas and received official patronage as an unifying and moderating influence. Its original objective was to achieve local autonomy for the hills within the Province of Assam and to train the people for self-government. It encouraged the Tribal Council already in existence to administer their own local affairs and consider possible reforms. It had then published a newspaper by name ‘Naga Nation’ for a few years.

The formation of the NHDTC in fact provided the Nagas a springboard to air their political views which got further accentuated with the conversion of the name as Naga National Council (NNC).

Initially the NNC was not demanding separation from India with the British leaving India but by June 1947 its colour changed and issued an ultimatum that the Naga Hills would cease to be a part of India when independence was attained. From then on the NNC became the lone spokesman for Nagas. It was also the time A.Z. Phizo made his entry into Naga politics and he was the leader of the hawks advocating a no-compromise stand which declared that Nagaland would cease to be part of India from August 14, 1947. It sent a delegation to Delhi “to propose the extreme view” and the result was the 9-point agreement signed between NNC and the then Governor of Assam Sir Akbor Hydari. Clause-9 of the agreement however became a bone of contention and the hawks rejected it.

By 1950 the group led by A.Z. Phizo gained control of the NNC as he became its President and steered it in the way he wanted. It was Phizo who did everything in the
name of NNC. Seeing the development some right thinking members left the NNC while some others joined the govt. Since govt. officials could not take part in politics the field was left open for the Phizo group in the NNC and there was no holding them.

It rejected the recommendations of a sub-committee of the Constituent Assembly of Assam which worked out the VIth schedule. It boycotted the subsequent Distt. Council elections (1951) as also the General elections held in 1952, in which no Naga exercised his right of voting, even though the government had gone through the whole election procedure. In the 1957 elections three Nagas filed nominations but no voting was held and they were elected and NNC achieved one victory after another.

In 1951 Phizo under the auspices of the NNC conducted a plebiscite and declared that 99% of Nagas had voted for independence which proved to be a hoax. Thereafter it gave leadership to civil disobedience. People were made to refuse payment of tax, not to co-operate with govt. forced officials, teachers to resign and children to leave school. No longer labour was given to police and officials nor supplies. The village headmen were made to return their symbol of authority, the red shawls in token of resignation. Nagas boycotted national and official celebrations. None of the programmes however went as planned by the NNC.

NNC had never officially approved a policy of violence. It was Phizo, its President and his supporters who perpetrated it after frustrated by the failure of its programmes of boycott and attempts at negotiation and Phizo’s failure to cross the borders to seek support of foreign powers. This group toyed with the idea of armed uprising and thus was born the Naga Federal Government (NFG)

3.4.2 Naga Federal Government (NFG)/Naga Federal Army (NFA)

The Naga Federal Govt. like the NNC had to pass through renamings. In September, 1954 during his tours of the Tuemang Frontier Division Phizo announced the formation of the Hongkin Government. It was called ‘Peoples Sovereign Republic of Free Nagaland’. Hongkin was declared head of State. Hongkin was presumed to be none.
other than Phizo himself. On March, 22, 1956 the Hongkin Govt. was substituted by the Naga Central Govt. A document issued on the occasion declared Nagaland to be a sovereign republic and it was claimed that “this had been so from time immemorial”.

During 1954 Phizo had organized armed gangs in Tuensang Area with help of one Thungti Chang and let loose a reign of terror, arson, looting, murder etc. from end of 1954. Many loyal Govt. servants and villagers were murdered. Among them was T. Sakhrrie who should have replaced Phizo as NNC President. The situation having gone beyond control Army operations started from April, 1956. On March, 22, 1956 the armed gangs formed under Thungti Chang was converted as Naga Home Guards (NHG) with Thungti Chang as the Chief. Earlier on March, 4, 1956 under one Kaito Sema Nag Safe Guards (NSG) was formed and he was made the Commander in Chief with a war executive under him. The formation of two parallel organizations led to a tussle. Phizo took side of Thungti Chang which antagonized Kaito Sema. As a result, the Seams stayed away from raids. Seeing the position Kaito resigned but this was not accepted. Ultimately Kaito threatened to surrender with all his NSGs. The pressure tactics worked and he was made Chief of NSG and NHG which subsequently came to known as National Country Guards (NCGs). This curse of split had been haunting the armed wing of UG movement since then. Kaito considered himself equal to Phizo which led to Kaito being branded as a dissident and subsequently he had to pay with his life.

In March, 1957 the old name National Home Guards was given to the Armed Wing. On January, 3, 1964 the armed wing was further reorganized and christened as Naga Federal Army (NFA). Kaito Sema was appointed Keya Kilonser (Defence Minister) and another person by name Mowu Angami as the Chief of Naga Army.

The Naga Central Govt. was placed on a firmer footing at a meeting (Sanis/Lotha area/July 13th, 1956) which was attended by representatives of all tribes. Khriesanisa Angami was elected as the President at this meeting. Besides it also appointed Ministers (Kilousers), Members of Parliament (Tartars) Governors (Ahngs) etc. Later, on October, 6, 1959 the Naga Central Govt. was renamed as the Naga Federal Government (NFG)
with Scato Swu taking over as President (Kedahge). Under the NFG there were separate wings for the youth known as Naga Youth Movement (NYM) and for women, known as the Naga Women’s Society (NWS). Members of NYM acted as couriers, raised subscriptions, constructed camps and collected information about the movement and deployment of Security Forces. The NWS acted as cooks/nurses, tailors and attended to recreation activities.


Touching on religion it mentioned that Protestant Christianity and Naga religion were recognized religions in Nagaland. According to it only the NNC shall be the recognized political institution in Nagaland. It was stated that “having our attachment to the truth of popular sovereignty as declared on March, 22, 1956 and in articles in the provisional Yehzabo of 1962, and following the amended Yehzabo of 1968 to establish national institutions based on the common ideals of democracy, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity among the people composing it.

Do hereby adopt our National Assembly the (Amended) Yehzabo of Nagaland this sixth March in the year of one thousand nineteen hundred and seventy one” (copy of Yazhabo – constitution enclosed - Annexure-F).

With insurgency taking a violent turn that also against the Nagas themselves who were asked to pay taxes, clothes, etc. often at gun point the earlier charm of the innocent Nagas turned into dismay and disbelief. It was against the spirit of propaganda unleashed
by UG on tax. Churches stopped functioning which created a squall of anger against the UGs. This led to formation of Village Guards (VGs) in villages for protection of their homes. Government acted quickly and issued them muskets, rifles and uniforms and gave them some training. These guards were selected by the chiefs and headmen and they had a large say in controlling them. During the period the action of the Indian Army had also earned praise. "An order issued in 1955 by the Chief of Army staff emphasized this:- "you must remember that all the people of the area in which you are operating are fellow Indians. They may have different religion, they may pursue a different way of life, but they are Indians, and the very fact that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of India’s greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own people and are disrupting the peace of this area. You are to protect the mass of the people from these disruptive elements. You are not there to fight the people in the area but to protect them. You are fighting only those who threaten the people and who are a danger to the lives and properties of the people. You must therefore do everything possible to win their confidence and respect and to help them feel that they belong to India”.

The intensity of the hostile activities can be gauged from the fact that between 1960-61 the number of SF killed were 200 (including officers) and 400 wounded whereas the hostiles had taken 7 years between 1954-61 to reach the figure. “These comparatively low figures indicated not only the tactical disadvantages but also the restraint with which most of the offensive operations were carried out”. Between 1961-1963, 357 kidnappings and murder were also reported. During the period Govt. of India announced a number of concessions which ultimately ended in the granting of Statehood on 1.12.1963 under the State of Nagaland Act, 1963. This act provided safeguards for their religion, legal and social practices. None of these however satisfied the UGs.

To achieve Statehood a lot of behind scene activities were gone into. The killing of T.Sakhrie, Secretary of NNC and a counterweight to Phizo was a turning point from peace point of view. A sort of Naga liberalism came to the fore thereafter and right thinking leaders came forward to openly condemn the hostile movement at great risk to
their lives. Following this a Naga Peace Organizing Committee was formed (1956) and appealed to the people to give up violence. Soon the Church leaders followed suit and they condemned violence and appealed to Christian Nagas to work for peace. From August, 22 to 26, 1957 the Nagas convened an All Tribes Naga Peoples Convention (NPC) at Kohima. It was a unique incident for its representative character. There were 1765 delegates and over 200 visitors representing tribe. The resolutions adopted inter alia included (1) negotiated settlements of the Naga problem and (2) pending a final political solution the Naga Hills Distt. Of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division of NEFA should be constituted into a single administrative unit under the External Ministry. The NPC however, made it clear that theirs was an interim demand and the final political settlement should wait till the extremist leaders joined hands with them in carrying out further negotiations with the Govt. of India.

As per the demand the Naga Hills Tuensang Area, (NHTA), came into being on 1.12.1957 and brought under the External Affairs Ministry. In order to create a proper atmosphere for the new administration to function an amnesty was declared and orders issued to release of convicts and under trial prisoners for offences committed against the State.

A 2nd NPC was held at Ungma, near Mokokchung in May, 1958. It was held in this village because it was from here the civil disobedience had started and it was a known hostile village. Piqued by this the UGs threatened to impose a fine of Rs.50,000/- if the convention was held. In spite of it the convention was held. The achievement of this convention was that it appointed a Drafting Committee to formulate their constitutional demands with a proviso that the govt. should keep the door open for the UG leaders to join if they wanted to.

The Drafting Committee included a former Kilonser (Minister) and a number of former rebel leaders. It prepared a 16 point Memorandum for the constitution of a separate State to be known as Nagaland within the Indian Union (Annexure-E).
A 3rd meeting of NPC was held at Mokokchung in October, 1959. The main demand here was constitution of a separate State within the Indian Union, known as Nagaland, under the Ministry of External Affairs, with a Governor and Administrative Secretariat, a Council of Ministers and an Assembly. Provision was also to be made for village councils, Range Councils and Tribal Councils to deal with matters concerning different tribes and their customary laws etc. A significant resolution was the call for stoppage of all violent activities. “The Naga People Convention further appeals to Naga People in general and the aggrieved families in particular to extend the same general pardon to the underground people coming overground and also we appeal to all underground Nagas to stop all sorts of violent activities from now on”. Following this the Naga State came into being, the decision about which was announced by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 1.8.1960 and the State of Nagaland inaugurated on 1.12.1963. The Naga peace process thus culminated in a happy ending, at least this was what everybody thought. The belief was that the UGs could be prevailed upon and made to come overground. The liberals realized that “The price of peace are more rewarding and abiding than those of friction”. The UGs however, felt piqued by the success achieved by liberals and “took the stand that it was through ‘their’ efforts and the privations suffered by the UGs in fighting against the security forces that Government was considering the conceding of a higher constitutional status to the Naga Hills. They therefore resented any idea of the representatives of the NPC reaping the fruits of what they claimed to be the endeavours of the underground leaders”.

The Govt. of India had for a time vacillated but since the NPC had represented a considerable section of the Naga population decided to go ahead. The UGs had made it clear then that they were not to fall in line with the recommendations of the NPC but would offer resistance to their implementation. Subsequently in April, 1964 came the constitution of a peace mission. The Govt. had faltered on the wrong side. Had it stood ground that the Statehood would be given only after the UGs also agreed and not otherwise and had given a little leeway to them the Naga problem should have ended there not withstanding the attitude of the NPC. By not taking the UGs into confidence, the Govt. of India thus lost the first chance to ensure total peace in Nagaland.
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3.5 Peace Mission

The initiative for this had come from the Naga Baptist Church Council (NBCC) which took the decision at a convention (5000) held at Wokha in February, 1964. A resolution adopted by it and sent to the Govt. of India requested it "to open further avenues for making available the services of Jayaprakash Narayan, Shankar Dev, Bimala Prasad Chalika and the Rev. Michael Scott with the sole object of exploring ways and means for the speedy restoration of peace and normalcy in Nagaland.

The then ruling party of Nagaland the Naga Nationalist Organization welcomed it and constituted a 9-member committee of the Legislative Assembly under the Chief Minister to assist the Church leaders. The NBCC had also requested Phizo in London for his cooperation in the implementation of the resolution. Phizo agreed and sent his host Michael Scott from London as his representative to take part in the peace mission. He arrived at Dimapur on March, 27, 1964. Scott's inclusion was also a mistake as the subsequent events proved.

The Peace Mission consisted of (1) Jayaprakash Narayan (2) B.P. Chalha, then Chief Minister of Assam and one respected by Nagas, and (3) Michael Scott. They held a series of discussions with the UG leaders as a result of which a draft agreement on cessation of hostilities was worked out. Among other things it was postulated that the agreement should be extended to all areas inhabited by Nagas including those in North Cachar Hills, Manipur, the then Tirap Frontier Division and that foreign observers should be associated with the peace talks. The Govt. of India rejected the foreign observer issue and instead desired that the Govt. of Nagaland should be associated. Rev. Scott prevailed upon the UG leaders to accept the amended form.

The Suspension of Operations Agreement (SOA) sometimes wrongly referred to as 'cease-fire' came into effect from midnight of Sept, 5, 1964. This was a significant contribution of the peace mission. Its proposals were considered "not only the fairest but
the only practical" solutions to the Naga problem. The UGs and Govt. of India were brought to the conference table by the peace mission and after doing its task disintegrated over an alleged statement of Jayaprakash Narayan about ‘liquidation of Nagas’, after which he resigned. The role of Rev. Scott had drawn much flak and had been suspect even when he was in Nagaland. It was he who had arranged an El Salvador passport and passage from Zurich to London by dubious means to Phizo. He not only became the host in London but was also championing the cause of Nagas at the behest of Phizo. Rev. Scott’s hand in the murder of T Sakhrie was also doubted. While the peace process was going on, Scott circulated some documents without the knowledge of the other two members which advocated the establishment of a “Naga Peoples Defence and Home Rule Commission” and “Indo-Naga Commission”. Scott also suggested that help of UN or Security Council be sought for “peace keeping operations in Nagaland”. He also subtly hinted that China may intervene “if there was any further massacre in Nagaland”. He also sent a “crime chart” prepared by Phizo and supplemented by himself to many agencies. In a way he played a negative role in the peace process and delayed it. As a result he was deported from the country on May 4, 1966.

The thread of peace parleys was then picked up by Dr. M. Aram who later became a one man Peace Mission. Peace was more or less established in Nagaland by the agreement but there were problems as the UG groups that had been to the then East Pakistan sometime during 1962-1963 were making their way back to Nagaland. Some of them indulged in bombing of trains on Assam – Nagaland border.

Even when this was so peace parleys between the Govt. of India and the NFG which made its nascency in September, 1964 continued unabated. The Govt. of India gave maximum importance to ensuring peace. In the parleys the Govt. of India was represented by Y.D. Gundevia, Foreign Secretary as its leader. The NFG was represented by Isaac Swu, SS Foreign Secretary, the then Chief Minister of Nagaland Shihu Ao, SS Governor Zashie Huire and SS Brig. Thinoselie M. Keyho. It failed to have the desired impact because of lack of mental dexterity of the NFG leaders. During the period of peace parleys the NFG/NFA reorganized themselves and despatched gangs to
East Pakistan/China for training/arms on the ground that there was no restriction on them stipulated in the earlier agreement.

Even then two distinct groups one pro-NFG/NFA and another for peace had emerged in Nagaland. The SF continued their intense activities because of which there were scaling down of NFA activists. During 1969 a China returned gang was also intercepted by the Army which clearly brought out Chinese complicity in Naga affairs. China also announced over Peking Radio that "neither Armed suppression nor political deceptions can curb the development of the armed struggle of the Naga-Mizo and other peoples". The capture of the China returned gang had a demoralizing effect on the NFA. Before it could recover from it, the NFA received another jolt with the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 as it could not get further help from Pakistan. An NFA contingent then lodged there had to surrender before the Indian forces as they were refused a safe place to stay. Angered, the NFA struck by ambushing the convoy of the then Chief Minister Hokishe Sema on Dimpaur-Kohima Highway (8.8.1972) in which his daughter received multiple bullet injuries. This was the last straw and the Govt. Of India retaliated by abrogating (31.8.1972) the suspension of operations agreement signed in September, 1964. Along with it the NNC, NFG and the NFA and all other connected bodies were also declared illegal under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. This was the first time that the Act was used. The adamant stand of the Govt. of India and the realization that the Naga institutions like the NNC in which the Nagas had reposed faith had been declared illegal, made the right thinking Nagas sit up. The NFG through the efforts of A. Aram, and its own volition, therefore agreed to accept the solution to the Naga problem within the frame work of the Indian constitution and thus an Accord between the Govt. of India and the underground organizations was signed at Shillong on 11.11.1975 which came to be known as the Shillong Accord. This was a watershed in Naga UG movement (a copy of the Shillong Accord is enclosed – Anneuxre-G).

3.6 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)

The Shillong Accord split the underground. For the accordists it was not merely a farewell to the arms but gave an opportunity to quit with honour, pick up the threads

70
from where they had left off and rehabilitate themselves. Just about the time a 1000 strong gang of UG which had been to China during 1974 under leadership of Isac Swu and Th Muivah returned to Burmese area when they learnt about signing of the agreement. They could not have chosen a more ‘inflammable’ moment to return. On hearing the news they remained in Burma. There were some purges and killings on tribal lines which further weakened the UGs. However two important developments had then taken place. (1) Muivah and Isac negotiated an agreement with the Eastern Nagas led by Hemi Naga Khaplagn for their survival and a troika came up with Muivah, Isac Swu and Khaplagn (2) they had a tie up with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an insurgent outfit representing an ethnic minority of Myanmar. The Shillong Accordists were also in no mood to explain the ‘compulsions’ behind signing of the Accord even though Isac Swu had written to the then NFG President that a political decision with Govt. of India should wait their return from China. Both Isac and Muivah therefore denounced the Shillong Accord on the ground that it was signed and controlled by Angamis and called it a “Betrayal of Naga People”. Both broke away from the NNC and after about four years of regrouping, reorganization and procurement of arms, formed the outfit styled as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) on 31.1.1980. It took a pro-China stand. It also formed the GPRN (Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Nagaland) with the following as the office bearers.

1. Isac Chishi Swu – Chairman
2. Khaplagn – SS Vice President
3. Th. Muivah – S.S. General Secretary.

In its manifesto (Annexure-H) issued it was stated that “indeed the Naga National Council is spent, it has turned out to be treacherous and reactionary. Any effort to revolutionize it is stifled. It has neglected to carry its solemn national trust through to the end. It has totally failed. The resort being made to ‘peace’ and ‘unity’ is simply a desperate attempt at covering up and making virtue of their obvious treason. We declare the issue is sharp between the reactionary traitors on one side and the revolutionary patriots on the other”.

71
Without taking the name of Phizo the manifesto condemned the leadership of NNC for acting independently of the actual conditions and in total isolation from the people. “No amount of attempts to explain away the aloofness of the leadership on the ground that he was sent out by the people could hold water any longer”. His family, who maintained “an air of hauteur” was criticized for giving “self motivated information”. It preached for ‘socialism’ for salvation of the people for which “dictatorship of the people through a revolutionary organization is indispensable”. It advocated for a religion based on “Nagaland for Christ” (a copy of the Manifesto is enclosed). It was here again that the Govt. of India lost the chance for the second time to bring permanent peace to Nagaland by not waiting to hold discussions with those across the border. The hawks were willing then but wanted only recognition over the accordists. It was in a way greed to enjoy spoils of office on the part of accordists that resulted in the speedy signing of the Shillong Accord.

NSCN organized itself and slowly became a ‘school of insurgency’ with the help of KIA and Karen UGS but failed to get continuous and active help from the Chinese. It had to ward off occasional attacks from the Burmese. Its volunteers often sneaked into Nagaland border areas for collecting essential materials. By 1986 the NSCN was either contacted or on its own took initiative in establishing contact with other militant outfits in the North East right from Arunachal to Tripura and there was an attempt to establish a pan Mongoloid fraternity. NSCN also took initiative in opening up channels of communication with Bangladesh and was successful in establishing a camp and had also reportedly established contact with the ISI. It later set up a command by name “Alee Command” in Bangladesh where training was rendered to recruits.

3.6.1 Split in NSCN (formation of – (1) NSCN(IM) and (2) NSCN(K))

NSCN suffered a major set back when both Muivah and Khablang clashed over an alleged attempt by Isac and Muivah for a sell out to Govt. of India and it split into NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K). Even though the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
and the United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLF) had tried to mediate nothing came out of it and there was a shoot out. Isaac and Muivah escaped into Nagaland and Manipur respectively with a handful of followers. From 1988 onwards therefore three UG groups viz. NSCN(IM), NSCN(K) and NNC/NFG/NFA were working in Nagaland. NSCN(IM) had regrouped both in Nagaland and Manipur well. They had come to operate from within these States. The placement of its battalions, and the area of influence in Nagaland were as follows:

**Table-IV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Name of Brigade/Bn.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>General Hqrs.</td>
<td>Niculand, Nagaland (Kohima Dist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Hanshi Brigade</td>
<td>Hungkoi, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Huthrong Brigade</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Thungho Pongmi Brigade</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>HVT (Hevuto) Bn.</td>
<td>Mokokchung Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>V.P. (Vephutso) Bn.</td>
<td>Kohima Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>JB (Jacob) Bn.</td>
<td>Kohima Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>ZB (Zoseibeito) Bn.</td>
<td>Zunheboto Dist., Nagaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>NP (Nanping) Bn.</td>
<td>Tamenglong, Manipur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>YP Bn.</td>
<td>Wokha Dist., Nagaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>AC (Ashiho Chaomai) Bn.</td>
<td>Ukhrul, Manipur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>STF (Special Task Force)</td>
<td>Genl. Hq. Intanki (Nagaland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Alee Command</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Cobra Command</td>
<td>Special Squad expert in explosives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE NSCN COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AT THE UNPO HEADQUARTERS' AT THE HAGUE.

Th. Muivah, GS (NSCN-IM)  Khodao Yanthan, V.C. (NSCN-IM)  Isac Chishi Swu, Chairman (NSCN-IM)
Each battalion had about 300 men. In addition there were GHQ and Brigade level staff. The total strength was estimated at 3000.

**Weapon holdings of NSCN(IM) in Nagaland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Make</th>
<th>Nos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>10 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>12 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>MMG</td>
<td>20 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>60 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>200 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>AK-56</td>
<td>300 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Sten Carbine/ Sten MK-II</td>
<td>100 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>30 US Carbine</td>
<td>40 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Modified .303 rifle</td>
<td>350 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>M20/9mm pistols/revolvers</td>
<td>160 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>M22 Chinese Assault Rifle</td>
<td>65 Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>M 21 Chinese Semi Automatic</td>
<td>80 Nos.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It also possessed unspecified number of M-16 US Assault rifles, U21 Machine Pistols and also unspecified quantity of explosives including RDX. Its main armoury was believed to be somewhere in Ukhrul district. The Govt. of GPRN remained as it was except that the Vice President Khaplang was replaced by Khodao Yanthan (a Lotha).

3.7 *NSCN (K)*

In Nagaland the NSCN (K) had no brigade but functioned at Battalion level. The following battalions operated in areas noted against each:-
### Table-VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Name of Battalion</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ist Battalion</td>
<td>Noyong/Tekti Area of Myanmar. (Pangmi Naga area opposite Arunachal. It was to shift to Dimapur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>IIrd Battalion</td>
<td>Nyanching (Myanmar) Burmese Konyak area opposite Mon Dist. Was to shift to Peren area for covering Athibung circle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>IIIrd Battalion</td>
<td>Tuensang covers Tuensang dist. including Tobu circle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>IVth Battalion</td>
<td>Mon covers Mon district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>V Battalion</td>
<td>Mokokchung – Mokokchung and Zunhaboto dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>VI Battalion</td>
<td>Jotsoma – Covers Kohima dist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each battalion strength varied between 150-300 men depending on the locality.

**Weapon holding of NSCN(K)**

### Table-VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Make</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>G2/3/4 Rifles</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>M 16/21/22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Sten Gun/Sten Carbine</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>W/T Set</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>.303 rifle</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>9mm/M20 pistol</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.38 Revolvers</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NSCN(K)'s main stock of arms was believed to be in Myanmar at Chalam where its headquarters was based.

The split in NSCN in 1988 and the subsequent regrouping by NSCN(IM) indicated that the NSCN(IM) was able to increase its strength much more than the old NSCN which had given the NSCN(K) reasons for worry. Even though it attempted to penetrate strong holds of NSCN(IM) it had to make a hasty retreat in the face of NSCN(IM) opposition.

The first clash between the two had taken place at Pangti village in Wokha dist. of Nagaland on 14.2.1993 when NSCN (IM) attacked (K) group and killed one cadre. The 2nd clash was at Zunheboto) when many cadres on both sides were killed. What ignited the trouble was switching over of loyalty by an NSCN(IM) commander to the NSCN(K). Earlier in July, 93 the NSCN(K) had launched an operation code named “operation mid thunder” against the NSCN(IM) which was the worst ever clash between them. In this clash the NSCN(K) men attacked a camp of NSCN (IM) at Ngmozubo in Zunheboto dist. and freed men of a particular tribe.

A comparative statement of area of influence strength and the tribe-wise support base of NSCN(IM) and (K) and the NFG/NFA are given below:-

**Table - VIII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name of Dist.</th>
<th>NSCN(IM) Strength/Tribe</th>
<th>NSCN(K) Strength/Tribe</th>
<th>NFG/NFA Strength/Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mokokchung Dist.</td>
<td>150 Aos</td>
<td>35- (Aos)</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wokha Dist.</td>
<td>200 Lotha</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kohima Dist.</td>
<td>320 -Rengma, Zeliang</td>
<td>180 (Angamis)</td>
<td>200(Angamis)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Zunheboto Dist.</th>
<th>400 Semas</th>
<th>150 Semas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Phok Dist.</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20 – Chakhesang,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pochury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>400 – Chakhesang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tuensang Dist</td>
<td>400 Ti</td>
<td>900 Phom,</td>
<td>500 Khemungan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>kirs,</td>
<td>Yimchunger,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sangtam, Phom,</td>
<td>Sangtam, Chang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chang,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khemungan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mon Dist.</td>
<td>20 Konyaks</td>
<td>1000 Konyaks</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that the NSCN (IM) is spread out in all the district but is weak in Mon district where the NSCN(K) has good strength.

**3.8 NFG/NFA**

The Naga insurgency was planned and executed by the NNC under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo. With the signing of the Shillong Accord the section led by Th. Muivah and Isac denounced it. Even though the overground leaders tried to perpetuate NNC hegemony its voice got trailed off to a whimper subsequently.

The Naga National Council (NNC) had formed the Civil Wing known as the Naga Federal Govt. (NFG) and an armed wing viz. Naga Federal Army (NFA).

The NFA was organized into seven brigades in late sixties and early seventies and consisted of three battalions per brigade. Each battalion had four companies with 140 men. Presently the NFG/NFA existed only on paper and were defunct except in areas mentioned in Table-VIII above where occasionally they made their presence felt. From insurgent point the NSCN (IM) and (K) groups were strong.
**Weapon holding of NFA**

*Table IX*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Make</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>AK-47/56</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>SLR</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Semi automatic rifle</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Sten Gun</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>US Carbine</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Pistol/Revolver</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>U 21 Machine Pistol</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SBBL/DBBL Gun</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the departure of A.Z. Phizo the NNC was literally orphaned as none of his followers had the capacity or charisma to take the organization forward. Late Zashie Huire who became president of NNC unilaterally abrogated the Shillong Accord in April, 1976. After his death Shingia Khemungan became President. Miss. Adino Phizo, daughter of Phizo who lived in London with her father was made permanent President of NNC. Its bases were essentially confined to districts of Phek, Kohima and Tuensang only. There were clashes both at armed and ideological level between the NNC and NSCN(IM). NNC/NFG/NFA had also indulged in extortion, robbery and forcible collection of taxes. The NFG/NFA’s fighting power was however very limited as they did not possess sophisticated weapons.

A.Z. Phizo died in exile in London on 30.4.1990 after which Adino Phizo returned and took over NNC Presidentship. There was opposition to her becoming President and this group made Khodao Yanthan as the President of the NNC on his return from London where he was also staying with Phizo.
3.9 Relationship with similar organizations within the State/Outside

3.9.1 NSCN(IM)

It had established its bases in big cities of India like Shillong, Guwahati, Calcutta, Gangtok, Darjeeling, Bangalore, and Delhi for sheltering and hiding top leaders. It had close links with ULFA/NDFB of Assam and UNLF/PLA of Manipur, ATTF/NLFT of Tripura. It also had close links with revolutionary organizations of Myanmar like Arakan Liberation party, Arakan Community Party, Arakan Tribal Party and the China Liberation Front. It had got contact men in them.

3.9.2 NSCN (K)

The NSCN(K) had tried to elicit support of the NNC once but was effectively neutralized by the NSCN(IM). It maintained close relation with all the UG outfits except the NSCN (IM). It had links with ULFA, Bodo Liberation Tigers (later National Liberation Front of Bodoland – NDFB) of Assam, ULTA, ADF, UPVA, NLFA of Arunachal Pradesh and KIA, of Myanmar.

3.10 Surrenders

A major surrender had taken place after the signing of the Shillong Accord when the real insurgency can be said to have ended. Thereafter a section opposed to the Accord remained in Myanmar and there was peace in Nagaland till around 1985. In 1988 after the split took place in the NSCN the Muivah group moved into Manipur/Nagaland areas and the so called insurgency took a turn for the worse. There were no major surrenders since then. The following surrenders had taken place from 1/97 to 31/3/2000:-

NSCN(IM) – 4
NSCN(K) – 33
NFG/NFA – 24
UNLF – 1
(of Manipur)
They surrendered without arms. The State Govt. of Nagaland was frequently appealing to the UGs to give up the path of violence and join the national mainstream. Ironically insurgency had become a profitable trade in Nagaland. The cease-fire had reportedly had a positive impact in that the cadres had become uneasy over curtailment in their activities which prompted the leadership to allow them liberty to do some actions which brought returns.

3.11 External Support

In early 70s China was one nation which actively aided and abetted the insurgency in Nagaland. Its interest in the North East got accentuated after the aggression in 1962. China had helped many Naga gangs in training and arms supplies. Thangkhul Muivah was Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the NFG for some time in China. Around 1975 it had offered a Naga Govt. in exile on following terms which did not find favour with A.Z. Phizo and other underground leaders of the NNC even though Th. Muivah, Isaac and the SS Army Chief Mowu Angami wanted to go for it fully.

1. The Naga Govt. in exile would be based at a suitable point in Chinese territory contiguous to Indian border.
2. Chinese would openly support Naga cause on the pattern of their support to other governments in exile.
3. The Chinese would guide the foreign relations of the Naga govt. in exile.
4. Chinese would help in setting up a rebel radio station and permit use of their propaganda machinery.

The Chinese courtship ended by 1971 more because of the KIA and the NSCN turned to Bangladesh where the ISI of Pakistan took full advantage of it. NSCN (now NSCN-IM) had bases in Geneva, Dhaka (Cox Bazar), Bangkok and Kathmandu. The new recruits were sent to Bangladesh for training through Dwaki in Meghalaya and Karimganj in Assam. It had established an office at Bangkok where Th. Muivah stayed. “The NSCN
(IM) had an elaborate network of offices, extensive residential apartments, front office which manage the burgeoning real estate business, bank accounts in fictitious names and even mailing address in Bangkok, the world’s so called vice-city.

Since the early nineties Muivah, the insurgent outfits President Isac Swu and about 50 important leaders stayed in prosperous Bangkok suburb Sukhaphiboon. Muivah stays in an exclusive apartment block called Thansap Mansion on Sukhaphiboon-3 Road, Muivah’s nephew Paul who is married to a Thai women working with a Japanese automobile in Bangkok lives separately. His flat is guarded round the clock by not less than ten cadres who live in a smaller house in the same locality and is close to the so called Government of the Peoples Republic of Nagaland Coordination Centre office which is a two storey building located at 100/482 Ramint Canivet Ramintra Road, a posh suburb of Thai capital. The NSCN bosses have arranged an exclusive box for the address. The mailing address available with the government is PB No.81. The P.O. is located at Chorcphhabua, Bangkok – 10230. The NSCN leaders live comfortably in Thailand as their cadres rough it out in Nagaland. Officials believe that the Thai police action (arrest of Muivah which has been mentioned under Manipur) has sent a message to the ULFA, National Democratic Front of Bodoland, Peoples Liberation Army of Manipur that Bangkok can no longer provide them with unhindered cover. One positive fall out of the decision is that the North East insurgent outfits will now find it difficult to strike arms deal in some of the South East Asian countries’.

“The visit of Muivah to Karachi before his arrest at Bangkok proves beyond a shadow of any doubt about his links with Pakistan’s ISI. This link naturally resist any pragmatic solution to the Naga problem”.

The link with China and Pakistan was based on mutual trust. Their interest would not die in the North Eastern region specially and in India in general. The Naga insurgents were their old friends and would never be averse to be of use for them. Pakistan had sponsored terrorism and NSCN(IM) was their time tested friend. Its leader Muivah and his ilk had earned enough and was established well abroad and probably Pakistan had a
hand in it. Through NSCN Pak ISI could control North-East and a proxy war in the form of a low intensity conflict could be perpetuated indefinitely which had made the North-East economically bankrupt. The patron-client relationship between the Naga-insurgents and the ISI was taken note by Govt. agencies seriously only recently. In fact the relationship had started in mid fifties when A.Z. Phizo led NNC had sent an emissary to the then East Pakistan seeking Pakistani support. This emissary Mowu Mosievili had met the then Chief Minister of East Pakistan Ataur Rahman of the Awami League. Mowu was however arrested by a Special Branch Officer of the Assam Police at a place near Damcherra on Cachar-North Cachar hill boundary. He was adorning the garb of a Buddhist Monk. Many documents which included a letter from the NNC President introducing him as Ambassador Plenipotentiary of Nagaland to Pakistan govt. (a copy of which was addressed to the “The New York Times” from Phizo) were found in his possession. Thus started the relationship between Pakistan and Naga insurgents. During the past one decade and a half a number of militant outfits, big and small of the North Eastern region such as both factions of NSCN, ULFA, NDFB, NLFT, PLA and UNLF, ATT, ANVC, MULFA, MULTA and the PULF had been roped by the ISI. The PULF (Peoples United Liberation Front – an Islamic outfit) was originally formed by a section of Manipur Muslims with help from ISI through the NSCN (IM). It was later able to extend its unlawful activities to parts of Assam in the Barak Valley and lower Assam. Its activities came to light when some of its volunteers were arrested in Assam during 1999 and they were reportedly trained by NSCN(IM). Judging from the developments the hold of ISI in the North East was stated to be complete.

3.12 Crime Chart

Between 1956 and 1988 the activities of the UGs in Nagaland were confined to rural and jungle areas. Fund collection in the form of taxes was collected from the villages just to maintain themselves. Their main target of attack was only the army/SF in general. With the split in the NSCN the group of Th. Muivah (NSCN-IM) moved to Nagaland and Manipur and started operating from urban areas by deploying UG units like the regular army. Fund collection extortion, looting of Banks, fraudulent withdrawal
etc. was resorted to meet cost of purchase of weapons for which huge amounts were required. It also started attacking selected police stations for snatching of weapons/ammunitions. Those who stood on way were killed. Special mention may be made of the following:-

June, 1994 – Director of Public Relations seriously injured in UG attack at Kohima
July, 1994 – Town Planning Engineer, Kohima was killed in his office.
August, 1994 – S.P. Mokokchung was ambushed and killed with his driver and Body guards.
October, 1994 – A Dy.S.P was killed at Kohima.
November, 1994 – O/c Traffic at Kohima was killed.
March, 1995 – D.C. Kohima was ambushed and killed.

As the police alone could not handle the situation, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 had to be invoked and whole of Nagaland was declared a ‘Disturbed Area’ on 4.4.1995 which was still in force. Even then the UGs had freely moved about and killings had taken place. Some of the prominent ones were:-

1. May, 1996 – Ambushed 16 AR Convey and killed 6 AR personnel.
2. May, 1996 – Dr. Ibotombi Singh, Lecturer in Nagaland University was killed in Kohima Town.
3. May, 1996 – Senior Advocate Z.V. Yaopei was killed in Dimapur Town.
4. May, 1996 – Hozhumi Sema, a Theologian working as Librarian at Azeto Baptist Church was killed.
5. June, 1996 – Tubu Kevichusa, Advocate and NNC General Secy. was killed at Dimapur. There were also many extortions.

NSCN(M) had agreed to a cease-fire from August, 1997 but this had in no way reduced its nefarious activities. The cease-fire would end by 31.7.2001 unless extended.
There were however echoes of discordant notes heard loud and clear on the cease-fire from the affected parties as was the case with all cease-fires in the past. While the NSCN(IM) claimed through an open letter signed by S.S. Home Minister of NSCN(IM) Tuccu that the cease-fire was for all areas inhabited by the Nagas which included areas in Manipur. The Chief Minister of Manipur Nipamacha Singh had stated that the cease-fire between the Centre and the UG outfit did not extend to Manipur. The NSCN (IM) replied that “Mr. Nipamacha Singh would live to regret it if he does not withdraw the statement and support the peace process”. It was alleged that the stand of the Manipur Chief Minister was designed to create a misunderstanding between the Nagas and the Meitei people and the NSCN(IM) would never allow the age-old friendship between the Nagas and Meitei people to be betrayed by what it termed “narrow-minded politics and politicians”. The C.M.'s stand was that “there is no formal or informal cease-fire in Manipur”. The NSCN(IM) maintained that “everyone in Manipur knows that four hill districts – Tamanglong, Chandel, Ukhrul and Senpathi were a part of Naga territory from ancient times. It said that the Naga people’s movement for the integration of all Naga inhabited areas in the region began long before Manipur attained Statehood and that the State Govt. had neglected the Naga settled areas in Manipur and they remained backward. Behind the statement of the Chief Minister was the fear of Manipuris that if they recognized a formal cease-fire in Naga inhabited areas of Manipur that would be tantamount to agreeing to the demands of the Nagas to include the areas of Manipur in ‘Nagalim’ or Greater Nagaland which would be detrimental to the interests of Manipur.

The other crimes committed were:-
Cash looted and recovered from 4/95 to 7/94

*Table - X*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Cash Looted</th>
<th>Recovered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,58,62,303</td>
<td>7,26,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,78,745</td>
<td>US$150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>64,22,694</td>
<td>15,46,174</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table – XI
S.F/UGs killed during 4/94 to 7/97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>UG Group</th>
<th>No. killed</th>
<th>Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NSCN(IM)</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Factional fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>NSCN(K)</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NNC/NFG/NFA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SF</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Police/Village guards</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Suspected UGs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Peoples Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bodo Security Force (BDSF) (National Democratic Front of Bodoland – NDFB)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- dc -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Govt. Servants</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shooting and killing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table – XII
Bomb Blasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Incidents</th>
<th>Persons killed</th>
<th>Persons injured</th>
<th>Total killed</th>
<th>Total Injured</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S.F. Police</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>S.F. Police</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sl. No.</td>
<td>Weapons Lost</td>
<td>Weapons Recovered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>AK-47 – 7</td>
<td>LMG – 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>SLR – 29</td>
<td>AK-47 – 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Sten Carbine - 27</td>
<td>303 rifle – 16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Sten Gun – 24</td>
<td>Carbine – 3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>303 rifle – 134</td>
<td>M-20 rifle – 1</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>.38 revolver – 12</td>
<td>Pistol/revolver – 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Pistol – 3</td>
<td>m.20 Pistol – 5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>US carbine - 3</td>
<td>12 bore gun – 8</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>LMG – 5</td>
<td>Sten gun – 6</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>GF Rifle – 1</td>
<td>SLR – 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2” Mortar – 1</td>
<td>.22 rifle – 1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>SBBL Gun – 4</td>
<td>.32 revolver – 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>.22 rifle – 1</td>
<td>Pistol (German) – 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>.38 Pistol – 1</td>
<td>AK-56 – 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>9mm Carbine – 1</td>
<td>Chinese rifle – 5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>.36 HG – 21</td>
<td>SBBL Gun – 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>BP Jacket – 2</td>
<td>9mm carbine – 5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rifle Bayonet – 1</td>
<td>30 US carbine – 3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>V/L Pistol - 1</td>
<td>.38 revolver – 16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sten carbine – 2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>.303 pistol – 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>9mm Pistol – 3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>M21 rifle – 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>12 Bore gun – 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapon Type</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Bolt Action rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>2” Mortar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Hand grenade</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>M.22 pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>9mm German rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>V.L pistol</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Rifle Bayonet</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Semi automatic rifle</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>RPs Rockets</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Chinese Grenade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Rocket launcher with IED</td>
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**Table – XIV**

**UGs arrested**


<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>NSCN(IM)</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>NSCN(K)</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>NNC/NFG/NFA</td>
<td>156+5=161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>PLA (Manipur)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Suspected UGs</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>PREPAK/Manipur</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Federal Govt. of Nagaland(FGN)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) Assam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>UNLF (Manipur)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Manipur Peoples Army (MPA)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ULFA (Assam)</td>
<td>2</td>
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### Table XV

**Crime Chart since 1.8.1997 (date of cease-fire) till 3/2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>No. of persons killed</th>
<th>Break-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Factional Clash - 132</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. NSCN (IM) - 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. NSCN(K) - 49</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. NNC/NFG - 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Civilian - 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Shooting and Killing - 158</td>
<td>1. NSCN(IM) - 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. NSCN(K) - 83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. NNC/NFG - 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Civilians - 59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Govt. Servant - 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Unidentified - 07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ambush/Encounter - 21</td>
<td>1. NSCN (IM) - 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. NSCN(K) - 03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>3. SF/PMF - 13</td>
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<td>4. Police - 03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Unidentified - 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Civilian - 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kidnapping/abduction - 56</td>
<td>Persons abducted - 131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Extortion/Demand - 246</td>
<td>Amount Involved - 2,88,61,941/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fradulent drawal of Govt. money - 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Amount drawn</th>
<th>UG group involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.6.98</td>
<td>Peren</td>
<td>10,00,000/-</td>
<td>3 NSCN(IM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.2.99</td>
<td>Mokokchung</td>
<td>23,00,000/-</td>
<td>3-4 NSCN/K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.11.99</td>
<td>Kuphera</td>
<td>15,08,662/-</td>
<td>3-NSCN(IM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cease-fire became meaningless as the NSCN(IM) blatantly and repeatedly violated the ground rules and indulged in killings, extortion, intimidation, robbery and other acts of terrorism. "The cease-fire became a mockery and the people were taken for a ride. The worst was an attempt on the life of the incumbent Chief Minister, S.C. Jamir on 23.11.1999 while he was on his way from Dimapur to Kohima. About 10 armed NSCN(IM) members laid an ambush in which the Chief Minister had a miraculous escape. 2 escort personnel were killed on the spot and 5 other police personnel sustained injuries. The UGs had laid 14 IED explosives and exploded them at the same time and also simultaneously fired upon the convoy. There was widespread condemnation of the incident. By this act the NSCN(IM) had in fact unilaterally abrogated the cease-fire." Thereafter however the State govt. unilaterally decided not to associate with the monitoring of cease-fire. Earlier in September, 99 the Chief Minister had "termed the ongoing cease-fire between the Central Govt. and the NSCN(IM) as a 'laughing stock'. He said that unless the "Centre takes it (cease-fire) seriously situation prevailing in the State would go from bad to worse". In the meantime the NSCN(K) had declared that a "bilateral cease-fire with the Govt. of India" was likely.

The ground situation was gradually turning against anti-social elements now posing as either NSCN(K) or NSCN(IM). The All Dimapur Businessmen and Shopkeepers Association downed their shutters (April, 26-27, 2000) in protest against extortion/kidnapping/abduction by the insurgents. The public was highly critical of the SF and the police for their inability to check the insurgents and questioned utility of a cease-fire. The success achieved had made the insurgents unhappy. For the insurgents extortion had become a virtual industry. No economic development was seen on the ground even though they remained on paper. What had caused frustration among people
were reports about “construction of big houses in the State by some middle level UG leaders”. Activities of both NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) also figure under the State of Manipur. The two may be correlated by the reader to have a complete picture about the activities of the organization.

3.13 Vulnerability of Police

As compared to population, Nagaland was, since the insurgency began, the scene of presence of maximum security forces in the country. As of now the State was divided into 10 police districts and had one DGP, two ADGPs, four IGP’s, Nine DIGs, Ten S.Ps, besides other levels of police personnel. The total strength of police personnel reached 16168 (March, 2000). In addition it had the following strength of para-military personnel:

- CRPF – 24 coys.
- BSF – 10 coys.
- Assam Rifle – 54 coys.

Still the cry was for more security forces. “Security measures can be effective only when security forces are present in sufficient number. The requirement of military presence in the North East is no less than that in the western front and Kashmir. The militants are equipped with very sophisticated armaments and fire power. The police alone cannot tackle them at present unless they are modernized and trained. The pre-Kargil strength of the security forces must be restored in Nagaland on an urgent basis”.

There were 47 police stations, 31 police outposts and 16 police check posts. The level of satisfaction calculated was just about 15% only. Most of the police stations were in rented buildings. Infrastructural facilities were below satisfactory level. Incidentally cost of construction was very high due to topography and law and order problem. Housing for police personnel was a distant dream. Out of the ten police districts only two viz. Kohima and Mokokchung had police lines. Out of the 47 Police Stations only five police stations had govt. accommodation. The rest functioned in rented buildings. Thus
policemen were exposed to danger to life from insurgents all through. In their search for safety they were bound to look to insurgents with pleading eyes jeopardizing law and order duties. The militants moved with sophisticated weapons with no law to bridle them. The policemen with low morale and with old weapons had no way except to kneel before them. It was no surprise that Nagaland was heaven for insurgents. There was urgent need to modernize and properly train the police personnel and provide them with the necessary wherewithal. Morale of the police personnel was at the lowest ebb. There was no separate cell for special branch and VIP security which was done by the State Special Branch. No separate Bomb detection and disposal squad also existed. There was also no Forensic Science Laboratory. What existed was only a Finger Print Examination Cell. As regards weapons it was necessary that the police personnel, at least in urban areas should have been issued with modern weapons to match the insurgents. The police personnel were also not trained to equal the insurgents in warfare. There was need to upgrade the PTS and the NAPTC (Naga Armed Police Training College).

Now that the para-military forces were stationed in Nagaland their services could very well be utilized to train the local police personnel.

The situation was turning favourable to the State Govt. with the real colour of insurgents getting exposed day by day. Th. Muivah languished in a Thai jail. His comrades in arms in Nagaland and Manipur were indulging in activities unbecoming of insurgents. What held back the population from reacting with the force of an avalanche was lack of will to ensure law and order on the part of police/govt. It was fear of the unknown that haunted the public. If the govt. and the police could allay it, the UGs would take to their heels and Nagaland would be free to hit the road to economic progress.

With the presence of huge strength of Central forces the local police had been made a non-entity in the ongoing insurgency. Unless this was made the sheet anchor to protect the State and its people lasting peace would be a distant dream.
3.14 Co-ordination between agencies

The word “Co-ordination” was stated to be a ‘misnomer’ in Nagaland. Not co-ordination but ‘diversionary tactics’ were adopted. This reportedly emanated from the anxiety and preference of the personnel in the field to first inform their superiors at the Centre or the State capitals instead of sharing the information expeditiously at the local level. If the situation obtaining in Nagaland was any indication one would not venture to conclude that the agencies concerned were making co-ordinated moves to face the challenges of the UGs. There was however realization among politicians and agencies concerned with law and order that “Insurgency has reached a complex stage requiring careful sensitive and tactful handling and calling for co-ordinated efforts by all the North Eastern States on the one hand and the Central Govt. on the other”. All were demanding united and coordinated efforts to tackle the ongoing insurgency problem. Politicians were more vociferous. It would be interesting to note what the politicians themselves said about it. “Some politicians in Nagaland and Manipur have accused the State govt. and other law and enforcing agencies to have master minded the present spell of inter-tribal clashes. The govt. has adopted a wrong and dangerous policy of giving money, arms and other help to some groups to finish off the NSCN(IM)” thus stated Hokisha Sema, former Chief Minister of Nagaland. Late Vamuzo, another former Chief Minister had also alleged that “the Govt. was giving money and arms to the FGN and some NSCN(K) activists to try and finish off the Isac-Muivah group”. It was a known fact that there was large scale support to the insurgents from political parties. Politicians failed to realize, time and again that supporting one against the other boomeranged and did not pave the way to restoration of peace and normalcy. The experience was that the supported group took advantage of it and exploited the situation for seeking further benefits. As mentioned earlier it was only in November, 99 there was an attempt on the life of S.C. Jamir, the incumbent Chief Minister of Nagaland suspectedly by the NSCN(IM) after which the State govt. unilaterally withdrew from participating in monitoring cease-fire implementation.
Because of political patronage the UGs got deeply entrenched in politics from which they made capital. At one time the present Chief Minister of Nagaland was accused by none other than then Governor Lt. General V.K. Nayar (Retd.) “for supporting Khaplang faction even though S.C. Jamir had strongly protested this report”. Ironically the needle of suspicion for the ambush on the Chief Minister in November last was pointed towards the NSCN(IM).

None of the agencies denied the fact that the security agencies and the Govt. in Nagaland had failed, due to various reasons, to evolve a fool proof system to co-ordinate and monitor the activities of UGs. With politics playing an all pervasive role other agencies did not feel the pressure to seek one and the UGs felt relieved. The communication gap among the agencies helped the UGs to “blur their trail and escape”.

‘Coordination’ however existed when officers at the higher levels were of the same mould but often this was not so. Multiplicity of intelligence outfits hampered coordination and free flow of information. Each S.F. agency had its own intelligence outfit but the sharing of information was dependent on the then obtaining situation.

There was also reportedly a wide communication gap between Central and State service officers functioning at vital centres of power. Quite often sensitive information which should have been shared at the appropriate level quickly was consigned to the pit of forgetfulness by local officers leading to bigger law and order problem. This happened more because of indifference and lack of camaraderie. There was utmost need for a single agency to coordinate efforts. Coordination meetings did take place but they were a mere ritual scaling down the importance in each successive meeting. The junior officers gradually represented the seniors who were originally earmarked to attend the meeting which smacked lack of sincerity of purpose.

Willing co-ordination to tackle the problem of insurgency therefore remained a myth. In such an atmosphere insurgency grew. During the last Parliament elections the Chief Minister of Nagaland was critical of the role of the S.F. “He expressed his shock to
learn that security forces deployed for election duties in the hyper-sensitive areas were not prepared to take any action when underground elements ambushed polling officials and police personnel at Techulumi under Phek district on the re-polling day on September, 28. This indicated that the State machinery itself was not coordinating its efforts with the S.F. While this was so the UGs were known for their own form of collection of advance intelligence on anything that they required. There were allegations that the Army was closing its eyes towards camps set up by the NSCN(IM) in villages of Nagaland confident that they did not have anything to fear from Indian S.F. “In Angami territory NSCN factions and the Indian Army see each other and do not fight. The NSCN people are in our village. We asked them to leave. We do not want to get into trouble with the army who will torture us. They said no, the Army will not come when we are here” (as stated by Headman of Khonoma village, near Kohima).

Almost all the para military and police personnel had a word of ridicule for the Assam Rifles (A.R.) one of the oldest and well entrenched S.F. in Nagaland which was termed as ‘Aram Rifle’ and a ‘drain’ on the scare resources of India. In such a scenario sincere coordination remained a distant possibility.

3.15 Elections and Insurgency

In spite of “Insurgency” situation Nagas had always participated in general elections ever since it became a State in 1963. The turn out was also impressive clearly giving out a message that it was gun culture which perpetuated insurgency and it had no approval from the people.

The lone Nagaland Lok Sabha seat was the cynosure of voters and political observers during the last Parliament Elections (Sept, 25, 1999). It had an electorate of 955914 and there was an overall turn out of 75.7%. Two organizations viz. (1) the Naga Hobo an apex body of the Nagas and (2) the NSCN(IM) refrained from participating. The Naga Hobo had been doing so from 1997. This time also it issued (Sept, 19, 1999) a statement which stated that “we are for solution and not election. The Nagas are of the
strong opinion that solution is more important. As such Hoho will refrain from participating in the election but it is for the political parties to exercise their wisdom in the best interest of the Nagas”. The NSCN(IM) decided to “stand by and support” the Naga Hoho’s principles.

There were however allegations that the “polls were rigged beyond all measures making mockery of democracy”.

The NSCN(IM) had already signaled to the Govt. of India “not to impose elections upon the Nagas till the ongoing Indo-Naga political dialogue was over”.

In spite of it, all the political parties participated in the elections unlike last time (1998) when the Congress had a walk over as the entire opposition refrained as per calls of the Naga Hoho and NSCN(IM).

In many parts there were however bomb explosions, firing, snatching of ballot papers, kidnapping and intimidation by NSCN(IM) cadres. In one case a Gaon Bura of a village in Zunheboto district was beaten and he succumbed to the injuries. These developments made the Chief Minister to term the ongoing cease-fire between the Central Govt. and the NSCN(IM) “as a laughing stock”. He said that “unless the Centre takes it (cease-fire) seriously situation prevailing in the State would go from bad to worse”. The Chief Minister was also unhappy that many of his ministers who were supposed to speak out against all odds perpetrated by UG elements remained silent “we should be bold because we represent the public who have confidence on us”. He also stated that elections in the State gave the people a clear choice between “democracy and terrorism” between “a Constitutional way of life and one under anarchy”. He called the election “a clear mandate for democracy”.

3.16 Role of NGOs and Human Rights Organizations

The following were the NGO organizations registered in Nagaland. Their functioning was on a limited scale.
2. Blue Blood Clan – Established in 1990 it promoted games and sports.
4. Nagaland Children’s Home – Established in 1970 to provide shelter, clothing and food to hungry citizen.

The following were the major Human Rights Organizations functioning in Nagaland:-

2. NMA (Naga Mothers Association)

The NPMHR of Nagaland, an old organization formed on 9.9.1976 and in association with North East Co-ordination Committee on Human Rights (NECOHR) was taking up alleged human rights violations in Nagaland and other North Eastern States. It stood for right of self-determination of the people of the region. According to it, the denial of this fundamental right had resulted in a vicious circle of Human Rights violation and unless the universally accepted and guaranteed Human Rights were not protected, people had no alternative than to rise violently against such violations. NPMHR was of the opinion that the national ruling classes everywhere were based on the suppression of basic rights of their own people and subjugation of other societies; that whenever resistance to this became strong the ruling classes collaborated to strangle it; and that only through organized efforts of all the oppressed people can they be defeated. It therefore attempted to give organized expression to the Naga peoples' fight for their rights while exposing to the people of India and to the world the imperialist policy that the ruling classes of India were pursuing through the mighty military machine against the Nagas. It periodically took up cases of alleged Human Rights violation by the Army and
paramilitary and the local bodies before NHRC and other world bodies. In the past it had also taken up alleged human rights cases before various courts.

Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) was one organization which had closely adjoined itself with political issues. Modeled on the pattern of Meira Paibi (torch bearers) an active women organization of Manipur the NMA a voluntary organization engaged in uplifting the society came into existence in 1984 at Kohima. The NMA was part of the Action Committee constituted by the Naga Hoho and NGOs. It protested against imposition of DAA/AFSPA on Nagaland. The NMA also coordinated different Churches in Nagaland to give momentum to the ongoing peace process initiated by the Indian govt. with NSCN(IM). It was also participating in meetings and conferences along with the Naga Students Federation (NSF) the Naga Hoho, an apex body of the Nagas and the NPMHR. It also runs the following institutions:-

1. NMA Kripa Counselling Centre.
2. NMA Kripa De-addiction Centre (15.6.1998)
3. NMA – Kripa Income General Project (Carpentry unit)
4. NMA Kripa Vision (Aids Hospice)

Drug addiction had become a fashion among the youth of Nagaland. Despite being a dry State, one could see youth making a beeline in front of clandestine liquor kiosks which dot the length and breadth of the towns. This menace gripped Nagaland from 1989/90 onwards. Car repairing shops, tea shops, hospitals, college and posh localities of Kohima town were the places where the I.V. drug culture had taken roots. Drug was easily brought to Nagaland town from Moreh in Manipur through drug peddlers. According to a report there were 261 persons who were HIV infected of which 80% were I.V. drug users. There was fear that the actual figure might be much more. NMA had been pioneering the campaign against drug use and AID through its Kripa Centres.
The history of blood bath was written in the streets of Nagaland and to contain it the NMA had issued an appeal to the Naga brethren to “shed no more blood” and to shun violence.

3.17 Future of Insurgency

The people felt relieved over the prospect of a negotiated settlement to the Naga problem brightening up with both factions of NSCN veering round for cease-fire. Even though this was a forced one on both the factions due to circumstances and a cease-fire was all that they wished to have a breathing time people were for it. No one was however fully confident that equilibrium between an elected govt. and a parallel UG set up would be established. As was the case in the past a particular event could spin off into any direction. All wished that in any discussion the Central Govt. was to have included all the groups. They felt that discreet or exclusive discussions with one or the other would only help to exacerbate tensions among the groups and strike at the root of peace process before it got off from the ground. NSCN(K) had expressed its willingness for a dialogue. It should not have been otherwise as it was facing attack from Burmese Army. Inside Nagaland the NSCN(IM) cadres were targeting it. In this scenario nothing should have been more welcome than a cease-fire. Similarly NSCN(IM) was in dire straight with its General Secretary Th. Muivah incarcerated in a Thailand jail and inside Nagaland people threatening to unite to oppose UG activities. No time was more ideal for a discussion and a settlement of the problem. But the elected Govt. of Nagaland headed by S.C. Jamir had suo-moto called off the cease-fire agreement with NSCN(IM) after an attack on him in November last. As in the past, this time also the cease-fire was marked more for its violations than for observance. As a good riddance however the cease-fire with NSCN(IM) was extended for another one year till July 31, 2001 this time assuring strict implementation of ground rules. The Naga HoHo (apex body of the Nagas) which was close to NSCN(IM) and thereby not well disposed to S.C.Jamir, Chief Minister had already warned against the possibility of NSCN(IM) withdrawing from the peace process if the Nagaland Govt. perceived as close to the Khaplang faction of NSCN was found active. This struck a discordant note. In any case the consoling factor was that some
initiative from both groups had come and the people hoped that the future held promise. The SF heaved a sigh of relief. But in the same breath they hastened to question whether the crime syndicates having the backing of the power centres would allow a cease-fire to be effective. How far the cease-fire would take the State towards normalcy would depend as much on the NSCN factions as on the Centre, the State government, the Naga HoHo, NNC/NFG/NFA and the crime syndicates consisting of anti-social elements, money spinning contractors operating with the unseen blessings of power centres.

3.18. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.18.1. Conclusions

The journey of the Naga insurgency, called the mother of all insurgencies, fathered by A.Z. Phizo in later part of fifties to the present state of the NSCN factions dictating terms to the Central Govt. for a cease-fire was a smooth one for an insurgency with overt and covert patronage from the politicians and financiers. It is now history that after signing the Shillong Accord in 1975 one faction led by the duo Th. Muivah and Isac Swu who were then in China broke away and preferred to continue the struggle for a Naga nation. They remained in Burma by building bridges with the rebels there and forming an organization known as NSCN. In the inevitable process of evolution trouble took place in the midst of NSCN leaders and it split into two factions which came to be known as NSCN(K) and NSCN(IM). The Nagas of Nagaland had to seek new pastures and returned to Nagaland (1988). By this time they had gained adulation from politicians inside who needed UG support for sustenance but when the UGs came at their own door step situation changed. Group loyalties had to surface leading to a question of existence. On the one side the UG set up a parallel govt. and on the other an elected govt. in power felt threatened. In order to prop up that elected govt. and to contain insurgency the Central govt. considered pampering by money as the best policy only to realize slowly but emphatically that it had not only spoiled Nagaland but in actual practice helped in perpetuating insurgency.
During the 43 years of insurgency Nagaland got more and more money leading to more insurgency, more guns, more people, more dust, more misery and only one cheer for democracy. The cry was for still more money. What however eluded the State was peace, harmony and progress. The deficit of a State in the Budget displayed where it headed. The budgetary deficit of the Nagaland State Govt. was steadily mounting year after year as shown below:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Crores</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Opening deficit – 1997-98 : Rs. 89.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. – do -                     : Rs.209.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. – do -                     : Rs.252.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. – do -                     : Rs.342.00 (likely opening deficit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The critical situation of the State can be realised from the fact that as against the estimated non-plan and State plan expenditure of Rs. 1222 crore during 1991-2000 as much as 55% (Rs.672 crores) was for salaries and pension and 17% (Rs.203 crores) for debt servicing leaving a barely 28% for development works, law and order and others costs. While this was so the real resources income from the State was a mere 25 crores in the form of taxes. Given the situation the non-plan gap in the resources was bound to increase without end. Therefore the State govt. was demanding that “the Central Govt. provide additional assistance to cover the non-plan gap in full without linking the same for working out resources for the State plan which virtually erodes the size of annual State plan outlay”. If this is not done the “State Govt’s activities will practically come to a stand still”. While this is so the insurgency spectrum speaks a different story.

During the same period Nagaland saw the third generation of insurgents fighting for an ‘Independent Nagaland’. Much was also written about the cataclysmic change of the Naga society. The State government repeated exhortations for a “New Nagaland” was ironically greeted by emergence of a killing field. The political philosophy of a ‘nation State’ propounded by insurgents was given a ride on the question of balkanization on tribal lines. It appeared that the philosophy of Narcissism had become the mainstay in Nagaland. Sadly enough victims of the Chauvinistic ideals of the political leaders were
the people who lived in perpetual penury in spite of pumping crores and crores by the Central govt. but yet the demand was more. Developments to build a ‘New Nagaland’ were nowhere seen.

The leader who engineered the Naga insurgency to usher them into a ‘Nagaland for Christ’ himself vanished into thin air and spent the life and died in the comforts of a London House leaving the people to their fate. His successors fought among themselves killing hundreds of their own kith and kin in ghastly ethnic killings. In the process they earned in crores by way of extortion, looting etc. stacked them in foreign banks and followed in the foot steps of their master to live in comfort. Yet again the victims were the poor people of Nagaland but the demand for an ‘independent Nagaland’ had not ceased for they gained by that

3.18.2 Recommendations

1. Proper monitoring of fund allotments and expenses: A form of insurgency by one group or other would continue to get more and more money from Centre. But pumping in more and more money would not make the people loyal. It would only make them to demand more and more in which the beneficiaries would be the leaders. “The Nagas, in fact, today blame the Govt. of India for the pervasive corruption in the State. Funds for development were generally misused or misappropriated by the unholy troika of dishonest contractors, corrupt bureaucrats and the unprincipled politicians. From the third to eight plan Central ‘assistance’ to the State has been to the tune of Rs.1465-68 crores. Much of it has gone down the Dhansiri (river). The Centre has lost on both counts – the development has not been commensurate - in fact it has been far below the actual investment and its is blamed for corrupting the Naga society. There should have been a system of monitoring to ensure proper utilization of the funds. This was not done. As a Naga officer said “The govt. of India only asks us if we have expended the money. There are no questions about its utilization”.

101
2. Political settlement should never be even visualized without stamping out insurgency completely. The govt. of India followed in the footsteps of the British in segregating the Naga. While doing so it did not make efforts to bring them psychologically closer to mainland whether it was constitution of a single unit combining the Naga Hills district of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division of NEFA (1957), giving of Statehood to Nagaland (1963) or the signing of the Shillong Accord (1975). Prevailing insurgency was overlooked thereby neutralizing impact of the political settlement which ipso facto put a tab on economic development.

3. The posting of officers whether of Centre or the State to handle sensitive positions of power should be on selective basis, who had established themselves for efficiency, integrity and unquestioned loyalty, as was done in the initial stages after independence. “Another common area of darkness is the commitment of the civil administration and the State police. Unfortunately both in Nagaland and Kashmir, not insignificant sections of the administration and the police force have been subverted. This explains the Naga rebels overrunning certain NAP and Manipur Rifle posts encountering little resistance and encamping with arms and ammunition. Why cannot we have functioning team in Kohima and Srinagar? Why cannot we have just thirteen committed IAS an IPS officers for Nagaland and the Kashmir Valley?”

4. Correct analysis of ground situation and suitable immediate corrective action. The situation obtaining in Nagaland was wrongly handled by successive Central governments. National leaders remained distant and unaware of realities. The complexity of the problem and intensity of feelings were never appreciated in proper perspective. Instead of having an overall policy and joint strategic planning to deal with the situation problems were dealt piecemeal as law and order problem which snowballed. Having no overall policy was considered the best policy and matters drifted.

5. Tag Development of the State to stoppage of insurgency: Terrorism and the crimes accompanying it played havoc with peace and harmony in society jeopardizing every prospect of development. For some time impressive progress was achieved. This stagnated with the coming in of the UGs from across the border (1988). From then
on economic progress lost momentum and the greed for more and more plan allocation got accentuated.

6. **Adequate measures to remove a feeling that insurgency paid:**

   This was proved and gained currency not only in Nagaland but in whole of the North East. This made people lazy and comfort living. With a gun in hand money flowed in lakhs. With the figure of unemployed youth in Nagaland touching nearly 15000 what the future would be was anybody’s guess. The State government should have taken steps to send a clear message that “Insurgency would not pay. It would be counter productive a losing proposition”. The message conveyed loudly and clearly however was that insurgency paid “politically as well as economically”. Opportunities for gainful employment abound. If government becomes facilitator, opportunities existed in agriculture, tourism, social forestry, animal husbandry, horticulture, mining, weaving and other micro-enterprises. A silver lining was the Prime Minister’s economic package for the North Eastern region but with insurgency it would be tantamount to dumping the amount to a bottomless pit. What required was a proper agency to keep a check on income and expenditure.

7. **Generate awareness among employees about necessity to develop Nagaland:**

   The culture of more pay and less work has come to stay which was one of the major stumbling block in the path of economic development. It is time for this sector to realize its responsibility towards well being of the State through improved culture.

8. **Create proper conditions for investment:**

   Would be investors balked because of disturbed conditions. Widespread terrorist activities ruined the ordinary business. Employees of Border Roads who worked for
progress of the State were targets of terrorists for extortion. Dimapur a flourishing business centre was a sad spectacle.

9. **Take stern actions against crime syndicates:**

Appearance of “crime syndicates” was a natural fall out of prolonged lawless situation. With more and more school dropouts, these syndicates had a flourishing trade. Even if normalcy returned it would be sometime before the menace could be stamped out.

10. **Identify and deport illegal migrants from Bangladesh:**

The spread of illegal settlements by Bangladeshis is on the increase at an alarming stage. They indulged in gun running, drug trafficking, flesh trade and in all other conceivable vices. No steps were initiated in this regard. Nagaland lacked worthy leaders to educate the good Nagas on the dangers in store for them.

11. **Change in mind-set of political leaders for good of Nagaland:**

Lack of coordinated action to deal with insurgency. In the absence of political will, the ultimate solution for resolution of insurgency, the other arms of govt. took things lightly and problems multiplied.

12. **Suitable psychological operations to bring the Nagas closer to mainland.**

The two factions of the NSCN coming to the conference table were welcomed by all sections. The Centre was however never known to have a complete grip over developments in the North East in general and on Nagaland in particular. Its actions had a similar pattern which swung between pampering and army action to crush the
movement as a fire fighting exercise only for the UG to sprout again. It had never given a
thought to psychologically moving the people closer to mainland. This being so people
were not without a lurking fear that a fresh group of insurgents may appear in Nagaland
to perpetuate the legacy as in the past. Yet they felt that somewhere someone had to make
a beginning and in an insurgency a cease-fire was welcome as the first step as it augured
well for the future. In the North East taming the NSCN(IM) the most powerful of the
outfits was sure to have a softening effect on the other comrades in arms in the region.

XXX
Chapter - 4
INSURGENCY/MILITANCY IN MIZORAM

4.1 The State

Mizoram today is said to be a 'garden of peace' but no happiness is ever achieved without suffering pain. From insurgency to peace, the journey was arduous for Mizoram. Though the movement is no more relevant it would be worthwhile to go through what had happened and how peace was achieved. The insurgency movement in Mizoram was of a special kind. It was a story of the complementary role played by bamboo, men and mice unheard in history. Rarely had rodents been responsible for starting an insurgency. Here, in Mizoram it transformed the one time Lushai Hills district into Mizoram, a full-fledged State in the Indian Union (1987) after gruelling through an insurgency movement.

The name ‘Lushai’ (also Lusai) connotes ‘Head Cutter’ (lu-Head, Sha – to cut) and the modern ‘Lushai’ generally prefers to address himself as ‘Mizo’ or ‘denizen of the hills’. The origin of Mizon is not known.

After annexation by the British in 1891, the Lushai Hills were administered in two parts, the southern hills by Bengal Presidency (from Chittagong) and the northern half by Assam (from Silchar). Both the parts were amalgamated in 1898 into one district called the Lushai Hills district under the Chief Commissioner of Assam. Under the Govt. of India Act, 1935, the Lushai Hills was made part of the ‘excluded areas’ and local chiefs were permitted to retain their powers though no “political activity” such as standing for elections to the Legislative Assembly was permitted.

With the implementation of the North Eastern Re-organization Act in 1972, Mizoram became a Union Territory and as a sequel to the signing of the Mizoram Accord on 30.6.1986, it became a full-fledged State (12.2.1987). Mizoram lies in the southernmost corner of the North-East India. It is bounded on the north by Assam and
Manipur on the east and South-East by Myanmar and West and South by Bangladesh and Tripura. About 75 per cent boundaries of Mizoram (722 kms.) are covered by foreign countries and as such is of strategic importance for the country. It covers an area of 21,081 sq. kms. and has a population of 6,89,756 (1991). Earlier it was the largest district of Assam but population-wise the smallest.

The whole area consists of hills running in the North-South direction in parallel series separated from one another by narrow valleys. The general level of these ranges is about 3000 ft. in the west and slowly rises as one goes to the East where there are ranges over 600 ft. high, the highest being ‘Blue Mountain (Phawng Pui)’.

The sides of the Hills are covered with dense forests and bamboo jungles. There are rivers but most of them swell only during rainy season and dry up during summer. Only one river viz. Tlawng however provides navigation for country boats throughout the year from Silchar in Cachar district of Assam to Sairang near Aizawl, the capital of Mizoram, from the North side. In the south, the river Karnaphuli provides facilities of navigation from Mizoram to Bangladesh.

Mizoram is sparsely populated which can be attributed to lack of communication, rugged hills and terrain and remoteness from rest of India. The whole population can be said to consist of Mizos. The term is relative as it may or may not include all hillmen. The Chakmas and the Reangs are now regarded as formal residents of Mizoram as far as political structure is concerned but remain socially distinct having no common culture and normative pattern with Mizos.

*Tribe-wise distribution of population was as follows* *(1961 census. Total population 2,66,063):-

**Table-I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Name of Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage to total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mizo/Lushai</td>
<td>2,13,261</td>
<td>81.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chakma</td>
<td>19,337</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuki (including Reang)</td>
<td>11,677</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lakher (Mara)</td>
<td>8,790</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pawi</td>
<td>4,587</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hmar</td>
<td>3,119</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table-II**

Religion-wise the figures were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Buddhists</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>34,788</td>
<td>59,343</td>
<td>54,024</td>
<td>4,438</td>
<td>6,89,756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Ref. Census India- 1991) Part IVB(ii) Table-c-9 Series – 24.)

The Mizos came under the influence of the British Missionaries in the 19th Century and most of them are Christians now. One of the beneficial effects of the missionary activities was the spread of education. Mizo language has no script of its own, the missionaries introduced the Roman script for Mizo language and formal education. Its literacy percentage record was as high as 88.06, the second highest in the country. Both Mizo and English are State languages.

Mizoram has great natural beauty and endless variety of landscape, the State is rich in flora and fauna. Almost all kin of tropical trees and plants thrive in Mizoram.

Mizos practice “Jhum” (shifting) cultivation, because of which a good deal of forest has fallen to the axe. The annual jhum area is around 40,000 hectares with a productivity level of a little over one tonne per hectare. Main produce is paddy followed by maize, chillies, sesame, ginger, etc. The entire Mizoram is notified as backward and is categorized as ‘no industry zone’.

108
4.2 Genesis of insurgency

As elsewhere in the north-east the seed of discontent and discord had been sown among the Mizos by the then local British administrators after the Second World War. They allegedly prodded them to self independence. “During the process of the hand over of power by the British the educated and well to do elite of Aizawl were in favour of joining the Union of India. In 1946, the citizens of Aizawl set up their own political organizations (a right that had been denied before) called the Mizo Union (MU). On 15.8.1947, the union sent its formal assent to the Governor of Assam that the Mizo Hills remain part of the State. Thereafter it became an adjunct of the Indian National Congress. The church had played an important role on the occasion. The two wanted to curb the powers of the tribal chiefs conferred on them by the British and to introduce democratic reforms. This set the chiefs against the Mizo Union. In 1952, the M.U won the district council elections which was merely meant to supplement the administration of the newly created post of Deputy Commissioner (who replaced the old autocratic “Superintendent” of the British days). The chiefs could not do anything before the onset of democratic reforms”.

The Lushais had lived for generations under the rule of their local chiefs belonging mainly to the Sailo clan and enjoyed considerable powers and privileges and utilized by the British as their agents for holding and administering the Lushai Hills district. The British administration intervened only in very serious cases. “The fact that the chiefs were recognized and their authority upheld by Govt. tended to render them negligent of the need to worry about the support of the people. The chiefs had major say in allotting lands each year to the villagers for cultivation. If the chief wishes to rebuild the house, he would call upon the villagers and they were bound to obey. The villagers were expected to surrender the forelegs of every animal they had shot or trapped to the chiefs as tax and to pay them every year certain specified quantities of rice. While most of these practices had their origin in ancient custom, some chiefs had grossly abused their privileges and treated the villagers as personal servants”. While this was so, the M.U. was constituted as a party to check illegal actions by the chiefs and to protect the
villagers from exploitation. Therefore, the Chief Council consisting of representatives of chiefs set in process measures to counter the activities of M.U. In turn the M.U. retaliated by launching a movement of boycott of the chiefs altogether. Opposed to the M.U. was another party, known as the United Mizo Freedom Organization (UMFO) which supported the Chiefs. Soon the M.U. urged the people to launch a civil disobedience movement against the Chiefs and the Govt. and violence broke out. There were then indications that the UMFO was working for the breakaway of the Mizo district from India and a link up with the Chins on the Burma side of the border. It was also supported by the chiefs.

The Mizo Union at its first General Assembly (September, 1946) discussed at length all alternatives – Union with Burma, Union with India, independence from both. It was resolved that Lushai Hills would remain with India subject to the condition that the question would be reviewed after 10 years. The institution of chiefs ceased to exist after independence.

The M.U had then rejected all approaches by Phizo and other Naga radicals who visited them with the proposal that they join Nagas for the demand for political independence.

4.3 Reasons for Insurgency

The year 1954 was a watershed in Mizo history. In April that year the name of the district was changed from Lushai Hills into Mizo district by an Act of Parliament. Most importantly this was the year when the father of Mizo Insurgency Laldenga returned from the Army’s demobilization Centre and took up an appointment as cashier in the Mizo District Council. He was opposed and vociferous about the liberal outlook of the elders in the district council and exaggerated the achievements of the Naga rebellion then raging in full fury. Without a party to move forward, however, Laldanga should have remained a firebrand within the confines of the Mizo Hills but a famine, locally called “Mautam”
suddenly fell into his lap as a God given gift from the eco-system of Lushai Hills. During 1959-1960 ‘Mautam’ struck and threw Mizos to untold misery.

The north east is rich in bamboo which flowers in two cycles – the one with the longer periodicity of 50 years is known as ‘Mautam’ and the other with 30 year cycle as ‘Thingtam’. The previous Mautam was in 1910-11. Mautam makes its inevitable visitation at the time of the dying of the bamboos in the forests. The subsequent sprouting of the bamboo shoots bring with it, a part of the cyclic scourge, an astronomical increase in rodents population. They go berserk and devour the bamboo shoots and the standing crops of ‘Jhum’. Attempts to beat them back were of no avail. They just kept coming in hordes.

Previously the chiefs (Sailos) utilized the reserve food grains. With this system having been dispensed with, since independence the elders turned to Shillong when the tell tale signs were seen “but the authorities were either ignorant of the ecosystem or callous or both. Imagine primitive tribes on the verge of starvation tucked away in antiquity. Crazed by hunger and fear they were ready to erupt and sever their fragile links with a ‘sadistic’ administration. Laldenga seized the opportunity, quit his job in the district council under questionable circumstances and formed the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) which later became “MNF by dropping the word ‘famine’. Even some members of the Mizo Union convinced of Assam’s malafides joined it. To break what he termed “economic blockade by Shillong”, Laldenga sent batches of volunteers across Burma border to bring rice from Chin Hillmen. By then, he was openly exhorting secession and the establishment of a “sovereign and independent Greater Mizoram”.

4.4 Organizations involved in insurgency
Mizo National Front

The only one organization involved in Mizo insurgency was the Mizo National Front (MNF). Its organizational set up was as follows:-
Mizo National Front
President – Laldengs
Vice President – Lalnunmaiwa
General Secretary – S. Lianzuala

Political Wing Mizo national Army Mizo National Volunteers (MNV)
(including civil admin.) (MNA - 5000) (5000)

Brig. Genl. S.S. Sawnvela
(MNV was initially unarmed but later provided with rifles and hand-grenades when obtained – mostly captured from Indian S.F.)

Dagger Brigade (4 brigades)

Lion Brigade (4 brigades)

Training school in the then East Pakistan.

The aim of MNF was to establish of a sovereign and independent Greater Mizoram. The MNF was armed with rifles, LMGs and Mortars obtained from the then East Pakistan.

4.4.1 Nature of Activities

Soon after formation, MNF intensified its activities initiating a concerted drive to collect “donations” from towns and villages to recruit volunteers and to give them
intensified training in guerilla tactics. At the same time, MNF opened a diplomatic front organized to obtain arms from the then East Pakistan and the Chin Hills. Pakistan went out of its way to arrange for the training of Mizo extremists at the exclusive training camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts just as it had done for the Nagas. In Dacca, where Laldenga had set up the ‘Mission’ the Pakistan Govt. was found more than willing to help. Arms started flowing to Mizo Hills from Chittagong viz. the railhead Dohazari. By the end of 1965 several batches of volunteers had received training in guerilla warfare. On their return, they openly flaunted their flag and formed a “shadow government of Mizoram” but concealed their weapons. The MNF drew support from all sections of the Mizos in general.

The MNF declared independence for Mizoram just after midnight of 28th February/1st March, 1966 and launched a number of attacks meant to isolate Mizoram from rest of the country, overpower the Assam Rifle detachments establish control over the main administrative centres and loot treasuries and armouries to sustain the rebellion. For a time, it was win for MNF but with Army moving in the situation was brought under control. On 2.3.1966 Mizoram was declared a disturbed area and by April, Army could take all important towns and MNF was on the run. Army launched two operations, code named ‘Operation Blanket’ and ‘Operation Accomplishment’ by which regrouping of villages was done which took the hostiles by surprise.

The liberation of Bangladesh resulted in the dismantling of Mizo UG set ups in that country. As a result, many UGs surrendered which included some top leaders. Laldenga went to Pakistan and sought asylum there. Soon the liberals got upper hand in Mizoram and the Mizo Union which was pro-Congress earlier joined the Congress party. Thus for the first time MNF suffered a moral defeat.

Conditions remained clam till 1974 when afresh upsurge swept across the land. After the assassination of Sk. Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh and the overthrow of his government new sanctuaries were established in the Chittagong Hill tracts by die-hard elements among the MNF and they soon launched a terrorist drive in Mizoram. It asked
all Vais (meaning outsiders) to leave Mizoram before January, 1975. Soon an attempted assassination of the then Lt. Governor, S.Mukherjee was later followed by a dastardly act of terrorism when a group of MNF volunteers entered the Police Headquarters in the heart of Aizawl and shot dead the IG, the DIG and the SP (January, 1975). For the first time, subsequently an IPS officer was appointed Chief Secretary to the Mizo Govt. and tough security was initiated. A campaign was also launched to educate the people leading to surrender of 500 MNF volunteers, many of them with arms.

Seeing the situation changed, Laldenga relented and agreed to have dialogue with New Delhi since 1976.

MNF adopted the tactics of avoiding open encounter with SF wherever possible. MNF was voted to power in the 1987 elections after the Mizoram Accord (Appendix-I) was signed (30.6.1986). That finally laid to rest the spectre of violence and insurgency in Mizoram.

Three issues, however were nagging at the ‘Garden of Peace’ viz. (1) The Chins’ (2) the Reangs, and (3) the foreigners (the Bangladeshis).

4.4.1.1 The Chins

There was crossing over of CNA (Chin National Army) volunteers to Mizoram from across the border. In fact, migration of the Myanmar nationals to Mizoram had continued unabated for years. The girls from Central Myanmar came to India for getting employment in the unorganized handloom sector as they are known for weaving. A major chunk of them are Chins who speak a language almost akin to that of the Mizo’s. The Mizo Govt. however argues that “Chins are like our brothers. Migration does take place and these are not very serious matters. The Mizo’s also migrated to the other side of the border when there were problems here”. But now there has been a backward migration from Myanmar to Mizoram in the backdrop of the continuous turbulence under the military regime and its staunch anti-democracy policy. Even some elected M.Ps from
Myanmar have been taking refuge in Mizoram and even in Delhi. It has often been suspected that the CNA cadres have also been taking asylum along with the pro-democracy political leaders from Myanmar.

4.4.1.2 The Reangs or Brus

Reangs also called Brus were claimed to be the original inhabitants of Mizoram. This was however disputed on the ground that they belonged to the Myani Hills of Chittagong Hill tracts of South East Bangladesh. Their ancestry in Mizoram was from 1942 when they migrated to the State from Tripura. Till 1961, their population was negligible which rose sharply within a decade. This was reportedly due to large scale migration from other places rather than due to biological factor.

“The Bru National Union (BNU) in Mizoram has been fighting for an Autonomous District Council for them in the west of Aizawl district under the 6th schedule of the Indian Constitution. This demand triggered off ethnic violence culminating in the exodus of 42,000 Reangs to Tripura who have been sheltered there in camps. The Mizo govt rejected the demand but offered the Reangs a sort of development council for their socio-economic upliftment. BNU insisted “that only an autonomous Council can accommodate their aspirations”. Reangs boycotted the September, 25, 1999 Parliament elections on the ground that many Reangs did not find their names in the voters list. The Mizoram Bru Refugee Committee (MBRC) also supported the BNU on the issue. They formed a militant outfit viz. Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) to fight for their cause which was active both in Mizoram and Tripura. This outfit was helped by the erstwhile Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) and later by the ATTF and the NLFT (both of Tripura) in training their volunteers, weaponizing, etc. The move of the BNLF was reportedly to unite all the Reangs in Tripura and Mizoram and fight for an autonomous council in view of the continuous inflow of Bangladeshis to Tripura. They feared that if the flow of foreigners continued, they would be alien in their own land and therefore wanted to consolidate the position.
4.4.1.3 The Foreigners (Bangladeshis)

The foreigners issue was also causing concern to Mizoram. According to the Chief Minister of Mizoram, “It is this issue which have led to disturbances and the State of insurgency in Manipur, in Assam, in Meghalaya, in Nagaland and in Mizoram also. And this is very important, specially here in Mizoram. I believe that now we really need prevention of the foreign infiltrants into Mizoram. And for this I am thinking of asking the Home Minister at least a battalion of PIF (Prevention of Infiltration Force) to guard the international borders. This is one point and the other point is that we shall have to identify the real foreigners who are the infiltrators in Mizoram. And we shall have to repatriate them to their own land”. According to official figures, the number of Muslims in Mizoram was stated that 10,000 but in reality it was assessed around 50,000 (total population 6,89,756). Mizoram has both land and river routes for egress and ingress to and from Bangladesh.

Mizoram was considered otherwise peaceful. It is however not without the problem of influx of Bangladeshis. As per the 1991 census there were 4438 Muslims. This was the official figure. There is a Mosque in Aizawl. “The Imam reportedly told the then Governor of Mizoram that on Id Prayer day the congregation was of about 10,000. These Bangladeshis sneak through the jungle and hilly terrains of south Barak Valley. They are not welcome. Because the Mizos have not developed their own work forces. These Bangladeshis are generally carpenters, masons and allied work force.

Twenty years of insurgency related unaccounted money and series of five year plans helped a section of Mizos including officials to amass wealth and become multi-millionaires. They have massive buildings almost as big as forts and who will work for them except these Bangladeshis”.

116
Today Mizoram presented a picture of affluence in an otherwise poverty stricken North-East. This State however was under the grip of consumerism not a good spectacle for Mizo's future.

Rock music, denim jeans and Maruti cars, multi-storyed buildings and ever increasing desire to earn money by any means by a section in the backdrop of lack of infrastructural development leading to frightful unemployment levels among the educated youth, non-existent avenues for self-employment, spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases and ever-widening hiatus between the Mizos and non-Mizo tribals speak a different picture. "All kinds of drugs are consumed by the youth here with many resorting to the intravenous injections of proxyvon - a major health hazard. The use of proxyvon is reported to have resulted in a sharp rise in HIV infection. The abuse combined with sex-related HIV spread is likely to cause unprecedented devastation in the years to come". The govt. was however alive to the seriousness. The administrative field continued to be the only source of employment. The figure of unemployment stood around 30,000 (1999) for a population of about 7 lakhs. "Moreover, the decades old contractor-bureaucratic-politician nexus in making a fast buck in township-centered development of a non-productive genre hardly provides any hope of retrieving the ever worsening situation on the employment front".
DISTRICTS OF TRIPURA

INSURGENT ORGANISATIONS OF TRIPURA:

1) ATTF
2) NLFT
3) BNLF
4) UBLF
Chapter - 5

INSURGENCY/MILITANCY IN TRIPURA

5.1 The State

Among the seven sisters in the North East, the State of Tripura, “the land of Fourteen Gods” can aptly be called a simmering cauldron of woes and India’s grief. An Achilles’ heel on the Indian body politic it was acceded to India on 15.10.1949 and as a curse bequeathed was also the problem of unchecked migration of outsiders more particularly Bengalis and their unplanned settlement in different tribal areas thereby basically altering the economical, social, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and psycho-emotional complexion of the State. The local Tripuris were made a non-entity due to deprivation of land by sheer exploitation by the strong over the weak. This issue served as the prime catalyst for insurgency in the State of Tripura. Subsequently other issues such as changes due to modernization, limited mobility, rising expectations, failure of govt. to remove poverty, indebtedness, activities of power groups at the behest of political parties, churches, corruption by govt. agencies and communication gap, etc. added tang to the movement.

Under British rule, a kingdom then, Tripura, enjoyed a special status in that it had only to recognize the British paramountcy and was otherwise independent. After accession, it was made a part ‘C’ State and subsequently a Union Territory from November, 1956. It attained statehood from January, 1972 along with Manipur.

Tripura was once a powerful kingdom. According to Imperial Gazetteer, East Bengal and Assam of 1909 “The Tripura kingdom reached its zenith under Dhanya Manikya (1490) who extended his empire from the Meghna river to the eastern limits of Arakans and north into Cachar through a series of campaigns. His successors expanded the Bengal conquests with the inclusion of Chittagong, Sylhet, Comilla and Noakhali adding to the earlier seizure of Chalkla Roshanabad. Later Tripura history was marked
by a series of encounters with the Mughal Governors of Bengal who invaded the State and sought tribute from it. The Mughal empire was soon in decline and with the British taking over the Dewani of Bengal, Tripura lost virtually all its Bengal conquests barring the Zamindari of Chakla Roshanabad (a strip of 570 sq. miles) running through Sylhet Comilla, and Noakhali and was more or less reduced to its present boundaries within what was known as Hill Tippera(h). Thus began Tripura’s contact with Bengal and Bengalis.

The State of Tripura lies between latitude 22 degree 56’N and 24 degree 22’N and longitude 91 degree 10’E and 92 degree 21’E. Tripura thrusts out its head in to Bangladesh and bounds the State on the northern, western and southern sides and has 839 km border with it. Its neck is held by Assam and Mizoram on the northern and eastern sides respectively. The maximum length of Tripura from North to South is 183.5 kms and breadth from east to west is 112.7 kms. The land surface linking Assam and Mizoram covers and area of 162 kms. The present territorial area of the State is 10477 sq. kms. A map of Tripura is enclosed. “Nature made Tripura a predominantly hilly region. It is dissected by six low range hills running north-west to south-east. They rise in elevation from 100 to 3000 ft. the heights increasing as one goes south-west to north-east with a strip of plain (called Bengal) running down the western fringe gradually widening further south. There are six principal ranges of hills viz. (1) Betamura (2) Baramura(3) Atharamura (4) Longthiarai (5) Sakhen, and (6) Jampai. The average distance between ranges is 12 to 18 kms. A peak known as ‘Betalang Shiv” is the highest”.

Tripuris were numerically more predominant than the other S.Ts of Tripura. Ethnologically they were affiliated to the Bodo Tribes of Tibeto-Burmen Group who were spread over the whole of Brahmaputra Valley and North Bengal forming a solid base of North Eastern India. Tripuri dialect commonly known as ‘Mrung’ belong to the Tibeto Burman group. There were other tribes also like Reangs, Jamatias etc. Their details are mentioned separately.
5.2 Genesis of Insurgency.

The seed of insurgency was embedded in the land tenancy system prevalent in the then Tripura Kingdom which grew up under proper surroundings. “There was a system of "ziarat" tenants. Land was taken up under what was called ‘Jangal abadi leases’ under which land was given free for four to ten years and a rent of two to three annas (equal to 12 to 18 paise now) charged gradually increasing till it reached a moderate amount. This was to induce land development. Apart from it the Tripuri kings encouraged establishment of tea gardens. It was here that migrant labourers were engaged and non-tribals particularly Bengalis started pouring in. This was the position during pre-independence days. During periods of communal and political unrest in the then East Pakistan, Bengalis made their way to the west of Tripura where Bengali settlements were there. Slowly this area willy-nilly began to take on the appearance of “Little Bengal”. Bengali culture started over-shadowing and the king himself accepted Bengali language. In course of time, Bengali became the State language. Although there were legends which spoke of existence of Tripura as a political entity since the days of Mahabharata, Tripura was consolidated as a kingdom by a tribal king of Indo-Mongoloid origin, who later assumed the title of Manikya. One of them Maharaja Virchandra Manikya Bahadur was a friend of Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore who visited Agartala at the invitation of the former. Tagore immortalized Tripura in his novel “Rajarshi” and drama “Visharjan” based on legends of the Tripura Kings.

The patronage extended by the king saw its reflection in all fields as Bengalis were engaged in Administration/Judiciary etc. This process saw the tribals taking a backseat. The tribals did not react initially. At one time the king himself had realized that a time would come when the tribals would be alien in their own land and took precautions to reserve certain areas for them. But the continuous influx of Bengalis made them to be eased out and go into the jungle. Demudation due to ‘Jhumming’ (shifting cultivation) saw depletion of forest areas affecting life of tribals. They took to borrowing money from the settlers who charged exorbitant rate of interest. This resulted in a vicious circle where the ‘Mahajans’ and money lenders exploited the tribals. With partition there
was an exodus and the population of Bengalis increased tremendously as the following statement would show. The tribals realized that their very existence would be in jeopardy if not reacting. What hurt them most was the way in which refugees in general were treated. While the Bengalis were treated as ‘displaced’ persons, the tribals like ‘chakmas’ ‘mogs’ etc. were treated as foreigners. After the merger, the Govt. of India was busy with refugee problem and did not take up contentious issues. Once in power, political leaders were busy with power politics and tribals became mere pawns in their hands.

Table-I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Variation</th>
<th>Total Tribal Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Tribals to total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>3,04,347</td>
<td>32-59</td>
<td>1,71,610</td>
<td>56-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3,82,450</td>
<td>25-63</td>
<td>2,03,327</td>
<td>52-89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>5,13,010</td>
<td>34-14</td>
<td>2,56,991</td>
<td>53-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6,39,028</td>
<td>24-56</td>
<td>2,37,953</td>
<td>37-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>11,42,005</td>
<td>78-71</td>
<td>3,60,070</td>
<td>31-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15,56,342</td>
<td>36-28</td>
<td>4,50,544</td>
<td>28-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>27,57,205</td>
<td>74-50</td>
<td>8,53,345</td>
<td>30-95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Ratio of Bengali/Tripuris 7:3)

The statement indeed shows a sudden spurt in 1951-61 period an abnormally high rate as compared to other decadal periods. This can be explained only as migrations from Bangladesh after partition.

The tribal argument that they were in majority was true up to 1941 when they were 53-16% of the total population and a majority. But then partition came and they continued in their areas in Bangladesh. To say that they were in majority on the Indian
side of Tripura after its annexation was not true to facts as a good portion of Tripura had gone to Pakistan. As such they were in minority and were never a majority from Indian point of view. But this basic fact is overlooked and the grouse that they were reduced to a minority in their own land was raised. It was indeed a fact that they were ejected out of their own land by both fair and dubious means by the settlers who were Bengalis.

For the tribals in general the situation was fairly good in urban areas. “In the rural areas they were dependant on ‘Ojhas’ (priests) and quacks who exploited the simple folk. Malnutrition, unhygienic living conditions led to ill-health and ailments. There were many deaths”. Unequal development, exploitation by settler Bengalis and political parties, lack of communication, lack of industrialization and total neglect by the Central Govt. after partition compounded the problem. If class distinctions were not there earlier because of economic development it took birth. Even the ‘Debharmanis’ and other educated high ranking officials who were close to the then king formed a class by themselves. Economic affluence became the criterion for class affiliation and in this scenario poor illiterate tribals had no place.

In between activities of Christian Missionaries added a new dimension to the deteriorating situation. Their activities reportedly included both manifest and unmanifest activities. They had allegedly encouraged the tribals in the interior to agitate for their due share. This is dealt separately. The communist ideology was already doing its round. Added to this was the Central Govt.’s most favoured policies for the SC/ST which further fired their imagination and raked their inherent tribal feelings. They now itched for wreaking vengeance upon Bengalis for their exploitation.

What had taken place in Tripura was only natural in course of events and not due to any intentional mischief by any section of society. It was more of exploitation by politicians and Church and Govt. policies which took matters to a point of no return.

Tribals got educated and they saw that they were over powered by 3:7. Their initial efforts for getting justice having failed they took to revolutionary methods. Even
then unscrupulous politicians exploited them which when realized led to severance of that relationship. Following table shows the State/District and Tribal population in Tripura.

**Total Population:** 2,757,205  
**Hindus:** 2,384,934  
**Muslim:** 1,96,495  
**Christians:** 46,472  
**Buddhists:** 1,28,260

**Table-II**

**District-wise population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name of district</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Tribal Population</th>
<th>Percentage to total dist. population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>West Tripura</td>
<td>1293861</td>
<td>325845</td>
<td>15-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>North Tripura</td>
<td>467147</td>
<td>96463</td>
<td>20-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>South Tripura</td>
<td>718732</td>
<td>296930</td>
<td>40-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dhalai District</td>
<td>277465</td>
<td>140107</td>
<td>5-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2757205</strong></td>
<td><strong>853345</strong></td>
<td><strong>30-94</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tribe-wise the Tripuris who speak the 'Kok Barok' constitute the majority. Tribe-wise population is as follows:-

**Table-III**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Tripuris</td>
<td>250545</td>
<td>330872</td>
<td>483536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Reang</td>
<td>46722</td>
<td>84003</td>
<td>122763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Jamatia</td>
<td>34192</td>
<td>44501</td>
<td>65033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Chakma</td>
<td>28662</td>
<td>34747</td>
<td>50853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Halam</td>
<td>19076</td>
<td>28969</td>
<td>42336</td>
</tr>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Chaimal</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

N.B. Tribal census was not done in 1991 due to insurgency and hence projected figures.

A special strategy called tribal sub-plan was adopted during 5th Plan period for the accelerated development of S.T., under which each department of the State Govt. was required to quantify and set apart an amount of their plan budget provision for implementation of schemes exclusively for the S.T. and the fund so quantified was not to be less than the percentage of S.T population of the State. The Tripura govt. has quantified 31% of the plan funds of each department towards the development of the tribals. It however remained a pipe dream as insurgency and development did not go hand in hand.

5.3 Reasons for Insurgency

Any insurgency has to have some basic favourable factors. Tripura had them plenty and more. An insurgency has to be led from the front by a charismatic leader(s) who awakens the pent up emotions of the people over an issue. Such feelings could be over social/economic/political deprivation, land alienation, oppression, and denial by a particular section that could be real or perceived and inspiration.

124
3.3.3 REASONS FOR INSURGENCY

Demographic
- 1. Land alienation due to large scale Bengali migration.
- 2. Restricted mobility of tribals.

Ecological
- 1. Denudation due to "Jhumming" (shifting cultivation).
- 2. Ecological imbalance.

Political
- 1. Exploitation of tribals by political parties.
- 2. Transfer of power from tribals to non-tribals.
- 3. Generation of power groups among tribals preaching terrorism.
- 4. Failure to fulfill promises.
- 5. Rising hopes and aspirations.
- 6. Uncompromising nature of settlers & tribals.

Economical
- 1. Lack of communication, infrastructure, employment opportunities.
- 2. Usurpation of powers by settlers.
- 3. Indebtedness and poverty.
- 4. Rampant corruption.
- 5. Dependence of tribals on 'Mahajans' & Money lenders.

Social & Cultural
- 1. Bengali cultural domination.
- 2. Social inequities and discrimination.

Linguistic

Geographic
- 1. Hilly terrain
- 2. Porous border with Bangladesh.
- 4. Help from ISI

Religious
- 1. Conversions
- 2. Deviationist activities of church

Neglect by Centre
- 1. Inefficient Administration
- 2. Failure to fulfill promises.
- 3. Failure of law and order machinery.
- 4. Alleged atrocities by S.F.
In an insurgency the perceived is usually blown out of proportion by harping on a nonexistent wonder world which sway simple minds. If the people as a class belonged to an ethnic group nothing would be more ideal for preparing psychological base for insurgency. While there were many leaders to take up cause of Tripuri tribals over land alienation it was the firebrand B.K. Hrangkhal who first raised the voice of armed revolt through an organization named Tripura National Volunteers (TNV). He was a Christian convert. Even though he had surrendered his legacy lived on for others to emulate. All the subsequent UG outfits had the blessings of Hrangkhal.

The geographical location played a crucial role. The porous international border with Bangladesh run in between Chittagong Hill tracts and a stretch of no man’s land in Bangladesh for about 15-20 kms. provided an impregnable fortress for any insurgent group to operate.

The Chakmas lived across the border, a community which was subjected to a raw deal during the Chakma refugee crisis in 1980. Those pushed back by India lived in those tracts and they provided safe haven for Indian insurgents. Ironically Chakmas constituted a chunk of insurgents of Tripura. People belonging to the same ethnic group across an international border played a pro-active role in any insurgency.

Foreign help was a foregone conclusion both from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Weapons were available at Cox Bazar in Bangladesh, one of the main centres of weapon supply for all insurgent groups. With everything available and a cause to pursue the cause of eviction of Tripuris from their own land there was no stopping of Tripuris. Given will, with support from Bangladesh government Tripura insurgents could prolong a guerilla warfare indefinitely without much ado. Incidentally the base for them was allegedly prepared by Congress and CPM of Tripura.

While the main reason for insurgency in Tripura was attributed to land alienation followed by inspiration from other insurgent movements in the North East, it would be
ideal if one delved into the causes put forward by the insurgent groups themselves for insurgency.

The Tripura Insurgents aver that their country was never subdued by the Mughals or had any treaty with British Govt. “This country was never subdued by the Mughals nor had any treaty with the British Government in the true sense of the term, during their rule in India”.

“It is to be mentioned here that four months before the declaration of Indian Independence on 15th August, 1947 A.D the last independent king of Twipra (Tripura) His Highness Bir Bikram Manikya Borna who had proposed to the British to place the entire north eastern region of India including the Chittagong Hill tracks under one crown died unnaturally on 17th May, 1947 A.D. at the age of 39 years in his own palace. Had he been successful the picture of North East would have been different today... It was at this stage that the kingdom was invaded and annexed by the imperialist India and subsequently made to sign the formal merger agreement on October, 15th 1949 A.D.”

“As expected tens of thousands of Boroks under the leadership of Aghora Dev Borna demonstrated throughout the country against this policy in the year 1948 A.D. In order to subdue the uprising and protest, the imperialist India disbanded the vast independent Tripura military forces and imposed martial laws in this kingdom for more than four years (1948-1952). Consequently throughout the country indigenous Boroks have been suppressed, thousands of Boroks were tortured, molested, harassed, raped, detained and imprisoned by the cruel and uncivilized Indian Army. In Khowai division the Indian security personnel fired upon civilians who were protesting against the unlawful and forcible merger killing three Borok women on the spot and injuring many others”.

“As a result of forcible merger of the kingdom into Indian Union thousands of Boroks became jobless”.

127
“After the unlawful annexation, the Govt. of India encouraged infiltration and settlement of Bengali Hindus from West Bengal, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and mainland India in Twipra kingdom. They were given employment opportunities, business facilities, educational, cultural and more importantly political power in the newly established Govt. of Twipra. As such the administration was filled up by the outsiders with the result that the administrative powers slipped out of the hands of the Borok people. After having captured all key positions in Twipra with the aid of imperialist India the illegal immigrants set ablaze all the historical evidence, document and administrative records of Twipra kingdom. The Bubagra Khumtrang (Rajmala), a chronicle history of Twipra was banned while Twipra Era (Tring) was replaced by Bengali calendar. Thereafter they imposed Hindu Bengali culture, religion, language and political domination with their Indian Army upon the Boroks. As a result the illegal immigrants have become Master of the State while the indigenous people have been reduced to slaves”.

“The rapid growth of population caused by the large scale immigration affected the genetic, ecological, geographical, economic, social, religious, cultural and political aspects of the society. In Twipra the growth of population is so phenomenal that over a decade following the partition, the territory registered more than twenty times increase in its population. This abnormally high growth of population is not due to the factors of fertilities and mortalities in the Twipra kingdom. But it largely accounts for a great influx of illegal immigrants the kingdom had to receive in the early years of independence. As a result by the 1960s the illegal immigrants had outnumbered the indigenous Boroks in their own homeland. The Boroks who constituted 99% of the total population of present Twipra as far the census conducted by late His Highness King Bir Bikrom Kishore Dev Borma in 1931 has only 30% of the total population at present”.

“Considering all accounts one can safety say that there has been progressive deterioration of the living condition of the Boroks after the annexation of Twipra kingdom by imperialist India in 1948. In fact taken as a whole the indigenous people are merely existing rather than living. Poverty, hunger, starvation and disease hunt them as
the economy of the State is over burdened with over population. In other words 3 million people in a State with area of 10,491 sq. kms and economy based on agriculture cannot naturally sustain such a big population”.

“It will not be out of place to point out here that the government of Twipra was largely responsible for land alienation of the indigenous people. It was clearly stated by Sachindra Lal Singh, Chief Minister of Twipra in 1963 who proclaimed the policy of Langal Jar Bhumi (he who ploughs the land shall own it). Consequently the illegal Bengali immigrants occupied lands owned by the Boroks by force with the active help of the government officials. His successors followed the same policies. Hence the government made various legislations in favour of Bengali Hindu immigrants at the cost of indigenous people. For instance, with the view of settling the illegal immigrants from the then East Pakistan, West Bengal and mainland India, the government led by Sukhmoy Sengupta dereserved 2170 sq. miles of plain available lands which were kept reserved exclusively for the indigenous people by the late His Highness King Bir Bikrom Kishore Dev Borma in two installments vide Memo No.149 of 1931 and 325 of 1943 respectively in spite of State-wide protests by the Borok nation”. “Similarly, in 1971 the State Government led by the illegal Hindu immigrants by an act evicted more than 20,000 indigenous people for the Dongor Hydro Electric Project. It covers an area of about 4,547.9 acres of plain cultivable lands owned by the Borok people. In fact, it was the most fertile land in Twipra. The protest movement organized by the indigenous people was suppressed by force. The government despatched police, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Army with elephants and bulldozers to demolish the houses and other establishments. As such the security force committed all sorts of excesses like torturing including old and children molesting of women, etc. to force the residents to vacate the area. To make matters worse the displaced indigenous people were not provided with suitable alternate settlement and proper compensation”.

“What heightens the magnitude of the problem is that the administrative machinery of the State Government of Twipra is biased against the Boroks in as much as it is manned by the illegal Hindu Bengali immigrants. All the avenues for development
of the Boroks be it education, employment or economic are blocked by them as
development of the Boroks in such areas as per their conviction would inevitably hamper
their interests in the long term. Hence one cannot expect any justice or fair deal from
such system so far as the welfare of the Boroks are concerned”.

Tracing out the agitational programmes launched by the Boroks it was stated that
“Boroks have left no stone unturned over the years in this regard but to no avail.

It needs no reiteration of the fact that the ethnic Boros had vehemently opposed
the very forcible merger right in 1948. But it was suppressed with brute force. As a
result “Sengkrak” (Clenched Fist) an indigenous peoples organization was formed in
1948 to oppose the influx of illegal immigrants and their settlement in Tripura. In the hill
areas they established a parallel govt. and as such the administration was practically
confined to the capital town for a few years. However it was subsequently crushed by the
Indian Army”.

“Sengkrak” had carried out violent activities on many Bengali refugee camps and
had terrorized them. A section of C.P.I.s Tribal wing named “Tripura Gana Mukti
Praishad” had also taken part in it.

In 1951 another organization named the Tripura Democratic Union was formed
but died a natural death within a decade without achieving any success.

In 1954 educated Boroks formed the “Adivasi Samsad” and made a representation
to the Union Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel but no solution could be
found. The Boroks blamed the Govt. of India and expressed the feeling that the govt. of
India was not genuinely interested in solving the problem.

Subsequently in 1967 all educational ‘Boroks’ representing various sections of
society viz. Politicians, social workers, employees, students and youths assembled and
decided to form an organization uniting all Boroks. The result was the formation of the
Tripura Upajathi Juba Sabha (TUJS). This was also the time when the CPM got defeated both in the parliament and assembly elections. TUJS became the mouth piece of the youth. It put forward demands such as:

1. Restoration of tribal lands to tribals.
3. Introduction of local language “Kok Borok” in Roman script as the State language.

Immediately after its formation, the CPM wanted it to function as its front which was refused. As a result the CPM members in the Executive Committee withdrew.

This year (1967) also saw the reemergence of “Sengkrak” (clenched fist) once again. If earlier this was formed by Tripuris, this time it was formed by the Chakmas and Reangs. The tribal Christian pastors had reportedly played a great role in instigating the tribals to take a strident attitude towards the State and Central Governments so as to get maximum benefits for tribals. They wanted the Tripuris to fall in line with other tribals of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, etc. areas so as to have a ‘Land of Christ’ in the area. Sengkrak was reportedly succeeding. It sought the help of the Mizo National Front (MNF) of Mizoram who readily helped as they were then fighting for independence of Mizoram. It demanded that Bengali settlers who had come should leave before 25.11.1967. When they failed to obey Sengkrak volunteers with the help from MNF raided Bengali colonies and indulged in mayhem.

On getting inspiration from the Nagas and Mizos, the TUJS formed the Tripura Tribal Students Federation (TTSF), Tripura United Karmachari Sangh (TUKS) and a Tripura Sena (TU) for the youth in order to mass base the organization. Like the “Sengkrak” it also got in touch with the MNF and trained the Tripura Sena in Guerrilla warfare. Thus the tribals of Tripura slowly but surely inched towards launching an insurgency movement.
Ironically instead of finding a solution to the problems raised by various organizations and desisting them from taking the road to insurgency by channelizing their energies to development of Tripura, the political parties like the C.P.I, C.P.M., R.S.P. Forward Block, Congress, etc. allegedly vied with one another in exploiting the growing disquietude to further party’s interests.

In between a socio-cultural organizations named “Barkhi Halami” formed by the Tribal intelligentsia for bringing amity between communities, when tensions were running high, came into being (1974) like a bubble only to burst. It had no takers.

In the 1977 elections Congress was wiped out and C.P.M. once again came to power with TUJS in opposition.

The C.P.M. as per promises made in election manifesto tried to form District Councils in Hills but the Bengalis in the Hills opposed it. To counter the move, the Bengalis formed an organization known as “Amara Bengali” (A.B.) in September, 1978. Behind it was reportedly Anand Margis. It organized Tripura Bandhs and opposed tribal councils. On the other hand, TUJS organized meetings etc. in support of Dist. Council. Untoward incidents took place in which both tribals and non-tribals adopted violent methods and the communal feelings were soured.

The tribals soon held a secret meeting in South Tripura, a tribal stronghold. Prominent leaders who attended the meeting were (1) B.K. Hrangkhal (2) Chuni Kalai (3) Dulal Hrangkhal (4) Karna Singh Jamatia. This meeting formed the mother organization of actual insurgency movement in Tripura viz. the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) under the presidency of Bijoy Kr. Hrangkhal @ B.K. Hrangkhal (then a new Christian convert) with the aim of establishing an independent tribal state of Tripura by ousting the legally elected government through armed revolution. Volunteers of ‘Tripur Sena’ were drafted to the TNV and groups left for Chittagong hill tracts for guerilla training in MNF (Mizo National Front) camps. The action of Hrangkhal drafting Tripur Sena Volunteers
was not to the liking of TUJS leaders and therefore he was expelled from the organization. This gave Hrangible a free hand. After completion of training of TNV volunteers Hrangkanhal with the help of MNF commenced insurgent activities. TNV volunteers raided police stations, ambushed S.F. convoys, looted markets, etc. TNV could get support from the masses.

By middle of 1979 communal atmosphere get vitiated. Coinciding with the movement in Tripura, the All Assam Students Union (AASU) had also launched an agitation for the ouster of foreigners from Assam which further inspired the Tripuris youth.

During the 12th annual general meeting of the TUJS held in south Tripura (March, 1980) a resolution was adopted demanding expulsion of all those who had come to Tripura after 15.10.1949 (date of accession). It also decided (1) to take deputations and demonstrate before all block offices during May and (2) to boycott all markets which was meant to exacerbate communal feelings.

By first week of June, 1980, communal tension started building up which ended in a carnage. Hundreds of villages were burnt, hundreds were killed on both sides, women raped, children orphaned. It was a genocide. At some places Muslims had allegedly taken the side of Tripuris. With this incident the relation between Tripuris and Bengalis became embittered and bitter.

In the T.N.V. a separate group was floated for some time named as “Army of Tripura Peoples Organization (ATPLO) by one Binanda Jamatia in December, 1980 allegedly at the instance of C.P.M. It kidnapped B.K. Hrangkanhal but was saved by his trusted lieutenants. It also got its volunteers trained by the MNF in the Chittagong Hills. It had defence, civil, foreign affairs wings, etc. and collected taxes and raided S.F. posts as part of its terrorist activities. Soon however Jamatia came to an agreement with the C.P.M and surrendered along with the followers on 23.7.83. Subsequently he joined the Gana Mukti Parishad, the tribal wing of C.P.M. making one to believe that ATPLO was indeed a brain child of C.P.M. He was however murdered brutally on 17.2.1985.
In the Tripura Upajati Juba Sabha (TUJS) also there were bickerings and some of its disgruntled elements formed an organization known as Tripura Hill Peoples Party (THPP) in 1980 but it also became a pocket organization of C.P.M. and took a strident stand against the TUJS - Cong-I combine. Ironically the surrendered or disgruntled only had gone to the C.P.M.

In October, 1988 a section of another group of disgruntled TNV volunteers formed an organization known as Tripura National Liberation Front (TNLF) which however surrendered in December, 1989 when government assured their rehabilitation. Ironically but for the promise nothing concrete was done by the government for their rehabilitation. The tribal youth as a result lost all faith in the government’s assurances.

5.4 Organizations Involved

Given below is a table of organizations that have been espousing the cause of the Tripuris. Among them, the ATTF and the NLFT were still engaged in indiscriminate killings.

Table –IV

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<tr>
<th>Sl.No</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sengrak (Clenched Fist) – 1948</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Tripura Democratic Union – 1951</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Adivasi Samsad – 1954</td>
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<td>Tripura Upajathi Juba Sabha (TUJS)–1967</td>
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<td>Sengrak – surfaced again – 1967</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Amara Bengali (of Bengalis) – 1978</td>
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<td>Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) – 1978</td>
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<td>Tripura Hill Peoples Party (THPP) – 1988</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Tripura National Liberation Front (TNLF) – 1988</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) – 1990</td>
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<td>(ii) Jirania</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(iii) Teliamura</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(iv) Khowai</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) – 1989</td>
<td>South Dist.</td>
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<td>Associate Organizations : (1) Tripura National Sengrak Force (TNSF)</td>
<td>(i) Birganj</td>
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<td>(2) Tripura National Force (TNF)</td>
<td>(ii) Nutan Bazar</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Strength : 700 (approx.)</td>
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<tr>
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3. **South District**
- (i) Santirbazar
- (ii) Baikora
- (iii) R.K. Pur
- (iv) Killa
- (v) Taidu
- (vi) Ompi
- (vii) Birganj
- (viii) Nutan Bazar

4. **North District**
- (i) Fatikroy
- (ii) Damcherra
- (iii) Choraibari
- (iv) Panisagav
- (v) Pecharthal
- (vi) Kanchanpur

**Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) – 1998**
This organization was active among the Reangs. It was actively operating in Mizoram.

**Bengali Organization**
United Bengali Liberation Force – Formed in 1999 by Bengalis to oppose the tribal outfits. Strength 100 approx. It is in
In addition to the above organizations, there were allegedly a number of surrogate insurgent outfits which indulged in killings/kidnappings. Some of them were also said to be of anti-social elements. Through some of the killings of innocent people “by sudden raid, the tribal militants set a dangerous example of degeneration of misguided youth into the depth of dehumanization”. Most of them were also reportedly the tools of I.S.I. operatives. “Geopolitical outcome of the interaction of the armed extremists with the I.S.I is responsible for a Kashmir like challenge in Tripura because the landlocked State has common border with Bangladesh facilitating easy infiltration and exfiltration by terrorists through the porous border.

In Tripura the militancy appears to have become a decentralized trade with 20 number of outfits outdoing each other in killing, extortion and kidnapping. Police and security personnel’s targets are the major banned outfits the smaller groups concentrate on kidnapping, extortion and killings as a means of making money, knowledgeable sources say. Even during the height of the T.N.V. insurgency, rape which is alien to Tripuri Society was not committed. During the past five years, a large number of women were raped or molested allegedly by the militants”.

5.4.1. All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) – a banned organization

In October, 1990 the C.P.M. in order to further its party interest by taking advantage of the prevailing discontentment among the tribal youth and to keep the Congress at bay allegedly formed the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). The reasons alluded were (1) rigging of Dist. Council Elections by the Congress - TUJS combine with the connivance of police and the local administration (2) to build up the party etc. During
the period some leaders of the TUJS were also brutally murdered by the ATTF. This was reportedly a move by the C.P.M. to maintain its hold among the tribals. This action of the C.P.M. should be seen in the backdrop of communist victories in West Bengal, Kerala and in Telangana in Andhra Pradesh. For a time however, it appeared that the extremists were taking part in politics. The aim was clearly to keep the influence of C.P.M in the tribal belt. ATTF like others demanded (1) eviction of all illegal immigrants who came after 1956 (2) implementation of provisions of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reform Act 1960 (3) Carving out a reserve area for tribals under Art. 320 of the Constitution and (4) deletion of illegal immigrants from the electoral roll.

In order to remove the ethnic character of the All Tripura “Tribal” Force the full form was changed to All Tripura Tiger Force in 1993 which ensured that the acronym of ATTF was maintained in tact. It also set up a political front viz, Tripura Peoples Democratic Front (TPDF). In a dramatic move later the volunteers of ATTF numbering about 1600 surrendered in 1993. It was allegedly a C.P.M. ploy to get benefits under the rehabilitation scheme and what came out was that the surrendered were only over-ground volunteers of ATTF and the military set up remained as it was earlier and drifted away from the C.P.M fold. Even though the present Chief Minister belonged to the C.P.M. the ATTF did not obey the C.P.M and functioned on its own. This was borne out from the statements of TPDF itself published in the annual statement on the 10th Foundation Anniversary according to which “Many unarmed democratic movements were waged in Tripura after the Indian occupation under leadership of different political parties like Congress, Communists, etc. But no unarmed democratic movement has been carried on for the restoration of the identity and the existence of the Tripuri nation. The basic agenda of these so called democratic movements were to rehabilitate the Hindu Bengali settlers and to establish their voting rights. Because the leaders from the settler refugees were the main controllers of that concerned political parties. The Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) the only political party led by the Tripura leaders has taken the way of unarmed democratic movement many times for the protection of the fundamental rights within the Indian Constitution. Surprisingly they have never uttered a single word on the identity crisis and the shabby existence of the Tripuri nation. In the meantime they have
sold out their distinctive political existence to the Congress Party and proved their complete incompetence to do anything for the benefit of the Tripuri nation.

The sole demand of the so called political parties of Tripura is to enlist the names of millions of illegal foreign migrants in the voter list to use those voters as a means to ascend the ladder of power in the Indian parliamentary democracy which is a game of sheer number”. It was also critical of the Manik Sarkar Govt. It was argued that “In addition, the present left front government formed by the Hindu Bengali settlers has already burnt down more than fifty Tripuri villages with the help of the Tripura State Rifles (TSF), the “core” communal arm of the Tripura “settler” government. More than thirty thousand Tripuri peoples have become homeless. Manik Sarkar the Chief Minister of Tripura has taken no punitive measure against the guilty TSF personnel because of their communal and racial affinity. On the other hand there are instances of giving reward to these terrorist police officers for their ‘heroic deeds’ against the Tripuri community. “The left government has exempted Bengali populated area from the imposition of AFSPA where the Tripuri people are killed, humiliated, kidnapped and raped by the Bengali racists. The ethnic hatred primes due to the communal role played by the State administration. That may trigger communal riot at any moment and the State government is waiting for it to play the vital role for the direct annihilation of the Tripuri people in the name of riots”.

As per an item titled “Why Do We Seek U.N. Mediation?” TPDF stated that “It is known already that India had signed two agreements with Tripura namely “The Tripura Merger Agreement” signed on 15th October, 1949 and “The TNV Accord” in 1988.

“The Indian Govt. has failed to protect the Tripuri nation in all aspects as per the assurance incorporated in the “Tripura Merger Agreement” of 1949. The Indian Govt. has not only declined to acknowledge the Tripuri as a “nation” but also reduced them to mere ‘slaves’ depriving them of their legitimate rights and dignity. Tripuri is recognized as ‘Tribal’ by the Indian Constitution. It is not enough. Tripuris have been dying like rats due to undeclared famine and severe deterioration of public health. Many of them
have been compelled to migrate to the nearby States or to the adjacent forests of the foreign country as the last resort of their struggle for survival. What more cruel history can be there in the destiny of nation than ours”?

“During the period of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, a “Memorandum of Understanding” was signed between the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) and the government of India in 1988. India government agreed to take drastic measures against the illegal influx. But this has been gathering dust as a worthless document in the past 10 years. Though the agreement confirmed to provide the constitutional fundamental rights to Tripuri people, yet they have been deprived of these rights totally by the heinous political conspiracy. The major part of the agreement has not been implemented except some consolations in the name of rehabilitation to the former TNV members.

Thus the tribal nation has been cheated twice by the agreements with the Indian government. Therefore we require the inevitable necessity of the mediation of the U.N. in any future talk on agreement with India. Because, we the Tripuri people do not want to be deceived time and again by the sophistry and scorched earth policy of Indian government.” The demand of the ATTF remained the same as they were earlier.

**Organizational Set Up of A.T.T.F.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing (Tripura Peoples Democratic Front) (TPDF)</th>
<th>Armed Wing (ATTF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. S.S. Vice President Chitta Deb barma.</td>
<td>1. S.S. C-M-C Chitta Deb barma @ Bikashkali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. S.S. Deputy Army Chief – Tiken Deb barma.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Also C-M-C under-graduate.

3. S.S. Organizing Secretary – Upendra Debbarma.
4. S.S. Publicity Secretary – Malinjoy Reang.
5. S.S. Communication Secretary – Subodhnlal Debbarma.
6. S.S. Finance Secretary – Chandra Rupini.
7. S.S. Cultural Secretary – Sachin Deb barma.

5. S.S. Capt. Koalmai Reang.
6. S.S. Capt. Lalit Deb barma
9. S.S. Area Commander Bikash Deb barma @ Rahul Deb barma.
10. S.S. Area Commander Marijoy Halam.

It observed 15th October every year as ‘Black Day’ to coincide with Tripuras anniversary of ‘accession’ with India.

Its weapon holding was around 100 pieces including A.K. series rifles LMG and Rocket launchers. Its area of operation was literally whole of Tripura but specifically Sidhai, Jimma, Teliamura, Kalyanpur area under West District, Birgonj, Nutanbazar, and Ompi in South District, Gandacherra and Raisbyabari in Dhalai district.

Its volunteers hailed mainly from Deb barma community (65%). Other communities were also represented. Their percentages were:-

1. Jamatia – 15%
2. Reang – 12%
3. Tripura – 7%
4. Others – 7%

Majority of them hailed from –

Sidhai – 25%
Kalyanpur – 25%
Khowai – 30%
Jiramia – 5%
Birgonj – 5%
Teliamura – 3%

Camps in Bangladesh

Training was given in the camps of ATTF located in Bangladesh. The camps were:

1. Satchhari – Habiganj district in Bangladesh.
2. Chhanbati – do –
3. Biswamanipara – Moulvi Bazar in Bangladesh.
4. Doluchhere – do –
5. Lalmai – Comilla District (Bangladesh)
6. Lawgang Khagrachari district (Bangladesh)
7. Taraban – do –
8. Wachu – do –

They also served as the base camps. The Headquarters was said to be at Srimangal, District Moulvi Bazar in Bangladesh.

The age group of recruits varied between 20-40. About 10% were graduates, 40% matriculates and others school dropouts.

The ATTF was allegedly a brain child of the C.P.M and was nurtured by it to operate in the Tribal areas as its front organization and was of the Communist mould. Their mission was to liberate Tripura from India.

The ATTF’s financial position was stated good “Abduction for ransoms have become a lucrative avocation in Tripura. Unofficial estimates place the total amount involved in this every year as Rs. 25 to 30 crores and much of such illegally acquired
wealth is deposited in Banks in Bangladesh and Thailand by the banned extremist outfits NLFT and ATTF."

ATTF imposed tax at the following rates on all sections of community which were collected through intermediaries and agents. Failure to pay invited death. The rates fixed were:-

1. Grade-I : Rs. 3000/- per annum.
2. Grade-II : Rs.2000/- per annum.
3. Grade-III Rs. 1000/- per annum.
4. Grade-IV Rs. 500/- per annum.
5. Ration dealer Rs.5000/- per annum.
6. Contractor: 12% of total estimate.
7. Rich Men : Rs. 1500/- per annum.
8. Needy : Rs. 500/- per annum.

The ATTF had an associate in the Tripura Tiger Commando Force (TTCF) which was reportedly operating mainly at Teliamura, Taidu and OMPI areas. It was allegedly having edge over the police as its operation were never known to the police in advance and it was at the receiving end most of the time thereby losing its image in the public eye. It had been targeting Bengalis for attacks who were settlers. For example during November, 1999 ATTF volunteers stormed into a market in West district and gunned down 18 innocent people and kidnapped ten others. Earlier in July, 99 a CRPF party was ambushed killing one and injuring another in north district.

The communication network of ATTF was reportedly of a very high standard. It had computers at its headquarters in Bangladesh and Cellular phones. The local people co-operated suo motu and out of fear in communicating messages, as couriers, etc. The political front Tripura People’s Democratic Front (TPDF) brought out an annual statement on the 10th Foundation Anniversary on 11th July, 1999. According to it “we have been able to place successfully the legitimacy and the legality of our struggle to the
world democratic community through our direct intervention in the U.N. floor in 1996, in the democratic organizations in the Asia Pacific region and in different international forum organized by international human rights organizations. We are happy to inform you that we have already entered the cyber media through our own web pages. The web pages and the English version “Choba” will help us to inform the world democratic community the day to day fact sheet of our struggle”. It carried the banner “Help dying Tripuri peoples – Long Live TPDF” and divided into sections such as documents, Newsletter, Human Right, The Land, The people, Brief History, The problem and the struggle. It was a fairly well designed site meant to convey its side of the story.

Publications

It published two monthly newsletters one in English “The Choba” and another in Tripuri (Kok Borak) language called “Homchang”. It was brought out by the Department of communication and publicity TPDF, 1409 Tring. These newsletters were under limited circulation and their readership was estimated at about 1000. The news letters usually dilated on alleged atrocities committed by the security forces, published names of tribals killed terming them as Human Rights violations, mass arrests/rape imposition of alleged draconian laws etc. all meant to arouse public sentiments against, the local administration and the government of India.

Relationship with similar organization within the State and Outside and with Public

ATTF maintained close relationship with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) both (Isac Muivah and Khaplang) factions, Revolutionary Peoples Front (RPF), Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and Kuki Liberation Organization (KLO) all of Manipur. It also gave moral support to “struggling comrades of Kashmir, Punjab, Andhra and Bihar of India”.

144
ATTF’s bases were essentially in Bangladesh where it had eight camps as already mentioned. In the editorial of ‘The Choba’ published during Sept, 99, it brought out the message from the U.N. Secretary General on the “5th Commemoration of the International Day of the World’s indigenous People”.

ATTF terrorised the Tripura people both tribals and non-tribals by its ruthlessness. Informants were summarily executed which sent shock waves of fear.

5.4.2 National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)

One Dhanjay Reang was opposed to the surrender of the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) during 1988. Many of those who had then surrendered got disillusioned as the government failed to fulfil the promises made at the time of surrender. Dananjay Reang therefore again took to the jungles along with 150 volunteers. For a long time its existence was not known to the outside world. Its first attack was on a police station wherefrom it decamped with nine 303 rifles. While leaving it had left a letter addressed to the Prime Minister of India signed by Dhanjay Reang the then Vice President of the Tripura National Volunteers stating that the raid was conducted by the NLFT and that it was formed in 1989 with Dhanjay Reang as the Supreme Commander and declaring that the NLFT would go ahead with its liberation war till tribals were liberated.

Formation of NLFT had reportedly had the blessings of TNV and its leader B.K. Hrangkhal who came over-ground. Dhanjay Reang was subsequently ousted from the NLFT and was replaced by Dhanu Kaloi as the C-in-C.

Its demands were :

1. Preservation of ethnic values.
2. Establishment of independent Tripura.
3. Severance of all relations with Bengalis and other communities.
The camp of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) at Jamtoli in Bangladesh.
4. Allotment of all Bengali occupied tribal lands to tribals.
5. Introduction of 'Kok Borok' the tribal language in the tribal Autonomous District Council (ADC) areas.
7. Maintain distinct identity of Tripuris.
8. Independence of Tripura as it was forcibly merged with India.

Organizational Setup of NLFT

Table – 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing (Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura)</th>
<th>Armed Wing (NLFT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Self Styled(SS) President – Biswa Mohan Deb barma.</td>
<td>1. S.S. C-in-C – Dhanu Kolai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. S.S. – Vice Prdsident Kamani Deb barma.</td>
<td>2. S.S. Lt. Col. Benoy Deb barma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. S.S. Genl. Secretary – Mantu Koloi</td>
<td>3. S.S. Major – Nayanbashi Jamatia (he was in Tripura State Rifles – TSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. S.S. Political Advisor – Jashua Deb barma</td>
<td>5. S.S. Capt. Jambir Deb barma (He was in the CRPF. Deserted with one LMG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Atrocities committed by NLFT in 1999:-

It’s area of operations included whole of Tripura and was reckless to the extent of sheer madness while dealing with its enemies. Its target of attack was mainly Bengalis but Tripatis were not spared in case of suspicion as informers. Some example of its activities during 1999 would give a vivid picture of the extent of atrocities committed by NLFT.
February, 99
1. Eight non-tribals were massacred at a place called Kanchanmala bazar area in west district. In retaliation non-tribals burnt 250 houses of tribals and burnt alive a tribal govt. employee.
2. Kidnapped two senior Engineers of the State govt. They were not freed.
3. Raided a house in Banduor village in south district and opened fire killing a 12th class student and injuring his sister.

March, 99
4. One person was killed and five including a school teacher and a sub-inspector abducted in Dhalai district.
5. Gunned down a tribal family consisting a father, son and relative of a family and burnt the house in West district.
6. Attacked a bus killing 4 passengers and injuring another 12 in West district.

April, 1999
7. Killed five persons, injured seven and kidnapped four from south district.

July, 1999
8. Attacked a jeep in south district killing 3 persons including elder sister of Ratan Lal Nath, Congress MLA in south district.

August, 1999
9. Kidnapped 4 RSS leaders but disclaimed responsibility. RSS accused Christian Baptist for the abduction with the support of NLFT in Dhalai district.
10. Father of Ex-Transport Minister of Left Front kidnapped from his house in South district.
11. Killed six and kidnapped four from Dhalai district.
12. Killed five villagers, torched four houses and a school and kidnapped three others in Dhalai district.
13. Ambushed party of Tripura State Rifles (TSF) killing one jawan and injuring another in South district.
14. Six including 4 C.P.M. activists were kidnapped from South district.
September, 1999
14. Samir Deb barma (C.P.M.) Panchayat Secretary gunned down inside his house in West district.
15. Stormed into BDO office at Manu in Dhalai district and abducted 17 govt. employees including 12 Panchayat Secretaries.
16. Ambushed a bus in South district in which a passenger died and two injured.
17. During Durga pooja gunned down two non-tribal and kidnapped a teenaged girl in South district.
18. Ambushed Assam Rifle Vehicle killing four jawans in South district.
19. Eight BSF jawans killed and arms looted in an ambush in Dhalai district.

October, 1999
20. During Lok Sabha elections NLFT launched extensive attacks in which eleven persons were killed including eight security personnel and two civilians and kidnapped four students in West district.
21. Chopped an aged couple for exercising franchise in West district (there was dispute that it was done by ATTF).

November, 1999
22. Ambushed a District Armed Reserve (DAR) police force in South district in broad day light, gunned down eight police personnel including a Head Constable and looted five rifles, one sten gun and two SLRs. Five injured.
23. 3 forest workers killed in West district.
24. Attacked two places, killed one, injured two and abducted three in West District.
25. Kidnapped four small traders in South district.

NLFT got support from public more out of fear. It killed people even on suspicion on any matter without asking questions. Kidnappings were done for ransom and children used for luring unsuspecting targets for kidnapping. It had a good number of school drop outs in its cadres who lured victims for paltry sums. In turn the UGs asked for huge amounts. This was a lucrative business for the UG outfits.
The last brutal attack on Bengali colony by the NLFT was in May, 2000 in which 19 innocent people were believed to have been gunned down in South district as a retaliation to killing of eleven tribals earlier by the opposite group.

**Camps in Bangladesh:**

As stated earlier volunteers of the NLFT were trained by MNF in Chittagong Hill tracts of Bangladesh. With NLFT gaining strength it established its own training centre(s) in Bangladesh. The government of Tripura had identified 21 NLFT camps in Bangladesh located at following places:-

**I. Khagrachari District**

1. Reza  
2. Zupui  
3. Jamtali  
4. Ujanchhari  
5. Lalu  
6. NineMiles  
7. Pujgang  
8. Nooncherra  
9. Silchari  
10. Mayami R.F.  
11. Ramgarh Upajilla.

**II. Habiganj District**

1. Shikhanagar (Assampara)  
2. Gobarkhala (Thakurgaon)  
3. Abadgaon  
4. Debrabari
5. Sundartilla

III. Bandarban
1. Nidenpara
2. Gilgal

IV. Rangmati
1. Thangang
2. Nabakchhara

V. Moulavi Bazar
1. Khasiapunji

The age group of NLFT volunteers varied between 20-50. There were some women volunteers (about 50). The volunteers mostly belonged to the lower income group and were committed to "liberate" Tripura from "Indian domination".

The recruitment bases were Birganj (25%), Killa (4%), Ormpi (5%), Taidu (5%), Santirbazar (5%), Jiramia (5%), Takerjala (5%), Teliamira (4%). The communities from which recruits came were:

- Deb barma community – 45%
- Jamatia – 25%
- Reang – 15%
- Others – 15%
Its arsenal was calculated at 500 pieces (approx.). It included A.K. series rifles, SLRs, 303 rifles, grenades, Chinese rifles, LMG, 2" mortar etc. They were purchased by payment of cash mostly from Cox Bazar in Bangladesh.

The financial position of NLFT was also reportedly good. One of the main sources of income was abduction for ransom. “Unofficial estimates place the total amount involved in this very year (1999) at Rs.25 to 30 crores and much of such illegally acquired wealth is deposited in Banks in Bangladesh and Thailand by the banned extremist outfits NLFT and ATTF”.

In addition, NLFT has imposed taxes in the form of subscriptions on people at the following rates:-

1. Govt. employees @ 3% of their total income per year.
2. Rs.20/- per “Kani” of land per year.
3. Rs.100/- house tax per family per year.
4. Rice – 1 Kg per year per family.
5. Rs. 500/- per power tiller/rice mill.

NLFT armed volunteers also reportedly visited tribal senior officers at times and persuaded them (often with threats) to make payments which were made.

Publication

During 1999 it brought out a “White paper on observation of Republic and Independence Day of India in Tripura” which was published by its information and publicity department on 5.7.1999 (4.07.1409 T.E.). It contained a background of insurgency movement and various alleged atrocities committed by the security forces from 1991 to February, 1999.
The publication mentioned about two Bengali outfits viz. National Bengal Volunteer Force (NBVF) and All Tripura Bengali National Police (ATBNP) and mentioned that they were carrying out systematic plans to completely exterminate the indigenous Boroks in their land of origin. "It is the illegal Bengali Hindu Immigrants who have kidnapped Dr. Pradip Reang an indigenous Borok doctor on 7th July, 98 from Santir Bazar Primary Health Centre and subsequently killed him even after collection of Rs. 9 lakhs as ransom from his family members. Similarly Mr. Rup Sankar Reang, an S.I. of Twipra Police was shot dead by his fellow policemen (Hindu Bengali) because of ethnic background at Ganganagar police station under Dholai district of Tripura on 14th December, 1998".

**N.L.F.T. Relationship with similar organizations within the State/Country and outside.**

**Table - 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Within</th>
<th>Outside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. NSCN (IM) and (K)</td>
<td>1. Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ULFA Assam</td>
<td>2. ISI of Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. NDFB Assam</td>
<td>3. KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PLA/RPF Manipur</td>
<td>4. Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. UNLF Manipur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. PULF(Mus.) Manipur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. MULFA – Muslim ULFA – Assam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. MLFA – Muslim Liberation Front of Assam.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ANVC (Achik National Volunteers Council, Meghalaya)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152
5.5 Surrenders

The surrenders of Tripura insurgents were all stage managed most of the time, since inception to get benefits. In this game political parties including Congress and C.P.M were allegedly in the forefront.

The first surrender was by 427 TNV men on 10.9.1988 along with arms. The people had heaved a sigh of relief then. But the reaction of the C.P.M. Polit Bureau proved ominous "there is no reason to believe that the chapter of armed struggle is closed for ever with the signing of such agreement. One Mr. Hrangkhal signed the agreement another will oppose it". Apparently C.P.M. thinking had never crossed beyond the borders of party interest and vote politics. Sure enough All Tripura Tiger Force given shape by C.P.M came on the scene only to cause head ache to the very C.P.M. The T.N.V was a part of Congress-I.

The next surrender show was in 1993 by 1600 volunteers of All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) stage managed by the C.P.M. as the U.G. outfit was then under its control. This was reportedly done to give surrender benefits to the followers of C.P.M who were in the ATTF then. With that surrender however both the NLFT and the ATTF drifted away from the hold of political parties. In 1997 there were 437 surrenders but only 3 in 1998 and 57 in 1999.

In January, 2000, Manik Sarkar, Chief Minister of Tripura announced a 25-point economic and rehabilitation package for tribals and appealed to the insurgents to shun the path of violence.

5.6 External support

The Tripura militants had their camps in Bangladesh. "A major problem the counter-insurgency mechanism in Tripura is suffering today is the cross border tension from the Bangladesh side. While ISI has been suspected to have aided the insurgent
groups in the State the militants presence in Bangladesh soil is certain. The government of Tripura have already identified 21 NLFT camps and 8 ATTF camps in Bangladesh But Bangladesh authority was persistent in denying the report that the NE insurgents were camping in their soil”. Earlier, in May, 99, however, the Bangladesh Security Forces had burnt down “four militant bases, two each in Sylhet and Chittagong Hill tracts and held fourteen rebels from a hide out in Chittagong city”

While the Bangladesh Hills provided sanctuaries the ISI provided the wherewithal for the Tripura UG outfits as already stated. Both the names of NLFT and ATTF figured in the list of UG groups in the North East who were at the beck and call of ISI.

The ill-gotten money through ransom, extortions etc. was reported to have been deposited in banks in Bangladesh and Thailand.

TPDF (Political wing of ATTF) was already in the international arena. In its annual statement dated 11.7.1999 it was given out that “it is very important to internationalize the issue of the crisis of identity and existence of the Tripuri people. Otherwise the Indian occupation Force will eliminate the whole nation in the name of counter insurgency operation. At this moment India has been pushing back the indigenous Kashmiri freedom fighters blaming as “Pakistani infiltrators” from their mother land. The Indian occupation Force are trying to crush and stain the freedom struggle of the Kashmiri brothers by their fabricated propaganda in the international arena. On the other hand, what is happening in the East-Timor? The Habibi government of Indonesia has agreed to institute referendum upon the issue of the independence of East Timor under the direct supervision of U.N. The Timorese people will determine their political destiny on the 8 August 1999 through ballot. It is significant achievement of the freedom struggle of East Timor from their relentless struggle at home and the successful mobilisation of the support of the international community abroad. The political development of East Timor is an inspiration for the ongoing revolutionary struggle of the world. We have been able to place successfully the legitimacy and the legality of our struggle to the world democratic community through our direct
intervention in the U.N. floor in 1996 in the democratic organizations of the Asia Pacific region and at different international forum organized by international human rights organizations. We are happy to inform you that we have already entered the cyber media through our own web pages. The web pages and the English version “Choba” will help us to inform the world democratic community the day to day fact sheet of our struggle.

It is very encouraging news for us that in the international arena peoples have come forward to help our struggle and some of them have already confirmed their active solidarity. The world human rights defenders community has already condemned and urged India to protect and promote the human rights of our seven sister regions. The reports have already stripped India nude before the democratic world.

In this regard we would like to express our profound gratitude to all the fraternal organizations of the seven sister regions for their tremendous collective effort that helped us introduce our nation and its crisis in the international level successfully”.

5.7 Crime Chart

Following were the atrocities committed by various UG outfits in Tripura during 3 years from 1997:-

Table - 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Extremists killed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Extremists arrested</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>S.F. killed</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Arms looted</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms recovered</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----</td>
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<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Civilians killed</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Released against ransom</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Died in captivity</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Untraced</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An analysis of the incidents would give an idea of the trend of violence in Tripura. A continuous upward swing can be seen in the case of incidents reaching a high of 614 in 1999, whereas they were 568 in 1998 and still far less (303) in 1997. The victims of the fight between the S.F and militants were more civilians. In 1999 against the backdrop of the killing of 22 insurgents and 41 security man 240 civilian lost their lives. In 1997 and 1998 also the number of civilians killed were high. This implied that both the S.F and the UGs were targeting civilians which made them to stay away from both unless forced. The kidnappings showed a sharp increase in 1998 and 1999 as compared to 1997. It could only be explained as a clear cut mechanism adopted by the UG outfits to earn easy money through ransom. The overall position also indicated that the UGs were having an upper hand vis-à-vis S.F.

5.8 Vulnerability of Police

There were 44 police stations. 3 more were to be established. The state had the following SF personnel to maintain law and order:-

1. Civil Police – 7786
2. Armed Police – 4596 (inclusive of 6 TSR battalions)
3. CRPF – 72 coys.
4. BSF – 71 coys (of them 61 were on borders).
5. Assam Rifles – 18 coys.
6. Army – nil
7. IRBns – 2
The vulnerability of the State police was explained by the DGP of Tripura himself when he stated that “The UG militants were at the receiving end till a few months back when we had enough forces to tackle them. The insurgents got a breather when the Union Govt. withdrew a large number of Army personnel from the C.I operations in the State. As the withdrawn forces is yet to come back, militants got the chance to intensify their offensive.” The former Chief Minister and leader of opposition Samir Ranjan Burman accused the Chief Minister Manik Sarkar “for passing the buck to the Centre in the name of non-availability of adequate forces. But no one can negate the fact that the law and order is the State subject and the State police is considered to take the main initiative in curbing militancy as it was done in case of Punjab.

Other than 3 battalions and one company of BSF for anti-insurgency operation, Tripura now had as many as six TSF battalions, ten thousand of State Police, more than 30 battalions of CRPF, four Battalions of Assam Rifles and ten Battalions of BSF for guarding the border areas and also 3500 home guards. If this force is found to be inadequate against 400 odd insurgents no amount of force will be enough”. Nothing could explain the situation in Tripura better.

Tripura saw the end of the last and beginning of the new millennium in bloodshed, kidnappings, extortions etc. perpetrated by the two main militant outfits, ATTF and NLFT and their surrogates with systematic regularity. The SF machinery had to remain mute spectators. The conventionally trained SF was found unable to cope with the problem much to the amusement of the UG outfits. There was therefore demand for still more S.F. personnel from the Centre. It had come to such a pass that the opposition Congress joined by the BJP was demanding for President’s rule which forced the Chief Minister to declare NSA within the State. Already 22 of the 44 police station areas fully and 5 partially were declared disturbed since 1996.
Tripura has 839 km. International porous border with Bangladesh, across which were situated the camps of the militants. This made matters difficult for the S.F. The Central govt. had taken measures for border fencing even though the State govt. was demanding for construction of roads. The dead line fixed was 2007 for completion of the border fencing. The efficacy of the scheme was however open to question. What mattered was "will" to ensure proper checking. The BSF which was manning it was withdrawn from the borders due to army withdrawal from the State, and posted them for law and order duties leaving the border free for infiltration/exfiltration.

The problems for the SF were getting multiplied to unimaginable proportions as there was "unusual pressure on the non-tribal residents residing for years in tribal autonomous council area to leave. More than 5 lakh non-tribals reside in the tribal dominated area and now they are issued notice to vacate the native place. Already around 8000 families or roughly 40000 people have relented to the militants' dictum and fled from the areas like Birganj, R.K. Pur, Omni, Teliamura, Gandachera etc. In a State which has already witnessed various types of refugee problems including that of the Reangs from Mizoram this new lot of homeless can be a major concern to the govt." There were also apprehensions that the "anti-tribal militant groups may finally emerge in a consolidated way leading to a bloodbath in purely ethnic terms."

On the other hand, the TPDF (political front of ATTF) was "trying its best for national unity for the united struggle for the independence and sovereignty of Tripura" as it believed that "without national unity it will be very difficult to lead the freedom struggle of Tripura towards victory". TPDF had appealed, without success so far for unity between the two UG outfits in Tripura viz. ATTF and NLFT. In an appeal TPDF requested NLFT to forge unity. The following would prove that the NLFT had not given an ear to the appeal "Compatriots, we the TPDF in 1993 had initiated a process for unity to minimize the differences among us. Unfortunately Kunjumunda, a TPDF member and a valiant national worker from minority community lost his life in the hands of NLFT brothers. We earnestly requested NLFT to explain the reason for killing of Munda."
Instead of giving a proper reply the NLFT issued a statement in the newspapers declaring death sentence to all the members of TPDF.

Exercising utmost restraint and patience in the greater interest of our national unity we talked with NLFT members on the 12th September, 1997 to stop fratricidal conflict. Surprisingly all these efforts went in vain. Because two of our national heroes viz. Mr. Tikendra Noatia and Mr. Chandra Rupini were brutally killed by NLFT, just after a few days of the second effort. It is a great loss not only to TPDF but also to the whole nation. It is unforgettable and unbearable. However, we accepted it as a sacrifice for national unity in the great cause of freedom and sovereignty of Tripura. We appeal to all not to take this earnest effort for unity as our weakness. For we uphold the basic national interest cutting across party as well as personal interest.

‘Forgive and Forget’ should be the guiding principle of our future process of unity. In no ambiguous terms, TPDF would like to hereby declare its quest for the permanent revolutionary unity with NLFT.

Without any confusion we declare that TPDF never wants fratricide. Hence even after losing so many leaders and workers TPDF has started again the unity process with the sole aim to unite the liberation struggles of Tripura. In the meantime, we notice a little progress in this direction. TPDF believes that the leadership of NLFT will put their maximum effort for unity keeping in view the heinous conspiracy of the enemy and the present situation of the dying Tripuri nation.

The people of Tripura are waiting for the great moment of unity on the eve of the 21st century. On this sacred day of our 10th foundation anniversary may we express our hope that the leadership of TPDF and NLFT will resolve all their differences through sincere deliberations and active unity in the spirit of forgive and forget so as to lead together the Tripuri nation towards sovereignty and independence.”
5.9 Coordination Between Agencies

The coordination was done through a State level coordination committee headed by the Chief Secretary. This composed of police, central para-military forces, the Assam Rifles etc. This was a loose set up. There was reportedly a feeling of uneasy constraint in the relationship as each agency was feeling a sense of superiority. Willing cooperation was therefore not forthcoming which affected operation in the field. This was reportedly more because of persistent failure of the S.F. to fully neutralize the depredations of the insurgent outfits. Whatever little success was achieved by any S.F unit was tried to be foisted as a great achievement much to the chagrin of others. What was lost in the process was the killer blow effect to any action by the S.F.

Recently (April, 22nd, 2000) an interview given by Brig. B.K. Panwar of the Assam Rifles to the popular T.V. channel Zee T.V. much to the consternation of all agencies including the government blew up a storm. He had reportedly stated that “the tribals in the State of Tripura had adopted the path of armed insurgency because they had been reduced to minority in their own land by immigrants from the erstwhile East Pakistan now Bangladesh”. He was also reported to have argued “that the tribals who constituted 70% of Tripura’s population in 1951 formed only 30% of the population at present”.

Reacting to the alleged statements of Panwar, Samir Ranjan Barman, former Chief Minister lashed out at the Brigadier for his “irresponsible and provocative interview”. He wondered “how a senior army official would make a statement with such serious political implication. Right at this moment a State of civil war is on in Tripura and even a spark may ignite a major conflagration. It is therefore height of irresponsibility on the part of a Chief of security force to speak in a manner which is tantamount to inciting mob violence against a particular community”. He appealed to the Chief Secretary who was also the Chairperson of the State coordination committee “to keep tight reign on Brig. B.K. Panwar and ensure that he refrains from his crude and unauthorized incursions into sensitive socio-political issue. This will serve the interest of
the State and its hapless people far better”. He also said that “he had received specific complaints from many people affected by ethnic violence in Jirania and Teliamura regarding the party’s activities in favour of a particular community”. He alleged that “there are several complaints of Assam Rifles jawans having actively aided and abetted the arsoning indulged in on a large scale by the tribal miscreants against the non-tribal Bengali community”. He further claimed that “the jawans even do not hesitate to threaten the non-tribals to leave their respective house and belongings on gun point”. As regards tribal population, the former Chief Minister argued that “Tribals constituted only 52.89% of the State’s population in the census of 1901 and the figure came down to 37-23 by the time of the first census of independent India was conducted in 1951. At its lowest the tribal population stood at 28.44% in 1981 census while a positive growth rate was noticed in 1991 census when tribal population was recorded at 29.56% while the non-tribal population came down to 70.44% and that barring the census years of 1901, 1921 and 1931 tribals in Tripura were never in majority.”

Assam Rifles had reportedly never enjoyed good reputation among the official circles nor they were successful in combating insurgency as could be seen from their own performance in the field.

It was also reported during a peep into the area of intelligence collection that too many agencies collected intelligence through their own channels but their sharing in actual form was held back with the small mindedness playing its part. Even within the department also lower level officials appeared reluctant to report all that they knew thereby losing essential elements. Intelligence also tended to take class character i.e., tribal-non tribal basis. The machinery also appeared to be in the grip of fear being a small place and vital information sharing was dispensed with. Again there was the possibility of leakage of source of information. Most of the time, action on intelligence was delayed or not taken at all and therefore the source out of fear did not venture to give information a second time. The degree of sharing of information between departments and at the coordination meeting was reportedly dependent upon the personal rapport of the higher echelons. With many of the staff members having relations in the UG set up
the UGs however knew what was brewing up at power centres. This had made the SF a victim of the circumstances. There was also a danger of the tribals and non-tribals going on parallel lines. If not checked, this trend would do more harm than good as beyond a level the twain may not meet at all.

5.10 Election and Insurgency

The parliamentary elections in October, 1999 and the Autonomous Dist. Council (ADC) elections on April, 30 and May 3, 2000 witnessed violent incidents perpetrated by the militant outfits. While the ATTF/TPDF boycotted both the elections the NLFT participated in ADC elections through its political front viz. Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT) in which it won 18 seats out of 30 seats thus getting a majority.

During the parliament elections violence continued. “In spite of the fact that sensitive areas of the State have been declared disturbed under the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act the insurgents of the banned ATTF and NLFT of Tripura continued with their unabated attacks. On the poll day alone the ATTF militants shot dead six CRPF jawans and four civilians in spite of the fact that security forces had stepped up their vigil throughout the State. On the other hand militants of NLFT outfits shot dead four Assam Rifle jawans and eight BSF jawans in the run up to the elections”.

The TPDF (ATTF) had given a call for boycott of Indian Parliamentary elections. “It is absolutely meaningless for the Tripuri people to take part in any Indian elections. The Indian Govt. has been betraying the Tripuri people time and again since the moment of the “Merger Agreement” in the name of elections. The Indian Govt. has failed totally to ensure the identity and development of the Tripuri Nation in its past 50 long years of long occupancy. In fact the constitution of India has been proved worthless in relation to its ability concerning the identity and development of Tripuri nation. Thus, what miraculous benefit will be conferred to our people if they would take part in the coming election under Indian Constitution”.
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162
During the ADC elections also the TPDF (ATTF) issued an election boycott call. The NLFT however sponsored candidates under the banner of Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT). The TPDF circulated a pamphlet directing the Tribal people to boycott all elections being organized by the “occupation forces of India and their lackeys”. The pamphlet was signed by its president Ranjit Deb Barma which stated “let there be a plebiscite to decide whether the people of Tripura are keen to remain part of India or intensify their struggle for independence.” Asserting that all the political parties in Tripura have cheated the “sons of the soil” it accused the Gana Mukti Parishad (GMP) the tribal frontal organization of the C.P.M of surrendering the interests of the indigenous tribal people to ‘Indian Imperialists’. It was equally harsh on TUJS and TNV for betraying the interests of Tripuri tribal people for money or for settling political scores. It expressed surprise over the C.P.M leadership “remaining silent” despite allegations against the party for having betrayed the tribal people”.

5.11 Role of NGOs and Human Right Organizations

5.11.1 The following were the registered NGO organizations that functioned in Tripura:-

1. Association for Social Health in India.
   This was started in 1978 to check exploitation of women. It was not functioning due to insurgency problem.

2. Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Briksha
   Mira Sangha. Established in 1987. It paid attention to afforestation and mother and child health care.

3. Aitor Ma Club.
   Established in 1982. It paid attention to preservation and development of tribal culture.

   Established in 1976 it paid attention to welfare programmes of the people.

5. Council for Scientific and Social Development
Established in 1993 it paid attention to social development in association with other NGO organizations.

6. Dishari
   Established in 1989 it took up promotion of environmental activity.

7. Harijan Seva Sangh
   Started in 1955 it worked for eradication of untouchability. This had become defunct.

8. Jana Kalyan Samithi
   Established in 1965, it paid attention to child welfare schemes.

9. Kalyan Samithi
   Established in 1965 it offered training in various trades to youth/girls for self-employment.

10. Kusht Seva Samithi
    Established in 1976 it paid attention to eradication of leprosy.

11. Organization for Rural Survival (ORS)
    Established in 1994 it paid attention to creation of awareness of health and environment.

    (SEVA) – Established in 1995 it paid attention to integrated rural development.

13. Tripura Adimjathi Seva Sangh
    Established in 1961 it worked for socio-economic and educational upliftment of SC/ST of Tripura.

14. Tripura Adivashi Mahila Samithy
    Established in 1953 it paid attention to development of women and children.

15. Tripura State Council For Child Welfare
    Established in 1965 it took up welfare of women children irrespective of caste, creed, etc.

The NGOs functioned on a low key. Most of them were active in the past. NGOs can play a great role in ensuring peace in the troubled state.

5.11.2 Human Rights Organizations

The one organization which took up Human Rights issues was the North Eastern Coordination Committee on Human Rights. It was an umbrella organization of various
Human Rights Groups functioning in the seven States of the North East. The publications viz. Choba (English monthly news magazine) and Homchang (Kok Borok – Tripuri language monthly news magazine) of TPDF/ATTF took up Human Rights violations by the SF etc. copies of which were sent to the concerned.

5.11.3 Christianity and Insurgency

As far back as 1953 the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India had asked the State Govt. of Tripura to furnish information on Foreign Missions who entered India during 5 year period immediately before and after 1947. The reply of the State Govt. reported about the existence of 5 foreign missions viz. (1) New Zealand Baptist Mission, Agartala (2) New Zealand Baptist Mission Bhangmung in the Jampuri hills (3) Roman Catholic Mission at Mariannagar, Agartala (4) New Zealand Baptist Mission at Dhuma Chhara under Kailasaher sub-division and (5) American Baptist Mission at Dharmanagar. The last two were established after 15.8.1947. The name of the New Zealand Baptist Mission was later changed into Tripura Baptist Christian Union (TBCU). As of now also there were 5 Christian organizations working in Tripura. They were (1) Tripura Baptist Christian Union (2) Zeraw Baptist Mission of Mizoram (3) Roman Catholic Church (4) United Protestant Church of North East India and (5) Evangelical Free Church of India. The TBCU was affiliated to the North East India Christian Council (NEICC) with its headquarter at Shillong. The NEICC was again affiliated to Dr. Billy Graham’s World Baptist Alliance. Barring the Roman Catholic church the remaining four were run by the Tribal Christian Missionaries of Tripura, Manipur and Mizoram. They all had profound socio-political influence on the tribals due to their welfare activities particularly in the field of education and medical treatment. Side by side the Christian missionaries offered socio-religious and political lessons to the young converts who were subsequently promoted to the rank of ‘Pastor’ as the path finder to the tribal societies. In fact the pastors were not only the spiritual advisors but also the socio-political leaders of the tribal society and it was at their instance the tribal extremists raised the demand for Roman script in place of Bengali script which was popular among the tribals of Tripura for a long time. The fact also remained that the Christian missions were mainly responsible for
militant activities in the entire North East India where also the tribals were making all out efforts to establish their own political authority.

The Dinesh Committee which had visited Tripura during July 1980 observed in its report "this was a limited significance only in comparison with far more overt missionary activity in the rest of the North Eastern region.... Even among the Christian Missions, it is only the Tripura Baptist Christian Union (TBCU) that has come to adverse notice because of the subscriptions they receive from abroad, and because of the political links with the tribal extremists. Besides a pamphlet entitled "The church grows through peoples movement" circulated mainly among the Church authorities in North Eastern India on the eve of the Mandai massacre (June 1980) gave the impression that there was a close relation between tribal political movement and conversion. The pamphlet stated" the political upheaval has made the tribals of Tripura receptive to the Gospel. If large members are to come to Christ viz. Peoples movement the Tripura Baptist Christian Union must be aided by other churches and missions". Dr. Rieweh Cunville who was the author and also the Director of the Bible Society of India stated "The desire to obey Christ's Great Commission at this crucial stage in the life of the peoples of Tripura must burn away all our denominational differences. I strongly feel (1) the door to be opened for any Christian denomination to cater and evangelize the Tripuris (2) were with the TBCU so that the caring and perfecting be done together with the TBCU and (3) all Churches to support and loan their best men and women for disciplining of the Tripuris as far as possible under the direction of the TBCU. This is the ideal method. Along with this third recommendation I also strongly urge the pumping into Tripura of material supplies - jeeps, public address system, tracts and printing materials to be used by the workers in their thirst for Christ among the Tripuris".

It was thus clear that Christianity was gradually but surely making inroads into the tribal hearts of Tripura introducing a new kind of leadership based on political and religious maneuvers. It was to be remembered that B.K. Hrankhal was a man from a sub-tribe of Kuki (non-tribal) who took up cudgels of terrorism subsequent to his conversion. His aggressive style of functioning and intimate contact with the Church brought him in
direct conflict with the devout Hindu Tripuris and Jamatia leadership who had dominated the TUJS and naturally within a short period Hrangkhal was sacked from the TUJS. With that he got a free hand and moved on his own as an insurgent with the backing of the church.

Blaming church for what they had done was also uncalled for. The church had hit the nail on the head to drive home the message of Christian love thereby touched the inner most sensitive tendrils of the human heart. Man earnestly wished for human love and care and they were badly in need for the Tripuris. The Christians gave just that and gave them in abundance. It was only natural that the Tripuris heard the one who extended all the love and care with the conviction that Christian Godly love would do no harm to them. On the other hand the Govt. of India and the Govt. of Tripura, the political leaders and the local "Mahajans" 'Money Lenders' had lured them to the traps of debt and perpetual misery and servitude, taught them methods of political chicanery and corruption, made them terrorists to fight for themselves, fed them bullets and gave them false hopes in repeat without a hope for fulfillment. Tripuris required love, the more pure and simple the more it was adored and respected. Christian missionaries touched only two aspects of life (1) Education. This improved Tripuris more than any other measure of the Govt. of India/Tripura. (2) Medical care and attention which moved simple minds of Tripuris. Where govt. doctors and officials dreaded to dare the Christian fathers and sisters ventured walking hilly terrains without a murmur with the message of the gospel as an unguent for the soul. They had no inhibitions and no self-interest to be achieved which the govt. officials had. It did not appear that the Tripuri insurgents would go the govt. of India's way whatever might be the palliatives. Any amount would be too little, too late and may not match the Christian love, pure and simple. The solution to Tripura's problem was to have been searched in the Gospels of the Christ.

5.12 Future of Insurgency

Tripura presented a picture of a towering inferno of insurgency in the North-East. Futile were the efforts of the govt. agencies attempting to douse it and they were at a loss
to evolve some means. The future looked uncertain. Some hopes were reposed in a
vague belief that the Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT) which won a majority
in the recently held autonomous Hill Dist. Council elections, supported by the National
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) would bring about a change in the situation, having
been elected in a democratic way. A silver lining was the reported dissolution of Tripura
National Volunteers by the old war horse B.K. Hrunkhal and his throwing the support to
IPFT. No one was under an illusion that any law would bring about a demographic
cchange to favour the tribes. If tribes and settler Bengalis would not subscribe to the
theory of co-existence they would only hasten their own doom.

5.13 Conclusions/Recommendations
5.13.1. Conclusions

The primary cause for insurgency in Tripura was land alienation a fall out of the
large scale infiltration from the then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Tripura surrounded
by Bangladesh on three sides and having 839 kms. Border (of which 100 kms riverine)
promised a safe land for migration since long during communal/political turmoils across
the border in Bangladesh. The partition of India on communal lines was perhaps the
biggest event which saw migrants in largest of numbers which pushed the local tribes in
Tripura to the periphery making them non-entities in all imaginable fields in their own
land. The migration continued unabated, the borders being porous.

Though it could not be denied that land alienation was the prime cause, insurgent
situation as such was a creation of political parties, mainly the Congress and the C.P.M
with partisan interest in mind. Tripura indeed had no dearth of political leaders respected
equally by the Tribals and non-tribals but their vision had not crossed beyond the barriers
of individual and party interests and they failed utterly to develop the State economically,
socially and otherwise so as to amalgamate it with national mainstream psycho-
emotionally.

This political failure was exploited by the Church which played the pivotal role in
moulding the Tribal minds through education and philanthropic work and made them
adopt a deviant attitude to fall in line with tribal movements elsewhere in the North Eastern region. Their unmanifest teachings on socio-political aspects of life manifested in the birth of insurgency demanding a separate tribal land. It was made clear by the actions of NLFT which demanded total conversion of tribals into Christianity and interestingly among its victims there were reportedly not a single Christian or Muslim.

When insurgency started, neither the Congress nor the C.P.M could put on leash insurgents nor could they evolve a method by which the demands could be met. They could not because they were at their manipulative best only when the youth were gullible but once the youth could feel the depth they refused to go by the diktat of political heavy weights. Left with no alternative the political leaders showed an accusing finger at the centre for all ills of the State the time tested ploy to divert the attention of the local people from their failures at home.

With no proper communication Tripura was a god forsaken place and their only easy outlet was to Bangladesh and the tribals were not be blamed if they found solace in Christian love and oneness with ethnic relations across the border in Bangladesh.

It was here that the ISI of Pakistan struck and struck decisively. There was reportedly incontrovertible proof to establish complicity of ISI in the North East in general and in Tripura in particular. Credit had to be given to the interested parties for creating a schism so successfully that there was no hope of bringing about a rapprochement to establish the olden day camaraderie between Bengalis and Tripuris. It was indeed a matter of serious concern for the SF that the nefarious activities of a section of anti-social and outlaws had provoked reckless counter reactions in equal measure from the sides of Tribals and Bengalis to bring about a grim situation in which the victims were not the well placed but poor and ignorant people having no knowledge about the powers at play. There were dangers of such unfortunate incidents snow bailing into bigger flare ups. The SF were finding it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to contain the senseless killings, abductions for ransom indulged in by the insurgent outfits on a
competitive basis. Over and above dark clouds of ethnic violence were veering round for a showdown.

Escalation of "violence and terrorism in Tripura had reached a stage which could be ignored by the nation only at great peril. The sordid massacre of the innocent without any rhyme or reason and the unabated spate of abductions for ransom had brought the seriousness of the situation in bold relief". The perpetrators of the crimes availed the geographical advantages present in Tripura like escaping first into the forest and then cross the border into Bangladesh where the S.F could do nothing more than remaining as mute spectators.

What was shocking was the callous way in which the political parties also made the life of common people miserable by calling bandhs and hartals in succession. They were the only weapons in the arsenals of the political parties to contain ethnic killings. The people had therefore to face rather three forces at play viz. the fury of the insurgents, the wrath of the SF and the gimmickry of the political parties all claiming to be champions of their cause.

According to Shyamcharan Tripura, a veteran tribal leader "with the formation of TNV in 1978 by B.K. Hrangkhal tribal movement in Tripura had become active and meaningful. Achieving one third seats reservation for tribals by amending Indian Constitution, Hrangkhal had done a great job for the welfare of tribals in Tripura. Practically with that achievement insurgency in Tripura had to be ended. But the C.P.M led Left Front took revenge by forming another militant group – All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) with the endeavour of kicking out the then Congress-TUJS coalition government. The TNV then unfolded another chapter of terrorism by launching National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). Thus insurgency in Tripura has been a continuing factor". This unequivocally established the complicity of both Congress and the C.P.M in leading Tripura on the gory bath of insurgency and making the ground ready for launching operations by a blood hound like the ISI of Pakistan.
No scaling down of terrorist activity was anticipated given the situation in Tripura. Law and order machinery had come to a grinding halt and groped for a direction to go. Both ATTF and NLFT controlled interior of the State. Instances were reportedly not rare when they ventured into the Agartala area, made collections and safely got away unknown to the S.F. S.F. was unable to ensure even a modicum of safety and security to the people there. The areas declared ‘disturbed’ where the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act was effective were the worst affected, throwing a challenge to the S.F who were imploring the centre to rush the Army that was withdrawn laying bare the reality on the ground.

Bangladesh did not present a picture of friendliness when it stated that there were no UG camps in Bangladesh. Both NLFT and ATTF had their camps there, 29 in all. Almost all the UG cadres of Tripura/Manipur/Nagaland used Tripura-Bangladesh Border for their egress into and ingress from Bangladesh. Denying that there were no camps was nothing but a blatant lie. “The most vulnerable stretch is adjacent to the Tripura border from Hantlang (situated on the trijunction of Tripura, Mizoram and Bangladesh border) to JALEYA (located near the southern tip of Tripura). The Bangladesh territory across this huge western axis is a safe haven for militants as about 15-20 kms. is uninhabited in Bangladesh. The difficulties encountered by the BSF in manning the border were (1) there were 7-8 routes through which militants passed and (2) each battalion of BSF covered an astonishing 95 kms. of border which made the crossing the border easy for the militants. The average calculation was that a minimum of 18 battalions of BSF was required to provide protection to Tripura border. In its place there were only nine battalions. Even some of them were withdrawn to places within the State following army withdrawal making matters easy for “militants.”

Without peoples support no economic development would be possible. With the activities of insurgents, no agency would dare to go to interior places. There was need for a mass contact programme through proper channels and the best way was the Pastors operating there. Emphasis should be on solving basic problem of the people. There were allegations that the officials going to the interior were persuading the beneficiaries of
schemes to ‘consider’ them at the ‘giving end’. Such attitudes must be avoided and informal relations should be established.

Voluntary organizations earnestly interested in the welfare of the people should be encouraged to take up peoples cause and helped. No politics should be injected to such organizations. The core issue of insurgency was the socio-economic development of backward people at par with the advanced. The existing institutions like the tribal Councils, Panchayats and Youth Clubs should be actively engaged. The virus of corruption should be checked at all stages. Tribals depended on forest produce. A share could be distributed to them from the income accrued. A survey of indebtedness of poor tribals would also be of help and assistance rendered wherever necessary. Education in Tripura was the worst hit during the past seven years of insurgency which was evident from the regular abductions and killings of teachers. Replying to queries from the opposition the Chief Minister stated “during the past seven years of insurgency, till January, 2000, 20 teachers were killed by the insurgents and more than 100 abducted. In the rural areas also education had seized to exist. This would be disastrous. The number of school drop outs indulging in nefarious activities was increasing alarmingly. One method for schooling for the place would be Navodaya Vidyalayas.

Primary health centres did not function at all. It would be desirable for doctors entering govt. service to serve in the rural areas for a minimum of five years. Voluntary service would be ideal. Tribal girls should be encouraged to become midwives, health workers, etc. The monitoring departments to review the progress of different tribal welfare schemes, should be made to do the job sincerely.

5.13.2. Recommendations

Even though intelligence alone cannot win a war, its failure would herald disaster. The C.I. wings of various of SF agencies were said to be searching for a method to penetrate the UG outfits. Normal set ups of government was not able to cope with the situation. There was urgent need for a special intelligence wing. It was not machinery
but men behind it that mattered. The developing situation was ominous. There was the possibility of ethnic clashes more particularly Bengali vs Tripuris entering a new phase. With inimical powers waiting for the kill such a situation would throw the State of Tripura to utter chaos and the nation to more difficulties.

The prime necessity was to bring down the level of violence. If the State govt. does not act, the only possibility would be Centre's direct intervention. There was also a necessity of detailed monitoring of Centrally assisted schemes and therefore the Central agencies should be given increased role in the area. Modernization of the State police, strengthening of Intelligence, strict Border Management, civic action to create goodwill of people were considered highly necessary. The State police should be made the sheet anchor to face the insurgency in the State at the ground level by proper training and motivation. With tribal – non-tribal affinities getting vitiated at the ground level striking at the root of normal relations, peace can be established only by making the police force more effective.

For far too long matters that were crucial to the well being of the people of a multi-ethnic society like that of Tripura did not get importance from any of the power centres in the way required either due to political considerations or simply because of failure to properly comprehend the progressively developing insurgent scenario. In spite of the sad state of affairs, there was one aspect which needed to be mentioned. Even if it was taken that the insurgents were correct and the govt. was wrong a dispassionate analysis of the so called insurgent movement in the State revealed that the insurgent outfits ATTF and NLFT and their surrogates were not fighting for any ideology or cause designed to benefit any section of the society whom they supposed to represent. What was taking place was simple beastly killings and counter killings as if only to wreak vengeance and each more atrocious and grisly than the other. The success of finding a "political solution" to the so called insurgency in Tripura "through discussions" had therefore receded to the level of a non-existent mirage. What was more ominous was the active involvement of a large number of school drop outs as accomplices of the so called insurgents in carrying out abductions on behalf of one or the other insurgent group in
return for paltry sums and the outfit bargaining for higher amounts of ransom which was a challenge thrown to the S.P and the political leadership of the State. Apparently, again they had no answer.

In the existing circumstances, the best bet would be to hand over the interior of the State to a specially constituted Commando force tutored and motivated on the same sanguinary ethos of ATTF/NLFT. These outfits and their surrogates did not deserve even a modicum of sympathy and consideration as such were the repugnant nature of their activities perpetrated on the people of Tripura which included Tripuris and the ‘outsider’ Bengalis.

Preaching sermons of peace to blood thirsty hounds like the ATTF and NLFT and their surrogates would be tantamount to preaching sermons in the ears of a buffalo. Tripuri insurgents demanded blood of their enemies and they were quenching their thirst with alacrity. But the victims were the unprotected and the weak and the helpless. The time had come to do something drastic to stem the rot and if the ilk of ATTF/NLFT were to be sacrificed just to teach Tripuris the art of living in a democratic country there need not have to be any inhibition in doing the worse so that the meek and the helpless who constitute the majority would live in peace. The same would be a warning to others trodding the insurgent path. A few insurgents were holding the State in a vice grip because the State was behaving like a recluse and the time was ripe for stern action.
Districts of Manipur

NAGALAND

IMPHAL
WEST
EAST

ASSAM

MYANMAR
(BURMA)

MIZORAM

MAJOR
ORGANISATIONS
ARE SHOWN IN THE
MAP

INSURGENT ORGANISATIONS OF MANIPUR (VALLEY STREAM)

1. UNLF
2. PLA
3. PREPAK
4. KYNL
5. KCP
6. PULF
7. NEMF
8. HRF
9. HPC(D)
10. ULFA(MUS.)
11. RPF(K)
12. KLO(REITEI)
13. MSA
14. IRL
15. PRA
16. NECA
(KUKI STREAM)
1. KNF
2. KNO/ANA
3. ZRO/ZRA
4. KDF
5. SSF
(NAGA STREAM)
1. NSCN(IM)
2. NSCN(K)
3. KLO/MEITEI
4. RPF(K)
5. ULFA(MUS.)
6. HRF
7. PRA
8. KCP
9. PULF
10. PREPAK
11. KYNL
12. MSA
13. HPC(D)
14. ULFA(MUS.)
15. RPF(K)
16. KLO(REITEI)

Map not to Scale

District HQ
State Capital
International Bou
District Boundary
Lake
Chapter – 6

INSURGENCY/MILITANCY IN MANIPUR

6.1 The State

Manipur is one State in the North-East which is writhing under the full fury of insurgency. It has been declared a disturbed area. It should not have been otherwise in the cacophony of divergent ideologies and perceptions of a number of insurgent outfits reverberating through the length and breadth of the hills and valley of the State. The mischief played by nature in its very placement was also a contributing factor for this predicament.

The State is hemmed in by tribal inhabited areas of Nagaland in the north, having ethnic relationship with Nagas of Manipur, subscribing to ideas of insurgency, Myanmar in the East/South-East with a 350 km international border, Assam in the West and Mizoram in the South-West. As a result the Naga insurgency spilled over to Northern Manipur and Mizo insurgency to South-West. Manipur is having the unique distinction of providing one of the seasoned leaders of Naga insurgency in Th. Muivah, self-styled (SS) General Secretary of the NSCN (IM).

Geographically the State is composed of Hills and a valley in the Centre. It is rectangular in shape and lies within latitude 28.83 degree N and 25.68 degree N and longitude 93.03 degree E and 94.74 degree E. The total geographical area is 22327 sq. kms, of which the valley, locally called Meitei Leipak (broad land of Meiteis) consist of 1862 sq. kms.

Manipur was an independent kingdom till 1891 when it came under the British subjugation. It became part of the Indian Union on 15.10.1949 after a merger agreement was signed by the Maharaja of Manipur. Since 1972 it is a State of the Indian Union. A map of Manipur is enclosed.

175
According to the 1991 census the population of Manipur stood at 18,37,149 of which 37, 105 were S.C and 63, 2173 S/JT. The distribution of population, community-wise, was as follows:-

**Table-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No</th>
<th>Name of District.</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Imphal East</td>
<td>7,11,261</td>
<td>1. MEITEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Imphal West</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Pangal also Pangan (Muslim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bishnupur</td>
<td>1,80,773</td>
<td>- do -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Thoubal</td>
<td>2,93,958</td>
<td>- do</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Churachandpur</td>
<td>1,76,184</td>
<td>1. Kuki</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Paite</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Hmar</td>
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<td>4. Simtc</td>
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<td>5. Zou</td>
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<td>6. Gangte</td>
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<td>7. Vaiphai</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Mizo (Lushai)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Kom Meitei</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Guite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ukhrul</td>
<td>1,09,275</td>
<td>1. Thangkhul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Thadou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senapathi</td>
<td>2,08,406</td>
<td>1. Mao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Maram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Thadou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tamenglong</td>
<td>86,278</td>
<td>1. Zelianrong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Kuki</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Religion-wise the population is divided as follows:-

1. Hindus – 10,49,470
2. Christian – 6,26,669
3. Muslim – 1,33,535

29 recognised tribes by the Govt. of India constitute 34.41% of the population. Manipuri Meiteis speak the Manipuri language which is written in Bengali script. The insurgents harp on “back to the past” and want to revive the old Meitei script. The tribals have their own languages but use Roman script because of Baptist Christian Missionary influence. The abstract nature of insurgency in Manipur was such that a few movements were development based, a few - ethnic and still others had political connotation.

6.2 Genesis of Insurgency

Insurgency in Manipur can be divided into three streams viz. (1) Valley Stream (2) Naga Stream and (3) Kuki Stream.

6.2.1 Valley Stream.

The Valley Stream insurgents believed that the Maharaja of Manipur was coerced into signing the instrument of accession. They were fighting for a separate country outside India. It started initially as a student movement. The basic reason was influx of outsiders. To express protest the students got united under the aegis of the All Manipur Students Union (AMSU) and All Manipur Students Coordination Committee (AMSCOC)
and launched an agitation over continued infiltration of “foreign nationals” from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal into Manipur, their identification and deportation. After going through the ordeal of agitations, an agreement with the State Govt. was signed for finding a solution to the problem putting January, 26, 1956 as the cut off date to identify the foreigners. This agreement however remained in cold storage with the Govt. failing to abide by the provisions. “Manipur has the highest number of colleges in a given area. The number of unemployed was touching a lakh for a population of 22 lakhs (approx.) of them mostly graduates. The insurgent leaders of today were victims of a system which left them literally to stew their own juice. The economic grind was excruciating. Manipuris by nature were proud and sensitive people. In fact the mainlander attitude had created the “big brother syndrome”. To this scenario came the quota of reservation. Though outwardly they displayed a façade of bonhomie with tribals (20%) who were traditionally considered inferior and the conquered, they came to overlord them which could not be digested by the proud Meiteis. The students blamed the Centre for not paying sufficient attention to the State and giving it a step-motherly treatment. A section of the youth argued that the govt. could be made to act only by violent movements and armed revolution was the only way. They stealthily made their way to the then East Pakistan (1968) for training and received the required help. Even though the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 forced a temporary suspension in their activities an organization named as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) which was claimed to have been formed in 1964 came in the open, agitating for an independent Manipur. “The Meiteis had traditionally held sway over the hill tribals. But now they found themselves left behind while the tribals in North and South Manipur were favoured and pampered by the authorities at Imphal and New Delhi”, disregarding the aspirations and problems of the majority Meitei Manipuris. Ironically the 80% Meiteis of Manipur had two tribal chief ministers to rule them much to their chagrin. Again tribals held most of the prestigious official posts under the provisions of the preferential treatment to Tribals SCs and OBCs and the vast army of educated Meitei youth coming out of colleges/universities were left high and dry. These boys formed the nucleus of the Meitei Insurgent outfits subsequently “as they did not like to live under a govt. practicing discriminative policies among the people.”
6.2.2. *Naga Stream*

"The complexion of the Naga Insurgency in Manipur is essentially that of Nagaland with total NSCN (IM) orientation and it is part of the same". The Northern part of Manipur and some parts of West Manipur inhabited by Nagas prominently Thangkhuls, had been a safe haven for insurgents right from early days of the Naga Insurgent movement in Nagaland. "The Naga movement should also be understood as part of tribal aspiration for independence to maintain their ethnic identity and style of living. They feel that being a part of India their past got diluted and in this context they expressed the same level of bitterness even against non-Naga tribals like the Kukis."

6.2.3. *The Kuki Stream*

This stream is a divided lot. It had its nascency in the Naga-Kuki inner contradictions as the "Kuki Homeland" issue cropped up only after a bitter clash between them. In this connection portions from a statement datelined "Kangla" “Nov. 24, 1993” issued by the "Central Committee of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF)" an insurgent outfit of the Meiteis is worth quoting "The root cause of the Naga - Kuki contradiction is that the Nagas treat the Kukis as encroachers on their land whereas on the other hand the Kukis assert that after having settled here for over 200 years they also have a right to exist projecting their collective identity. Depending on the opportunity available, the British and today India, had taken advantage of this contradiction in dividing and suppressing us. They had used one community against the other.

After some Naga tribes of Manipur joined the struggle for an independent Nagaland, they started collecting “house tax” from the Naga inhabited hill areas of Manipur. The house tax was also collected from the Kukis in these areas. On the other hand Kukis of Manipur generally subscribed to the struggle for an independent Mizoram from the consideration of closer ethnic affinity (later on however the Kukis distanced themselves from that struggle).
Thus, the respective struggles based on ideologies of ethnic exclusiveness sharpened the Naga-Kuki contradiction and the two communities began to pull apart in opposite directions. Taking advantage of this sharpening contradiction some self-styled political leaders of both the communities who are neck-deep in the business of India’s unprincipled politics began to spread poisonous propaganda in order to stir up the sentiments of their respective communities for electoral gains (a harmful effect of the Indian Politician system?). At one pole some Naga leaders began to spread slogans like all contiguous Naga areas of Manipur should be merged with ‘Nagaland’ ‘Southern Nagaland’ etc. At another pole, demands like “Kuki dominant autonomous district” “Kuki Homeland” etc. began to be floated by some leaders. These slogans and demands have sharply polarized the hill population on ethnic Naga-Kuki lines. Things began to hot up as the Nagas voiced their strong opposition to the demands of a “Kuki District” or “Kuki Homeland” and the Kukis refusing to pay “house tax” for “Nagaland”.

Thus, the Naga-Kuki contradiction having turned antagonistic, ultimately reached a flash point.

It is in such a charged situation that a section of the Naga freedom fighters began to kill the chiefs and other leaders of some Kuki villages who resisted paying “house tax”. Subsequently Kuki militants retaliated against a particular Naga tribe – the Thangkhuls – who they thought were responsible for the killings. Thus the direct conflict between the two militant groups dragged the common people into the imbroglio and soon it assumed the dimensions of ethnic blood bath in the hills.

Now scores of Kuki villages have been burnt down and many persons killed. In some cases even entire inhabitants of villages have been massacred. Likewise in some areas Naga villages have been razed to the ground and many killed. It is an irony of history that both Nagas and Kukis who escaped the killing spree in the hills are now taking shelter in the plains which they regard as the land of the Meiteis. The only way to resolve the contradiction among the ethnic communities in Manipur is “co-existence”.

180
The futility of ethnic blood letting shall become more self evident in the course of history’.

“Kukis were primarily hunters with very little inclination towards a sedentary life such as agriculture. They belonged to the Tibeto-Burman group settled in Burma and Manipur region from time immemorial. They came from Central China according to folklore and legends and settled in Zale’n-gam (land of freedom) located half in Myanmar and the other half in India, once stretched from the Chindwin river in the East, the Naga hills in the north North Cachar (Assam) hills in the west and Chittagong hills in the south. Kukis are now spread in (1) Churachandpur district (2) Chandel district (3) Sadar Hills (4) Tamenglong district (5) Ukhrul District in Manipur State (6) North Cachar hills and (7) Karbianglong both in Assam. They were fierce and clever fighters. They had engaged the Britishers in innumerable skirmishes ultimately resulting in the Kuki war of independence of 1917-19 over the issue of forced recruitment of work force for first world war. The total strength of Kukis now lying spread out was estimated at 14.9 lakhs. However the earliest record of migration of Kuki tribes into Naga territories was found in the 1830s. They migrated from the Chin Hills of Myanmar probably in the year 1834. In 1840 a British political agent Mc-Culloch brought in a large number of Kukis and let them loose in Naga hills with ration and fire arms to fight against the Nagas. Within a short period of time thousands of Kukis were settled as subjects of Manipur. However the majority came subsequent to the first world war after being turned out by the Chins (Myanmar) in the process of inter-tribal wars.

The Kuki-Naga clashes were going on in Manipur with killings and counter-killings.

Under the Kuki group about 37 tribes figured. All of them did not claim to be Kukis. Paites (called Zomis) who were included among Kukis were fighting with them. This started when 10 innocent Paites were killed by the Kuki National Front (a militant outfit of the Kukis). After protracted interference of political leaders an agreement was signed between the two according to which it was decided “that the nomenclature Kuki
and Zomi would be mutually respected by all Zomis and Kukis and all points of memorandum of understanding between Kuki INPI (apex body of Kukis) and the Zomi Council shall be operative and binding on all concerned persons and parties including the government."

In fact the Kuki – Naga tangle has a long history. When Nagaland became a State (1963) the Kukis had aspired for a "Kuki Land" comprising districts of Churachandpur, Chandel, Senapathi, Tamenglong and parts of Ukhrul in Manipur and parts of Nagaland, Assam and Myanmar. The demand was also presented before the Central Govt. The Kuki militant organizations were asserting this demand time and again. This was however strongly opposed by the Nagas of Nagaland and Manipur. The NSCN was in the forefront opposing the demand which resulted in an attack on Moreh town in 1992 wherefrom Nagas were asked to leave by the Kukis. This town has a sizeable Kuki population and thrives on smuggling. The estimate was that about 5-10 kgs of heroin was smuggled daily into Manipur through this route and from here to the rest of India. All agencies were greased adequately to turn a blind eye to the goings on. The Moreh town was citadel for all nefarious activities and no agency of govt. or otherwise was able to do anything nor had the will to do it. The militant outfits were also not bothered as long as they received their self imposed income and taxes and commissions from the smugglers. This money was used to purchase weapons.

Having asserted themselves, though by accident, rather than by design the Kukis were reluctant to give up their militant posture which had come to stay. This they felt had given them the much needed recognition and protection. Insurgency in Manipur can also be classified as urban and rural. The U.G. organizations coming under the Valley Stream were essentially urban in character and the others rural. While the spread of rural based UG organizations to urban areas was more to explore avenues of income the interest of urban based organizations in rural areas was for ensuring safe havens during raids by S.F and also to broad base themselves.
6.3 Reasons for Insurgency

6.3.1 Economic Reasons:-- The basic reason for insurgency in Manipur was economic. The youth feared that when the unemployment problem was already mounting, influx of outsiders would make matter worse. It was dependent upon the Central Govt. both for plan and non-plan expenditures. The State lacked infrastructure for development—barring the Loktak Hydro Electric Project (that too a project of the National Hydro Electric Power Corporation) there was no major project which was noteworthy. Its
economy was agriculture based but was having no modern irrigation system. The schemes started remained in limbo. There was a feeling among the youth that if the provisions of the merger agreement were implemented properly Manipur might not have faced the present problems. "This had made the youth to shed the Vaishnavite Hindu identity and revive the century and half old concept of tribal Mongoloid unity". The cost of production was higher by 20 to 30% making products price-wise uncompetitive. Goods came from other parts and successfully competed with those produced locally. To cap them Manipur is land locked whose cry was never heard far beyond the confines of the mountains.

The Indo-Myanmar trade which was started in 1995 was hit because of what was termed as "violation of bilateral agreement" by India and Myanmar which included factors such as taxation on non-taxable incomes. Under this agreement the two countries had agreed to trade 22 items mostly vegetables and other catables through the border of Moreh about 120 kms. south-east of Imphal on NH39. Trade across the border was always brisk. According to a rough estimate, about 7-10 lakh was spent daily by the Indian traders in a supermarket in the Burmese side. Continuous insurgent activities had broken down the trade to a considerable extent.

### 6.3.2. Lack of Communication

Roads, the life lines here were only 26.33 kms per 100 sq. kms as against 32.13 kms in the North-Eastern region. Rail lines were only upto Jiribam a distance of 9 kms inside Manipur. Transportation was badly lacking in Manipur. The infrastructure and facilities available in this field were far below the required level. The air service was only thrice a week, the rail-line was upto Jiribam connecting Silchar. A new rail-line from Karong town in Senapati District to Dibhu in Assam covering Dhansiri (also in Assam) has been planned but would take time. The difficulties posed by the topography make it necessary for the rail-line to pass through 103 tunnels and the total estimated length was 56.97 kms. A proposal had been sent by the Manipur Govt. for Imphal –
Silhet (Bangladesh) rail-line and another line from Jiribam – Badarpur to improve the communication network.

**6.3.3. Political Reasons**

Regionalism, communal and caste politics were tools in the hands of politicians to garner votes. Manipur was no exception where it was taken to extremes. "Many political leaders are known to be having both covert and overt understanding with the U.G. elements. This kind of patronage had given the initial base for insurgency to develop in the past and today the politicians were unable to contain the movement". On the other hand, the politicians put the blame squarely at the door step of the Centre. They attributed the cause of insurgent movement as the direct result of unemployment of educated youth and economic backwardness of the region. The problems were also concerned with the historical background coupled with the sense of alienation prevailing in the minds of younger generation. This feeling of negligence by the Centre, rampant corruption in public life and geographical location of the region had contributed to the problems in Manipur. The administrative policies pursued were also allegedly faulty. To the misfortune of Manipur the State was never known to have produced any good leader. Instead of sorting things out the administration drifted like a rudderless boat which took matters to a point of no return. Manipur Public Service Commission became defunct in 1991 because of corruption charges. No effort was made to either revamp or replace it. As a result, there was no recruitment to Class-II and III levels creating a vacuum at middle levels. With none to supervise the lower rungs revelled in the new found freedom and enjoyed payment without doing anything worthwhile. Service to people became a thing of the past and matters moved only if palms were greased. The adverse effect snowballed into total collapse of administration leading to a sort of anarchy. A financial crisis hit the State. Employees were not paid salary for two months successively resulting in market glut and then nose diving to the bottom of economic activity. It may take a long period for the market to recover. The govt. was planning to borrow 150 crores from the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) to pay the pending salaries of its employees which was "frowned upon by economists as well as political observers of the
State”. This was when the RBI overdraft of the State “stood at Rs.203 crores and Govt. bill encashment remained ‘banned’. The employee work motivation as well as working capacity was on the wane while their wages were on the rise. Amidst this situation the Govt. employees launched a strike paralysing 80% of the govt. administration set up. A section of the saner ones believed that these were harsh times and harsh measures were needed “Ministers expenditures and tours have to be cut drastically, recruitment and post creation must be banned altogether, resource mobilisation have to be carried forward on war footing, if necessary under security cover and even employees may have to be made to do with “half salaries”.

The situation in rural areas was still worse. The Public Distribution System (PDS) had totally collapsed. Black marketing with all its attendant vices made life of poor miserable. Illiterate and uncared, they were mere pawns in the political chess board.

The unscrupulous indulged in nefarious activities like drug trafficking, flesh trade, circulation of porno books, blue films and commission of crimes. Manipur was a safe haven for heroin trafficking as it was close to the notorious Golden Triangle. Use of heroin led to the spread of HIV and AIDS. There were reportedly about 8000 HIV cases including 500 women. The majority of cases of AIDS spread was said to be through intra-venous use of drugs which was mainly heroin. The fact was that sero positive rate among the intra-venous drug users (IDUS) in Manipur was one of the highest in the world, their age group was between 17-30. For some others insurgency became a vocation to be adored and there was no dearth of volunteers for insurgent groups.

Both State and Central Govts became institutions to be despised. For insurgents with fingers on the trigger things started moving their way as they liked and with forcible collection of taxes and extortion there was no dearth of money which they distributed selectively. They got an instant Robinhood image. Discipline in the form of ruthless punishments like killing, beating of drug traffickers, etc. imposed by insurgent groups were initially accepted but soon inter and intramural squabbles in the outfits led to shooting and killing, making life of people once again miserable.
There was indeed a mushroom growth of insurgent outfits each trying to control sources of income. The State was in the throes of untold misery, the poor bearing the brunt and more and more middle class were pushed to the below poverty line. If beggary was unseen in Manipur it became a common sight, most of them doing drug trafficking clandestinely.

6.3.4. Ethnicity

“Ethnicity leads to organized effort on the part of a community to bring about changes in the socio-political system. But unless prompted this ethnic relationship remains dormant”. Manipur is a pluralistic matrix society where a medley of many ethnic linguistic communities were positioned and lived together under a Maharaja for long. It presented a remarkable combination of ethnic and cultural diversity. “This was probably because Manipur was one of the ancient trade routes between India and South East Asia and different waves of Aryans, Mongolians and even Dravidians passed through Manipur over the centuries”. To a large extent, the various ethnic groups had a self-dependent mode of existence and there was an equilibrium. Meiteis being mainly agriculturists their produce were consumed within the precincts of the valley and rarely shared with the hills where they had their own jhum cultivation. What made the people to go back into their cocoons of ethnicity through calls for insurgency was the visible and perceived dangers (often the main reasons for starting insurgent movement) awaiting them if they did not wake up. It came to the fore through the steady flow of “foreigners” from Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal besides businessmen from other States of India and the impending danger of assimilation of their culture. Over night all outsiders became “Mayangs” (foreigners). As of now “nowhere in the North-East is the ethnic divide more pronounced than in Manipur. The Naga - Meitei divide has sharpened due to government’s negotiations with NSCN(IM). The Naga-Kuki conflict has attained violent proportions. The recent Kuki-Paite clashes in Churachandpur area was doused with great difficulty and there is simmering of Kuki-Meitei differences and confrontation.
In most of these confrontations the ethnic insurgent groups have taken advantage of the situation or precipitated it into violent conflicts."

6.3.5 Language

Meiteis also felt that the Hindu Vaishnavism was imposed on the people of the valley by the then Maharaja Garib Nawaz who was influenced by the Vaishnava saints of Bengal. This was responsible for the use of Bengali script for Meitei language. The extremists were also trying to revive the traditional script. Attempts were also being made to make the people worship the traditional Gods of Meiteis. The Naga and Kuki movements were nothing but moves to maintain their separate identity. Researches of the Linguistic Survey of India enables us to take a comprehensive view of the relationship of the Meitei language to the language spoken by the hill tribes both in the State and beyond it. Dr. D.Grierson gives it a place in the Tibeto-Burma group of languages and defines the position of the Kuki-Chin group to which it belonged in the following words "The Kuki-Chin languages are closely connected with the surrounding groups of the Tibeto-Burman family, the Bodo and Naga languages to the North Kachin to the East and Burmese to the east and the south". In another passage he insists on the close connection between Kachin and the Kuki-Chin languages especially Meitei which he considers to be "link language between the two groups".

6.3.6 Neglect by Centre

It was Naga and Mizo insurgencies which had shown the way to Meiteis. With prolonged alleged neglect by the Central Government, people became disillusioned and their psychology was for insurgency and a call for revolt was all that they needed. There were no dearth of leaders to lead and inimical neighbours of India were only too ready to help.

6.3.7. Lack of Good Leadership

The State was never known to have had a good leader. Steeped in corruption and political chicanery they used the people and the youth for self-aggrandizement. When the
youth realized the truth they took to insurgency. In fact all other issues emanated from utter failure of politicians to lead the State.

6.3.8 Geography

The State of Manipur is geographically divided into Manipur Valley and the Hills. The Hills provided safe sanctuaries to the terrorist group. The very lay out of Manipur had turned it into a training field for militant new recruits. The people became the soft targets for both the UGs and the SF. Factional killings and patricidal wars were witnessed here and most of the outfits had experienced bloodshed among the comrades in arms due to ideological differences or internal measures. The peoples armies fought among themselves and with the army/CPMF. The people were left with no choice except to support the people’s armies who promised them justice and parity resulting in Balkanization and growth of terrorist outfits one after the other.

6.4. Organizations involved in Insurgency/Militancy in Manipur

Table III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valley Stream</th>
<th>Naga Stream</th>
<th>Kuki Stream</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lup (KYKL)</td>
<td>(KDF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)</td>
<td>5. Special Sacrifice Force (SSF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. North-Eastern Minority Front (NEMF)</td>
<td>7. Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front (CKRF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hmar Revolutionary Front (HRF)</td>
<td>8. Thangajil Hill Area Defence Council (THADC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF) – a combination of serial 1,2 &amp; 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA) – Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Revolutionary Peoples Front (Kangleipak) – RPF(K)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Kangleipak Liberation Organization (KLO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Meitei State Army (MSA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ireibak Kanba Lup (IKL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Peoples Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.4.1. UNLF (United National Liberation Front) – (A banned organization)

The students and youth of Manipur having failed to achieve their demand of identification of illegal immigrants in Manipur through agitational methods decided to take to militant path. Thus was born the first militant outfit on 24.11.1964 known as the United National Liberation Front formed under the leadership of Arembam Somorendro Singh of Sagalband, Imphal. With the conviction that Manipur was “an independent State and forcibly merged with India”, they decided to fight for an “Independent Manipur”. They decided to go to India’s enemy (the then East Pakistan). The year was 1968. As a first step one Oinam Sudhir, a former school teacher and a revolutionary with an intellectual bend of mind and Somarendra were despatched. Before they could finalize an agreement with Pak authorities about 200 youth led by Nameirakpam Bisheswar, K. Santomaba and Dhaneshwar joined them and this resulted in differences of opinion. This was the time when relationship between India and Pakistan were getting strained. As Pakistan did not want another issue of confrontation with India, the Pak authorities handed over the youth to Indian Army on Tripura border albeit with a promise to consider their request. Sudhir and 8 others however stayed back and out of them two viz. Bisheswar and one Santomaba were later sent back to Manipur for collection of money but then again the Pak authorities was not ready to help. This initial set back proved to be a permanent curse for the militant movement in Manipur as differences of opinion between the group members led to expulsion of Sudhir for his ‘extraneous’ activities. He subsequently formed an organization styled as “Consolidation Committee of Manipur (CONSCOM). He got help from two other Manipuris and set up the Revolutionary Govt. of Manipur (RGM) at Sylhet and later printed and distributed leaflets in this regard at Imphal. The frequent internal feuds between leaders failed to convince cadres and the Pak authorities on how far they were committed to “fight for the cause of Manipur”. After much effort the Meitei youth “received enough attention from
the Pak authorities” and the Manipur youth were trained in handling of sophisticated weapons and launching of guerilla warfare. In return the Meitei youth promised to help Pakistan and were reported to have launched ambushes on Indian army during Indo-Pak War (1971) at Cachar, Dharmanagar and Karimganj areas. With the defeat of Pakistan Army the Manipurs had to return to India but came back with weapons. Though they were intercepted and arrested, they along with others who were handed over to the Indian Army earlier were released in the general amnesty announced in connection with State formation in 1972. Neither the intelligence nor the army could see through the game plan or find out the real leaders of UNLF and thus began the UNLF activities in Manipur. By this time (1973-74) a group of UNLF volunteers under the leadership of Raj Kumar Meghen alias Sanayaima had been to upper Myanmar where they helped the Naga UGs in organizing themselves. Samarendra in between gave up hard life. After the amnesty was announced N.Bisheswar, Sudhir and Santomaba set up a farm at Kondong Lirembi area of Chandel district. Although they started doing business and were picking up well Bisheswar decided to restart the insurgent activities again and embarked on “collecting” funds to reorganize the splintered groups. This set him sharply against Sudhir and Santomaba and they started gunning for each other. (Santomaba was a relation of Bisheswar). The differences ultimately ended in the killing of Sudhir and Santomaba and with them the RGM died a natural death. The UNLF under the leadership of Rajkumar Meghen continued but wanted to make people ‘conscious” before any action was launched which clashed with the ideas of Bisheswar who preferred armed revolution and the two drifted away.
Table IV

Setup of UNLF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing</th>
<th>Armed Wing (Manipur Peoples Army)</th>
<th>Area of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rajkumar Meghen (50 years)</td>
<td>1. Thompa @ Wangpa (C-in-C)</td>
<td>East/West Imphal Districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Secretary (top leader)</td>
<td>2. Thambal @ Marjit (GSO)</td>
<td>Bishnupur Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. H. Ibomcha @ Mangang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incharge (Home) (CCM)</td>
<td>3. Y. Kulachandra @ Champa (CCM)</td>
<td>Thoubal Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Pinabei @ Thomba (CCM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some Kuki inhabited areas in the hills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strength – 700 approx.
40 women
3000 sympathizers in the valley
200 sympathizers in the hills

Aims and Objects

1. To liberate Manipur from India and the Indian Occupation Forces (IOF).
2. Regain the sovereignty of Manipur and its neighbours.
3. Establish an independent and sovereign Manipur.
4. Regain lost territories from Myanmar.

Weapon holdings

It was able to amass a good number of weapons which was believed to be around 500 (all types) including A.K. series, SLRs, LMGs, G and M Series, Rocket launchers, 2" mortar, Sten Gun, Carbines, small arms, rifles, grenades etc.
Nature of Activities

The UNLF along with other insurgent groups was successful in terrorising the people into unquestioned obedience. In early days of its coming into being it launched an all out war against drug consumption/trafficking, pornography, blue films etc. and many had fallen victims to the bullets of UNLF. With passage of time however, it was believed to be utilising the channel to earn money to purchase weapons.

The spirited activities by the UNLF noted initially had slowed down to attacks on selected targets of security forces. UNLF had joined hands with similar groups of Manipur like Peoples Liberation Army, armed wing of Revolutionary Peoples Front (RPF) and Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) to launch combined operations against the S.F. and was party to a joint declaration dated 1.3.1999 about forming of the Manipur Peoples Revolutionary Front (MPLF). This organization is dealt separately.

The UNLF was an advocate of Pan Mangoloid Movement which however did not go far. Earlier it was also a party to the formation of the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) formed on 22.5.1990 by the NSCN (Khaplang) faction to unify "all like-minded revolutionaries in the region". Its main aim was to build up a united struggle for the independence of Indo-Myanmar. According to the declaration signed by the NSCN Chairman SS Khaplang, ULFA Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and UNLF General Secretary Sana Yaima "so far the long struggles for national independence of various ethnic groups in the region have not been able to make much headway rather it has been going down the road to capitulation as had happened in Mizoram and Tripura". "The reason stated was the historical limitation of ethnicism which made their leaders unable to see the potential strength of the region as a whole". This was indeed prophetic as with NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) announcing cease-fire one after the other, IBRF was dumped into cold storage to die a natural death. It had first received a crude jolt when the Thangkhul Nagas got engaged in an ethnic cleansing of the Kukis.
Profile of Insurgents

This outfit has a good member of educated cadres including women, many of them rank holders in universities who joined the movement while still in their youth. The leadership was matured. Recruitment and training were still going on. The age group was between 20-50. The cadres belonged to lower middle class. "Education breeds indiscipline" was true of Manipur. Out of colleges/universities they were without jobs and found available jobs occupied by outsiders. Frustration got multiplied due to neglect by the Centre towards the State. Their mission was to change the society by "liberating Manipur."

Recruitment/Procedure for Recruitment

Most of the recruits who joined the organization did so on their own volition out of commitment to the cause of liberation of Manipur. No forcible recruitment was resorted to. They were trained both in NSCN and KIA base camps in Myanmar. Later the recruits were sent to the NSCN(IM) camps located in Bangladesh. The training period was for 3 months at the minimum. In regard to tactics adopted the UNLF was many a time on the winning side, because of the surprise element in their attack and the fierceness with which they launched them.

Factionalism

As stated the UNLF had two factions. One is led by R.K.Meghen and the other by Namoijan Oken Singh. Both claimed that theirs was the real UNLF and had indulged in bitter feuds even to the extent of killing each others supporters. The Oken group had about 200 supporters and Meghen about 500.

Means of Communication

UNLF was in possession of about 25 wireless sets and was reportedly making use of internet of the PLA/RPF. The PLA/PRF had one of the best web sites. UNLF had also quite a number of cell phones according to one surrendered UG.
**Relationship with other similar organizations both within and Outside.**

UNLF had singed a joint declaration with PLA/RPF and PREPAK (1.3.1999) constituting the Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF). Whether it was working smoothly was open to question. Since inception it was maintaining close association with the then NSCN and ULFA. After the split of the NSCN, UNLF was maintaining links with both the NSCN(K) and NSCN(IM). Mutual help varied from supply of weapons/training, provision of ration, shelter/ moral support and direct action incase of request.

**6.4.2. Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Armed Wing of Revolutionary Peoples Front (RPF) (banned organization).**

This organization was formed in 1978 on the initiative of late Nameirakpam Bisheswar Singh. It was banned in 1979 but was very active. Originally Bisheswar was one of the members of the UNLF but soon fell out on ideological grounds as he looked to China for inspiration and guidance and believed in armed revolution, here and now, much against the thoughts of others. "He was by nature "soft-spoken" but a man of steel." In early 70s he along with 7 others set out to Tibet but enroute arrested at Dibrugarh and had to return. He was convinced that China would be more conducive and geographically beneficial to the insurgents in the north east. By this time he was also influenced by the teaching of Mao and believed that Communism would be suited for Manipur.

Once again two groups of about eight each set out to Tibet on 14.6.1975 and reached there after an ordeal. At Lhasa they met the local Committee Chairman of the Communist Party. Since they had to be representatives of some organisation, they took the name of Consolidation Committee of Manipur (CONSCOM) formed earlier by Sudhir, one time leader of Bisheswar who was expelled from UNLF. At Lhasa instead of being trained in weaponry they were given ideological briefing and had to be satisfied
and returned without weapons but were briefed to obtain weapons from any source available.

Before the training the Manipuri youth had told the ‘trainers’ that ‘Manipur was an independent country but were merged with India forcibly’. They had studied and analysed together whether the “Chinese theory or the method could be applied to Manipur or not. Other subjects covered were (1) Chinese history (2) how to organize masses (3) guerilla warfare (4) torture of innocent people during “revolution” (5) life after revolution (7) counter revolutionary methods adopted by security personnel.” They came back sometime in early 1978 not fully satisfied but Bisheswar and some others had conceived ideas about “liberated zones” in Kabaw valley in Myanmar with the help of like minded organizations. On return this group began to mobilize masses as per teachings of Mao and started violent activities for secession of Manipur from the Indian Union under a new organization which came to be known as the “Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) with N. Bisheswar as its first Chairman.

PLA indulged in killings, lootings, punishment of drug traffickers, blue film suppliers, anti-social elements and other cleansing work which terrorized whole of the valley and drew attention from outside. Soon the organization was banned.

Availing the ban, the volunteers fanned out to interior areas and indoctrinated innocent people to Communist ideology. They knew that after attacking security forces they had to sink into villages for safety – “that sea” to use Mao’s metaphor “in which the guerilla swim like a fish”. They set up as many camps as possible which spoke about its wide base today. Around this time some PLA volunteers had been to Myanmar to establish contact with Manipur extremists there but were caught in an attack by the Myanmar army and some were killed. This set back disheartened the young minds and some had planned to go to China again to “get weapons from them”. The idea was discarded but soon they decided to do daring attacks on security forces through well thought out plans. Such attacks were done in waves so that security forces had no chance
to escape. Their main aim was to snatch weapons and killing was done only when necessary.

A Section of PLA volunteers was also despatched to Bangladesh to seek help but were turned back saying ‘India is not our enemy and we at present cannot help you’. Then they launched the major attack on the security camp at Mongshangei in which killings took place on both sides but PLA could get 10 SLRs and one LMG. Subsequently, one Temba Singh, a Lhasa Trainee, went to KIA along with 27 people including eleven girls and established the PLA (Eastern camp) there. Temba was later expelled because of anti-party activities.

**Aims and Objects**

1. To liberate Manipur and its neighbours from the domination of India.

2. To restore the lost political sovereignty of Manipur and her neighbours.

3. To establish an independent sovereign republic comprising of Manipur and her neighbours.

4. To regain the lost territories from Myanmar.

**Table-V**

**SETUP OF P.L.A./R.P.F.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing (Revolutionary)</th>
<th>Armed Wing (Peoples Liberation Army)</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irengbam Bhorot @ Choran Sing</td>
<td>1. P. Manohar Praveen Kumar @ Praveen (C-in-C)</td>
<td>East/West Imphal Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manohar Praveen Kumar @</td>
<td>2. G. Inaocha Sharma @</td>
<td>Bishnupur Dist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

198
Strength – 1500
500 over ground
200 women
2000 sympathizers

Its nature of activities included indoctrination of villagers particularly youth in
communist ideology, India’s economic policy, activities of “Indian Occupational Forces”
(IOF) necessity of education, reasons and remedies for ethnic clashes, the war of
independence, contributions of various revolutionary groups, their experiences,
limitations while fighting for independence, lack of unity among revolutionary groups,
evils of drug, liquor necessity of rendering help to victims of ethnic clashes, education of
students about the necessity for unity among them. Tax collection, check on drug
trafficking (those carrying more than 100 grms of heroin were shot) keeping tap on govt.
activities etc.

PLA/RPF had a wide base than any other outfit in Manipur. If the proposed
Manipur Peoples Liberation Front had taken shape it was more because of the efforts of
the PLA.

Profile of Insurgents
The age group of PLA volunteers varied between 18-50, the leadership being in
the hands of the aged and the wise. The sex ratio was 80% men and 20% women and
most of them belonged to the lower middle class who nurtured grievances over low standard of living and lack of employment opportunities.

A good number of the volunteers were University rank holders without employment. PLA volunteers believed in Mao’s communist ideology and the leaders who shaped PLA were trained by the Chinese at Lhasa in Tibet. It was not known how many were married but the volunteers were forced to maintain moral ethics under threat of punishment. PLA’s mission was to liberate Manipur from the subjugation of the Indian govt. and to drive out the “Indian Occupation Force”.

**Weapons**

It had an assortment of weapons totaling about 1000 of which the important ones were:

1. AK 47/56 guns – 260
2. M22 SMG – 50
3. M 16,21,23 Semi automatic rifles – 300
4. Land Mines – several bundles
5. Sten Gun – 20
6. Binoculars – 50
7. 2” Mortar – 20
8. Night Vision Sets – some

**Finance**

Its financial base was stated sound. The main source of income was tax collection from all sources including rich businessmen and kidnapping for ransom. PLA ensured that the poor people were never touched, rather they were helped which had given this organization a psychological support base in rural areas.
Another main source of income was reportedly a cut from Govt sponsored schemes (believed to be 10%) for which Central Govt. gave money. The deduction and payment was said to be through sympathisers in the Govt. machinery. It also reportedly did a monthly collection by way of cut in salary from the govt. employees etc. Some businessmen were reported offering regular funds as protection money.

Means of Communication

PLA/RPF was believed to be in possession of about 25 wireless sets, besides cell phones and computers and internet. It had also its own web site “The web site of Revolutionary Peoples Front Manipur is by far the best site in terms of content and design. Unlike other home pages of militant groups the web site goes beyond emotional propaganda and takes a very logical approach. One section that catch one’s attention is the STAR FORCE : Special Task Force formation July, 1998. “Save our society from HIV, AIDS and Drugs” – Immediately establishing RPF as an organization that cares for the community.

Other sections include joint declaration : call to boycott Indian Independence Day : A Message to the people in relation to the National Games, condolence at the brutal killings of ULFA leaders’ relatives and warm Revolutionary Congrations to the Manipur and Tripura peoples from Arbind Rajkhowa Chairman, United Liberation Front of Assam.

Documents : The access one can have in the site are fairly impressive ones which include memorandum submitted to the de-colonisation Committee (Committee of 24); Annexure of the Memorandum, Declaration made by RPF during the 49th Session of the Human Rights, Sub-Commission at UN Headquarters, Geneva, open letter to the G8 countries, SAARC countries, ASEAN countries and China”.

Relationship with similar organizations both within and outside

PLA/RPF maintained close relationship with UNLF and PREPAK within Manipur and the organizations had already signed a joint declaration to form a new outfit
styled as "Manipur Peoples Liberatn Front" (MPLF). This front was said to be more a brainchild of PLA. It was also close to both the NSCN(IM) and (K) of Nagaland and Manipur. It had very intimate relationship with ULFA of Assam. Outside Manipur PLA was reportedly hobnobbing with KIA of Myanmar, with Bangladesh and with ISI of Pakistan. There were unconfirmed reports that PLA was for a time in Cohorts even with the Myanmar army after refugee camps were set up in Manipur and Mizoram for refugees from Myanmar following military crackdown on supporters of pro-democracy movement..

During 1991 the President of PLA/RPF Irengbam Bhorot had been to Bangladesh and during that time had "established contact with the Pakistan army to negotiate to get all kinds of support to wage war against the Indian Govt". "A letter seized from the underground members said that the question of survivability comes if the help is to be obtained from Pakistan army in view of the geographical location". It was also the view of the underground members that "getting help from Myanmar army will enhance the efficiency of the PLA activities in view of the convenient geographical conditions. Again a PLA/RPF team led by the organization's Vice President had reportedly visited Pakistan from Dhaka on January, 22, 1991. "The team was told that it could not get any assistance as it was not part of IBRF. Pakistan seems to have extended help to IBRF".

The external help varied from supply of weapons, training, provisions of shelter, moral support and direct involvement in case of request. The routes taken by PLA and other outfits for going to and coming from outside is given separately.

6.4.3. Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)

This outfit was formed by R.K. Tullachandra Singh a one time member of the UNLF. Since inception this organization was marred by internal feuds leading to a split. One faction was led by Salam Khomba of Nongpok Sakmai (since merged with another extremist outfit named Kanglei Yawol Khnna Lup (KYKL) and the other was led by Lorembem Setungham. It was banned in 1979 and was an unlawful organization.
## Table VI

### SETUP OF PREPAK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing</th>
<th>Armed Wing</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Uritkinbem Sarat Singh @</td>
<td>Khundrakpam</td>
<td>Imphal East-West Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meiraba - Chairman</td>
<td>Leibakmacha C-in-C</td>
<td>Pockets of Thoubal and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bishnupur districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. N. Shanti @ Chinglemba @</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langanba, SS Defense Secretary.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kh. Ratan @ Sathiba @</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hera SS Home Secretary.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Estimated Strength

150-200 volunteers

### Aims and Objects

1. To secure freedom for Manipur from India, and establish an independent sovereign state.
2. To ensure land ceiling system and Panchayat system
3. To abolish capitalism
4. To create employment and ensure job oriented education.

The volunteers of the groups were also trained in NSCN Headquarters and the KIA. It was a party to the joint agreement for the formation of the Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF). In its strongholds it was causing headache to the S.F. The age group of volunteers varied between 20-40 and they hailed from rural areas. They belonged to lower/middle class.

Its arms holding was estimated at 30/40, all varieties including AK series, Sten Gun, Carbines, SLRs, etc.

It also did Tax collection, extortion etc. to make up finances.
It was in possession of some WT equipment for communication. It was maintaining close relationship with UNLF and PLA within the State and NSCN/KIA in Myanmar and with Bangladesh outside the State.

6.4.4 *Kanglei Yawol Khnna Lup* (KYKL)

This outfit was formed during May, 1994 by the breakaway groups of 3 banned extremists organizations viz. UNLF (Oken faction) PREPAK (Khomba faction) and KCP (Kangleipak Community Party – Ibopishak faction). It has its headquarters in Bangladesh. Its cadre strength was estimated at about 200.

Its important leaders were:

**Civil Wing** 1. N. Oken @ Imobi SS Chairman

**Armed Wing** 2. N. Touba @ Koiran, S.S. Commander-in-chief

Both the Chairman and Commander in chief were arrested by the SF and the KYKL was in a spot.

Its areas of influence were portions of Bishnupur and Thoubal districts and some pockets of Imphal district.

Its aims and objects include (1) To unite all the revolutionary organizations operating in the State of Manipur and (2) to fight together in the struggle for independence.

Its weapon holdings were around 30/40 of all varieties like AK series, sten gun, etc.
Its cadres were already trained ones who were deserters from other outfits. They were trained either in the KIA or the NSCN training centres.

KYKL was making efforts to strengthen itself. This organization was in the thick of difficulties due to surrender of its volunteers with weapons.

Ideologically it claimed to be following principles of Che Guevara. Its S.S. PRO S.K. Loya while giving an interview to pressmen at a place (Ukhrul district) stated that “its relationship with UNLF was like sworn enemies and KYKL did not treat UNLF as a revolutionary organization”. It was termed as a Mafia aiming at achieving absolute control of colonial Manipur Govt. with the help of gangsterism. “They are a group of trigger happy criminals using all the paraphernalia of a revolutionary party. Their present political agenda is to create ethnic tension in Manipur with the sole intention of fishing in troubled waters. With their emergence the casualty is revolution itself. The lavish lifestyle of UNLF cadres have brought about corruption in the revolutionary groups of Manipur”. Giving his views on the “controversial issue of “Manipur’s territorial integrity” he stated that “our political outlook is that Kangleipak as well as entire North East region are being colonised by India. India is a prison house of nations where the Hindi speaking heartland colonises the peripheral rimlands in the name of a federal union and federalism”. “We respect the nationalism of the Nagas, Zomis, Hmars, Kukis and even ethnic nationalism of the Meitei Muslims. Without this respect there can be no revolution and without revolution we are doomed to national death. KYKL stands for the larger nationalism of the entire region which is going to be built up on the principle of All for one, one for all”. “The fate of the boundaries of the region should be decided by all the people of our region”.

As regards communication it was having only cellular phones. Its financial position was not sound but believed to be getting assistance from foreign sources including Bangladesh and ISI of Pakistan. It had some clashes with PREPAK and KCP
volunteers but was trying to patch up. But generally KYKL did not hold good reputation among other insurgent organizations.

For a time KYKL did extortion actively from politicians/businessmen. It also killed those refused to pay extortion money.

6.4.5 Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)

This organization was formed on 15.5.1980 and its cadre strength was around 350/400. Its important leaders were:-

1. Punshiba – leader of the organization.

2. Leibakmacha Singh SS Home Secretary

3. Laba Singh SS General Secretary

4. K.K. Mangang SS President

Its areas of influence were Imphal East Thoubal district and some areas of Bishnupur district. During earlier days of its formation it was active among the agricultural workers in the rural areas. With PLA making inroads into rural areas this organization had to take a back seat. It was also ridden with factionalism and was not a well organized outfit. It had two factions in Manipur.

Its objects were

1. To defend the liberty of the proletariat class and farmers.

2. To preserve the ethnic identity of Kangleipak.
3. To liquidate the political parties which are against them.

4. To win freedom of Kangleipak.

It had an assortment of 20/25 weapons including AK rifles, sten guns, carbines/grenades, etc.

Its volunteers were reportedly trained in Bangladesh and got assistance from there. The KYKL however did not allow it to have free access in Bangladesh of late.

6.4.6 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isac – Muivah) (NSCN-IM)

The year 1988 would go down in the history of Naga insurgent movement as a year of fights among the top leaders viz. Khaplang and Th Muivah. This year saw the split of the National Socialist Council of a Nagaland (NSCN) a monolithic organization so assiduously and painstakingly built by the two which had created an awe in the minds of both the Govt. officials and other members of insurgent movements in North Eastern region. The big brothers themselves fought bitter battles killing hundreds of their followers much to the dismay of every one. Th Muivah had a brush with death. Just like any other split political party adopting names the subsequent formations came to be known by the initials of the respective leaders viz. National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khaplang (NSCN-K) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (I)sac (M)uivah (NSCN-IM) as in the latter case both Isac and Muivah enjoyed same status and desired to have equal importance in the name of the organization also. If the Khaplang–Muivah feud was any example this show of solidarity was of no significance. It also conveyed that individuals mattered and not the organization as a whole.

After the split Isac Muivah faction could not stay at the NSCN Headquarters at Chalam in Upper Myanmar and therefore shifted to Manipur area. Their followers
essentially belonged to Nagaland and Manipur. It had set up Imphal town as the correspondence centre of its different regions including Nagaland.

The NSCN(IM) was formed on 30.4.1988. Even though the split took place the NSCN-IM managed to regroup and consolidate itself with remarkable speed. In fact it emerged stronger and the catalyst was a slogan "Nagaland for Christ" which shook the young Christian Naga minds. Coupled with it was the traditional idea of having a "greater Nagaland" or 'Nagalim". It now aimed at attaining an independent Nagaland consisting of Naga inhabited areas in the North Eastern region and some portions of Myanmar.
### Table-VIII

#### SET UP OF NSCN (IM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing</th>
<th>Army Wing</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Govt. of the Peoples Republic of Nagaland (GPRN)</td>
<td>1. Part of Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Isaac - Chesi Swu - President/Chairman Kedhage</td>
<td>2. SS Maj. Genl. V.S. Atem - Commander in Chief</td>
<td>2. Whole of Ukhrul district inhabited by Thangkhuls (In Manipur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Khodos Yanthan - Vice President/Vice Chairman/Khalo</td>
<td>3. SS Brig. NG. Markson - CO lst Brigade</td>
<td>3. Tamenglong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Thuingalang Thangkhul Muivah @ Th. Muivah/Prime Minister/G.S./Ato Killonser</td>
<td>4. SS Lt. Col. Livingstone - CO lst Brigade</td>
<td>4. Senapathi district (Manipur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Khayaop Hurray - Minister, Forest and environment Trade, commerce etc.</td>
<td>7. SS Maj Pungthing - CO NP BN</td>
<td>7. Tuensang and Wokha districts (Nagaland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Angelia Shimrey - Foreign Minister/Killonser.</td>
<td>9. SS Maj Pukhe Mao - CO Vephuhte BN.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women Wing - National Socialist Women Organization (NSWO)</strong></td>
<td>10. SS Col. Ramkathing - CO Alee Command (Foreign Command / believed to be based in Bangladesh)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. SS Cap. Ms. Kapungwon - Chairperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ms. Suno - Vice Chairperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mrs. R. Shimray - Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ms. Poune - Treasurer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Ministers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. A.K. Lunganla (Zeliang) - Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Medintiba Jamir (AO) - Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. M.K. Pamol - Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. M.S. Singyaola (Thangkhul) Women's affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Angaikhan Maring - Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home Department</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Miss Atung (Thangkhul) - Under Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sahoni - Section Officer (MIP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. T. Vitothe (Sema) - Secretary Law and Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Winner Shimray - Section Officer (Religious affairs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Vikeye Sema - Secretary Education.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tho Rengtang - A.D. Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SS Maj. Shinkhlim - Director NBI.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. J.D. Bon – Secretary, Finance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nitovi Sema – Under Secretary, Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forest and Mineral Resource</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kupto – Section Officer Forest etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Committee</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. V.S. Alem – SS Maj. General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Silus – Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Puni Mao – Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rindong – Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance Committee</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. V.S. Alem – SS Maj. General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Angalihorn – Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Francis Shimray – Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tribes in NSCN(IM) Group

(1) Thankhus
(2) Semas
(3) Angamis
(4) Changs
(5) Aos.

It had good support in above areas. Recruitment was done on a regular basis. It was more from the Thankul area and they were trained in Bangladesh. Reorientation courses for all cadres were conducted on a regular basis.

The NSCN(IM) had formed a separate Armed Unit known as “Naga Lim Guard” to operate in Kuki area which had perpetrated the worst ever heinous crimes on the Kukis. Its office bearers were –

1. Kan Khangpou Kamei, Chairman

2. Alankabui of Sipilong

This unit was allegedly involved in mass killings, as part of the ethnic cleansing of Kukis. “Well armed Nag Lim guard (an organization formed to ‘protect’ Nagas), with tacit support from underground organizations was allegedly involved in the Kuki conflict in the region.”

Aims and Objects

The aims and objects were stated as follows:-

1. Independence of Nagaland

2. Creation of Greater Nagaland (Nagalim) as an Independent Sovereign State.

**Strength**

Its cadre strength was estimated at 4500-5000 (approx) and another 2500 of civil wing. It had about 5000 sympathizers spread all over Nagaland and Manipur.

**Weaponry (Manipur)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.K. Series</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.303 Rifles</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.22 SMG</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket launcher</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.16 Rifles</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&quot; mortar</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.21 Rifle</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.20 pistol</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.23 Rifle</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.38 revolver</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.213 Rifle</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenade</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLR</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Mines - several bundles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.T. Set</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sten Carbine</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stengun</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Vision set</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Profile of Insurgents

The age group of NSCN(IM) volunteers varied between 65-20 and about 250 were women. They all hailed from poor to low-middle class families attracted more for an adventurous life. Basically sturdy and ebullient each Naga wished to be part of a movement in the name of Christ. With easy money their ambition got fulfilled which they did not find in normal life. Most of the new recruits were stated to be graduates. The Nagas generally valued independent life and preferred to protect their values and culture untrammelled by outside influence. About 50% were married and kept their families with them.

Finance

The main source of Finance was tax collection. It had framed its own rules for the collection. Every order came in the name of the “Government of the Peoples Republic of Nagaland”. The working people were divided into (1) registered contractors (2) suppliers and (3) employees. The contractors and suppliers made payment according to their income. The govt. employees were categorised as Class-I, II and III. Class I would pay 50% of pay as tax annually, class II and III 35% and Class IV 25%. Contributions from every State govt. department was also taken. In Manipur one of the reasons for clashes between Kukis and Nagas was the tax collection for Naga cause from among the Kukis living in Manipur who refused to pay it, which was taken as an affront.

Contractors/businessmen carrying forest goods were also taxed. The rates were:-

- Teak – Rs.2000/- per trip.
- Pine – Rs.1000/- per trip
- Common wood – Rs. 500/- per trip.

Vehicle tax was also levied. The vehicle tax for interstate transport carrier was Rs. 15000 per year. State transport truck and buses Rs. 8000/- per year. Mini Bus
medium truck – Rs. 5000/- per year. Taxi Rs. 2000/- per year. Auto – Rs. 1000/- per year. Elephant – Rs. 10,000/- per year.

There was tax for private buses plying between Moreh (Manipur) and Nagaland the rate for which was changed from time to time. There was a move to strengthen the UG set up at Dimapur so as to control the road route from Dimapur to Kohima and onwards to increase the income. Even otherwise Dimapur was a hot bed for UG group activities. It is a major business centre bordering Assam. Failure to pay the tax had resulted in killing very often.

Means of Communication

NSCN(IM) was one organization which had all amenities for communication. Its infrastructure for running the set up was also stated good. It had a good number of typewriters, electronic generators, photostat machines, cellular phones and provision of internet. “The NSCN Web site is among the better designed Web sites of the insurgent groups of North East. In the background section one can find basic information with regard to the Naga people. Its section include who are the Nagas, suppression and struggle; where are we now after 50 years struggle; Nagalim; resource potentials. The anti-Naga groups and the Competent political party of the Naga cause and finally Nagas in the historical perspective. It is a well illustrated site; full of pictures from Naga cultural dance troupes in the Naga Army and Council of Kilonsers (ministers) and Secretarial staff.

It is a site full of messages. First there are messages from important office bearers of NSCN – from President to Prime Minister and Chief of Army. Then there are messages of solidarity from international organizations like unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations (UNPO) and from European Alliance to Naga Organization like Naga Hoho and Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA).
The site has also an annexure section where all the documents from 1929 Simon Commission and 1947 Nine Pont Agreement to 1975 Shillong Accord 1995 UNPO Resolution on Nagalim and 1997 Cease-fire agreement are given.

Publication

During its existence the NSCN(IM) had brought out only one souvenir which was meant for limited circulation among its own people. It traced the history of the Naga Movement, Organizational set up, Armed/Civil Wing etc. along with messages from the top leadership.

Relationship with similar organizations within and outside

NSCN undivided was the precursor to all the other insurgent movements in North-East and was the big brother who aided in training, weaponising and prodding other groups to launch relentless struggle to achieve their aim. Its leaders and volunteers maintained close relationship with outfits in Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh and in the past with Mizoram extremists. Outside its volunteers were originally trained in China. Th. Muivah was Naga Federal Govt’s “Ambassador plenipotentiary” for some years in Beijing. It had maintained close affinity and working relationship with KIA, Bangladesh and ISI of Pakistan. Its headquarters training centres etc. were in upper Myanmar. It maintained a battalion of Army in Bangladesh. Besides it reportedly had well-established camps in Bangladesh. They were located at (1) Mawkhan Village Jaintiapur, District Sylhet (2) Rastun Hotel, Dhaka, Dist. Chittagong (3) Rangi Dist, Sylhet (4) Christian Mission, Maulvi Bazar (5) Haluaghat.

NSCN(IM) was allegedly procuring arms through Thailand and South East Asian countries. NSCN (IM) participated in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in the month of July, 1993 in Vienna and subsequently in the indigenous Peoples’ Forum. It had established offices in Nepal, Hongkong and some European capitals in addition to Bangladesh and Pakistan. Th. Muival’s visit to Pakistani
Intelligence agencies was no secret. On January, 19 2000 Th. Muivah was arrested on arrival at the Bangkok International Airport from Karachi. He was travelling on a South Korean Passport under the name Choung Hwan Soo “Muivah had been a long time resident of Bangkok and Seoul, as a self-proclaimed stateless person and had been enjoying a degree of indulgence from the Thai government. A tacit agreement that his travel documents would not be subjected to serious tests of authenticity was one of the elements of the compact...” “prior to his arrival in Bangkok Muivah had spent an indeterminate period of time in Karachi. In the manner that the Pakistan Intelligence Services adopt for easing the transit of Indian insurgents through its territory, his passport bore no stamp, whether of entry into or exit from Karachi”, “Th. Muivah is in considerable difficulties in Thailand for using a false passport not once but twice – in the third week of January 2000 and thereby invoking a total of four charges. When he was arrested for the first time on January, 19, he was in possession of a South Korean passport and was travelling under the name of Choung Hwang Soo as he disembarked from a Thai Airways Flight from Karachi. He somehow managed to wriggle out with a Bahl 200,000 ($ 5000) bail which he jumped and fled to Southern Thailand. The next time he was arrested at Hatyai airport while attempting to board a Malaysian Airways flight in the guise of a Singapore national ZhoXio Hui on a Singapore passport. This time he was promptly taken to court where he pleaded guilty to using a false passport and was given a one year sentence”. The govt. of India had taken the position that it would provide assistance in securing Muivah’s release only if the former made a request for such assistance. Muivah has however made his position rather clear by reportedly saying that “he would rather die than seek Indian help”.

Undivided NSCN had trained 3/4 batches of volunteers (about 1500) in China after which it established its own training centres in upper Myanmar where it gave training to volunteers of other outfits also.

“Muivah had gone to China along with Isac Chishi Swu and Mowu Angami heading a gang of 500 youth for training. While the gang was undergoing training China had offered “to support a Naga Govt. in exile”. Muivah was also
said to have been taken by the Chinese to Hanoi and then to the theatres of war in Vietnam. The intention obviously was to show him first hand the China Guerilla Warfare techniques as employed by the Vietnamies and impress him with the successful results it was achieving against the armed might of the USA”

6.4.7 NSCN (K)

This subject has been dealt in detail under Nagaland and here it is touched only to the extent applicable to Manipur.

After the formation of the NSCN(IM) the NSCN(K) did not like to give unfettered sway to it in the Manipur area and set up its own unit. Its office bearers were:

1. Joseh Sello – SS President cum Finance
2. George Sankhil – SS Finance Secretary
3. Manshi Rongmai – SO Commandant Zeliangrong region
4. P. Joseph – SS Revenue Secretary
5. Pomi Anal – SS Commander, Ammamcht Region
6. SS Lt. Vasani – Chairman, Sherpoumaramth region
7. Wungkhai Thankhul – Thangkhul region (Ukhrul dist.)

In Manipur area even though it could establish units much consolidation could not be done due to machinations and occasional attacks from the NSCN(IM) cadres. It was able to establish a semblance of working relationship with the Anal Nagas of Chandel district.

It had a two-tier system of administration as elsewhere but no clear cut demarcation could be done in the area. During early part of 1998 the NSCN(K) with the support of the NNC attempted to extend influence to Manipur and infiltrate into certain
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pockets after the SF launched operations against it in Nagaland but the NSCN(IM) launched an operation neutralized and forced it to retreat.

Its influence was limited to certain areas of Chandel and Tamenlong districts only.

**Weapons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>90mm Mortar Gun – 5</th>
<th>60mm Mortar Gun – 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2” Mortar – 10</td>
<td>G2/3/4 Rifle – 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stengun – 100</td>
<td>M21/22/16 Rifle – 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher – 10</td>
<td>Hand Grenade – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9mm Pistol – 10</td>
<td>WT Set – 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The NSCN (K) was willing to have a “bilateral cease-fire with the Govt. of India” and had declared a cease-fire from February, 2000.

**6.4.8 Kuki National Front (KNF)** It has two factions viz.

**6.4.8.1 Kuki National Front (KNF/President) and**

**6.4.8.2 K.N.F. (Military Council)**

The KNF(P) was formed in May, 1988 at village Molnoi in Myanmar by one Mekholun Kipgan Kuki @ Nehlum Kipgen of Senapati district. He was the first SS Chairman but was killed in an encounter with the CRPF on 12.10.1993. Subsequently Semtinthang Kipgen @ Thangboi @ Ronco took over as the President KNF.

**Aims and Objects**

Its main was formulation of a separate Kuki land within the Indian Union comprising districts of Churchandpur and Chandel and Kangpokpi and Saikul subdivision of Senapati district.
**Table-VIII**

**SET UP OF K.N.F. (PRESIDENT)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing</th>
<th>Armed Wing</th>
<th>Area of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (1) Semtinthang Kipgen @ Thangboi @ Ronco – President</td>
<td>(1) S.S. Maj. Shanada – Commander Southern Command/Admn.</td>
<td>1. Churachanmdpur district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (2) H. John Kuki @ Jhankholet Bait – Finance Secretary/ Secretary Information and Publicity.</td>
<td>(2) H. Haokip – Commander - Churachandpur. (3) T. Samuel @ Hethong Haokip (Defence Secretary).</td>
<td>(2) East Imphal district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. M. Robert Kuki – Deputy Financial Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Chandel district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Senapati District.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KNF Military Council (MC)**

**Background:** Originally a Kuki organization styled as Kuki Defence Force (KDF) was formed by one Saikam Kipgen @ Patrick Henry resident of Hengbung Village (PS Kangpokpi) district Senapathi during 1992 to defend the Kuki villages from attack of Nagas following ethnic clashes between them. Soon KDF indulged in extortion etc. from the Kukis themselves and ambush of S.F. Its first target was Manipur Rifles from whom it snatched weapons etc. Seeing the violent activities of the KDF the KNF(P) leaders invited KDF leaders to join it and the merger took place along with weapons and became KNF but again factionalism took place.

Subsequently group fighting took place between KNF (P) and KNF (MC) in which the latter literally routed the KNF(P). The factional feuds led to loss of support for KNF(MC). Of late, however due to pressure from Kuki Impi Manipur (KIM) the apex body of Kukis there was change in the attitude of KNF(MC) towards the KNF(P) who
advised them to fight for Kuki cause without indulging in factional feuds. Even then KNF(P) shifted its area of operation.

The KNF(MC) was also claimed to have been formed in May 1988 arguing that it was the real KNF.

Aims & Objects

The KNF(MC) was demanding a separate Kuki State within India comprising whole of Churachandpur district, Kangpokpi and Saikul sub-division of Senapati district and Kuki dominated areas of Temanglong and Ukhrul districts.

Its main leaders were:

1. SS Maj. Genl. Sekikam Kipgen @ Patrick Henry – Commander in chief.
2. SS Lt. Col. James Vaiphei @ Hemin Vaiphei – Dy. Commander in chief
3. SS Maj. Timothy Haokip @ Thanglun A.O. (Dn.-I)
4. SS Maj. Th. Hemlal @ Th. German, Army Command (Dn-I)
5. SS Maj. Johnson Hansing @ Mamang Hangseng, Army Command (Dn-I)
7. SS Capt. Francis Simpson – Finance Secretary (Dn-I)
8. SS Capt. Kenedy Kipgen – Finance Secretary (Dn-II)

Nepali cadres

1. SS. Cadre Chetri Nepali
2. SS. Cadre – Charlie Nepali
1. SS cadre Bijoy @ Bijoy Singh of Churachandpur.

The combined strength of KNF(P) and KNF(MC) was estimated at 600 and they had about 250 weapons (all type) which inter alia included LMGs and SLRs.

The KNF militants operated mainly against Thangkhuls due to ethnic enmity. It held the view that "only Kukis had been left without a state "although they were living like Nagas and Manipuris for ages. It claimed that the Kukis constituted a distinct tribe and race in India and their demand was not only "Genuins" but a "rightful claim".

The Kukis got their training in Myanmar. They also had some training from the PLA/UNLF activists. The age group of Kuki militants varied from 20-35 and had no girl recruits. Most of them were educated and belonged to lower middle class. It was a mixture of married and unmarried. Their mission was only to create a "Kuki Homeland" inside the Indian union.

KNF's financial position was stated fairly good. It collected taxes and indulged in extortion. KNF had relationship with Meitei extremist groups.

6.4.9 Kuki National Organization (KNO)/ Kuki National Army (KNA)

The KNO was formed in 1989 at Molnoi village in Myanmar. Its aim was to form a separate Kuki land in Myanmar. It was the political front of the Kuki National Army. Its activities were noticed in Manipur also as the Kukis as a tribe inhabited both the sides of the International border.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Wing</th>
<th>Armed Wing</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. P.S. Haokip @ P. Shokhojang Haokip @</td>
<td>Army Wing (KNA)</td>
<td>1. Chandel district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shokhojang Hoakip - SS President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tongpao Haokip @</td>
<td>1. SS Brig. Khaijaman</td>
<td>2. Ukhrul District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antonne Kuki - Ss Home Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Saijang Haokip - SS</td>
<td>2. SS Lt. Col. Tongkholun Haokip @</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary, Finance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nehmong Haokep - Chief</td>
<td>3. SS Maj. Paosei Haokip -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizer</td>
<td>Commander (Ukhrul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ngangam - OSD Churachandpur</td>
<td></td>
<td>area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Jangu Haokip - PRO</td>
<td>4. SS Maj. Paolian Haokip -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chandel</td>
<td>Commander (Tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ngampao Baite - Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hqrs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Its target group was the Thangkhuls and operated both in Manipur and Myanmar among the Kuki Naga tribe.

Its strength was estimated around 600 both in Myanmar and Manipur. In Manipur, its weaponry was estimated at 60 (all varieties). Its volunteers were trained in Myanmar. The age group of cadres was between 20-40 and most of them were educated youth. They were a committed lot fighting for the cause of Kuki Homeland. Its financial base was
derived only from collection of taxes and donations from Kukis. It was reportedly having some wireless sets in its possession. It was maintaining relationship with the KNF in regard to matters of mutual interest of the Kukis. The NSCN(IM) was its sworn enemy and occasional clashes were taking place.

6.4.10 Zomi Reunification Organization (ZRO) & Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA).

This outfit was formed during later part of 1992 when the Kukis and Thangkhuls started fighting for supremacy. One of the major tribes under the Zomi group Paites thought it prudent to get organized in view of the fast changing communal and ethnic scenario in the region. It thought of having a common platform to unify the Zomi group viz. Paites/Teddimchins, Vaiphes, Simte, etc. spread all over Manipur, Mizoram and Myanmar and the result was the Zomi-Reunification organization (ZRO). Since all other organizations had an armed wing the Zomi Revolutionary Army was also constituted.

**Table – X**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important office bearers of ZRO</th>
<th>Important Leaders of ZRA</th>
<th>Area of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Thanglian Pau – President</td>
<td>1. Reuben – Commander in Chief</td>
<td>1. Manipur – Churachandpur district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Calvin @ Paupi – S.S. Director, Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strength: 500 approx.*

223
Aims and objects

1. To unify all the Zomi group tribals viz. Simte, Vaiphei, Teddim Chins under one umbrella and to ensure their protection and bargaining power.

2. To awaken and bring under one fold all the Zomis living in India, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

3. To demand a separate land for the Zomis.

The ZRO was reportedly doing regular money collection in order to purchase weapons and to meet training costs. It was in possession of some weapons. Among the Zomi group it had recognition and support. Its volunteers were trained in Bangladesh.

6.4.11 Hmar Insurgent Groups

Hmars meant North People who lived in North of Mizo hills. Many regarded them as sub-tribe of Mizos while others regarded them as Kuki Nagas. Some others regarded them as independent. They were spread in North East. The Hmar population in Manipur was estimated around 50,000. This community was spread over in Taipaimukh, Churachandpur, Jiribam and Imphal areas of Manipur. This ethnic entity was also in the insurgency mould with two insurgent groups viz. the Hmar Revolutionary Front and Hmar Peoples Convention (Democracy) taking up its cause. The HRF was constituted in 1994 by one L.Z. Hrangchao @ Lienzam, S.S. Marshal with the object of pressurizing the Mizoram Govt. for total implementation of the Mizoram-HPC Accord (Memorandum of settlement – July, 27 1994) for creation of a Sinlung Hills Development council. The HRF had a soft corner for a Hmar political leader viz. Selkai Hrangchao of Manipur. This outfit used to give protection to NSCN(K) activists in certain villages resided by Hmars. HRF also maintained relationship with valley insurgent groups like UNLF and PREPAK.
Groupism had been plaguing the insurgent outfits in Manipur. This was true of Hmar groups also. HRF was actually formed by the surrendered of the erstwhile Hmar Peoples Convention which ceased to exist after the signing of the above accord.

To counter it Lalminthang Ex. General Secretary of HPC took initiative in forming the Hmar Peoples Convention (Democracy) in 1996 under the patronage of one Dr. C. Amo, Ex. Minister of Manipur after a tussle in the HRF. Lalminthang was trained by the NSCN(IM) when he was a HPC activist and was opposed to NSCN(K). The HPC(D) maintained links with NSCN(IM) and operated in areas of Churachandpur and Imphal East district. Hmars were settled in North Cachar Hills of Assam also since a long time back. There was bickering among them over tax collection by NSCN(IM) activists. This was going on before the surrender of Hmars but after surrender they were not ready to pay the tax leading to action by NSCN (IM). Though the opposition was muted the Kuki-Naga bitter clashes started over the issue of tax collection. Since then every community or tribe recruited and trained their own revolutionary force for any eventuality. This was also one of the reasons for nomenclature impasse. Since every community or tribe claimed original nomenclature and was trying to enforce “their idea of unity” upon each other the outbreak of violence was inevitable. In many cases, vested interests were also instigating the simple tribals on these lines to fight to serve their own individual interest which could be discerned in groupism in insurgent movement.

At one time the Hmar Church leaders Forum tried to bring unity between the two warring groups and both had agreed to abide by an agreement in the presence of Church Leaders (1998) but even then they continued to operate independently because of NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) group rivalry.

The two groups were equally strong and had about 100 members each. They formed part of the NSCN(K) and NSCN(IM) support base and held some sophisticated weapons. The Hmars were however unhappy over groupism. Both the groups had their cadres trained in weapons etc. in Myanmar and they belonged to 20-30 age group. Most of them were unemployed and educated youth. In Manipur they got a share of the taxes
collected by their big brother. In Cachar Hills there was murmur over payment to NSCN(IM).

Both the HRF and HPC(D) maintained links with NSCN(K) and NSCN(IM) respectively. In addition, HRF had nexus with UNLF (Meghen) and PREPAK. Their outside link was through NSCN(K) and NSCN(IM) with Bangladesh and Myanmar.

6.4.12 Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF)

PULF was a Muslim Insurgent outfit formed in 1994 on the initiative of one Mohd. Abdul Kaleem @ Md. Azad Khan @ Md. Khan who was the SS Chairman in Chief. Its headquarters was in District Thoubal (Manipur). It was active in Imphal East and West districts and in District Thoubal. Its formations were existing in Guwahati and Nowgong (both Assam) Dimapur in Nagaland and Agartala in Tripura. Its strength was around 250 and about 1000 sympathizers in Manipur.

PULF cadres worked in close cooperation with NSCN(IM) cadres. It was reportedly having connection with ULFA in Assam and some groups in Arunachal Pradesh. Its weapon holding included AK 47, .38 revolver, pistols etc.

Its volunteers were trained in Bangladesh by the NSCN and Pakistani agents. PULF was said to have been used by the NSCN(IM) to maintain links with Pakistani ISI.

It indulged in extortion, looting etc. to raise funds. Its cadres were trained in operating wireless sets by the NSCN(IM). This outfit was also reportedly raised to organize Muslims behind the NSCN(IM) in order to increase its strength vis-à-vis NSCN(K). It could be successfully used by ISI of Pakistan to spread its tentacles in the North east and whole of India and in further embittering the already existing worse ethnic scenario.
6.4.13 North Eastern Minority Front (NEMF)

It was also a Muslim outfit formed by one Md. Kiyamuddin @ Kiya during September, 1994. Its objects were to (1) maintain communal harmony (2) to protect integrity of Manipur (3) unite all revolutionary organizations in the valley (4) to establish Islamic values in society etc. Its area of operation was in the valley districts particularly in Muslim pockets.

Behind the formation of NEMF was UNLF (M) as it wanted to check the growth of PULF and its nexus with NSCN (IM). It was later found hobnobbing with the Kuki National Army (KNA) and NSCN(K). Its strength was estimated at 250. This organization faced a split in 1995 and bulk of the cadres switched over to the PULF making NEMF a namesake organization. The UNLF (M) had trained its cadres in sophisticated weapons, drill, jungle warfare, etc. and actually had taken part in ambushes, weapon snatching etc. The trainings were held in Manipur and Myanmar. Recently the NEMF was involved in some cases of looting/extortion etc. for raising funds.

6.4.14 Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF)

This outfit was jointly given shape by three UG outfits viz. (United Liberation Front (Meghan) (UNLF) (2) Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and (3) Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak(PREPAK). It came to existence on 18.3.1999 after the leaders of the outfits signed a joint declaration to the effect on 1.3.99 which is enclosed (Appendix-J). This body consisted of 6 persons two each from the three outfits. To execute the work programmes it constituted an executive committee with three persons, one each from the three outfits. The Body included Home Secretary from PREPAK, Secretary General Central Bureau from PLA/RPF and Asstt. Secretary Organization from the UNLF who would be permanent members. A financial committee was also constituted with a decision that each outfit would henceforth stop their own ways of earning. It decided to follow a combined economic and educational policy. Other decisions were (1) jointly suppress ethnic clashes, (2) not to fight with other groups
to sort out problems, (3) adopt combined policy for purchase of weapon and to open a
station at Moreh for the purpose. The joint declaration was signed by –

1. Achanmoa, Chairman PREPAK
2. Irangbam Chaoran, President, RPF/PLA
3. Sana Yaima, Chairman, UNLF.

6.4.15 Minor Insurgent Organizations of Manipur.

In addition to the above UG organizations, there were a number of minor
organizations which were either splinter groups of the main ones or were formed for
collecting easy money or by politicians to protect their own interest. Such outfits came
and went but in the muddle none took care of them. Some such organizations known
were:-

1. Naga Lim Guard – A front of the NSCN(IM) operating in Kuki areas. It indulged
   in the worst ethnic clashes with Kukis.
2. Kukis Defence Force – Of the Kuki Tribe
3. Special Sacrifice Force (SSF) - of the Kuki tribe
4. Revolutionary Peoples Front (Kangleipak) - of Meiteis
5. Kangleipak Liberation Organization (KLO) – of Meiteis
6. United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA) – of valley Muslims.
7. Meitei State Army (MSA) – of Meiteis
8. Ireibak, Kanba Lup (IKL) of Meiteis
9. Peoples Republican Army (PRA)
10. North Eastern Council Army (NECA)
11. Kuki Security Force (KSA) - of Kukis
12. Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front (CKRF) - of Kukis in Myanmar
13. Thangajil Hill Areas Defence Council (THADC)
6.5 Counter Insurgency Operations by Government

Surrenders:

As far as Manipur was concerned the Govt. of Manipur was on a weak wicket in regard to ensuring peace and progress of the State by making the insurgents to see reason and surrender. “Manipur Govt. headed by Chief Minister Wakangbam Nipamacha Singh has appeared to have lost its confidence in bringing the underground youths to the national mainstream by way of farewell to the armed struggles of the undergrounds. So far only a handful of the UGs belonging to the valley areas came forward to eschew the path of violence and join the national mainstream in response to the reiterated appeals made by the Chief Minister and other political leaders of the country. Needless to say that the law and order situation of the State is in the state of volatile manner”.

All Govt. measures so far had fallen on deaf ears. The reasons were many. The Manipuris liked to be fed. Insurgency ‘as an industry’ was thriving and if they surrendered their prestige, position, power and easy money would vanish into thin air. The surrendered insurgents were facing hardship because of the apathy of the State Govt. It failed to take up positive measures to better the standard of the surrendered. The last major surrender was by 19 militants in the early 1990s. 3 UGs two of KYKL and one of PLA surrendered during 2000 (till February, end). Between 1998 and 1999 25 UGs surrendered. The surrendered blamed the State Govt. for failure to take up proper measures for their rehabilitation. They were attached to Govt. forces to launch operations against the insurgents. The insurgents were demanding same rank as in UG and regular appointment in the police forces.

In 1999 however 37 surrendered were taken to the Manipur Police and Manipur Rifles. Their fate was however hanging in balance as about 9 of the surrendered were killed by the UGs, 3 again rejoined the UG set up and other 2 died. The killing of the surrendered in brutal manner desisted even the willing ones from surrendering. Ironically the State Govt. machinery could not provide sufficient protection to them. The
surrendered was thus between the devil and the deep sea and remaining in UG offered them a better choice for being alive.

The State govt. had announced a surrender-cum-rehabilitation scheme. The response to which was as follows:-

**Table - XI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of UGs surrendered</th>
<th>Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(2 - NSCN(IM))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 – UNLF/ 2 - PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 - UNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2 (INSCN-IM)</td>
<td>6 – PLA / 1 – KCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3- NSCN(IM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 – PREPAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-KYKL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-UNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5 NSCN-IM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 - PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 - PREPAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 - UNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 - KCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 - KYKL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 - PULF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6 – PULF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 – NMEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 – NSCN-IM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11- PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - PREPAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 - UNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The surrendered were feared by the UGs as they were utilized by the Security Forces in neutralizing or annihilating them. On the other hand the surrendered also lived in constant fear of getting killed by the UGs. Therefore the principle came to the point of “kill or get killed”. In between the two, UG life was proved better as it spared the humiliation of getting killed by juniors in the UG. The “surrender” therefore was in a stalemate.

6.6 CRIME CHART

The following gives details of incidents in Manipur during 1997, 1998 and 1999:

Table - XII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Extremists killed</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Extremists arrested</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>S.F. killed</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arms looted from S.F.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Arms recovered</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Civilians killed</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Murders (for various reasons by UG)</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kidnappings by UG</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>No. of Ambush/Attack on SF/Police</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SF Killed - 85</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civ. killed - 9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UG killed - 2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Encounters between Police/SF and UG</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SF killed - 5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civ. killed - 15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UG killed - 124</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Attack on civilians</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SF killed - 2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civ. killed - 111</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UG killed - 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Extortion cases</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Inter-gang rivalry</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civ. killed - 2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UG killed - 44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bomb Explosion</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SF killed - 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civ. killed - 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UG killed - 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Insurgency related cases reported</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>1143</td>
<td>1065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Money looted by valley extremists</td>
<td>17000</td>
<td>334342</td>
<td>989769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Money looted by hill extremists</td>
<td>997500</td>
<td>541410</td>
<td>342730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Money recovered by</td>
<td>161240</td>
<td>63750</td>
<td>912920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>S.F/Police from valley extremists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|   | Money recovered from hill extremists | 45600 | 104250 | 98250 |

A review of the crime chart would reveal that the attack on SF for snatching weapons was highest (147) in 1999, more than double of 1998. Even though the SF/Police could recover nearly half of the weapons it showed the resilience of the UG elements and their gaining strength. The casualty of the SF in ambush was also not less (53) only, three short of 1998. If one made a comparative study of the strength of the security personnel in Manipur to control the insurgents and the strength of the UGs these figures would be enough to cause serious concern. Even though the UG gangwars continued unabated that would in no way be a matter of relief. There were efforts of UG groups for an alliance and if that materialized they may pose bigger problems in the days to come.

6.7 Vulnerability of Police

From 1978 Manipur police was facing very serious law and order problems from the extremist groups. Initially the UG groups were abducting security personnel and concentrating on soft targets like small patrolling parties or individual security police personnel going on leave. Later UNLF, PLA and PREPAK had decided to launch combined operations and they were effective. The PLA and UNLF had also trained women cadres in laying and operation of IEDs. They also served as couriers. The insurgent scenario from law and order point of view was:-
Imphal District (East-West)

Imphal being the capital most of the insurgent groups were attracted to the place. Meiteis being the dominant community, the Meitei insurgent groups were quite effective both against the SF and the Hill insurgents. Every valley insurgent group had its own pockets of influence. The PLA/UNLF were striking at the SF with a high rate of success. UNLF was more effective and active in rural areas. Their coming together under the umbrella of MPLF would pose further serious problems. The operational strength ratio was PLA - 40%, UNLF - 40% and rest - 20%.

Bishnupur District

It formed the smallest district in Manipur but thickly populated by Meiteis and Meitei Pangal (Muslims) with borders with Imphal/Thoubal and Churachandpur districts. It was one of the hot bed of insurgent activities of both hill and valley insurgent groups. Operationally valley insurgents posed challenge to the SF. Besides PLA and UNLF, KYKL and PREPAK also operated here effectively. The operational ratio was PLA - 60%, UNLF -30% PREPAK/KYKL and rest 10%.

Thoubal District

A thickly populated district with a population of 2,93,958 in a 514 sq. kms. The majority were Meiteis but there were pockets of Maitei Pangal (Muslims) and tribals also. The NH-39 the ‘milking cow’ for all the insurgent outfits pass through this district onward to the smuggling town of Moreh on Indo-Myanmar border. Having its border with four districts this was an arena for intense field of activity for each insurgent group. Outfits like UNLF, PLA and KYKL had their tactical headquarters here because of this factor. Operationwise UNLF had 60% hold, PLA - 20% and KYKL - 20%.

Churachandpur

It is the biggest district in Manipur and was the worst affected during the Kuki-Paite ethnic clashes. While they were fighting with each other through their insurgent
outfits viz. KNF (Kuki) and ZRA (Paite) they also targeted the SF. While ZRA controlled the town and sub-divisional areas, the Kukis controled the rural areas. Percentage wise Kukis constituted 70% and Zomi Paites 30%. They had agreed to settle their disputes peacefully but their targeting the security forces continued.

Ukhrul

This is the second biggest district of Manipur. It is a stronghold of the Thanghuls wherefrom Th. Muivah SS, Genl. Secretary of NSCN(IM) hails. It was affected by the Kuki-Thangkuls clashes as there are pockets of Kuki villages here. The dominant factor here was NSCN(IM) which had about 75% hold followed by KNF of the Kukis – 25%.

Senapathi

This district has a conglomeration of all tribes, which can be divided into 3 groups viz. Nagas (Mao, Maram, Paomei, Thangal and Zamei) Kukis and Meiteis and pockets of Nepali, Kom, Moirang. Senapathi saw the fury of ethnic clashes between Kukis and Thangkhus. When Nagas formed village protection forces, the Kukis organized through KNF and KNA and genocide followed. NH-39 the life line run through this district also and the clashes affected the life of whole Manipuris. The two main insurgent groups who made this district their operational area were (1) NSCN(IM) – 60% and (2) KNF/KNA – 40%. With the Naga-Kuki clashes when both the group volunteers took shelter in the valley, the insurgent groups from there started infiltrating into this district also more as middlemen to ensure peace.

Tamenglong

In the Naga-Kuki clashes this district bore the brunt. It is mainly inhabited by Zeliangrong tribe of Rani Guidinlue who joined the NSCN(IM) in perpetrating the worst ever crime on the Kukis as part of ethnic cleansing. Casualties were very heavy on both sides. The major victims were women and children who were cut down by choppers in
hundreds. Families of opposite tribes were annihilated in one go. The second life line
the NH-53 passes through the district. The two dominant insurgent groups operating
were NCN(IM) – 60% and KNF/KNA – 40%.

Chandel

This district was also a centre of the worst Naga-Kuki clashes. Its population is
mixed consisting of Paite, Anal, Kuki, Maring, Moyon, Chothe, Meitei, Lamkang, Kom,
Koireng, Zomi, etc.

Both NSCN(IM) (40%) and KNF/KNA (40%) were equally poised here. UNLF/PLA and PREPAK (20%) had also their bases/headquarters here. It is a
commercial centre which explained the presence of all groups.

“There is no gain saying the fact that law and order of this sensitive border State
has been deteriorating with blood curdling actions carried out by various UG
organizations including banned PLA, the armed wing of the RPF, the UNLF and its
armed wing the Manipur People’s Army, the KCP and PREPAK have appeared to have
launched all out efforts for fighting for their cause.

On the other hand the law enforcing agencies including the Army, Assam Rifles,
BSF, CRPF, Manipur Police crack Commandos etc. had also been rendering their best
services for maintaining peace in this strife torn State. Interestingly over 55 security
men fell prey at the hands of the undergrounds last year while 66 insurgents of various
outfits had also lost their lives at the counter insurgency campaigns carried out by the
law enforcing agencies. Apart from it, many innocent persons had also lost their lives in
the killing and counter-killings between the security forces and insurgents.

However Manipur Government headed by the Chief Minister Wahengham
Nipamacha Singh has appeared to have lost its confidence in bringing the underground
youth to the national mainstream”. This explained the effect of insurgency and the
counter-insurgency actions by police/SF in Manipur State. While all the three viz. (1) Insurgents (2) Govt. (3) Police, and the Central forces usually termed SF were meant to look after the ‘people’ they were made to face the bullets in the crossfire between the SF and insurgents. For more than 35 years, this has been going on. The politicians who remained in seats of power looked askance exhibiting helplessness.

Manipur insurgency was tackled by about 1400 police personnel, 5 battalions of CRPF, 8 battalions of Assam Rifles, 9 battalions of BSF, 7 battalions of Manipur Police and 2 battalions of IRBS. One brigade of Army was also stationed at Leimakhong Army Headquarters. The Central forces were deployed “to assist the local police”.

The SF operations were effective every time but the UGs were also equally if not more effective. UGs were targeting CRPF more than other branches of SF. “The CRPF has become the main target of militants. Of the 12 attacks carried out against the security forces since July, 99 the para-military bore the brunt of militants’ fury half the number. Officials of the force have also expressed grave concern. But with the withdrawal of Army from many parts of the State the CRPF has become more vulnerable to militant strikes as they are utilized more. Apart from the terrain and language barrier which have so far proved to be major hindrances, the CRPF also do not have logistic support like the Army which has made their task all the more difficult”. With the security forces vastly inadequate to take on the might of the UG outfits who resorted to hit and run tactics the situation is unlikely to improve in the immediate future. In most of the cases operations were jointly launched by the SF.

Insurgency can be tackled only by the police but it has both advantage and disadvantage. Central forces can be effective only to the extent that local police provide intelligence which was apparently lacking. Manipur appears to have convincingly proved that insurgency cannot be tackled by might alone.

Police personnel belong to the State and have ethnic relationship with the UGs. Instances were reportedly not rare when they fearing the UG bullets had handed over
their service weapons to the UGs. These incidents reportedly had a telling effect on the overall morale of the police force. This had also reportedly forced the authorities to withdraw all weapons from rural police stations for fear of their being snatched by the UGs. To that extent it can be termed as surrender by SF/Police to UGs. Thus it appeared that SF was at the receiving end. It cannot however be denied that if any agency can solve the insurgency problem, it is police, and police alone can do it. Today people of Manipur appeared to have distanced themselves both from the SF and the UGs as they were getting caught in the cross fire between the SF and UGs. “Incidents ... have distanced the common people from both the security forces as well as the militants”. It cannot also be denied that winning people to the SF side is of utmost importance both for countering insurgency and for enhancing the prestige and standing of SF.

The Govt. employees of Manipur had not received pay for two months and they were a frustrated lot. All economic activity was literally at a stand still in Manipur. This had a dampening effect on the police force. The seriousness of the problem can be understood from the fact that the personnel of the 1st and 2nd Manipur Rifles had resorted to “a weapon down strike” from December 8 and December, 11 respectively demanding payment of arrears of HRA and SCA. They resumed duty on December, 15th following conciliation with the authorities. Of late, however, the euphoria that the people had with the UGs appeared to have died down.

The whole of SF was put in a tight spot with the withdrawal of the Army because of Kargil War. Taking advantage of it the UGs had intensified their activities which put heavy pressure on SF. There is urgent need to address this problem. The State might face still more problems in the days to come as more and more youth were prepared to join the UGs because of rising unemployment and intensifying economic crisis.

6.8 Coordination between agencies

Coordination between Assam Rifle, Army, Police and CRPF existed but what could be known was that it suffered from strains. Army and Assam Rifle resented being
placed lower in hierarchy. An on-going struggle to impose one’s will on the other did the round. This was apparently borne more out of ego. The Assam Rifles was in Manipur far too long and did not like to be dictated. They indeed had manpower, expertise and thorough knowledge of the lay-out of the place but yet insurgency had grown under their very nose. Nick named as “Aram Rifles” in nicer terms and as “Arami Rifle” in bad sense the AR had often been a subject of ridicule than praise even in the past. The induction of the para-military called to question its very credibility. With no superior agency to correlate the work, the law and order became the casualty.

Co-ordination between the civil Administration SF and judiciary proved effective when officers sitting at the helm were of the same mould. But it did not appear so always. Once the relation soured it took time to respond to a healing balm. The relationship had often swung between bouts of mowing and reaping. They also did not have clear guidelines. Often the judiciary allegedly swayed to the side of law in the name of “lack of evidence” more as a ruse to save their lives from the threat of a bullet. This perceived danger had done more harm than good to the overall functioning of the SF and the Army. It was also tantamount to playing into the hands of the UG. It is also true that no amount of laws can pierce the insatiable urge for self-preservation.

In spite of these developments it cannot be said that the people had been completely alienated from the administration and the SF. The saner ones were of the opinion that if only the politician, police and the administration asserted the public support would flow unhesitatingly and willingly.

“Ironically the police force itself contain a large number of sympathizers of insurgents. It will be really difficult to weed them out. The police force is lacking the gut and has thoroughly exposed its weakness of fear of life.”

The geniality between the Army and police displayed outside was seen equally counterpoised with a burning desire of the Army to place the police in tight spot given an opportunity. “The mutual appreciation is very superficial and that the contradictions and
recreminations still persist. The GOC maintains that 90% of the “insurgents” which the army had handed over to the police were released by the police or the court. 70% of such youths rejoin the armed movement and this vicious recycling is causing headache to the army. I.G. of Police, L&O, Manipur, says that most of them had been released since they could not be implicated in any crime”. Army also alleged “that confiscated money which was later handed out to police had always vanished in the thin air. This time the unusual step of depositing Rs. 65,000/- in the govt. treasury…. The stunned police were given the treasury receipt along with the arrested businessman who was promptly released”.

What had exacerbated the relations further was a statement of the Chief Minister himself who also held the Home portfolio, in which he stated that “the army officers had informed some high officials of the Union Home Ministry that the police are in hand in glove with the insurgents.” The argument was that “almost all the UG outfits in Manipur have publicly declared that they shall not kill or hit back when attacked by the personnel of police and Manipur Rifles. This is an incontrovertible sign of nexus. On the other hand the insurgents made it a point to attack all the Central Forces”. The Chief Minister also pointed out that “if it is so the army is having a nexus with the NSCN(IM) militants since it is not arresting or killing any of the militants in Manipur. There are intelligence reports that the army is hobnobbing with the NSCN(IM) militants in many mountain stations. It is clear that the State and Central forces are working poles apart much to the glee of the insurgents”

6.9 External Support

The Insurgent outfits operating in Manipur had links in Myanmar and Bangladesh right from inception. One of the main outfits which extended training, weapons, psychological and moral support was the NSCN(IM) which had its headquarters in Myanmar and a training centre in Bangladesh. NSCN volunteers had their initial training in China but since 1980 it established its own training centre in upper Myanmar. One Muslim outfit which spread its network in the whole of North East was the PULF (Peoples United Liberation Front). “This Islamic Militant Organization was originally
formed by a section of Manipuri Muslims with the help from the ISI through the NSCN-IM. But it has been able to extend its unlawful activities in parts of Assam in the Barak Valley and Lower Assam. Following the arrest of some militants of PULF viz. Akbar Ali, Zahurul Islam, Saiful Islam and Hazarat Ali belonging to Howli area of Barpeta district (Assam) on July, 22, 1999 the activities of this rebel body came to be known. It can be stated without fear of any contradiction that almost all the extremist organizations – big and small of the region are patronized, trained and guided by ISI. Among these are both the factions of the NSCN, PLA, UNLF and PULF” (all functioning in Manipur). The contacts continued unabated. New recruits were sent mostly to Bangladesh after the NSCN(IM) shifted its centre of activities to Manipur/Nagaland. Because of free ingress and egress of people through Bangladesh and Myanmar International borders, and the borders being porous, no difficulty was faced by the UGs.

The local police could not effect any check on the free flow across the international borders. At certain sections of the borders the thick jungles being inaccessible no check post also existed which made going to and coming from Myanmar very easy.

6.10 Elections and Insurgency

The last Assembly Elections to the Manipur Assembly were held amidst killings and booth capturing and rigging. The insurgent outfits boycotted the elections. Incidents that took place were -

Abdul Salam, MLA, MSCP allegedly ordered his escort party to open fire at the workers of a rival party – killing one and injuring two. The Escort personnel of Family Welfare Minister had beaten up some persons who was confronted in a public meeting for his unfulfilled promises. They had to shoot when angry people converged. On their way KYKL insurgents ambushed them killing one person. The insurgents left the place after snatching all arms and ammunition from the personnel.
The cavalcade of BJP candidate at Andro Dr. Angom and the sitting MSCP candidate at Kandrakpam M. Lala were overpowered by the Kuki militants. The Manipur Rifles personnel escorting Andro handed over the guns and ammunitions without firing a single shot. In the case of Lala the militants opened fire killing three Manipur Rifles personnel and two civilians. Eleven others were injured.

In district Chandel the BJP candidate Thangkhulan was attacked by a valley UG outfit at Sajik Tampak area due to mistaken identity in which the escort commander of Manipur Rifles was killed along with 3 civilians.

Same day insurgents attacked the 32 BSF at Saikot in which 3 BSF Jawans were killed and four others wounded.

Gunmen abducted Songlienthang Songate the Candidate of JD(U) in Tipaimukh Assembly constituency from his house at Churachandpur and shot him dead. The election was countermanded. Repoll was conducted in 102 booths in the first phase and in 35 in the 2nd phase. The elections were held in 2 sessions in the valley and four sessions in the hilly areas and the turn out was about 80%. The insurgents had reportedly allowed the election process to go on as they were “properly” appeased by various leaders. Though Nipomachap Chief Minister has managed to win “the government is floundering in financial crisis to the extent that it has no money to pay salary and pension. Law and order has touched rock bottom with the foreign trained insurgents getting upperhand. There is already a demand for the imposition of President’s Rule since there is no money in the Govt’s exchequer”.

6.11 Role of NGOs and Human Rights Organizations

There were 18 registered NGOs engaged in various activities connected with development of the State. Their activities were going on but on a low key because of the unsettled situation in the State.
Among the Human Rights Organizations which took up mainly the alleged atrocities committed by the S.F. the following were very active:

1. North Eastern Coordination Committee on Human Rights (NECCHR) – It took up the Human Right violation cases with all the concerned International bodies and tried to project them as the HRC saw them. It argued that the Indian State machinery was engaged in “exploitation and repression” of the people. It was an associate of the Committee for Coordination of Nationalities and Democratic Movements (CCNDM) and was quite vociferous on the SF action in the North Eastern states. According to it unless the issue of human right violations in the North East was addressed there would not be peace in the region or in mainland India. “The only ray of hope in this otherwise black scenario is the firm and violent resistance to all types of exploitation of the ongoing peoples struggles which are now more sustained and encompasses a wider area than ever before in the last five decades. The forceful occupation of Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, Tripura and other parts of North East by the Indian ruling class after the British Colonialists physically left India forced these regions to take up militant struggles for freedom and self-determination.”

2. Human Rights Alert (HRA) – It brought out a monthly newsletter titled “Manipur Update” giving out its version of all actions by the SF which were highly critical. Copies of the newsletter were reportedly sent to both national and international human rights bodies.

3. United Voluntary Youth Council (UVYC) – This outfit worked in close cooperation with the PLA/UNLF/PREPAK UG outfits and enjoyed much clout among them.

4. Committee Against Atrocities on Civilians (CAAC) – It was a conglomerate of 20 voluntary organizations which took up cases of civilians affected by SF action. Ironically it did not take up cases of civilians affected by UG action.

5. Manipur Human Rights Committee.
6. All Manipur Students Union (AMSU) – It took up cases relating to victims of SF action and highlighted them through processions etc.

7. Maira Paibi (Women Torch Bearers) – It fought for women rights and against atrocities committed on women by the SF. This organization however remained silent on atrocities committed by UG groups on women.

8. Civil Liberties and Human Rights Organization (CLAHRO) – It provided legal aid to victims seeking justice through law courts.

9. Committee on Human Rights (COHR) – This was formed by 18 front line organizations including Manipur Students Union. It was more a mouth piece of UG outfits.

10. Macha Laime (ML) – Formed in 1997 took up cause of women at the appropriate levels.

Some of the human right activists were working as journalists of vernacular dailies like Hyeiyen Lanpao and Laarci Laatheip.

6.12 Future of Insurgency in Manipur

The local police view was that the insurgency would continue to simmer for a long time to come and more and more pressure would be mounted on police and the para military forces. The reported unification of militant groups was viewed with serious concern. The withdrawal of Army from outskirts and the replacement with BSF after withdrawing them from the borders were measures affecting the functioning of the police. It also viewed with helplessness the increasing nexus between police personnel and the UG which did not augur well for future. The study indicated that the hope for the people of Manipur was in the backing of anti-social elements because of their multiplicity
and ruthless killings before which the Govt. was acting like a “helpless spectator”. The people would continue to be victims with no hope of relaxation in the situation. In every way the people were a disillusioned lot. They did not know for whom the gun shots were made. The most dangerous part was that the politician – militant nexus had destroyed the society. The future looked grim.

6.13 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

6.13.1 Conclusions

Manipur was plagued by ceaseless war cries for ‘liberation’ from India by a horde of UG outfits aided and abetted by inimical neighbours. They called the police/para military/BSF and Army present in Manipur as the “Indian Occupation Forces (IOF)” and were “waging” a “war” against India. This was not an overnight development. A land locked State with “a precipice above and a precipice below” and a valley in the centre its cries were cries in the wilderness for long with none to hear which forced them to go for “liberation.” Unfortunately “Manipur was never known to have produced a good leader who cared for the people”. Today every other element in the valley accused the unscrupulous politicians of both the Centre and the State “for fuelling the ethnic unrest in the valley keeping in view partisan political interests”. While the Central leadership of main political parties failed to establish “psycho-emotional” links with the people of a land locked State the local politicians enthused the youth to agitate accusing Centre for all the ills of the State.

The problems of Manipur could be bracketed as demographic, socio-economic, political, religious, ethnic, linguistic and most important psycho-emotional. Therefore the counter insurgency measures should be multi-pronged intending to provide a healing balm to the lacerated souls on all these points with a little of harsh dealings to enforce discipline. Blaming the centre for all ills had become a fashion. For the politicians of the State power at any cost became the criterion. The budget stood proof that nearly 90% of the allocation to the State came from the Centre “but the amount was never utilized
properly for the growth of the State that can lead to balanced employment in sectors outside the government”. The administration of Manipur was never known to have stepped out of the “Yes Master” syndrome. Nothing more was needed to drive the State to confusion and chaos and the youth to insurgency.

When the youth got trained and came out with AK 47s the very leaders elected by the people, who had to work for the people, took it as an affront and branded them as law breakers fit to be shot and killed. The tone and tenor of the administration was not different. The rest has became history with blood letting by hundreds of innocent people who were not at all aware of the power game of their leaders and the insurgents. This continued unabated with no end in sight. Both politicians and administration grope in the dark with the usual habit of pointing an accusing finger at the Centre. Ab initio no step was taken by any agency to ameliorate the genuine grievances of the youth and to find a solution. Youth were coming out of colleges in hundreds and they sought employment. Matters drifted and drifted perilously. A real crisis had to develop for the government machinery to act and it did act, but with only bullets and no bouquets. Even this was too late. Like a leopard which tasted blood the youth now bay for the blood of the Centre as was taught to them by the wily politicians, for they would gain only by that.

It should not however be denied that what Manipur displayed was the end result of policy of divide and rule, appeasing one against the other. Jealousy and greed can never be satiated. When help started coming from the Centre first the avariciousness of the leadership had to be quenched. Centre provided funds with apparently no check on the way of spending. 80% of the allocation went for salaries, pensions and wages, about 15% for repayment of loans and interest thereon and what was left for development was meagre. Centre did neglect Manipur and neglected too long which indeed hurt the psyche of the Manipuris. The State was bankrupt and was thinking of taking loan to pay salaries and pensions.

Start of Manipur insurgency coincided with the coming out of colleges of the first batch of youth. “Education breeds indiscipline” and they questioned what they saw.
Manipuris are basically emotional in nature. Added to this was the new found reservation policy which left them no choice than to go back to the “Tribal State” discarding the “imposed” Vaishnavism. Tribals who constitute just 20% came to rule the 80% Meiteis. All prime jobs fell in their hands. The cauldron of discontent simmered violently and it flew full blast at the Centre. Meiteis stooped to the level of blaming their own dead king for signing the Accord and the Centre for “forcibly” getting a signature from him for ‘annexation’ of Manipur. Belly is far more important than one’s own ancestry and culture.

The local administration was also to be blamed. It allowed problems to grow to unmanageable proportions and had no other go except to look to the Centre to provide more and more Central forces to control the lawless elements the loyalty of the local law and order machinery either being doubted or they proved incapable of taming their own creations. The demand still continues for more and more Central forces. Today the youth in the UG (3-5000) has grown up so much that they could challenge about 180 coys of SF and one brigade of army.

Worse still, the boys were tending to unite. The time tested policy of carrot and stick at the benevolent and divide and rule at the malevolent level would now boomerang if not handled with care and caution. With politicians greasing the palm of the insurgents even now and nurturing them the road would be rugged. All UG set ups were operating from within collecting money etc. and presented a system of parallel govt. Given will they are capable of doing much more. Submerged are also four dangers.

(1) The threat from Muslim fundamentalist elements who were supported by ISI of Pakistan was real. One such group PULF has spread out its tentacles all through North East and among its associates are NSCN groups, PLA/RPF and the UNLF, all major outfits operating from Imphal, capital of Manipur. This combine would be formidable unless neutralized diligently and ruthlessly. (2) Drug – This menace was eating the Manipuris alive. It was more in rural areas where they were blissfully ignorant of the outside world. The drug mafia demand nothing more and nothing
less. (3) Nowhere in the North East was the ethnic divide so sharp and deep than in Manipur. Even while groups of tribes were taking shelter under one umbrella for protection, they searched out whether a sub-group of their own could be formed to stake more claims through play of politics. Thus we had Kukis claiming for “Home Land”. It claimed to possess 37 other sub-tribes including “Paites” with whom it fought bitter and gruesome battles only recently but now reconciled. Then there were Zomis, Hmars, Reangs Vaipheis to name only a few with their claims. With the Govt. dolling out special packages as part of appeasement policy, more and more groups and sub-groups would join the queue. Unfortunately, Cox Bazar (weapon sale centre in Bangladesh) is not far off for them. If govt. does not go their way they would go the UG way for that has become a flourishing industry in Manipur and ISI also played the game but demanded obedience and fair play which the UGs were more than willing to do as NSCN(K)(IM),PLA/RPF and UNLF had shown. (4) Proliferation of small arms. With each UG group vying for supremacy and with arms suppliers abounding the craze was for small arms which would pose serious problem for detection. Selected bands in UG groups were also said to have been trained in an “Explosives Training Centre in Rajasahi opposite Malda district of West Bengal”. This if true would also pose a real challenge.

6.13.2 Recommendations

Bring change in mind set. The situation has not gone completely out of hand. Given will it can be retrieved and retrieved effectively but at a cost. Firstly the politicians should be told in unequivocal terms to change their style or else President’s rule would be the only way. For this again a thorough psychological briefing of the nerve centres in the society through NGOs, well meaning youth groups may have to be done giving about the intention of the Central Govt. The Manipur society need to be tended by a loving mother and only Centre can do it. A friendly atmosphere towards the Centre is of necessity. Economic packages that can be effectively digested by the sickly State only need be announced so that they can be effectively implemented. Importance is to be given more on roads as the interior places are still unconnected. All expenses are to be centrally monitored as the UG group MPLF a combine of PLA/RPF, UNLF and
PREPAK has taken a decision to snatch away 30% of the funds coming from “India” to itself to ensure completion of the projects.

Fight insurgents like insurgents. A Commando Force of young hardened and ruthless soldiers, fully motivated by an effective leadership would go a long way in combating insurgency. The insurgent groups were with bloated ego and felt that they could take on even the army. This can be done from existing forces and they should be trained just in the fashion of the UGs to take a thorn by a thorn. Along with the training Manipuri language should be taught at least upto a certain level. They should however be trained on the bedrock of ethical values and true nationalist ideals. Their bullets should be bullets of peace, solidarity and prosperity. Once the UGs are tamed and brought to mainstream they should be made to see reason and assigned tasks in further bettering the State.

Ensure coordination between various security agencies like the local police, CRPF, BSF, Assam Rifles and the Army operating in Manipur to counter insurgency more or less independently, the quality and usefulness of coordination depended on the mental make up of senior echelons of the forces. Instances were not rare when the army and the police did not spare an opportunity to blame each other much to the glee of the militants. In one case an Army top brass blamed the local police and in return the C.M. was reported to have accused him for leniency towards NSCN(IM). Nothing can be more inane. A correlating agency with powers to decide on its own would be in the interest of smooth functioning of all the agencies in the State.

*Train/motivate and Modernize police force*

It cannot be denied that the police and police alone could be made the sheet anchor to protect the people from the clutches of the insurgency. Central Forces were outsiders and their usefulness could be furthered only by help from the local police. If police did not play a key role in Manipur that would prove too dear for the State and the country.
Monitor Fund allotments and its expenses

Corruption, appeasement of the UG for existence, unconcerted fear of the UG's bullet have shaken the faith of the people in Manipur State govt. The poor who constituted the majority of voters and who were ignorant voted Nipamacha to power. They knew that insurgency brought dividends. But any amount given would surely vanish into thin air and the UGs were lying in wait. The only way out was Centre's direct intervention through Centre's own channels under strict supervision. It is unlikely that UGs would dare to scuttle economic developmental efforts of the Centre. Time would mellow even the worst of criminals. If economic development would not take place fast and fast it should be, with devotion, the unemployed youth whose number is touching a lakh in Manipur are most likely to turn into insurgents and as is known they are a law unto themselves and do not believe in niceties. They were ruthless and would be so in the future.

Streamline intelligence machinery

Intelligence was one field which caused disquietude among all the SF agencies that operated in Manipur fighting insurgency. Each tried to pretend that its intelligence was far superior than that of others. It appeared that no one was on sound footing. What was lacking was simple coordination. With more than one agency competing for supremacy, field of operations were bound to overlap which led to suspicion and acrimony. Withholding of information of real intelligence value at lower levels appeared one of the biggest drawbacks. This could be removed by motivation. Only intelligence can help win insurgency and not battalions of SF trained in conventional war. The problem in Manipur was to infiltrate the various ethnic groups under cover without which no concrete intelligence would be available. Since operational intelligence forms an indivisible part of political stability of the State the initiative should emanate more from the politicians. This appeared totally absent and the only way left is for the administration to evolve a scheme, coordinate and supply hard operational intelligence to the S.F. It was also amply clear that the insurgent outfits got advance intelligence on whatever and from whichever source they wanted. If they were not striking, they had a
real fear of the Indian Army. They were bidding time and the stalemate would continue indefinitely, probably till Manipur became a desert.
District Map of Assam

Only Active Insurgent Groups/Organisations are shown in the Map
Chapter - 7

Insurgency/Militancy in Assam

7.1. The State

Assam, one of the seven States in the North east mentioned as ‘Pragjyotishpura’ (city of Eastern Light) and ‘Kamarupa’ and as the land of the ‘Kiratas’, in the puranas is an amalgam of various ethnic and cultural phenomenon. Assam was a geographical expression for the North-East in general once but after independence the scalpel of Machiavellian divide-et-impeera had to be applied diligently and with systematic regularity to assuage the irreconcilable stands taken by some of the major ethnic groups. The region now consists of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura and Mizoram euphemistically called the seven sisters. Even the existing Assam is a pluralistic matrix of a society with ethnic and tribal loyalties criss-crossing international boundaries and it is open to question whether there is any holistic Assamese identity in it. Campaigns were heard for autonomous States like Bodoland, Kamatapur, Barak land, besides constitution of autonomous Tribal Councils for particular tribes threatening to confine the Assamese to a few districts in upper Assam like Sibsagar, Jorhat, Golaghat, etc. With more and more small States emerging these demands got a boost. As far as Assam is concerned, however, if the same criteria is followed it is anybody’s guess where the vivisection would end.

Assam’s history was a source of pride for its people. Before the British occupation of Assam in 1826 it was never a part of India. Assam was not included in the Mauryan, Gupta, Mughal empires. During the medieval period, Assam had successfully repulsed several invasions of Delhi Sultans and Mughal emperors. The story of Lachit Borphukan, one of the famous Ahom Generals, who showed temerity to cut his own uncle’s head, as he failed to complete a task allotted to him in the stipulated time in the face of an impending Muslim invasion is ever etched fresh in the minds of the Assamese.
While it was a source of pride, it also provided the base for separatist outlook. Two aspects connected with the British rule led the people to have an anti-outsider attitude. First with the British came the Bangalee clerks, professionals, doctors and lawyers and they dominated. Bengali was made State language and Assamese was labelled as a dialect. After years of agitation only Assamese was accepted as State language. This had hurt the Assamese and they hated all that was Bengalee. The second was the tea industry developed by the British which became a symbol of exploitation of Assam by outsiders. The dividends from tea gardens went to British. The middle-men were Marwaris and their profit went to Rajasthan. The work force was from other parts of India and they sent their remittances to their families in those States. The Assamese were deprived of the benefits from the tea industry.

Assam is strategically located in the North-East between 24o and 28o North latitude and 89o and 46o East longitude. Because of the geographical situation this region remained isolated and neglected and as a result of which discontent took place and finally to a great extent contributed to the emergence of insurgency.

The State is bounded by Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh in the North, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura and Bangladesh on the South, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh in the East and Bangladesh (districts of Sylhet, Mymensingh and Rangpur) and Cooch Bihar district of West Bengal in the west. Its geographical area is 78438 sq. kms.

Assam provided a gateway across the surrounding hilly and mountainous terrains. After independence, the lower part of the Brahmaputra valley beyond Dhubri went to the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). With that the mainline of Bengal-Assam Railways went to East Pakistan making the Brahmaputra valley completely isolated from the rest of India, barring a small piece of land called the Siliguri tract (or chicken neck).

The most domineering feature in the topography of Assam is the course of the mighty river Brahmaputra which carved out the Brahmaputra valley between the parallel ranges of the Himalayas in the North and the Meghalaya plateau in the south. The river
debauches the plains from Sadiya wherefrom it takes the name Brahmaputra and runs directly westwards for about 720 kms traversing every district of Assam valley until it crosses the Garo Hills district of Meghalaya and turning south to enter the plains of Bangladesh. The river was an important trade route to Dacca and Calcutta which are situated at a distance of 646 and 761 kms. respectively from Guwahati.

After independence Assam was made an autonomous State with twelve districts, seven in the valley and five in the hills to the south of the valley. Out of the five, barring North Cachar and Karbi-Anlong districts, others became States. Nagaland in 1963 (previously Tuensang and Naga Hills district), Meghalaya in 1972 (previously Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills districts) and Mizoram in 1986 (previously Lushai Hills district). The remaining district was split into two viz. North Cachar district and Karbi Anglong districts. They were given option to either to join or opt out of the Meghalaya State and they opted out. “The reorganization of the North-East in 1972, an euphemism for the vivisection or dismemberment of composite Assam marked the end of an era and the beginning of a volatile and uncertain future. An unvarnished political decision the reorganization by its very nature opened the Pandora’s box of claims and counter claims and created more problems than it solved”.

The seven districts were also subsequently restructured into 23 districts (details given separately). The father of the Assamese identity was Shan Prince of Tai origin by name Siu-Ka-Pha. He entered into Assam from Burma in 1228 AD and was believed to have established the ‘Ahom’ kingdom and ruled Assam till 1819 for six centuries unparalleled in history. As regards the name ‘Assam’ however there is controversy. “The tradition of the Ahoms themselves is that the present name is derived from ‘Asama’ in the sense of “unequal” or “peerless”. This was a term applied to them at the time of their invasion of the valley by the local tribes in token of their admiration of the way in which the Ahom kings first conquered and then conciliated them. According to Badan Powell (The Indian Valley Community – P 35) the name of ‘Asam’ is most probably traceable to (the Boro) “Hacom”, the lower level country. In this case it was the country which gave its name to the people”. The consensus was more for attributing the name to the term
“Asama” in the sense of “unequal” or “peerless” as the Ahoms came to Assam not as ‘Ahoms’ but as “Tai”. “It is found in the book “Deodhai Asom Buranjee” that the name “Asam” came from the Mikirs. The basic term Assam is interpreted by some scholars as a formation of Sanskrit derivation which means “peerless” or “unparalleled”. The opinion of the academic circle is that the name Assam came from the Ahoms”. Some others attribute the name to the land being uneven, being hilly and derived from “Asama”. Along with the name “Asom”, “Ahom” or “Assam” the Assamese ethnic identity got evolved through a process of assimilation. The Ahom rulers followed a conscientious policy to integrate a common society out of the diverse tribes joined by means of marriage etc. Apart from the king himself, Ahom nobles and officers also married girls belonging to tribal communities. Assamese became the lingua franca and the Tais did not impose their language on the Ahoms. Many positive elements from the non-Ahom communities were accepted in the Ahom ethnic identity to give further boost to the process of assimilation. In course of time, Assam became a medley of various ethnic, linguistic and religious communities who got juxtaposed and intermingled with the original inhabitants like Bodos, Kacharis, Mikirs, Miris, Rabhas, Koch Raj Bongshi belonging to Tibeto-Burman Indo-Chinese (Mon-khmer) family, etc. The Assamese no doubt occupied a predominant position. In such a situation it was not surprising that fissiparous tendencies were at work to tear it apart. The govt. policies of preferential treatment to communities added an impetus to it. The Ahom rule came to an end because of the departure from the principles of ethnic assimilation and unity established by them. This was the direct cause of Burmese and Maomaria uprisings. The treaty of Yandabo (1826) between the Burmese and the British had only formalised the collapse.

The total population of Assam is 2,24,14,322. Religion-wise details are as follows:-

**Table-I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>1,50,47,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>6,373,204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

255
Christians - 7,44,367
Sikhs - 16,492
Buddhists - 64,008
Jains - 20,645
Others - 3,26,000

(Census: 1991)
The district-wise population is as follows:-

Table-II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Dhubri</td>
<td>2745</td>
<td>13,32,475</td>
<td>Muslims (majority) Koch-Raj Bongshi (Bodo-Kachari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Kokrajnar</td>
<td>3498</td>
<td>8,00,659</td>
<td>Bodo/Santhal/Assamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Bongaigaon</td>
<td>2,15,1.72</td>
<td>8,07,523</td>
<td>Bodo/Santhal/Bengalis/Assamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Goalpara</td>
<td>2,484.21</td>
<td>6,68,138</td>
<td>Rabhas/Bengali/Muslim(Maj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Barpeta</td>
<td>3462</td>
<td>13,85,659</td>
<td>Koch/Kachari/Assamese/Muslim (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Nalbari</td>
<td>2269.41</td>
<td>10,16,390</td>
<td>Assamese/Bengali/Bodo/Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Kamrup</td>
<td>4345.33</td>
<td>20,00,071</td>
<td>Rabhas/Assamese/Bengali/Bodos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Sonitpur</td>
<td>4324</td>
<td>14,24,287</td>
<td>Assamese/Nepali/Bengali/Bodo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Darrang</td>
<td>3481</td>
<td>12,98,860</td>
<td>Rabhas/Bodos/Bengali/Assamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dhemaji</td>
<td>3237</td>
<td>4,78,830</td>
<td>Assamese/Bengali/Nepali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lakhimpur</td>
<td>2277</td>
<td>7,51,517</td>
<td>Sonowal/Assamese/Bengali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tinsukia</td>
<td>3790.60</td>
<td>9,62,298</td>
<td>Assamese/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bengalis/ Biharis/ Santhals/ Muslims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dibrugarh</td>
<td>3381.63</td>
<td>10,42,456</td>
<td>Muslims/ Assamese/ Bengali/ Kachari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Jorhat</td>
<td>2851</td>
<td>8,71,206</td>
<td>Assamese (Maj.)/ Bengali/ Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Golaghat</td>
<td>2667</td>
<td>8,28,096</td>
<td>Muslims/ Assamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sibsagar</td>
<td>2668</td>
<td>9,07,983</td>
<td>Muslims/ Assamese/ Bengalis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Morigaon</td>
<td>1587.70</td>
<td>6,39,682</td>
<td>Muslims (Maj.)/ Assamese/ Tiwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Nagaon</td>
<td>3973.30</td>
<td>18,93,171</td>
<td>Muslims/ Assamese/ Bengali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Karbi-Anglong</td>
<td>10334</td>
<td>6,62,623</td>
<td>Rangma/ Dimasa/ Assamese/ Nepali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>North Cachar Hills</td>
<td>4888</td>
<td>1,50,801</td>
<td>Dimasa (also Boro Kachari)/ Assamese/ Nepali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Karimganj</td>
<td>1809</td>
<td>8,27,063</td>
<td>Bengali/ Muslim (Maj.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Hailakandi</td>
<td>1327</td>
<td>4,49,048</td>
<td>Muslim (Maj.)/ Bengali/Hmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Cachar</td>
<td>3786.10</td>
<td>12,15,385</td>
<td>Bengali/ Muslims/ Assamese/ Hmar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78438 | 2,24,14,322 |

Tea production and agriculture are the main occupations of the Assamese. The State has one national park and thirteen wild life sanctuaries. The Kaziranga Wild Life National Park covers an area of 430 sq. kms. while the wild life sanctuaries cover an area of about 1780 sq. kms.
There are 880 tea gardens which produce about 15% of the world’s tea production. Assam is also fairly rich in petroleum, natural gas, lime stone and coal. It also produces variety of silk viz. Eri, Muga Tassar and Mulberry. The Muga silk is not produced anywhere in the world.

7.2 Genesis of Insurgency

A cup of the hot aromatic beverage prepared by infusing the famous Assam tea leaves into boiling water is welcomed by all that too early in the morning but the knowledge that that very tea was one for the major factors responsible for making the youth of Assam to inbrute and become insurgents would make the belly churn. History bears testimony to the development and the seed of insurgency in Assam was said to have been planted when the first tea plant was planted (1830s). It was one Maniram Dutta Barua, an Assamese aristocrat who paved the way for the British to start tea plantation. Strangely enough he himself had to pay with his life for having braved the odds to set up tea plantations in the 1840s much to the consternation of the British Masters who under a subterfuge got him hanged for alleged complicity in the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. He was hanged not because of the Mutiny but because the British could not digest the temerity of Dutta Barua in venturing to start a tea plantation in his own native land where the British ruled. Thereafter Assam had not produced any more Dutta Baruas to nurse the people of Assam which was visible from their laid back attitude and easy going nature displaying only pride even when ‘outsiders’ were decamping with all their wealth. The tea planters had faced problems due to lack of working class. The locals turned a blind eye to developments. Being agriculturists by profession they were more or less self-sufficient in meeting their demands. Today there are about 8 lakh tea plantation workers mostly non-Assamese contributing about Rs.140 crores to the State exchequer. Attempts were indeed made by the local administration in the past to induce the Assamese into the plantation but they felt shy of doing jobs below their status. Added to this was rank indifference to education which they felt “was the responsibility of the government and the natives had no exertion to it”.

258
One of the British Commissioners (Francis Jenkins) was interested in imparting (1834) scientific (manual) education to enrich economy of Assam. He was convinced that “Assamese by no means want of intelligence”. He stressed on the need for both manual and literary education. “The leisurely life of the privileged class who administered the country so far incapacitated them for any physical work and it was unreasonable to expect this physically weak class to be fit or keen to manual educational to care livelihood as soon as they lost their privileges”. While this was so the Bengalis who were educated and intelligent were employed in the courts and in administration and they were posing a threat to the local population. Jenkins had felt that “the state of things appear to me to be pregnant with evil and I know no other method by which it could be remedied than by the govt. taking some active measures to provide instructions for the Assamese youth”. Imparting education to Assamese aristocracy was started as a conciliatory process and was not due to awakening among the Assamese. The British were successful in generating interest for education only by espousing the cause of ‘self-interest’ among the Assamese.

While this was so after the Sepoy Mutiny for about fifty years the British did not allow the locals to get into the tea business. There was a boom in tea trade in the 1860s and the number of plantations reached 150. They were in need of workers who were imported from outside. Raja Gaurinath (1780-94) had entered into a commercial agreement with Capt. Welsh (1794) which opened the gateway to migrants of Bengal but it was not until British occupation of Assam in 1826 when avenues of employment and trade were opened and influx of migrants began from the neighbouring districts of Bengal. The Marwaris (Rajasthanis) followed suit. They held monopoly of trade both internal and external. As more and more workers were needed surplus population from Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra. The Central provinces, etc. were cajoled and brought to Assam. The tea garden population maintained a distance from the local population because (1) they came from far off places, (2) spoke a different language and (3) followed different customs. In fact, they had nothing in common with the locals. In such a situation distrust and suspicion was only natural. “Even the ‘Sahibs’ not willing to take any risk of his workers hobnobbing with the more enlightened population lest they got
ideas ‘inimical’ to the Company’s policies, forbid any contact with the outside world”. The workers included tribal labourers from Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa engaged mainly in gardens, Bengali Muslims from East Bengal who settled in river banks all along Brahmaputra Valley, Bengali Hindus who settled in Cachar and in towns of Brahmaputra Valley, where they held middle class jobs, Marwaris who captured wholesale trades, money lending act who later purchased tea plantations from the British, Nepalis who did household jobs and Punjabis who did business on their own.

This apart a major factor that shook Assam was the unabated infiltration from the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). It was started by the turn of the century more particularly from 1940 and then was continuing unabated, the peak being during the Indo-Pakistan war period in 1971. It resulted in change in demographic pattern of the State of Assam and in many districts it had reduced the local people into minority.

The population growth in Assam was much higher than the rest of the country specially between 1951-1971 as the following would show:–

Table-III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of population growth</th>
<th>Assam</th>
<th>All India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>1901-1911</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>1911-1921</td>
<td>20.48</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>1921-1931</td>
<td>19.91</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>1931-1941</td>
<td>30.40</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>1941-1951</td>
<td>19.95</td>
<td>13.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>34.90</td>
<td>21.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>34.93</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>1971-1981</td>
<td>23.36</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(There was no census in Assam in 1981. The figure indicated was worked out on the basis of 1971 - 1991 growth rate)

A sharp increase in the Muslim population in Assam vis-à-vis Hindu population was apparent from the following:-

260
Table – IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assam</th>
<th>All India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>35.70</td>
<td>38.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>37.18</td>
<td>30.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1971-91*</td>
<td>41.89</td>
<td>77.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Growth and percentage of Hindu and Muslim population mentioned above was worked out for the period 1971-91 on the interpolated population figures for Assam for 1981.

Source: Director of Census, G.O.I., Guwahati

The chart indicated that there was sharp increase in the growth of Muslim population in Assam and it was not normal growth but an influx from Bangladesh.

Three districts of Assam viz. Karimganj, Cachar and Dhubri have common borders with Bangladesh. All India percentage of decadal increase in population during 1981-1991 was 23.85% whereas in the border districts of Assam viz. Karimganj showed a decadal increase of 42.08%, Cachar 47.59% and Dhubri 56.57%. It can be stated that only infiltration contributed to the sharp increase. Till 1965 the task of guarding the international border in Assam was with the Assam Border Security Force Battalion (ABSF). Thereafter it was given to BSF.

It was on the issue of large scale of infiltration that there was widespread agitations in Assam launched by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) between 1978-79 demanding expulsion of illegal migrants from Assam which it argued threatened not only Assamese existence but also threatened security of the country. Two organizations viz. AASU and the Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP) organized large scale satyagraha which resulted in the signing of the Memorandum of understanding popularly
known as the “Assam Accord” on 15.8.1983 between them and the Govt. of India, which inter-alia stated that:-

5.1: For purpose of detection and deletion of foreigners 1.1.1966 shall be the base date and year.

5.2: All persons who came to Assam prior to 1.1.1966 including those amongst them whose name appeared on electoral rolls used in 1967 elections shall be regularized.

5.3: Foreigners who came to Assam after 1.1.1966 (inclusive) and upto 24th March 1971 shall be detected in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964.

5.4: Name of the Foreigners so detected will be deleted from the electoral rolls in force. Such persons will be required to register themselves before the Registration Officers of the districts in accordance with the provisions of the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1957 and the Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1939.

5.5: For this purpose Government of India undertake suitable strengthening of the Govt. machinery.

5.6: On the expiry of a period of ten years following the date of detection the names of all such persons which have been deleted from the electoral rolls shall be restored.

5.7: All persons who were expelled earlier, but have since reentered illegally into Assam shall be expelled.

5.8: Foreigners who came to Assam on or after March, 25th 1971 shall continue to be detected, deleted and expelled in accordance with law. Immediate and practical steps shall be taken to expel such foreigners.

5.9: The Govt. will give due consideration to certain difficulties expressed by the AASU/ASGSP regarding the implementation of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) act, 1983.

The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 famous as IM(DT) Act was flawed and could not be of any use was one of the main accusation of the AASU. Its stand was that it suffered from certain defects such as:-

262
1. The onus of proof was on the prosecution under IM(DT) Act as opposed to the foreigners Act, 1946 under which the onus was on the suspected foreigner.

2. There was no provision in IM(DT) Act for compelling the suspects to furnish the particulars required in Form No.1 of IM(D) Rules of 1984 and penal provisions to deal with such suspects in case of their refusal to furnish information as required in Rule.5.

3. There was no provision for compelling suspects/witnesses to furnish information or statement to police officers making enquiry and as such taking recourse to action under Sec. 176 IPC was difficult in case of default.

4. The inquiring officer was not empowered to search houses/premises of the suspects nor can they compel the suspects to produce documents or give the necessary information.

The Tribunals set up under the Act faced only constraints in implementing the law. It alleged that witnesses were not coming due to want of necessary allowance. The person who was declared as illegal migrant became untraced and often changed residence. There were also strong resistance to enquiry from the settlers. Even if all the formalities were gone into actual deportation was not done in most of the cases. While this was the position which helped more the migrants it was reported to have been amended recently to make the govt. machinery to effectively deal with the problem, a step too late.

While this highlighted the legal tangle which helped influx there were many other factors which also encouraged unabated inflow of Bangladesh Muslims.

The migration of Bangladeshis should be viewed from past history present realities and future designs. The migration initially was for economic reasons. Sir Syed Sadullah who ruled Assam for five consecutive terms (1940s) had shown a missionary zeal to settle East Bengal Muslims in Assam and did so under a cover programme “grow more food”. The then Viceroy Lord Wavel described it as “grow more Muslims” campaign. The then Census Superintendent (1931) C.S. Mullan while reporting on
population growth had warned the Assamese that they were an endangered species. According to him “probably the most important event in the province during the last twenty five years – an event, moreover, which seems likely to alter permanently the whole future of Assam and to destroy more surely than did the Burmese invasion of 1829, the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilizations – has been the invasion of a vast horde of land hungry Bengali immigrants, mostly Muslims from the districts of Eastern Bengal and in particular Mymensingh. This invasion began sometimes before 1911 and the census report of that year is the first report which makes mention of the advancing host. But as we now know, the Bengali immigrants census for the first time on their Char Islands of Goalpara in 1921 were merely the advance guard – or rather the scouts – of a huge army following closely at their heels. By 1921 the first army corps had passed into Assam and had practically conquered the district of Goalpara... where there is waste land thither flock the Mymensinghias. In fact the way in which they have seized upon the vacant areas in he Assam Valley seems almost uncanny without fuss, without tumult without undue trouble to the district revenue staffs a population which must amount to over half a million has transplanted itself from Bengal into the Assam valley during the last 25 years. It looks like a marvel of administrative organization on the part of Government but it is nothing of the sort, the only thing I can compare it to is the mass movement of a large body of ants... It is sad but by no means improbable that in another 30 years Sibsagar district will be the only part of Assam in which an Assamese will find himself at home”.

During partition Pakistan had visualized that Pakistan would comprize of Muslim majority provinces in the west and Bang-e-Islam comprising Bengal and Assam in the East. Moinul Haque Chowdhury then P.S. to Md. Ali Jinnah who thereafter became a Minister in Assam and later in the Union Govt. had reportedly told Jinnah that “he would present Assam to him on a silver platter.” Jinnah confidently declared at Guwahati that Assam was in his pocket. The Cabinet Mission Plan placed Assam in Group ‘C’ with Bengal. Both the Congress High Command and the Muslim League accepted the grouping plan but Gopinath Bardoloi vehemently opposed it. He was supported by
Mahatma Gandhi. The grouping plan was foiled and Assam was saved from becoming part of Pakistan.

Pakistan’s failure to get Assam was a source of heart burn in that country. Zulphikar Ali Bhutto in his book ‘Myths of Independence’ wrote “It would be wrong to think that Kashmir is the only dispute that divides India and Pakistan though undoubtedly the most significant. One at least is nearly as important as the Kashmir dispute, that of Assam and some districts of India adjacent to East Pakistan. To these Pakistan has very good claim”.

Sk. Mujibur Rahman in his book “East Pakistan : Its Population and Economics” observed. “Because Eastern Pakistan must have sufficient land for its expansion and because Assam has abundant forests and mineral resources, coal, petroleum, etc. Eastern Pakistan must include Assam to be financially and economically strong.” (Assam in this sense included whole of North-East and not merely present Assam).

Theory of Lebensraum

Eminent Bangladesh thinkers were making out a cause of “Lebensraum” (a German word meaning “living space”). In an article titled “The Question of Lebensraum” by Sadiq Khan (a former diplomat and an intellectual), published in the weekly ‘Holiday’ of October 18, 1991, the writer puts forth a strong defence of the large scale Bangladeshi emigration (“The Holiday” is a political mouth piece of Bangladesh though the name sounds innocuous, it had to be so as it was brought out during martial law in Pakistan). According to him, “The question of ‘Lebensraum’ or living space for the people Bangladesh has not yet been raised as a moot issue. All projections however clearly indicate that by the next decade, that is to say by the first decade of the 21st century Bangladesh will face a serious crisis of Lebensraum. No possible performance of population planning, actual or hypothetical, significantly alters that prediction. It is said that a borderless world has become the prime requisite for economic growth under the new world order. In fairness, if consumer benefit is considered to be better served by
borderless competitive trade of commodities why not borderless competitive trade of labour? There is no reason why Bangladesh should not insist on globalized manpower market as consumer markets of nation States are being progressively globalized under the dictates of monetarists. There is no reason why regional and international cooperation could not work out a plan and execute population movements and settlements to avoid critical demographic pressures in pockets of high concentration. There is no reason why underpopulated regions in the developed world cannot make room for planned colonies to relieve build up of demographic disasters in countries like Bangladesh.

We shall hope for the best in international cooperation. We shall hope for the best in accommodation from the developed world. In reality nevertheless Bangladesh may expect little external relief, in the short run on the issue of lebensraum. It is also doubtful that Bangladesh may develop sufficient sustainable urbanization or can engineer sufficient reclamation of habitable land from its own off shore potential to settle its projected population growth in the next decade. A natural overflow of population pressure is therefore very much on the cards and will not be retrainable by barbed wire or border patrol measures. The natural trend of population overflow from Bangladesh is towards the sparsely populated lands of the South East in the Arakan side and of the North East in the seven sisters side of the Indian sub-continent”.

In yet another article titled ‘Lebensraum for Bangladeshis’ apparently as a sequel to Sadiq Khan’s article Abdul Momin, former Foreign Secretary and Bangladesh’s first Ambassador to China appeared in the Holiday dated November, 22, 1991 (in Bangladesh) gave a horrifying demographic scenario of Bangladesh “The runaway population growth in Bangladesh resulting in suffocating density of population in a territorially small country presents a nightmarish picture. 114 million (Bangladesh Govt. Planning figures) within an area of barely 55000 sq. miles making for a density of 1054 to the sq. mile what is worse all projections point to an inexorable growth leading to 137 million (density 2470) by year 2000. No other people except in a city State like Singapore is so packed like Sardines in a can”.

266
Unfortunately nowhere in the articles there was a word about containing its suicidal population growth. It gave the impression that population production was their prerogative as it pleased and it was neighbours responsibility to provide them ‘Lebensraum’ and it was ordained by the Allah. They had to simply obey his command. Here came the religious aspect of ‘lebensraum’. Their own people who lived in the Seven Sisters received the freshers with open arms. There are other reasons also. The density of population per kilometer in Bangladesh is 969. The growth rate of population is 2.2 percent and its population is growing at the rate of 2.8 million per year. In every year 1/3 of Bangladesh gets inundated by floods displacing on an average 19 million people. 60% of the population live below poverty line. The per capita income in Bangladesh is 170 dollars per year which is much lower than the per capita income in India. The border between Bangladesh and the North East is porous. The people of North East are lazy, lethargic, easy going and were pampered and spoiled by the Govt. of India by caring them like patients in the ICU without prompting them to stand on their own feet. Under these circumstances the hardworking, religiously fanatic, united people should overpower the North East which was more or less complete. The following indicators of the dimension of illegal migration would also highlight the factual position.

Between 1971-81 the Bangladesh census records show a reduction of 39 lakhs Hindus and another 36 lakhs between 1981-1989. Thus obviously 75 lakhs Hindus had come to India, probably to States other than Assam.

There were 7-5 lakh Bihari Muslims in refugee camps in Bangladesh in 1971 of which 33000 were taken by Pakistan. There were only 2 lakhs left thereafter. The remaining was unseen and apparently flocked to the North East of India.

Most interesting case was that in Bangladesh the population had come down to 7.14 crores in 1974 which was 7.5 crores in 1970. On the basis of 3.1% annual population growth rate of that period the population in 1974 should have been 7.5 crores. The short fall of six million people can be explained only by large scale migration.
Enumeration of election list in Assam by the Election Commission showed more than 30% increase in 17 assembly constituencies and more than 20% increase in 40 constituencies between 1994-1997. The all India average for three year period was 7% whereas that of Assam was 16.4%. The following table would show the relative percentage growth of population of Assam, All India and Bangladesh:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Assam</th>
<th>All India</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>1901-1911</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>1911-1921</td>
<td>20.48</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>1921-1931</td>
<td>19.91</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>1931-1941</td>
<td>20.40</td>
<td>14.22</td>
<td>17.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>1941-1951</td>
<td>34.98</td>
<td>21.51</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>34.95</td>
<td>24.80</td>
<td>29.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>1971-1981</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td>31.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>1981-1991</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.85</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. There was no census in Assam in 1971. The figures were worked out on the basis of 1971-91 growth rate.
2. There was no census in Bangladesh in 1971. It was carried out in 1974. The population grew by 40.4% between 1961-74 and another 21.9% during 1974-81.
3. The much higher percentage of growth rate in Assam from 1911-1971 over the All India and Bangladesh figures indicates migration to Assam. The All India growth rate of 1921 should be viewed as an aberration but even in that decade Assam’s growth rate was higher than neighbouring Bengal districts which now constitute Bangladesh.

While the thinking of Bhuto, Mujibur Rehman, and Sadaq Khan were crystal clear what were the thoughts of Indian leaders about the problem would be worth probing.
The Govt. of India had always followed a policy of appeasement. During partition there were exodus to and from the then East Pakistan of Muslims and Hindus. The Muslims returned much to the consternation and bewilderment of the Hindus in the 7 States after the signing of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 1950. This Pact made a provision that minorities who ran away to East Pakistan in the wake of communal riots of 1950 in Assam could return to their homeland if they so desired. This enabled not only the victims of communal riots but also of partition days to return. According to estimates more than 16 lakhs had come back between 1951-1978. During 1971-78 period alone objections to the tune of 3,46,000 were made for wrong entries in electoral rolls but since the Congress was then the beneficiary nothing was done to send them back.

It was not that Indian leaders did not know the gravity of the situation and the security threat to the nation. But they preferred to put personal interest before national interest. The emigrants provided a powerful vote bank, that too for the Congress. Dev Kanto Barooah once said All India Congress President's famous saying that "so long as Ali's (Muslims) and Coolies (Plantation labour) are with the Congress party, it did not care for anybody" was ample proof which was highlighted by the AASU and AGP in the past, time and again.

During 1991 Hiteswar Saikia was able to form a Congress(I) Govt. in Assam defeating AGP then considered as the political arm of ULFA. It was welcomed by all. But behind it was the ‘Ali’ factor. Even then he was credited with the formation of Foreigner's Tribunals for the detection and deportation of post-1971 infiltrators. Under the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, which was in reality a law meant to protect the immigrants from any harm, the complainant had to deposit a sum of Rs. 25/- now Rs. 10/ and he should be one living within a radius of three kms. from the suspected foreigners residence. It envisaged primary investigation by the police and subsequent reference to a three-Judge Tribunal. A commission viz. "Tewari Commission" which looked into it commented "The procedure was very time consuming
and protracted". As many of the foreigners lived in Char (riverine areas) another difficulty was of keeping track of persons detected as illegal immigrants. As there was no provision to detain them very often they disappeared without leaving any trace and moved to some other areas". Above all, under the Foreigner's Act 1946, applicable elsewhere, the onus of proof was on the suspect whereas under IM(DT) Act on the complainant thus favouring the foreigner. Small wonder that despite crores of money being spent on these agencies until January, 1999, only 9599 illegal migrants identified and only 1459 deported. It was also doubtful whether they were formally handed over beyond the border. The IM(DT) Act was a dismal failure. It was repealed very recently (August, 2000).

The AGP Govt's performance on this very vital issue of migration by Bangladeshis was equally profane.

"In 1966, the secret of AGP's return to power after being in the wilderness for five years was its ability to play the Congress game in the matter of using the clandestine vote bank. The AGP had made the same compromises that the Congress made. It was clear from its election (1996) manifesto which did not contain a single word on the detection and deportation of foreign nationals on which it had come to power in 1985. The manifesto gave the impression that there where neither illegal foreign infiltrators in Assam nor any problems related to them. Incidentally all other parties had dilated on it but not the A.G.P. The A.G.P mind became clear when Abdul Mujib Mazumdar (A spokesman for Bangladeshis) was made a senior cabinet Minister, the very person who had reportedly drafted the IM(DT) Act. A.G.P. went a step further and also stalled all actions against illegal infiltrators from Bangladesh. The bottom line is that what the A.G.P has demonstrated. That any Govt. in Assam must serve the interest of the Bangladesh lobby in order to survive. There is no political party that seems to have the guts to say that it would prefer to fall rather than to remain a government for the illegal migrants from Bangladesh. This is what has erased any difference that might have existed between the Congress and the A.G.P. in Assam".
District Map of Assam

MUSLIM POPULATION - 1991 - PERCENTAGE TO TOTAL POPULATION

Percentage to total population:
- +50
- 40 - 50
- 30 - 40
- 20 - 30
- 10 - 20
- < 10

Map not to Scale:
- State Capital
- State Boundary
- International Boundary
As mentioned earlier the religious census of 1991 showed an unusual growth of Muslim population from 35.92 to 63.73 lakhs, a 77.42 percent as against 41.89 per cent of the Hindus. As per the census four districts Dhubri (70.46), Goalpara (50.18), Barpeta (56.07) and Hailakandi (54.79%) had become Muslim majority districts. Even with the present rate of increase Nagaon, Morigoan and Karimganj would emerge as Muslim majority districts by 2001. In Darrang district with about two lakh Muslim population in 1971 about 108.10 per cent growth was recorded in 1991 reaching 4.15 lakhs. Today they constitute over 30 per cent of the State population and were no longer a ‘minority’. It became a powerful political force in State politics which was borne by the volte-face made by the then Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia in the Assembly on April, 10, 1990. He declared that “There is not a single foreigner in Assam” when the sword of Damocles was hanging over his head Saikia had no alternative but adopt the policy of appeasement of the religious minorities announcing reservation of jobs under govt. according to population pattern and opening up for them riverine areas, forests and tribal belts and legitimizing these by issuing ‘pattas’. Needless to say if the influx of immigrants remain unabated even as at present it is only a question of time when the indigenous Assamese ethnic groups inclusive will be alien in their homeland. With their multiplication, at no distant future they will form the majority in the Assembly and the next step will be the demand for referendum on merger with Bangladesh”. Will it not then fulfil the dreams of Bhutto, Mujibur Rahman, Sadiz Khan and Abdul Momin? Bangladesh would be solving the problem of ‘Lebensraum’ and the problem of ULFA would eclipse itself.

7.3 Reasons for insurgency

7.3.1 Influx From Bangladesh

A single issue that had stirred the Assamese from their mental torpor and catapulted the Assamese youth to insurgency was the steady unstoppable and substantial inflow of Bangladeshis which was continuously changing the demographic balance of Assam in front of their eyes. The newcomers were indeed of help to Assam. They offset the traditional shortage of labour but a gradual realization of the inherent dangers, set off alarm bells ringing, abetted by political outbursts and intemperate discussion in public
about the socio-economic imperatives. The youth initially used peaceful means to draw attention to the emerging scenario but the response if any from the concerned was none-too-serious. Having left with no other option some of the fiercely radical youth decided to take to arms. The ire of the youth branched to other realms only as a natural corollary to wreak vengeance and the easy target, as elsewhere in North-East was the Central Govt. for its alleged economic exploitation.

Table VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neglect by centre</th>
<th>Porous international Border</th>
<th>Influx from Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Identity crisis</td>
<td>Deterioration in life style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising expectations</td>
<td>Alleged economic exploitation of Assam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular support</td>
<td>Inimical neighbours</td>
<td>Language tangle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assamese seeking/supporting secession was not of recent origin. In January, 1948 the Asom Jatiya Maha Sabha (AJMS) the premier body of the Assamese identity had wanted Assam to come out of the Indian Union and become independent like Myanmar. On January, 3, 1948, Ambicagiri Roy Chowdhury, considered a messiah of the new generation of the Assamese and who was also once the General Secretary of the Asom Jatiya Maha Sabha (AJMS) had sent a Message to the Naga National Council conveying full support to the Naga cause for self-determination. He supported Bodo land demand on the grounds of area, economic viability, population, culture, natural and agro-resources and history.

In this scenario it was natural that the youth got embroiled over the influx from Bangladesh. But what brought matters to a head was bye-election that was to be held in
Mangaldoi constituency in April, 1979 when it was found that 45,000 voters, i.e., one sixth of the total electorate was declared foreigners by competent courts. The demand of the Students Union (viz. All Assam Students Union) to revise the voter list was turned down by the Union Govt. It however ordered a fresh election. The Students Union stuck to their stand “No revision, no election”. Then followed the anti-foreigner movement resulting in killing of thousands, irrespective of age, sex, rendering homeless over a lakh and destruction of properties worth millions which lasted for nearly six years till 1985.

The agitation came to a close with “a face saving device” viz. the Assam Accord (1985) in which the primary objective – detection, deletion and deportation of foreigners was surprisingly entirely left out. In the elections held the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) a newly formed outfit supported by the AASU and composed of young “immature boys” swept into power ending 48 years Congress rule and formed the govt. (December 1985). It had the mandate to give priority to detection, and deportation of foreigners.

“When the A.G.P won the elections there was a sense of euphoria among the locals. The Assam Accord which brought to an end the six year long agitation was touted as the document which would usher in a new era of prosperity and stability to the turmoil ridden State” The people of Assam had then felt that “the boys were able to bring New Delhi to its knees. But soon however the boys realised that conducting agitations and winning elections and getting popular mandate by espousing issues affecting people were easy but administering a State on sound lines was a different matter altogether and they flopped within one year. Soon disappointments and mutual acrimony began and Assam’s new leaders found the going impossible. Added to this was the attitude of putting obstacles in their way by the Congress. Some of the ministers who were in their late twenties had little or no experience or the required educational background to pick up the rudiments of administration one could understand the inexperience of the boys but what one was not really prepared for was their total inability to understand even the simplest of issues”. Therefore the question of the migrants problem was left untouched.
The A.G.P Government tottered from one crisis to another and the administration was done by the bureaucrats.

Assam presented a supreme irony. Born out of the anti-foreigner agitation, A.G.P after tasting power forgot the very purpose of the peoples mandate. As the next election was drawing near it did not feel shy to seek the support of that very community against whom it wanted to fight. Once again AASU took cudgels to threaten punitive action like social boycott if they aspired to capture power with votes of foreigners. After remaining silent on the issue when A.G.P came to power the last minute efforts of the AASU to whip up the foreigners issue were brushed aside. By 1990, the Assam Accord, a document hastily drawn up, itself was all but forgotten which made Hiteswar Saikia to say loudly that “there was no foreigner in Assam”. The boycott of the process of issue of identity cards for voters by the AASU boomeranged as only the AASU/AGP vote bank did not vote during elections whereas ‘foreigners’ turned up to vote which ensured a Congress-I victory. In general in Assam the public apathy towards foreigners issue had grown. What was surprising was that the land owning middle class Assamese, the support base and vote bank of AASU/AGP had become indifferent to the problem of infiltration. Talking about voters it was seen that “if the population of Assam had risen phenomenally so also the number of voters. Only a few figures would suffice. Between 1957-1962 (only five years) the number of votes increased from 4,493,359 to 4,942,816 (4,49,457 voters or ten percent). In the next four years the number of voters increased by 13 percent to 5,585,056 and by 1970 the number of voters stood at 5,701,805. But within a year after that in 1971 the number of voters increased by 10.42 per cent to stand at 6,296,198. Likewise in the year between 1978 and 1979 the number of votes increased by 7.06 per cent. All these increase were abnormal by national norms of increase in the number of voters. Much of the large scale infiltration can be attributed to inaction and apathy of the people coupled with their disinclination for skilled work or manual labour. This apart, the cupidity of officials who are only too willing to enroll Bangladeshi voters in our electoral rolls or to mutate landed property in their names had greatly facilitated this influx”.

274
But there were sections who felt dispossessed of inalienable rights because of infiltration. Slavery as an institution existed in the Assamese life. It took decades to die out in the absence of rehabilitation programme. Most of them emerged as poor tenants, among them there were tribals, in the prevailing land of abundance and capital shortage. The tribals who constituted 12.82 percent of the population refused to take things lying down. They were determined to defend their lands to the last. There was a strong resurgence of tribal identity and self-assertion because of the giving of autonomy to tribal groups and promise of scheduled tribe status to indigenous communities like Koch Rajbongshi. A strong undercurrent of ethnic tension swirled below the surface in the tribal inhabited areas. Sporadic incidents of violence in Bodoland Autonomous Council areas and the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council areas spoke of deep rooted animosity towards immigrants encroaching on tribal territory. For the same reason the migrants spread was to safer areas where the people were receptive.

It was not that the immigrants were silent. With gaining strength fundamentalist militant groups sprouted with I.S.I support. Their objective ranged from defending against attack by tribals to carving out an Islamic Republic in the North East apparently taking cue from the proverbial camel.

7.3.2 Alleged Neglect by the Centre

“It was ironical that major steps in Assam’s development owe their origin to a situation of crisis.

Assam was a Cinderella and was so remote and neglected by the Centre that many people did not even realize that it was a part of India. It was thought of more often as an adjunct of Burma or Slam. It was when the Japanese threatened to invade India through Assam that our Cinderella began at least to receive the attention to it”.

The people of Assam had always accused the Central Govt. of step-motherly treatment to Assam. They often quoted a statement of the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru when Chinese army in hordes were descending in the plains of Assam (1962). At a stage it was certain that Chinese would occupy Tezpur and Indian Army was asked to withdraw to the South Bank of Brahmaputra to give the Chinese a fight when Nehru made the now infamous message over the radio saying “My heart goes to the people of Assam”. Fortunately however Chinese withdrew on their own.

The feeling of neglect was palpable initially. The geographical location was a significant factor in this regard. While every other part of India is integrally joined the mainland the North-East is connected by a mere 14 km wide (Chicken neck) land between Nepal and Bangladesh, with only one track line of railway. This line runs on North bank from New Bongaigon to Guwahati, which was built by the British. This was usually hoisted as an example of neglect by the Centre. Another line on the south bank was from New Bongaigon to Guwahati was cleared by the Railway Board in 1983-84. The then estimated cost was Rs.179 crore. Now after 16 years later as it neared completion the cost rose to Rs.637 crores. There was a reason for the delay. While the first phase from Jogighopa to Goalpara was completed and was opened to traffic on April, 15, 1998 the second phase from Goalpara to Guwahati (125 kms) could not be completed on time because of militancy. The Bodo militants who controlled the area struck terror among the construction workers and also indulged in killings/abduction etc. A railway engineer was abducted, a supervisor was killed and the labourers fled in terror. Work could be completed only after R.P.F was posted in strength. On this line hinges the life of the people of the North East, as much of provisions had to come through this route. While this remained true the heart burn was that major products of Assam like tea, oil, coal etc, were taken out of the State for processing. Communication was one subject which had not received sufficient attention. This was however one side of the story. The Central funds were later flowing unabated. As was the case in other States in the North East in Assam also a major amount was going for payment of salaries (67%) and pensions and a portion (16%) for interest payments on loans and what little was left had to be shared. This situation was on the face of mounting unemployment.
Assam’s background presented before the 11th Finance Commission indicated a sluggish growth during five decades. It was reflected in the per capita income or per capita Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) which was higher than the national average in 1950-51, but started declining at a high rate since 1960-61. The following figures confirm it.

*Per capita NSDP of India and per capita NSDP of Assam (1980-81 prices)*

**Table — VII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Assam</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>1127</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>(+) 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>(-)210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>1530</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>2761</td>
<td>1628</td>
<td>(-)1133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sectoral contribution by broad groups revealed that at constant (1980-81 prices) the contribution of the primary sector declined from 48 percent in 1980-81 to 41 percent in 1996-97. The contribution of the secondary sector, however hardly showed any change over this period remaining at about 12 percent in 1980-81 and 1996-97. The share of the tertiary sector increased from around 50% in 1980-81 to almost 47 percent in 1996-97. This indicated stagnation in States industrial sector. There has been very little industrial diversification as Assam’s dependence on tea and oil continued to be preponderant as these industries were not able to create the expected backward and forward linkages and transit growth impulses through the establishment of down stream industries.

Accusing the Centre had been a characteristic feature of the North East States and Assam was no exception. The debt burden of the State was mounting and stood at 37 percent of the NSDP (11th Finance Commission). This was happening in spite of the fact that the Central Plan assistance was in the form of 90% grant and 10 percent loan.
7.3.3 Unemployment & Migration

Mounting unemployment was also one reason for insurgency which provided both an adventurous life and easy money. The incidence of unemployment among the educated in the State was 29.02% in 1993-94 which was considerably higher than all India figure of 9.56%. In rural areas, the incidence of unemployment among the educated was higher (33.79%) than in the urban areas (17.53%). As per available data on the live register of the employment exchanges the number of job-seekers at the end of January 1998 was 15.06 lakhs. The number of educated job-seekers among them was 9.85 lakhs. The State govt. had an action plan to generate 5 lakh employment opportunities during the 3 year period 1999-2001. While this was the official stand the actual figure of unemployed was reportedly around 25 lakhs.

One can see a direct relationship between migration and unemployment. The migrants were in search of livelihood and employment and they migrated only to such places. And if Assam had provided it the fault was more within and not without, not that they had it plenty but whatever they had they failed to exploit and provided it for grab. This was because “Assamese youth were basically easy going, lethargic, and had to be fed. They refused to do any work involving sweat or skills. It was easy for any kind of migrants to find employment in a land where there were no indigenous carpenters, masons, barbers, cobblers, washermen, blacksmiths, plumbers and even tillers to till the soil. It was a matter of little pride that everything from the milk for the morning cup of tea to the eggs for the breakfast must be provided by producers from outside. Assam is known for bounty of nature and provided the best place for rearing cows. All services were to be provided by outsiders, whether, Bihari, U.P or Bangladeshis. No doubt there were some Assamese post graduate auto drivers etc. but they did not feel shy to fleece their own people in the most despicable manner with the blessings of the administration and police. Most of the healthy Assamese youth wanted salary paying jobs without wanting to give any real productive work in return and their expectations were very high. All hankered after short cuts to riches and five star life style projected by the Bombay
commercial films which would be possible only for less than one percent of the population. Any hard work was given on contract to an outsider. Thus a stage reached where the very survival of the Assamese, their culture, tradition and very identity was given on contract to Bangladeshis”. The Bangladeshis have caught the Assamese in a vice-grip, like that of an octopus, from which none not even ULFA could disengage it. “No society can hope to survive unless it can provide all the services it needed from within (if not all goods). No society can survive if it lacked its complement of manual labour, carpenters, masons, washermen, cultivators, sweepers, cleaners, etc. A society that lacked skilled labour opened itself for exploitation and would be overpowering and overwhelmed” as has happened in Assam.

Bangladeshis were pouring into Assam (also North-East as a whole) because of economic compulsion and what better place could there be than Assam/North-East. “The only possible way to counter it was through economic boycott of foreigners. No ULFA bullet can finish this problem nor Central Govt. can. There is no law against economic boycott. Instead of analyzing problems in their proper perspective and taking remedial measures crying hoarse had never solved problems. By targeting outsiders (mainlanders) whatever economic progress was achieved was also put to dust opening further avenues for Bangladeshis. It would be only a question of time when the very Assamese identity, if at all there is would melt into the thin air. The problem got accentuated because of scheming politicians and self-seeking bureaucrats” ignorant public and continuous influx of vulturine Bangladeshis waiting to have a peck at the good Assamese.

One of the gravest threat to Assamese people emanated from the people living in ‘Chars’ (river islands). A simple journey by boat, particularly after the onset of autumn, in the river Brahmaputra one can see numerous small and large ‘Chars’ dotted with thatched huts in and around it. In Dhubri district (south Salmara – Mankacher subdivision) alone, the number of population living in ‘Chars’ was estimated at 414580. The socio-economic conditions was far too worse to believe. They virtually led a seminomadic life because of inundation and formation of ‘Chars’. During inundation they live either in country made boats for months (June-Sept) or shifted to high rise
embankments and waited till floods receded and then begin life again. “The process of settlement in ‘Chars’ had begun many years back and had created political turmoil often. They are foreigners but enjoy Indian citizen status. A large number of them had entered India at the behest of political parties for their own political gain. But the fact was that more were living in urban areas now. Various socio-economic factors like poverty, lack of infrastructure, limited fund allocation had led to the failure of development programmes. Further fertility rate among the community was a bit high since a small family consisted of four/five children. On an average three girls were found in a family. Polygamy was another reason for growing rate of children. In the population of this community children upto the age of 14 years now constituted 65%”. Child labour was a common sight in the area. The community encountered poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, lack of health care, unhygienic conditions coupled with many other social and economic problems but stoically ensured that the production of children did not go down upon which their future depended. This multiplying factor of the Bangladeshi community was indeed a serious threat to the very existence of Assamese.

7.3.4 Porous International Border

The All Assam Students Union (AASU) had stirred (1999) out of its self-imposed hibernation to once again take up the question of influx of Bangladeshis. This time it was the border fencing which had a mention in the Assam Accord signed 15 years ago. It expressed its unhappiness at the Centre’s dithering attitude over the construction of roads and fencing along Assam’s border with Bangladesh.

Assam has got 267.295 kms. border with Bangladesh of which 160.295 kms is land and 110 kms riverine. Three districts of Assam viz. Dhubri, Karimganj and Cachar have common borders with Bangladesh. Karimganj has 92.35 km border (41 kms riverine and 51.35 surface) and Dhubri 144 kms of which 10 kms. riverine and Cachar has 28.260 kms. In the Dubri sector barbed wire fencing was claimed to have been done for 134 kms. In the Karimganj Sector border fencing was in progress. The border areas are mostly inhabited by Muslims which provided safe landing pads for migrant
Assam is the easiest target of the illegal migrants.

Unwanted guests: A burden on the State.
Bangladeshis. The ‘Chars’ along the Brahmaputra river prevented their detection. During August, 1999 a team consisting of representatives of the All Assam Students Union (AASU) Govt. of India and the Govt. of Assam had visited the border areas to assess the progress made “Following the confession of two I.S.I agents that they entered Assam through Indo-Bangla border in Karimganj district paying an amount of Rs.200/- per head to the Border Security Force (BSF) personnel”. The Govt. of India representatives had given out that the construction of fencing work and border roads along the entire stretch of Indo-Burma border from Mizoram to West Bengal would be completed by 2007. The Centre had sanctioned Rs.170 crores for the construction of fencing and roads along border in Karimganj and Cachar district. Of the 153.507 kms of border roads to be constructed along the international border of Assam 102.809 kms had been completed”. The State Govt. and the AASU leaders were trying to sensitize the people to prevent infiltration of foreigners to the State through borders. According to the Govt. of India representative: about 15-20 lakh Bangladesh infiltrators had entered into Assam from 1971 through the border. The Centre had also sanctioned a 3500 men strong Prevention of Infiltration Force (PIF) to form a second line of defence against infiltration.

The AASU which was taking up the border fencing issue after a gap of 15 years criticized the deplorable condition of the Indo-Bangla border and delay in completion of the border roads and fencing. It feared that the ISI might establish strong base in Assam if the govt. failed to seal the border. Arguing that the Govt. of India was using heavy forces to vacate some parts of Kashmir from the 3000 Pakistani intruders it alleged that it was silent about lakhs of Bangladeshi intruders in Assam. It cautioned that the situation in Assam would be worse than the situation in Kashmir if immediate steps were not taken to solve the problem of infiltration to Assam. The demographic set up of Assam was changing and the indigenous people would soon lose their identity due to large scale infiltration. It criticized the State govt. for failing to detect and deport foreigners from the State which was one of the provisions of the Assam Accord.

While this was what the Govt. of Assam and Govt. of India and the AASU were doing the actual position on borders was reportedly that the barbed wire fencing was in
tattlers and rusty and raised question about their maintenance. Infiltrators could easily cut wire and get into Assam. Central funds were reportedly allotted for raising double stage fencing but in reality only single stage fencing was provided. The officers who were looking after construction and maintenance of roads and fencing were also reportedly wound up by the State Govt. The questions therefore remained whether fencing would be able to prevent infiltration. “It is only the joint strategy of the Centre and the State rising above “vote bank politics” that can help minimize the influx of aliens. Total prevention is difficult due to geographical and demographic factors”. But none was under an illusion that the crow would become crane by taking a bath. The enemies of the country in the form of Bangladeshis were deeply entrenched in Assam and were getting multiplied caring a damn for family planning and soon would be engulfing the whole of Assam. AASU had known it for long and the ULFA had taken birth because of it but both frittered away their energies forgetting the purpose for which they were fighting. The second generation Bangladeshis taking birth in Assam would not be as pliable as their parents were and would not hesitate to take weapons if need be.

7.3.5 Language Tangle

The issue of Assamese language had caused much commotion throughout Assam in the 60s. Relation between Bengalis and Assamese had got exacerbated beyond wildest of imaginations. For a time however even the Eastern India Tribal Union (EITU) which was taking up the demand of separate Statehood for tribals had second thoughts about separation but once the Assamese stuck to their guns the mosaic of Assam started cracking. A nationalist Assamese leader like Bimala Prasad Chaliha had also to pay a price for a statement he made like a statesman that “the demand for making Assamese the State language should be first raised by the non-Assamese residents”. There was then a tumult of protest all over. Today everyone in Assam wondered if only they could understand the significance of the proposition envisaged by Chaliha.

The then Commissioner of Assam, Hopkins while commenting on the dispute over the use of the word Assamese stated that “Bengali is the only written language
throughout in which the people can express themselves and that when we take up any
document and strike out all the Bengali words there is nothing left to us – I can no more
get any document without Bengali than Shylock could get his pound of flesh without
blood”.

Language issue was also a direct fallout of the unabated influx. Had the
Assamese people realized that Assamese language was the pivot around which all other
heterogeneous ethnic societies in the region as a whole revolved the State perhaps might
not have splintered. There were anti-Bengali riots in 1948, 1950 and 1956. Unfortunately the then leadership of the Assam Pradesh Congress had also helped to
stoke the fires. It argued that “unless Assam was organized on the basis of Assamese
language and culture the survival of the Assamese nationality will become impossible”.
The movement for declaration of Assamese as the official language was started sometime
in May, 1960 and soon as was invariably the case turned into anti-Bengali violence
following a report in the local daily Assam Tribune about wall posters in Shillong bearing
the legend that “Assamese was donkey’s language”. The violence spread throughout
Assam valley as the dead body of an Assamese student of the local Cotton College of
Guwahati allegedly killed in police firing resorted to ward off a mob trying to set fire to
some Bengali owned tea stalls was allowed to be taken to his town Sibsagar. A salient
feature of all agitations in the past was that it was coloured by a feeling of frustration at
one’s own failure to equal others in any field whatsoever and this found expression in
physical and other forms of attacks where victims were Biharis, persons from U.P., or
Bengalis. The attacks were more against Bengalis because they were at all centres of
power right from British days, places which Assamese should have occupied had they
been educated.

The then Chief Minister Bimala Prasad Chaliha had to pay a price for his
statesmanlike statement on language by his defeat in the next assembly election (Amguri
Constituency). He was however elected from Badarpur assembly constituency in the
Barak valley with Muslim support which earned him the nick name “Badruddin Chaliha”
from the Assamese nationalists. He was then helped by Moinul Haque Chowdhury who
was known for his pro-Pakistani views and support for immigrants from across the border. He was Minister both in the State and at the Centre.

The developments made Chaliha to succumb to the demands of the Assamese and the official language bill was adopted which also ended the short lived honeymoon with the BITU and soon the All Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLIC) as a political party was born. The rest became history.

It cannot however be denied that the language tangle reared its head only because of re-organization of States on linguistic basis in 1956 and in that sense disintegration of Assam was inevitable.

B.B Lyngdoh, one time Chief Minister of Meghalaya while speaking to P.K. Mahanta, Chief Minister of Assam on May, 1990 during a meeting stated that “If Assamese was not made the State language in 1970 we could have stayed as the inhabitants of the same State like own brothers. Till then we had introduced ourselves as the Assamese”. Mahanta replied that “on the issue of the language a member of the leading Bodo people are now demanding a separate State. The youth of these States at present abhor and avert the very name of the Assamese language as far as possible. Assamese could extend gradually till 1960 in such a way that had that speed been maintained the entire North-East region would have accepted it as the medium of exchange of thought and the region would not have divided and sub-divided”. Unfortunately experience is by industry achieved and perfected by the swift course of time and administration and politics did not offer space for play of emotions which quality was possessed only by Statesmen. Language issue aroused feelings of the Assamese which in turn led to opening of a Pandora’s box of woes from the clutches of which Assam had never recovered.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Name of the Organization</th>
<th>Approximate Strength</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>BLTF (Bodo Liberation Tiger Force)</td>
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<td>01. Kokrajhar 02. Karbi Anglong dists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>B.T.F. (Bengal Tiger Force)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>01. Nalbari 02. Darrang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>RNSF (Rabha National Security Force)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>01. Dhubri 02. Goalpara</td>
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<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>A.T.F (Assam Tiger Force)</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>01. Nalbari</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kamatapur Group**

01. KLO (Kamatapur Liberation Organization)
02. KLA (Kamatapur Liberation Army)
03. HSF (Hindu Security Force)
04. UPDS (United Peoples Democratic Solidarity)
05. KNV (Karbi National Volunteers/KARBI Peoples Front (KPF).
06. NEGA (North Eastern Guerilla Army)
07. BVF (Bodo Volunteer Force).
08. UBNLF (United Bodo National Liberation Front).
09. KRSF (Koch Rajbongshi Security Force (KRSF).

Santhal

01. BCF (Birsa Commando Force)
02. ADI – ULFA (Adivasi ULFA)
03. ACFA (Adivasi Cobra Force of Assam)
04. ADISS (Adivasi Suraksha Sena).

Muslim Fundamentalist Organizations in Assam

01. MULFA – Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (300 – Armed)
02. MULA – Muslim United Liberation Army (50 – Armed)
03. MULTA – Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (250 – 300 Armed)
04. ILF – Islamic Liberation Front (50 – Armed)
05. IULA – Islamic United Liberation Army (details not known)
06. IRF – Islamic Revolutionary Force (details not known)
07. AMLA – Assam Minority Liberation Army (100 – Armed)
08. SIMI – Students Islamic Movement in India (750)
09. MLFA – Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (100 – Armed)
10. MNVF – Muslim National Volunteer Force (250 – Armed)
11. IRA – Islamic Revolutionary Army (100 – Armed)
12. MLTF – Muslim Liberation Tiger Force (details not known)
The activities of the main outfits were as follows:-

7.4.1 ULFA (UNITED Liberation Front of Assam)

Right from independence Assam was known for spasmodic bouts of linguistic/ethnic convulsions but each time it came out unscathed and with renewed vigour. The year 1979 was however different which brought out a cataclsmatic change for the worse. This year “Assam entered a phase of turmoil unprecedented even by standards of its own trouble-ridden history. Concerned and enraged over the unabated influx of foreigners from Bangladesh the students under the banner of the All Assam Students Union had launched a massive agitation. This agitation was to keep the State on the boil for the next six years” which was subsequently taken over by a militant outfit known as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Its volunteers were from the AASU and another organization known as the Assam Jatiyabadi Yuba Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP).

ULFA pronounced by most of the Assamese as 'ALPHA' took birth on April, 7, 1979 in ‘Rang Ghar’ the ancient amphitheatre of the Ahom kings in upper Assam’s Sibsagar district at a meeting attended by the following:

1. Rajiv Rajkonwar @ Arabinda Rajkhowa, Chairman
2. Golap Barua @ Anup Chetia, General Secretary.
3. Samiran Gogoi @ Pradip Gogoi, Vice Chairman
4. Paban Barua @ Paresh Barua – C-in-C..

Barring Paban @ Paresh Barua all others had worked for the AJYCP which was a radical group much more active and systematic in its approach as compared to the AASU. AJYCP did a lot to the youth of Assam by silent work. It took up the issue of dual citizenship and the demand that the Centre should take over the responsibility of funding and executing the flood control measures in the States. Its argument was that the
WHERE IT ALL BEGAN: The Rang Ghar in Sibsagar, Assam, where Baruah and associates founded the ULFA in 1979
floods in Assam were a national problem, its solution should be the national responsibility. "This group of youths aware of the AASU’s plan to launch an anti-
foreigners movement felt that only an armed battle would make Delhi sit up and take
notice. They had witnessed several peaceful agitations in Assam from their childhood
days and seen them wither away without any tangible results. In the area where they
were raised this group of youths had seen the tea gardens flourishing even as the lot of
the people around these sprawling estates deteriorated". They believed that the resources
of Assam were “exploited only for the benefit of Delhi and its power brokers in the State”
which had to be stopped for which a “Swadhin” (independent) Assam was necessary.
Since 1979 however it waited for six years when the office bearers explored possibilities
of tying up with like minded organizations to test the waters. They found a role model in
the then undivided NSCN and approached them for guidance, training, arms and shelter.

The first contact was established with the NSCN at Dimapur in June, 1981
through the then S.S. Foreign Secretary of NSCN Shimrey. He advised them to formally
constitute the ULFA and accordingly it was constituted initially with the following office
bearers:-

1. S.S. Chairman – Budheswar Gogoi (Sibsagar)
2. S.S. Vice Chairman – Suran Dihingia (Namrup)
3. S.S. Advisor – Someswar Gogoi (Dibrugarh)
4. S.S. Ambassador – B.K. Buragohain (Tinsukia)
5. S.S. Member – Pradip Gogoi (Sibsagar district)

Around 1983 some boys of Tezpur, an important town in the north bank of
Brahmaputra had formed another organization called Assam Peoples Liberation Army
(APLA) more or less with the same aims as the ULFA but better organized and well
spread out in lower Assam areas. By 1985 both APLA and ULFA joined together for
making ULFA a formidable outfit. One of the important office bearers of APLA was
Munim Nobis.
### Table IX

#### 7.4.1.1 Organizational Set-up.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Council</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Wing (Bahini)</td>
<td>Civil Wing (Dal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHQ – Dalkhorang</td>
<td>Polit Bureau (11 members)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Sanding Committee (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dy.C-In-C</td>
<td>(1) Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zones (4)</td>
<td>(2) Vice Chairman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>(3) C-in-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>(4) Genl. Secy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoons</td>
<td>(This virtually took all decisions)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Dy.C-In-C</td>
<td>Dist. Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mausa Parishad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gaon Sabha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sakha Parishad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>General/Home Secy.</td>
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Later ULFA was reconstituted (1983) with the following:-

1. S.S. Chairman – Rajiv Konwar @ Arabind Rajkhowa (now in Dhaka).
2. S.S. Vice Chairman – Pradip Gogoi @ Samiran Gogoi.
3. S.S. Home and Finance Secretary : Golap Barua @ Anup Chetia (now in Dhaka Jail)
4. S.S. Commander-in-Chief : Paban Barua @ Paresh Barua (now in Dhaka)
5. S.S. Organizing Secretary : Hirakjyoti Mohanta @ Naran Deka @ JayantaMedhi (later became S.S. Dy. C-in-C but killed in Army action).
6. S.S. Publicity Secretary : Bana Hazarika @ Chitraben Hazarika (died of Cancer in 1998).
8. S.S. Ideologue (Public voice of ULFA : Sidhartha Phukan @ Sunil Nath (surrendered).

Two other persons viz. Ratul Kotoki (earlier Member) and Chakra Gohain were elevated to the position of Dy. C-in-C subsequently. Chakra Gohain was later executed (1989) due to anti-organizational activities. Thereafter Hirakjyoti Mohanta was elevated to the position of Dy.C-in-C.

ULFA started recruitment of cadres during later part of 1983 and early part of 1984. The recruits came from all parts of Assam but one district viz. Nalbari provided the highest number. Lying about 100 kms west of Guwahati and bordering Bhutan on the North, Nalbari was in economic ruin due more to vagaries of nature. In fact Nalbari provides a case study for everything that had gone in wrong in Assam.

It has a mixture of tribal and non-tribal population and is criss-crossed by several tributaries of Brahmaputra. With the onset of monsoon they overflowed the banks causing untold misery to the inhabitants. For three fourths of a year nearly half of Nalbari remained under water. Standing crops got destroyed in swirling waters with systematic regularity. A rural area the people remained in perpetual economic ruin. To cap it was the influx from Bangladesh which put heavy pressure on the land and there was constant friction between the two. Despite this however the literacy rate was 54% four percent more than the State average. While upper Assam flourished in industries like tea, ONGC, etc, economic development was a distant dream for areas beyond Nalbari – Barpeta with unemployment, lack of care, lack of industries and lack of avenues to channelise the energies of the youth coming out of colleges. Frustration grew which resulted in their joining the ULFA in large numbers, that too with a sincere commitment to fight for Assam. “When a leader of ULFA approached one he could get a dozen others with him, girls included”. Most of the leaders were either from upper Assam from tea garden areas who developed a dislike for the highflying life of the garden people, or Motoks a dispossessed community with links to the Ahom rulers or were from
Nalbari. They found that they had nowhere to go. Thus “ULFA began really as an expression of opposition to more than 100 years of exploitation”.

ULFA constitution initially provided for a General Council and a Central Committee which was normally the decision making authority. The Central Committee had a Standing Committee consisting of (1) Chairman (2) Vice-Chairman (3) C-in-C and (4) General Secretary which virtually took all decisions.

This underwent a change at the General Council Meeting held at Dhaka during 1992. The Central Committee was replaced by a 11-member Polit Bureau consisting of the following:-

1. S.S. Chairman – Rajiv Konwar @ Arabind Rajkhowa (now in Dhaka).
2. S.S. Vice Chairman – Pradip Gogoi @ Samiran Gogoi
3. S.S. Secretary General and Home Secretary : Golap Barua @ Anup Chetia (in the Dhaka Jail)
4. S.S. C-In-C : Paban Barua @ Paresh Barua (now in Dhaka)
5. S.S. Asstt. General Secretary : Rishiraj Singh
6. S.S. Chief Organizing Secretary : A.B. Phukan
7. S.S. Foreign Secretary : Sashadhar Chowdhury
9. S.S. Publicity Secretary : Arnab Hazarika @ Anirudha Chowdhary
10. S.S. Finance Secretary – Chitraben Hazarika
11. S.S. Cultural Secretary – Miss Pranati Deka (since arrested)

This meeting also redrafted the ULFA Constitution. JLFA was provided Civil (Dal) and Armed (Bahini) wings. All operational activities came under the Armed Wing and other activities like organization, recruitment, provision of shelter etc. under the civil wing.
The organizational set-up at the local level in each ULFA district consisted of :-

1. Local unit
2. Sakha Parishad
3. Gaon Sabha
4. Mauza Parishad

The local unit had eleven members, 5 Local Committee Members formed a Sakha Parishad, and three Sakha Parishad Members formed a Gaon Sabha. The Mauza Parishad Members were nominated by the Dist. Committee.

While this was what the constitution stated the Armed Wing was the supreme authority and the Civil Wing only played a secondary role.

For operational purposes ULFA had divided Assam into four zones as follows:-

East : (1) Jorhat (2) Dibrugarh (3) Tinsukia (4) Golaghat (5) Sibsagar.
West : (1) Goalpara, (2) Kamrup (3) Nalbari (4) Barpeta (5) Dubri
North: (1) North Lakhimpur (2) Darrang (3) Sonitpur
South :(1) Nagaon (2) Cachar (3) Karbi Anglong

ULFA had full time paid activists headed by a district commander and a network of informers. The defence wing of the district was responsible to the district commander whose orders were to be implemented without question. They carried out abductions, killings, recruitment and training, publicity, collection of taxes/donations etc.

The Civil Wing looked after the administration and the military wing operational affairs. The ULFA hierarchy could be classified into (1) top leadership (2) district level leadership (3) the hard core militants and the (4) low level cadres. The cadre strength also could be classified into military wing, recruits/trainee volunteers who overtly pursued the cause and sympathizers who also rendered all help to ULFA. Among them
majority were volunteers ready to do any task for the sake of ULFA. No one was in doubt as to who controlled Assam during its hay days.

The armed wing order was as follows:-

1. **Section**: 9 persons with a Section Commander and a 2 I/c.
2. **Platoon**: 3 sections in each platoon with a Platoon Commander and a 2 I/c.
3. **Company**: 3 platoons commanded by a Platoon Commander and assisted by a Sgt. Major or Coy. 2 I/c.
4. **Battalion**: 3 coys under a Battalion Commander with following officers:-
   (1) Quarter Master
   (2) Adjutant
   (3) Signal Officer
   (4) I.O.
   (5) Doctor.

The GHQ was to exercise the overall command. ULFA had no permanent GHQ. It called the GHQ ‘Daikorang’ like Naga NFG’s ‘Oaking’. GHQ always remained mobile. ‘Daikorang’ was taken from Tai language to synchronize with the adventure of Chao Chuka Pha, the first Thai King who conquered Assam.

Where the Chairman of ULFA resided it was called Council Hq. (CHQ) and the operational HQ of the C-in-C was called GHQ (General HQ). Till 1989 they operated from Myanmar located at Tonyu and Chellam respectively. Assam was called ‘Mother Post’. They came to Assam in 1989 leaving a skeleton staff at Myanmar camps. On return ULFA established a number of camps in Assam area mostly in the Brahmaputra valley districts and had trained more than 2500 new recruits. From the middle of 1990 ULFA GHQ started functioning from a camp located at Lakkimpur district with a strong training base at a place called Charaipung. CHQ was then operating from Lanka area of Sibsagar district.
Following Army action against ULFA in 1990 it had no alternative than to seek a safer place for the HQ. At first GHQ was shifted to Tengapani (Arunachal Pradesh). As this camp was found out and raided by the Army it was shifted to Dhaka (Bangladesh) where to Paresh Barua, C-in-C also moved. CHQ continued to remain mobile either in Nagaon or Karbi Anglong districts or in Bhutan camps.

For getting into the ULFA, an individual had to submit an application to the Secretary District organization. A screening test was held and a strict verification done. At the time of joining an oath had to be taken. Then they were briefed about the ULFA and had to undertake any task given whatever might be the risk involved.

There were two types of recruitment - one for the Army and the other for the Civil. Both boys and girls were recruited. To join ULFA recruits should be –

1. A resident of Assam
2. Physically fit
3. Should be between 15-20 years. For Civil Wing the age limit was 50 years.
4. Should be loyal.
5. Should not drink/gamble.
6. Should take oath to preserve Assamese culture.

The rules framed by the Central Committee were final. Promotions were controlled by a Special Committee working under the C-in-C. A cadre was given 15 days leave. In case of sickness he had to inform his superior who would send a weekly report wherever necessary. Recruits were not given salary but all their expenses were met. Depending on merit assistance to the family was also rendered for treating the sick or for marriage ceremonies etc.

After the recruitment was over there was a basic training for the recruits which included PT, drill, weapon training and field craft. Internal lessons comprised of political and military aspects. Those trained in Myanmar were persons with much more grit and
endurance than those trained in Assam. Most of those had taken part in guerilla warfare against the Army of Myanmar along with NSCN.

Training schedule was tough. Each trainee had to get up at 0400 hrs. P.T. from 0500 to 0530, breakfast at 0600 hrs. Maintenance training from 0700 to 1200, administration work from 1400 hrs. Dinner was served at 1600 hrs and daily roll call at 1800 hrs. Great emphasis was given on practical training on ambush, encounter, raid, etc. Regular practice exercises were also conducted. Each individual was given an opportunity to fire a minimum of two rounds. Special training was given to selected cadres at the GHQ which included inter-alia handling of explosives and radio communication.

Theoretical training consisted of lessons on guerilla warfare propagated by Mao Zedong. Each trainee was made to understand the importance of conducting racce of the target. They were made to move mostly at night avoiding main target, open grounds. They adopted a pattern before entering a village and establishment of a camp. The camps were selected with great care and caution. They had devised SOPs for the same.

The punishment meted by ULFA was often very severe including outright execution. The Central Committee exercised dictatorial powers over the entire rank and file in the organization. A betrayer of the cause of ULFA had to face the consequences at the discretion of the CC/regional Chairman.

Youth joined ULFA because of—
1. Recurring feeling of hatred towards Central Govt. for not fulfilling promises made in the Assam Accord of 1985.
2. Prolonged exploitation of Assam’s resources and a feeling that Assam was not compensated adequately.
3. Growing corruption and ULFA’s attempt to convince people about it.
4. Lack of employment opportunities.
5. Acceptance by society as a whole the credentials of ULFA.
Moto of ULFA was Aikya (unity) Bilap (revolution) and Mukti (freedom).

7.4.1.2 Aims and objects:-

1. To establish a ‘Swadhin’ (free) Assam through armed revolution where ‘scientific socialism’ would be the way of life and where natural resources would be exploited for the benefits of its own people – all its people including the immigrants – and not to benefit the unscrupulous power elite in Delhi.

2. To protect the interests of Assam and the neighbouring States like Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura.

3. To establish full control over natural resources like oil, natural gas, forest resources etc. of Assam.

4. Stoppage of exploitation of Assam by any outside agency.

5. To oppose oppression and suppression of the Assamese by outside forces.

6. Establishment of good neighbourly relations with neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and Bhutan.

7. Start dialogues with foreign countries in conformity with the aims and objects of ULFA in conformity with its goal.

7.4.1.3 Area of influence:

The ULFA militants operated in whole of Assam. After the split (1992) and mass surrender that happened its support bases also suffered considerably. Its present support bases were as follows:-

1. Greater Guwahati.

2. Nalbari – areas near to Bhutan.


4. Bongaigaon – Bijni, Abhayapuri, North Salmar
5. Dhubri
6. Goalpara
7. Kamrup
8. Darrang
9. Sonitpur
10. Lakhimpur
11. Dhemaji
12. Karbi Anglong
13. Nagaon
14. Golaghat
15. Jorhat
16. Sibsagar
17. Dibrugarh
18. Tinsukia

While this indicated the geographical area of influence psychologically ULFA had captured the minds of the vulnerable sections of the society who mattered. In fact, it had two faces, one to hoodwink the people and the other the real one which was camouflaged and indulged in inhuman atrocities. It could sustain for a considerably long period (1983-90) throughout Assam because it was able to influence the minds of the middle class, teachers, doctors, engineers, professionals, media-men, bureaucrats and other civilians. ULFA cadres were treated with respect and were considered as heroes. People spoke about the ‘Sangathan’ (organization) in hushed reverential tones. It also floated (1988) an outfit by name “Jatiya Unnayan Parishad” (JUP) headed by a college lecturer which took up rural projects, building roads and bunds, cleaning up streets and sprucing up towns and educating the illiterates which fetched it a wide support base. Slowly ULFA took upon itself correcting the evils of the society and for a time acted as the dispenser of justice which also earned approbations from public. During a period of time when its influence was at the peak (1989-90) a spoken word of command from a local ULFA commander was enough to bring the whole village to construct a new road, repair old ones, construct ‘bunds’ to block floods. Even wives of police officials — and in one case
the DC turned up to participate in the work. The presence of govt. officials had undermined the authority of the govt. itself then and to that extent strengthened ULFA’s clout. Bootleggers, gamblers, blackmarketeers were rounded up and made to repent and give up their illegal business. Simple crimes were punished summarily, corrupt officials were made to pay huge sums or helped ULFA in various other ways. “our aim to earn the Robinhood image was achieved easily” claimed an ULFA leader.

ULFA’s repudiation of the Assam Accord (15.8.1985) under which the AASU/AAGSP called off the foreigners’ agitation as per condition stipulated in the Accord as an abject surrender to New Delhi and its denouncement of the treaty of Yandabo (1826) signed between the British and the Burmese earned it the support of the radicals.

In 1985 ULFA’s field of influence got extended to the Govt. itself. In December that year the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) swept to power like an avalanche at the head of which were leaders of the six year old anti-foreign agitation led by the AASU. ULFA had a “whole lot of brothers in the govt”.

A Minister in the AGP govt. was reported to have commented about ULFA as “boys from among us”. ULFA boys were everywhere and their area of influence had no limit. They had gained an invincible halo. Its volunteers during the period infiltrated all wings of the government including the police to the extent that “when the State’s Director General of Police watched a video film seized from an ULFA camp in 1990, the policemen on duty outside the room passed on the news to militant activists. They were inside all day, the D.G and at least two other senior police officials gloating over the knowledge that the underground knew instantly what its opponents were doing”. Its influence had overriding impact.

7.4.1.4 Strength of ULFA

The growth of ULFA was meteoric and at the height of its glory (1989-90) the support base was estimated at 7000 and total sympathy from the middle class people of
Assam. Slowly but decisively it got reduced more because of its own activities like murder, arson, looting, dacoity etc. the impact of which had to be borne by the middle class itself. By 1992 majority of its supporters became inactive and the strength came down to about 2000 (civil/Army) and 3/4000 sympathizers. Most of the cadres were held up in the Bhutan camps.

7.4.1.5 **Weaponry**

Weapon position of ULFA was stated as follows:-

1. A.K. series – 250
2. Sten Carbines – 200
3. LMG – 20
4. .303 Rifles – 350
5. Pistol/Revolver – 300
6. Rocket launchers – 2
7. 2” Mortars – 5
8. Hand Grenades – 100
9. Ammunition – 8000

7.4.1.6 **Finance**

It was reportedly holding Rs. 40-50 lakhs in the ‘war chest’ at CHQ Bhutan. The outfit continued money collection through extortion, abduction/kidnapping for ransom. It also collected fixed amounts from big business houses and tea gardens. Its local units were reported to have been directed to increase collections from respective areas. In one case the Anchalik Committee of Nagaon was asked to collect Rs. 5 crores. Instances of issuing demand notices demanding Rs. 2 to Rs. 5 lakhs were also reportedly taking place. More details about fund collection are given under ‘nature of activities’ as for a period of time its activities were directly related to fund collection only.

7.4.1.7 **Nature of activities**

ULFA had entered the arena of insurgents in the North-Eastern India with a bang but the question whether it had ended with a whimper lingered "ULFA began really as an
expression of opposition to more than 100 years of exploitation". Though ULFA took birth in 1972 it remained crawling till 1983. It was exploring avenues to unify like-minded organizations and could rope in the Assam Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) and Yuva Chhatra Army (YCA) and Yuva Chhatra Parishad (YCP) spearheading the foreign agitation.

ULFA started recruitment during 1983-84 and despatched them for training in Myanmar under the NSCN and the KLA (1987). Two batches were led by C-in-C Paresh Barua. They came back hardened and well trained and started indulging in various terrorist activities which included political assassination, murders, robberies, extortion, intimidation, etc.

Even as ULFA was able to open up foreign contacts and its activities were getting into shape many of its political wing leaders were rounded up by police under TADA and lodged in Guwahati jail. On their release they went about their work in a realistic manner. It spent a lot of energy and time for the upliftment of the society initially.

In the society as a whole ULFA evoked fear, respect and affection. Till 1988 ULFA had not paid much attention for money collection but then on it became a regular feature. Around this time Paresh Barua C-in-C returned from Kachin for the second time and went about organizing ULFA set up. He created the post of President of the district committees where there was none earlier. He also established the main camp at Lakhipathar and entrusted the task of money collection to his trusted boys (1989). This was when the killing spree/robberies etc. was still going on. There was reportedly a meeting held between ULFA and some of the ministers in the then AGP Govt. some time in early 1990 later part of 1989. "In that meeting an informal understanding had been arrived at between the two sides. Accordingly ULFA was told to limit killings and bank robberies although nothing was discussed about the individual extortions. In return the ministers promised to go soft on the outfit and virtually turned a blind eye to its activities".
This stand of the govt. in power (in fact an extended arm of ULFA) allegedly made ULFA to think high and cast eyes on big money in the tea gardens. It proved to be a turning point both for the tea gardens and the ULFA for the worse. Assam had to grieve silently thinking about its own fate. The pressure on tea gardens started building up since early 1990. This was the time selected by ULFA to wreak vengeance on the tea gardens. The Tea Garden Managers were told to donate amounts politely but firmly. Even otherwise the tea gardens were making donations to the Jatiya Unnayan Parishad (JUP) in the form of agricultural equipment, fertilizers, seeds etc. There was a delay in payment as the orders had to come from Calcutta, their headquarters. The tea gardens made ULFA to strike and it struck with vehemence and no mercy was shown scarcely realizing that they were striking at the core of Assam’s economy. ULFA continued its activities without interference from any agency, govt. or otherwise.

The year 1990, in fact, saw the ULFA storm which ravaged Assam more than ever before. ULFA’s monstrosity came out in true colours this year. Besides tea gardens, it started extorting huge amounts from members of the business community, industrial houses, government officials and civilians under threat. Its collection was believed to have crossed the 100 crore mark. Documents seized by the army indicated the tax rates imposed by the ULFA. The monthly rate was as follows:-

1. Heavy industries – Rs. 1,00,000/-
2. Medium scale industries – Rs. 500/- - 10,000/-
3. Small industries – Rs. 500/- - 2000/-
4. Shops and hotels – Rs.500/-
5. Contractors and Public sector – Rs.500/- - 2000/-
6. Doctors – Rs.100/- - 1000/-
7. Teachers – Rs.100/- - 200/-
8. Labourers and Cart Pullers – Rs.100/-
Tea Estates and Others

1. Williamson Major (Group) – Rs. 3 crore
2. Tata Tea – Rs.50 lakhs
4. Chandana Tea Estate – Rs.5 lakhs.
5. Badlapur Tea Estate – Rs.9 lakhs
7. Ambika Tea Estate – Rs.3 lakhs
8. Motor Vehicles Inspector (Kokrajhar) – Rs. 4 – 5 lakhs
9. Sales Tax Department – Rs. 3 lakhs
10. Forest Department – Rs. 4 lakhs.

It also snatched about 2000 guns from various tea gardens. Kidnappings for ransom also reached high levels and the victims were tortured or killed. It went on rampage in upper Assam tea gardens collecting money. Most of them coughed up 1 to 2 millions. Some paid more but none less than 5 lakhs. All the money went to the ‘war chest’ of ULFA. They also took vehicles of (all types) but returned and no payment was made. The most important kidnapping done by ULFA was that of the General Manager of the Oil Refinery, his son and the Driver who were later released in exchange for 3 hard core ULFA activists. More than 250 persons were gunned down by ULFA between 1980-90 which inter-alia included Surendra Pal brother of business tycoon Swaraj Paul. Some of the killed were buried in mass graves. The ruthlessness and the manner of killings, kidnappings, extortions etc. created panic at all levels. Political parties had also to bear the brunt. The leader of the United Minority Front (UMF), a grouping of non-Assamese Communities including Muslims and the Bengali Hindus was also one of the victims which led to their forming militant groups. Congressmen had also fallen victims to the bullets of ULFA. Even marriage parties were low key affairs. Other parties were discretely thrown. “It was amazing, we asked for a little and they were prepared to go well beyond what we wanted. That was when we realized how soft the State was, how weak the businessmen were, how much black money they had, that they could pay up and still have enough for themselves, said an ULFA leader”. ULFA activities in tea gardens led to the formation of Assam Tea Plantation Security Staff (ATPSF) the number of
which reached 2700 by 1997. Each tea garden was provided 20 men with weapons. Their efficacy was yet to be assessed.

Ironically the money collected by ULFA were given to selected businessmen for safe keeping. In some cases even government officials, including policemen and contractors were reportedly used. The businessmen had a lot of money in their credit and when ULFA demanded return of the money it was paid up with five percent interest. While ULFA was happy the economy of Assam took a beating. Though the business community felt panic most of them took a big share outside the State and fled. They had decided to destroy Assam economically.

AGP Government was merely a pawn in the hands of ULFA. One of Assam’s leading writers stated “They have introduced a different political culture, if one call it a culture, which is totally devoid of refinement and respect for moral values.... I do not mean to say that all politicians before them were saints and only the AGP politicians are a bunch of rogues. But they frighten me by their arrogance, intolerance, bad manners and disrespect for our age-old values”. The whole machinery was with ULFA. The climate of fear was all pervasive. “The AGP had degenerated into a bunch of squabbling impotent factions led by spineless politicians. It had become a cloak for ULFA’s activities”.

All these development led to induction of Army and imposition of President’s rule in Assam on November, 27/28, 1990 thus ending the AGP rule and the entire State was declared ‘disturbed’. Along with it Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was promulgated and Army launched an operation code named ‘OP Bajrang’. ULFA was declared a terrorist and secessionist organization and banned, meaning that association with or membership of the rebel group was a criminal offence amounting to a treasonable act and punishable with life imprisonment or with death penalty.

Army operation though achieved some success could not break ULFA. There were allegations that neither the police nor district administration was taken into
confidence by the Army more because of the suspicion that both the police and administration were compromised and would not be helpful to the Army. ULFA however declared a unilateral cease-fire on 28.2.1991 as a tactical move. This was a ploy to make the govt. to withdraw Army. The army’s operation was also used as a propaganda means by ULFA to defame the Central Govt. for letting loose a reign of terror on the people of Assam. Army’s moves were also known to ULFA well ahead as even the Army’s plan of crackdown known only to a selected few was reportedly known to ULFA leadership which made them to vacate all camps before arrival of army. As it was election time the govt. was eager to pull back army.

As the situation improved considerably, army operation was suspended from 20.4.1991 thereby paving the way for General elections and in the June, 1991 elections Congress(1) with Hiteswar Saikia at the head came to power. This was more because of Assamese caste Hindus not voting and the Muslim migrants voting en-masse to Congress(1). This made Saikia to declare that “There is not a single foreigner in Assam” just to appease the Muslims.

During November, 1991 a representative of ULFA (Jugal Kishore Mahanta) was to have gone to Sri Lanka to meet the LTTE leadership but had to call off. This visit was to be in response to the visit of an LTTE operative C. Dinesh Kumar to the Lakhipathar camp in October, 1990.

Though the OP Bajrang was called off Army continued to stay with the aim of (1) marginalising ULFA so that it would not function as a smooth network of extremists, able to move and strike at will (2) that they would scurry for cover (3) communication network is exposed (4) to cut off their sources of funding. ULFA was also equally elusive and to appease the Army and the new Congress(I) govt. it made some of its sympathizers, informants etc. to surrender. As the organization had maintained the ‘need to know’ principle the knowledge of the surrendered was limited and the Army could not get any leading knowledge about ULFA. However, with lifting of restrictions ULFA leaders started moving freely and with this Army intelligence became alert. They kept a tab on
all movements of the leaders so as to be of use in future. For all practical purpose OP Bajrang ended in a stalemate. It had failed to win the confidence of the people, the administration and the police.

With army back in barracks and Congress(I) in power comfortably and ULFA having got a breathing time the people heaved a sigh of relief. The A.G.P was in tatters with internecine squabbles leading to a split resulting in the formation ‘Natum’ (new)A.G.P. Two close friends viz. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta and Brige Phukan (Chief Minister and Home Minister) fought bitterly and split the party. The NAGP however died a natural death.

The peace that was in evidence when Saikia assumed power was fleeting as ULFA struck hard by kidnapping 14 senior and junior officials from Assam oil fields and Additional Secretary General Admn. Department from Guwahati. One of the officials was a Soviet national and Engineer in Digboi by name Sergei Gritchenko. He was shot by the ULFA on the plea that he had attempted to escape. ULFA demanded release of TADA detenues for the release of oil officials. Pursuant to the demand the Govt. had per force to release 465 detenues and declared that Govt. would offer a general amnesty to all arrested provided ULFA released all the kidnapped persons. While this was going on ULFA killed two more hostages (both ONGC executives). Thereafter ULFA again struck in the old style by indulging in murder, extortion and kidnappings resulting in another Army operation.

Army had to be called in by the Saikia Govt. in September, 91 and it launched the second operation code named ‘Operation Cloudburst’ which was followed by ‘Operation Rhino’. It was a joint operation by all concerned. The weaknesses of ‘Operation Bajrang’ were overcome. Army was quick and led to unearthing of huge quantity of weapons, cash chest, camps, etc. A lot of cadres of ULFA were nabbed and communication network effectively shattered. The most important breakthrough was the arrest of a top leader of ULFA Anup Chatia along with three other associates from Calcutta. The Vice Chairman, Pradip Gagoi, was arrested at Guwahati. Their revelations
led to unearthing of ramification of ULFA at Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta, Bangalore and Tamil Nadu, which confirmed nexus of ULFA with LTTE, Khalistan and also an underworld foreign exchange racket. Despite action against ULFA by army, para military and the police ULFA’s record of killings and kidnappings during 1991 registered an all time high. It gunned down about 200 persons who were considered as enemies, and an equal number was kidnapped for ransom. There were also a lot of killings/kidnappings which were not reported.

One of the major catches of Army was Hirakjoti Mahanta, S.S. Dy. C-in-C. Considered most close to the SS C-in-C. Paresh Barua and the most dreaded in ULFA for his sheer ruthlessness and thirst for blood who was shot dead. “A week before his death, this strapping 27 year youth had become the rallying point for the ULFA’s cadres and supporters. These cadres had projected him as their future leader who unlike other opportunist leaders would not compromise on ULFA’s principles and objectives”.

The arrest/killing of some of the top leaders of ULFA greatly demoralized the leadership and rank and file. This led to restructuring and ULFA declared a unilateral cease-fire on December, 17, 1991. S.S. C-in-C Paresh Barua escaped to Bangladesh but S.S. Chairman Arabind Rajkhowa came overground. This had improved the law and order situation in Assam. In a communication addressed to the Prime Minister of India on January 1, 1992 ULFA leadership stated “we hereby confirm our resolve (1) to accept a solution of the Assam problem within the Constitution of India (2) to abjure violence (3) to deposit arms at an appropriate time mutually agreed upon”. It also requested for withdrawal of army operations. As a good gesture Govt. suspended Army operations from January 14, 92 to Feb 3, 92 which was later extended to an indefinite period. Later however Army operation was resumed from April, 1, 92 in six districts viz. Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Sibsagar, Nagaon and Darrang due to increased ULFA activities.

Following suspension of operation several rounds of discussions were held between ULFA representatives and representatives of the Govt. of India for a negotiated settlement of the ULFA issue.
There was hostility from sections which had fully supported and was not harmed by UGs. Murmurings of betrayal were circulating. In Bangladesh Paresh Barua was furious and felt isolated. He denounced the compromise as a “sell out to India’s colonial masters in Delhi”. He argued that men like Hirajyoti Mohanta (killed by army) had not died in order to facilitate a surrender. Many others were prepared to overlook ULFA’s record of excesses “because they justified these actions as inspired by the national urge of true patriots”. Added to this was total confusion in rank and file.

Convincing rank and file proved difficult if not impossible for Arabind Rajkhowa, S.S. Chairman, Pradip Gogoi, S.S. Vice Chairman and Anupchetia. “A strong but local group albeit smaller than the pro-talk faction and the neutrals was meanwhile rallying around the unbending figure of Paresh Barua”. This section was also aware that if they came overground there would be retaliation from relations of those killed.

Slowly Arabinda Rajkhowa and Anu Chetia and Gogoi gave up their efforts and under the guise of seeking opinion of Paresh Barua made their way to Bangladesh but never came back. There were rumours that ISI and NSCN were putting pressure on them not to yield to pressure.

This led to groupism as pro-talk and anti-talk and the ULFA split. Arabind Rajkhowa and Paresh Barua group betrayed the trust of the Govt. of India. Another group viz. pro-talk led by ULFA leaders like Kalpajyoti Neog, Munim Nobis, Sidhartha Phukan (Sunil Nath) who had support bases in the districts declared their firm resolve to continue with the peace process and declared so openly on 31.3.92.

7.4.1.8 ULFA Split

It meant a vertical split in the ULFA which ended in the surrender with weapons of 3500 ULFA activists. The anti-talk leaders crossed over to Bangladesh. More and more units joined the pro-talk group.
The radical ULFA camps shifted either to Bhutan or Bangladesh and were in contact with Pakistan ISI. It was also indulging in recruitment in Assam which was however far less than surrender.

The ULFA was believed to have struck an agreement with Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) and Koch-Raj Bongshi Security Force (KRSF) both operating in Lower Assam and Jalpaiguri – Darjeeling areas of West Bengal and the National Development Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and decided not to target each other. It had made successful efforts to woo the migrant Muslims in the ‘Char’ (river islands) areas which was pregnant efforts with dangerous portends from security point of view. "ULFA is at present fine tuning its structure to replace the NSCN(IM) now involved in peace talks with Centre, to head the militant pantheon in the North-East. The ULFA’s efforts are currently centered around re-establishing its camps in Bangladesh and strengthening its bases in Bhutan and Myanmar with assured supplies of arms and ammunition from across the international borders of the State. Incidentally both the AGP and the Congress have of late accused each other of a ‘Clandestine nexus’ with the militant outfits aimed at settling their political scores”.

The army was hopeful that with its continued sustained operation on all fronts peace would be established leading to an era of prosperity and development in Assam.

The recent Kargil war proved an advantage against ULFA in Assam. This was because the ULFA chairman Arabind Rajkhowa had sent a message to the local press in Guwahati in which he justified the action of Kashmiri militants. He also condemned the military action by the Indian army and exhorted the people not to support the Indian army action in Kargil. The news published had thrown back the people. The local people could hardly believe it. This was in the face of death of four Assamese youth in Kargil war. ULFA had made a tactical error which proved suicidal. A lot of resentment had reportedly taken place in the ULFA then and some were planning to leave the outfit.
Since 1991, AASU was also critical of ULFA for kidnapping and torturing of students. Students warned ULFA that they would not tolerate threats or attacks from any quarter. ULFA had also issued a booklet (1992) declaring that the “erstwhile residents of ‘East Bengal’ who had been encouraged to migrate to Assam by government in the 1930s and 1940s “are part and parcel of the national life of Assam. It even criticized AASU for not giving political direction to the anti-alien agitation. AASU hit back denouncing ULFA as anti-Assam. It pointed out that ULFA activists were based in Bangladesh and that was probably the reason for this new attitude to migrants. It criticized ULFA for launching a misguided movement consisting of extortion and murders which destabilized the situation in Assam and ULFA’s declaration was the basis of a plan to reduce Assamese into a minority.

At that time, AASU was not alone in criticizing ULFA. An organization known as United Reservations Minority Communities of Assam (URMCA), a conglomerate of Association of indigenous people and tribes that opposed ULFA organized rallies and marches against the militants. “They (ULFA) are simply chauvinist Assamese middle class people masquerading as leftists and seeking to portray a pan-Assamese identity”.

In spite of it, ULFA was far from finished. It was still reportedly targeting tea companies and taking protection money on an annual basis. “We all know that the tea companies are paying protection money to the militants, be it to the ULFA, Bodos or the Nagas. The problem is of proving the fact”. As a result kidnappings of tea garden personnel had come down.

By 1995 AGP again made a come back and there were allegations that it had the backing of ULFA. ULFA also adopted a resolution during the time which stated that the outfit would support a party which included the following points in its poll manifests:-

1. The right to self-determination of a nationality should be included in the Indian Constitution.
2. The ‘black laws’ such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 and the Assam Disturbed Area Act 1958 which gave blanket powers to the SF must be withdrawn.

3. The ban on all national parties (read militant groups) must be withdrawn.

4. The army must be sent back to the barracks since the ultimate resolution to the insurgency issues has to be political.

“Promptly within a couple of months AGP included these points in its fresh poll manifesto although to be fair to the party it had raised the issues earlier also”. But soon after coming to power AGP, ULFA struck by killing S.P of Tinsukia and a journalist in Guwahati and the two drifted apart.

ULFA’s support base though had taken a beating the crime chart showed the resilience of the outfit to strike at will in spite of Unified Command operation in Assam. The reasons can be attributed to support/direction from the Pakistan ISI. According to a surrendered UG, the ISI was using ULFA (1) For espionage mainly in border districts of Assam (2) For building strong bases in Bangladesh and Bhutan (3) For gaining support from some intellectuals, journalists in Assam (4) Because of clandestine support extended by political parties for mutual benefit (5) Lukewarm attitude of Central govt. to effectively deal with the organization (6) Sustained insurgency movements in the North-East region (7) ULFA’s good funds position.

It had however became a pale shadow of its former self as far as ideologies were concerned. “ULFA was born with one sole aim of procuring some 100 odd guns and drive out the illegal migrants from the State to give a moral boost to the AASU which once spearheaded the six year long mass movement. After that the outfit widened its objective by including demand for secession but its activities political or otherwise was confined within the country’s boundaries.

As the outfit sought an international platform to highlight its demand the foreign agencies primarily the Pakistan ISI seized the opportunity.
Three Central Committee members had thrice met the top ranking officers of the ISI in Afghanistan and most significant outcome of the meetings was that thrice the ULFA leadership had refused to become pawns in the ISI game which wanted the former to blow up major economic installations of the country”.

7.4.1.9 Means of Communication

ULFA had all means of communications. Its web-site was one of the better designed. “The ULFA home page published by the International Publicity Department is divided into – the Land of Assam, Natural Resources, The people of Assam, A Brief Introduction to ULFA’s aims and objects.

Though it is bare bones text based site it gives a fair insight into the ULFA thinking process. Take for example its division of “The people of Assam into three parts – (1) The Assamese society developed through the historical assimilation of different human races. (2) The indigenous tribal society which preserves its own identity till now, staying outside the periphery of the historical assimilation of different human races, (3) The foreigners migrated from Indian sub-continent after 1947 for different causes. Or this interpretation of the present situation of Assam – All the industry, industrial products and the markets come under the control of the colonial ruling class. In the consequence, the strategy of annihilation of nation starts. Services, industries and the markets are packed in with foreigners, deceiving the indigenous people, they have caused to occur illegal migration of millions of Indian and non-Indian foreigners to Assam and rehabilitated them to render the people of Assam into street beggar and minority they have fabricated a portion of the foreigners as the representative of indigenous people of Assam enthroning them at Delhi – Dispur as Member of Legislative Assembly or Parliamentarian”. It was also in possession some wireless sets, cellular phones, electronic gensets, photostat machine, etc.
"ULFA availed information technology to further its game plan. It came to light when SF busted an office of the "External Affairs-Office-Cum-International Publicity wing of the organization in Meghalaya (Byrnihat). Apart from a Telephone, a P.C., a high power VHF set, a colour T.V., a VCR, one cordless telephone, a laser printer, floppies, photographs, a service book of the ULFA, large number of documents including a list of about 300 intellectuals and artists, sympathetic to the extremist outfit were recovered".

7.4.1.10 Publication

ULFA brought out a monthly publication viz. "The Liberation" and a fortnightly viz. "Freedom". They brought out articles titled (1) from the Chairman's table (2) alleged atrocities committed by the S.F on ULFA cadres (3) news clippings from Assam (4) alleged human rights violations. Their readership was around 1000.

7.4.1.11 Relationship with similar organizations within the State/outside

The relationship of ULFA with some of the North-East insurgent groups like the NSCN was as old as the ULFA itself as without NSCN's help it should not have been able to get the required training. With the training received it acquired greater capability to launch terrorist violence. NSCN acted as the mentor of the ULFA. It also provided sanctuary, weapons, ammunition and advice. ULFA also forged alliance with the United National Liberation Fron (UNLF) of Manipur and they along with the NSCN(K) formed the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) (this however died a natural death).

ULFA also developed closeness with the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur and jointly carried out Bank dacoities, highway robberies and attack on soft targets. It had also links with another outfit of Manipur viz. Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). Initially these outfits provided ULFA shelter and sanctuary in their camps in Bangladesh during 1990/91.
The United Peoples Volunteers of Arunachal (UPVA) recruits had received initial training from the ULFA at its Lakhipattar camp during 1990. They had resolved that they would jointly make efforts to unify revolutionary organizations like ULAA (United Liberation Army of Arunachal) etc. for the greater interest of the people of Arunachal. The Bodo Security Force (BDSF – later became NDFB – National Democratic Front of Bodoland) of Assam had entered into an agreement with ULFA for mutual understanding, help and assistance and had established camps jointly within Bhutan. Earlier they were targeting each other. They had also resolved (1991) that they would be unanimous in effecting mutual respect, equal status of language, culture, customs and traditions of the indigenous people of Indo-Burma origin. ULFA often took help of the extremist groups of Meghalaya viz. ALMA (Achik Liberation Matgrique Army – now disbanded) and HNLC (Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council). They acted as the conduit and provided shelter and facilities for exfiltration and infiltration to and from Bangladesh.

7.4.1.12 Surrenders

September, 15, 1991 was a watershed in Assam’s history so also 28.11.1990 when Army operations code named Operation Rhino and Operation Bajrang, respectively, were launched to tame the recalcitrant ULFA of Assam. While the first Operation Bajrang literally fizzled out, Operation Rhino took ULFA by the horns grievously wounding it. The Rhino could have gored ULFA to death had the hard cores consisting of Arbind Rajkhowa and his friends not escaped to Bangladesh to chalk out fresh strategies, fresh partnership and to cause fresh headache. In spite of it the Rhino had indeed brought ULFA to the negotiating table and a section under leadership of Kalpajyoti Neog, Sidhartha Phukan @ Sunil Nath (voice of ULFA) and Munim Nobis (originally of APLA and the man who established links with ISI of Pakistan), decided to bid farewell to the arms culminating in a split of ULFA and the ultimate surrender of 3572 ULFA volunteers with arms and their joining the national mainstream. The split virtually led to erosion in the rank and file of the hardliners. More and more district units joined the peace process subsequently. The surrendered came to be nicknamed as SULFA. A sum of Rs. 1.10
million was given by the Central Govt. for their rehabilitation. Of this, half was to go for raising two battalions of police to fight future insurgencies. The other half was for payment to those who were desirous of leading normal life. SULFA had earned notoriety for their extortion and corruption. They were also not allowing contracts to go out of their clutches.

There were thirteen surrender ceremonies since 1997 when a unified command structure came into existence and a total of 1338 ULFA surrenders had taken place till August, 2000. Some of the surrendered ULFA cadres were of the opinion that “the ULFA is no longer the revolutionary organization. It has become a terrorist outfit. The killing of a social activist like Sanjoy Ghosh who was working for the uplift of the people of Assam is a case in point (He was a respected social worker who attracted attention of ULFA which suspected him for being a govt. agent and was killed). This had tarnished ULFA’s image. There was feud between the leaders of the political and armed wings of the outfit. It was becoming increasingly difficult for activists to survive. We have no idea to whom to report. C-in-C Barua has turned into a dictator. There is no democracy in the outfit anymore”. A women ULFA who surrendered stated that “We have shown the way and more are on their way”. There were allegations that the surrender package was not lucrative and several had gone back to jungle.

The SULFA had observed April 7, 2000 (raising day of ULFA) as ‘Pledge Day’. In a leaflet issued by the Guwahati based Coordination Committee of former ULFA activists it was decided to observe April 7 as the day of pledge against terrorism this year. It stated “we were once misled by a few leaders and celebrated April 7 as the foundation day of the national liberation struggle. To set the wrong right we will observe the day as a ‘pledge day’ against terrorism. The former militants appealed to the people to organize public meetings all over the State and discuss common initiatives that can be launched to root out terrorism. The Committee also appealed to all former militants to contribute towards this end as members of the society.
In the late 70s the State reeling under economic backwardness, unemployment and illegal infiltration had looked to Delhi for a solution to their problems.

However, lack of attention from Delhi forced the people to lose confidence in the existing system.

Around this time a section of youth sought to provide an alternative through the ULFA. Self-discipline and campaigns against social evils by the youth who joined the ULFA to liberate the State through an armed struggle earned the outfit popularity.

With increasing popularity the ULFA started getting access to money and power. The leadership, which had earned popularity through self-discipline slowly, became addicted to luxuries and started restricting their struggle only against the poor.

The corrupt were given power in return of money. The leaders of the struggle born during the Assam agitation against illegal Bangladesh migrants shifted to Dhaka after being unable to cope with Army operations.

From luxurious hotels in Dhaka, they started dictating the course of the so called liberation struggle in the State and also established links with the ISI.

It resulted in a spurt in ISI sponsored terrorism in the State. Massive amounts of funds were extorted and the already backward economy of the State came to a grinding halt.

The disgraceful chapter that the ULFA is writing with the blood of Assamese people is not their national liberation struggle. Rather the liberation struggle for the Assamese people now is to root out the ISI sponsored ULFA from the soil of the State.”

SULFA volunteers were accused of abetment in the alleged extra judicial executions of ULFA volunteers during later part of 1999. There were also allegations
that SULFA was the creation of the Congress Party. "It is not that the AGP led government had given birth to the SULFAs. It was the Congress Govt. which had given birth to the SULFAs."

7.4.1.13 External Support

Initially external support came (1983) from the NSCN (undivided) then based in upper Myanmar. It was top ULFA leaders like Anup Chetia, Arabind Rajkhowa and Pradip Gogoi (Vide Chairman) who established contact with NSCN, the most powerful insurgent group in the North-East. This relationship got strengthened over the years. It offered all help from training, sanctuary, support, weapons and advice etc.

It was not before 1987 that the first contact with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was established. But once established the KIA offered to render training to ULFA men and women – "but at a steep price". This relationship was guided as much by monetary concerns as by national aims of the ULFA and the KIA. It continued till 1989.

During the courtship with KIA, Paresh Barua had taken batches of ULFA recruits to the KIA training centre. The trainees had come back hardened by their successful voyage and on their return, indulged in bank robberies, dacoities etc, to collect money for payment for weapons/ammunition obtained from the KIA.

KIA had reportedly helped ULFA to establish contact with China. Paresh Barua, C-in-C was reported to have visited Unan province a number of times. Later leaders like Arbind Rajkhowa, Hirakjyoti Mohanta (since killed), Kalpajyoti Neog (since surrendered), Chakra Gohain (since killed) had also visited China. "The Chinese stepped up their activities after the Pokhran nuclear test in May, 1998. In supplying arms to insurgents in the North-East the Chinese are careful enough not to be directly involved. They operate through a mysterious organization known as "Black House" which delivers the arms after erasing the Chinese markings. Sources said the ULFA leaders who had been to China for arms and indoctrination (on paper the ULFA subscribes to Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism) met Chinese Army officers also. The first contact was made in 1993 and renewed in 1997”.

Through the influence of NSCN in Myanmar, ULFA had reportedly established contacts in Thailand and Paresh Barua, C-in-C was maintaining the link for the purpose of procuring arms and ammunition.

7.4.1.14 ULFA and the ISI

ULFA’s contact with the ISI of Pakistan was an established fact. It was believed to have commenced during 1988 when Munim Nobis (APLA) made efforts to meet its officials first at Dhaka and later at Karachi. Through him a delegation of ULFA visited Pakistan which included following:-

1. Arabind Rajkhowa, Chairman
2. Hirakjyoti Mohanta, Dy. C-in-C
3. Pradip Gogoi, Vice Chairman
4. Anup Chetia, General Secretary
5. Manoj Hazariya

This delegation had reportedly met Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Chief of Hizb-I-Islami of Afghanistan which was patronised by the Pakistan ISI. Between 90-93 more than 40 ULFA leaders/cadres were trained in the Afghan camps under the supervision of ISI. In 1991, Paresh Barua and Sunil Nath had met ISI officials in Islamabad.

“The arrest of four Pakistani ISI agents from Guwahati in August, 99, revealed its game plan in the North East. According to them the plan included:-

a) To train up a large body of Muslim youths from Assam and launch a holy war (jihad) to “liberate Assam” and establish an Islamic country consisting of certain other parts in North East India (The ISI provided active assistance to various militant outfits to
carry out recruitment, training, etc and also provided them with arms, equipment and logistic support).

b) Make use of ULFA and certain other local militant outfits for creating large scale disturbances in Assam including bomb explosions in public places, railway stations, tracks, market places, etc.

c) Make use of ULFA and certain other militant outfits for destroying public property like oil pipelines, oil refineries, oil depots and other installations.

d) A two-pronged economic warfare—

i. by siphoning away money collected by underground elements of Assam to Pakistan and other countries,

ii. by pumping in large quantities of fake currency notes into the economy.

e) To foment communal trouble in the State by inciting innocent law abiding Muslim citizens by creating misunderstanding and hatred against the non-Muslim population.

On their statements 31 militants were nabbed from different parts of the State and the Assam/West Bengal police recovered large quantities of very high explosives from a place not far from the border of Assam and West Bengal in the North Bengal-Bangladesh border.

This seizure has conclusively proved that ISI has been operating from Bangladesh taking advantage of the political ferment in that country and the Islamic fundamentalists nexus with ISI”.

“After its failure in Kashmir, Pakistan is now attempting to separate the entire North-East from the rest of the country by cutting off the ‘chicken’s neck’ the narrow zone between Srimpur (Assam) and New Jalpaiguri (North Bengal) in pursuance of the policy laid down by the deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who is reported to have planned several fronts similar to Kargil. To that end, several training camps have been organized under ISI in North and West Bengal and North-East. Apparently the entire area is threatened by massive Bangladeshi infiltrators under the patronage of the ISI”.
ULFA’s top leaders like Arabind Rajkhowa (chairman of ULFA), Paresh Barua (C-in-C), Anup Chetia (Genl. Secretary – now in Dhaka Jail) escaped to Bangladesh after Operation Rhino and they continued camping there. ULFA had established a number of camps in Bangladesh. The known camps in Bangladesh were at Joydevpur, Srimangal, Bhannuganch, Chota Damai and Adampur. ULFA was reportedly having two base camps one each in Bhutan and in Dhaka where from Paresh Barua C-in-C operated under a pseudonym N.V. Zaman. “That the ULFA, the NDFB and some Tripura militant groups have camps in Bangladesh for a long time is an open secret, though Dhaka has never admitted this, despite being shown photographs of such camps. But apart from giving sanctuary to militants from North-East Bangladesh is also using them, particularly the ULFA cadre for espionage mainly in the border areas. The Director General of Foreign Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh is masterminding these operations in close collaboration with ISI”. For a long time it was operating a motor driving school at Kal Bazar in Dhaka in the name of “Orchid Motor Driving School” which was used as a cover to facilitate infiltration/exfiltration of ULFA cadres from and to Bangladesh. These were done by obtaining Bangladesh Govt’s permission and under its authority. The ULFA cadres had assumed names under which the Bangladesh govt. prepared the documents.

There were also allegations that the Burmese army had made secret moves to get in touch with ULFA through Bangladesh and had reportedly issued End User Certificates for consignments of arms and explosives meant for ULFA transferred through Bangladesh.

The ULFA was said to have been inextricably caught in the web spun by the Islamic fundamentalist groups in Bangladesh. These organizations were rendering all help to the ISI of Pakistan which inter-alia included Jammat-e-Islami and Harkatul Zihad. ISI network extends to several districts in Bangladesh like Comilla, Sylhet, Noakhali and Chittagong Hill tracks. ULFA had also sought and received the support of Pakistani collaborators and assassins of SK. Mujibur Rahman and Muslim League factions etc. to further its aims.
7.4.1.15 ULFA and LTTE

ULFA leadership had established contact with the LTTE and some of its hardcore volunteers were also reportedly trained in handling of explosives and guerilla tactics. Instructors of LTTE had also reportedly visited ULFA Headquarters in Assam before Army operations and guided the cadres in laying of mines, booby traps and in construction of trenches, etc.

7.4.1.16 ULFA and Khalistan

ULFA’s network had got extended to the Khalistan militants and the man who established the contact was reportedly Anup Chetia. Subsequently some Khalistani militants also established contact with ULFA leadership in Assam which further got strengthened through their network in Pakistan and Nepal.

7.4.1.17 ULFA and Bhutan

Even though the leaders of ULFA had escaped to Bangladesh after the Army operations most of the ULFA camps were shifted to Bhutan adjacent to the Assam border. As a result the organizational network of ULFA in Assam suffered a serious setback. The formal split further crippled it but even then it was not without a solid support base and therefore its ability to come to life remained undiminished.

There were indications that Bhutan had woken up at last and had decided to evict them either through peaceful means or under pressure. The execution would however prove to be far more difficult than the Bhutan govt. had imagined “as the militants had not only established sound business relations with the local populace but had also improved local economy somewhat by depending on the Bhutanese for their goods and services. And from all available information, both goods and services have been supplied to the militants at a premium because of risk involved. However the hit and run potential of this agreement had created problems for the Indian armed forces for the simple reason
that no sovereign state could possibly countenance the intrusion of the troops of a
neighbouring country even though it is obliged to wink at the long term occupation of its
woods by the insurgents of the same country. The militants had asked for some more
time. The Bhutan govt. had not only threatened to use force but had also equipped its
augmented army with modern weapons. Making it clear to the people that Thimpu would
not allow its territory to be used for anti-India activities the Bhutan govt. recently
cancelled the licence of shopkeepers who had set up shops close to the militant camps. It
had also warned citizens against providing any logistic support to the militants declaring
that anyone violating the order would be punished under the National Security Act”.

This had made ULFA leadership to search for green pastures elsewhere and they
were reportedly planning to shift their Bhutanese establishments to Arunachal Pradesh
and the Assam-West Bengal border areas like Cooch-Bihar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling
districts of North Bengal areas of West Bengal and along the Indo-Bhutan international
border districts of Assam like Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, Darrang, Nalbari
and adjoining areas. ULFA had also trained the volunteers of the Kamatapur Liberation
Organization (KLO) and the Koch Rajboungshi Security Force (KRSF) for quite
sometime in the ULFA camps in Bhutan. The main purpose was to get ‘safe passage’
through North Bengal. The KLO/KRSF were also helping ULFA in meting out treatment
to the injured persons in private nursing homes etc. under fake identity.

The Suryakatha area under Bilaspara sub-division of Dhubri district was also
claimed as ‘Mukti Bisharan Bhumit (a liberated land) by ULFA.

ULFA had also reached an agreement (1999) with NDFB and the BLT not to
target each other in the greater interest of the two.

7.4.2 Bodo Security Force (Bd-SF) – National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)

Sensing danger in the moves of the Assamese youth, the Bodo Tribe, one of the
oldest and largest single group of plain Tribals of Assam became restive. They had
reasons for doing so.
The turbulent river Brahmaputra cuts the State of Assam into two distinct parts as it traverses from east to west before entering Bangladesh. In tea garden parlance the two parts were known as north Bank and south Bank. The Tinsukia – Dibrugarh – Sibsagar – Jorhat – Golaghat sector falls on the south bank and those which are in the districts of Nalbari, Darrang, Sonitpur and Lakhimpur fall in the North bank.

Economically the North bank districts were neglected. Added to this the havoc caused by incessant floods had made the life of people miserable. Inhabited by a volatile mix of Bodos immigrant Muslims and Hindu Bengalis the districts of Darrang, Sonitpur, Nalbari and Barpeta perpetually remained in economic backwardness compared to the other districts of the State especially those located in the rich tea, coal and timber sectors of upper Assam. Though Bodos were the original settlers in Assam with the advent of the Ahoms this community got marginalised which continued even after independence. Throughout history of Assam this community had suffered. The Bodos reportedly migrated from Central Asia around 3000 B.C. They had ruled Upper Assam, i.e., the area east of Nagaon from Adimbaipur as their capital (now Dimapur in Nagaland). They moved to safer places during successive attacks from Ahoms and the Burmese from the East and the Muslims from the West. Their economic backwardness was a natural consequence but they had practical wisdom. They inherited a hurt psyche and suffered from a deprivation syndrome. Being originally settlers, they were not prepared to accept foreigners to co-exist in their hold. Their ire rose against infiltrators who eyed for fertile lands in their possession. Spread in small pockets all over Assam, Bodos constitute the largest sections in the districts of Darrang, Sonitpur and Kokrajhar.

It was in 1968 that the first stirrings of unrest among the Bodos was noticed in an organized manner when the Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) demanded a separate homeland for the Bodos called “Udayachal”. The Bodo trouble however came to national limelight only in 1986 when the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) demanded 50 percent of the Assam State as a separate State for the Bodos. The agitation by the ABSU continued till 1993 when an Accord (known as the Bodo Accord) was signed (20.2.1993)
which evolved a scheme for setting up of the Bodo land Autonomous Council (BAC) for development of the people in the Council areas in general and the Bodos in particular. The irony was that like all other Accords in the North East this Accord was also dumped to be forgotten bringing the situation to square one.

While the ABSU was going through the agitation, a group (77) of radical youth from Udalguri area under the leadership of Ranjan Daimary, a post graduate Political Science student of the North-Eastern Hill University (NEHU) came to the conclusion that only violence could force the authorities to listen to their grievances. With this motive in mind they formed an organization known as the Bodo Security Force (BDSF) on 3.10.1986 at Adala Khasibari in Darrang district in Udalguri sub-division.

Before giving leadership to the BDSF, Daimary was a member of the Young Boro Nationalist Association (YBNA) which was formed in 1983. This organization had vowed to instill and foster a “spirit for protection and promotion of liberty, equality and fraternity of the Bodos and free them from the socio-political and economic exploitation, oppression, suppression and colonialism”.

During the period from 1983-1986 the YBNA had indoctrinated a number of youth in Bodo villages through village mobilisation and political classes. Daimary had prepared a constitution for BDSF and got it approved in what was called a Constituent Assembly on 24.1.1988. Its motto read “let us die for the Bodo Nation but let no Bodo Nation die for us”.

The aims and objects of the BSF were:-

(1) To liberate Bodoland with an armed struggle for a distinct identity and civilization of the Bodos.
(2) To transform a democratic socialist society to promote liberty, equality and fraternity.
(3) To free the Bodo nation from socio-political and economic exploitation, oppression, suppression and colonialism.
(4) To struggle for liberation of the Indo-Burma region, in alliance with other revolutionary organizations of the oppressed aboriginal nationalities of the region.

The organizational setup of NDFB as follows:-

**Table-X**

National Council (15 Members – Highest legislative and Executive body)

- Chairman/President
- Vice-Chairman/Vice President
- General Secretary

- Civil Wing
  - Foreign Secy.
  - Publicity Secy.
  - Info. Secy.
  - Pol. Secy.
  - Home Secy.

- Armed Wing
  - Military Secretary
    - C-in-C of Bodoland Army
    - Dy.-c-in-C
    - Commands
      - (1) Central Command covers (Darrang/Kamrup/Nalbari/Barpeta districts)
      - (2) Foreign Command or Southern Command
      - (3) Western Command (covers Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, Dhubri districts)
      - (4) Eastern Command (Sonitpur, North Lakhimpur and Demaji)

1. Chairman – Ranjan Daimary @ Nobla @ Ronsaigra r/o Borigon/Dist. Darrang.

324
2. Vice Chairman – Lenjai Brahma.
3. General Secretary – Govindo Basumatari @ Sumikar Basumatari @ B. Swimkar, Udalguri, dist. Darrang.
4. Home Secretary – Hectorson Mushahari @ Henthasia r/o. Ambagon Paneri, dist. Darrang. – Arrested by Army (97).
5. Foreign Secretary – Ranjan Daimari.
6. Military Secretary and Chief of Bodoland Army (BLA) – Bwithi Boro – killed in 1996. He was reportedly replaced by one Hastaisa.
7. Dy. C-in-C – Anandowari @ W. Ansula.
8. Finance Secretary – Nileswar Basumatari @ Jabda Joolia (arrested – 1996).

In April 1993, the General Council of the BDSF resolved to rename the outfit as National Democratic Front of BodoLand (NDFB) and the Armed Wing as the Bodoland Army (BLA). This decision was subsequently ratified in the Central Council Meeting (November, 1994).

The strength of NDFB was estimated around 1000 of which 700 were well trained. The organization commanded maximum influence in Darrang district as majority of the top leadership hailed from the district. It was also strong in Sonitpur, Nalbari, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, Darrang and Kokrajhar districts.

Arms holding – It was assessed as follows:-
1. 2" Mortar – 1 with 10 rounds with Central Command under Capt. Rajni Narzary.
2. LMG – 5 Nos.
3. AK 47 – 170 Nos.
5. 9mm Pistols – 40 Nos.
8. SLRs – 110 Nos.
10. Total ammunition -1,60,000 rounds.
12. RDX - Is in possession but quantity not known.

The headquarters of the NDFB was located at Dwimu across Udalguri inside Bhutan.

For recruitment to the NDFB a stringent procedure was followed. Initially a preliminary enquiry was conducted. On the basis of his/her educational qualification he was inducted and after successful completion of training the individual was taken to either (a) Bodoland Commando Force (b) Political cadre, or (3) Field Study Centre.

The cadres of NDFB were a committed lot and belonged to 20-40 age group. About 10% were women volunteers. The leadership and majority of cadres were Christians.

“With the sole exception of the Naga militants the Bodos are the most efficient, ruthless and organized force. They are also very secretive. And unlike their ULFA counterparts they are not fond of Maruti cars and Yamaha Motorcycles. They can walk any distance in the hilly terrain and have the ability to merge with the population since their life style essentially remains simple”.

7.4.2.1 Fund Collection/Nature of activities:-

Since formation NDFB (BDSF) was dependent on ‘Bodoland’, tax collection/extortion from businessmen, tea gardens/kidnapping for ransom/voluntary contributions for raising funds.
Around 1980-90, ULFA was on a rampage in the tea gardens amassing huge amounts for its ‘war chest’ and the way in which money flowed had baffled it beyond words.

Probably NDFB had also learnt a lesson from ULFA. During early part of 1990 NDFB started targeting tea gardens in the North Bank. Like the ULFA it also started sending innocuous notes asking for ‘donations’ to the revolutionary cause. As was the experience of ULFA initially the tea plantation managers either neglected the notes of were replied cursorily. They were ignorant about the simmering discontent among the Bodo radicals. The reaction of NDFB was sharp and quick and it came in the form of an attack at a function at Dhekiajuli (60 kms. from Tezpur) on Diwali day in 1990 when its volunteers mowed down the revellers in which one manager was killed and many injured. From then on none made a mistake about Bodos and its ‘revolutionary’ movement never suffered from financial crisis. The biggest catch (1992) of NDFB was the Williamson Magor group of tea companies, which had 44 gardens in the State of Assam of which 50% fell in North Bank. This company’s manager was threatened with dire consequences and the company coughed up a whopping 1.5 crores. Earlier (1991) the Godrick group had given Rs. 20 lakhs to secure its manager’s release.

Worried over the worsening situation, the govt. had given permission to the Army to operate as NDFB started killing/bombing indiscriminately. Bhutan had also given one time permission to the Indian Army, to chase the militants upto 20 kms inside Bhutan but the militants moved deeper into Bhutan’s unadministered area.

In December, 1992 the militants had raided an Assam Police Armed Battalion located at Saraikholia in Kokrajhar district and decamped with 44 self-loading rifles and huge quantity of ammunition. They were allegedly aided by an insider.

The outfit’s another major action was the kidnapping of the senior manager of the "Guwahati Branch of the Tata Tea Company (1993) from whom a demand for 15 crores was placed. Various other tea companies had fallen victims to the extortion of the
NDFB. The tea plantations later hit upon the idea of payment of a regular sum in the form of protection money. Having made big money the organization decided to lie low. There were also other compelling reasons like divisions in the Bodo community, opposition from Bangladesh settlers and Adivasis who also took to Arms to resist the NDFB. The opposition turned into clashes on ethnic lines and NDFB resorted to ethnic cleansing by driving out non-Bodos in Dhubri, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, etc. and thousands of Adivasis were displaced. In fact, there were instances in which both Bodos and Adivasis ran away from each other’s reach. Such incidents were a common feature since 1996. “Nearly 12000 adivasis are presently taking shelter in Grahampur, Dingdingia and Sebapur relief camps. Ethnic clashes to drive out non-Bodos from the BAC (Bodo-Autonomous Council) areas has led to the mushrooming of many underground organizations in the lower Assam region. The MULFA (Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam), MULTA (Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam) have surfaced at the backdrop of successive attack on the religious minority beginning with the infamous carnage of Basbari (Barpeta) in 1994 while Adivasi militant like ACMA (Adivasi Cobra Militant of Assam) and the Assam Adivasi Suraksha Samiti (AASS), Gorkha Tiger Force (GTF) emerged after ethnic clashes near Gosaigaon area in 1996 under Kokrajhar district. The attack on religious minority ever since spilled over to Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar and Dhubri districts and similarly Adivasis were reported to have gained strength and growing stronger by each passing day in Bangaigaon and Kokrajhar”. The MLTA was emerging as a force to reckon with in the Muslim dominated area of Dhubri district. It came to light when S.F busted a gun factory run by it. It had also come to notice for keeping clandestine links with suspected ISI agents. Dhubri is also having common borders (both land and riverine) with Bangladesh and insurgent groups prefer this area for ingress/egress. There were allegations that political parties were behind the clashes and had made capital out of it. “A study into the incidents of massacres that occurred in these years revealed that almost all had been allegedly engineered by political leaders but at later stages the situation was hijacked by militant outfits of respective communities”.

328
7.4.2.2 Means of Communication

NDFB had a network of informants throughout its area of operation. It also made use of cell phones, VHF sets, etc. for communication.

7.4.2.3 Relationship with similar organizations within the State and outside

NDFB was maintaining cordial relations with ULFA and the two had resolved not to target each other. Similar moves were on without success to finalize an agreement with another Bodo outfit viz. Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) which had already decided to cease-fire. There were also frayed feelings among them over the issue of use of script for Bodo language. While the NDFB was for introducing Roman script, the BLT and the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) were for use of Devanagiri script. The BLT felt that the script issue for Bodo language should be decided by the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS). This controversy haunted the Bodos and they were divided vertically over the issue. While this was so, the ABSU which was party to the Bodo Accord argued that the militant outfits were offshoots from the ABSU and therefore they should give up opposite stands and fight unisonally for Bodo land. The NDFB however wanted secession from the Indian Union not only politically but culturally and it wanted to bring down the curtain on the Roman script. It feared that the Devanagari script, if introduced, would continue to influence the Bodo society with the Pan Indian development. It was also targeting top Bodo intellectuals who were opposed to Roman script for Bodo language.

The NDFB had turned to the big brother NSCN, then based in Myanmar for training of its volunteers. It had also approached the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur for the same purpose. Accordingly, three NSCN/UNLF activists were deputed to impart training (early 1988) to NDFB volunteers in Darrang district area. After the training, NDFB/NSCN/UNLF volunteers had jointly indulged in a number of dacoities in Darrang district of Assam and in Meghalaya.
Subsequently, NDFB established contact with Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, the then Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) and later the National Liberation Tigers (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) of Tripura.

7.4.2.4 External Support

Initially some of NDFB cadres were trained by the NSCN (undivided) in Myanmar. Till recently the organization was maintaining a camp (about 100) in Cox Bazar in Bangladesh where also its recruits were trained. Bulk of NDFB cadres were reportedly stationed in Bhutan. With Bhutan Govt.'s decision to eject them out however they were shifting to Bodo areas/Bangladesh.

7.4.3 Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF – BLT)

The signing (1983) of the Bodo Accord between the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and the Government saw a split in the Bodo movement. As the NDFB was opposed to the Accord it started attacking the ABSU volunteers. Even though the majority of the erstwhile Bodo Military Force (BMF) and ABSU Volunteer Force who were spearheading the movement had surrendered, a group (70) decided to neutralize the NDFB and they formed the BLT. The groupism was then drawn on political lines and while the BLT backed the ABSU the NDFB backed the Peoples Democratic Front (PDF).

Since 1994 BLT started killings in the name of Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF). The non-demarcation of the boundaries of the Bodo Autonomous Council as stipulated in the Accord had also helped to aggravate the Bodo problem.

BLT was formed on the initiative of Prem Singh Brahma of the ABSU. For the same reason BLT had influence in ABSU dominated areas like Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, Nalbari, Kamrup, Darrang, Dhemaji and North Lakhimpur districts. Both the ABSU and the All Bodo Women Welfare Front (ABWWF) were also supporting the BLT. It stood for a separate Bodo land.
The BLT had a strength of 500, of which about 100 were trained in handling weapons.

It functioned through the district units under the overall command of the Central Committee. It had Action Groups to carry out extortions.

**Weapons:**

- AK series – 20
- SLRs – 10
- LMGs – 10
- Carbine – 15
- Stengun – 15
- .303 - 150
- Small arms – 30

The outfit was in possession of explosives and was found using it more often because of the adverse impact on the public.

BLT was dominated by Hindus unlike NDFB which was Christian dominated.

The organization "reached (29.3.2000) an agreement with the Govt. on the ground rules for suspension of operations and to abjure violence. It had agreed not to engage in violent or unlawful activities like killing, kidnapping, extortion, intimidation, carrying of weapons in public and agreed to abide by the Constitution of India and the laws of the land". The two sides had also agreed to set up a joint Monitoring Group comprising the representatives of the Govt. of India, Govt. of Assam and the BLT to oversee the suspension of operations. The BLT however wanted the govt. to ensure:

1. Creation of a separate Bodoland State in the North bank of Brahmaputra.
2. Creation of autonomous district councils in the South bank of Brahmaputra.

3. Induction of Bodo – Kachari people of Karbi Anglong in the VIth schedule.

The Bodo movement was nothing but 'a struggle for survival'. Several attempts of unification among the Bodos failed due to the ego clashes in the leadership. The agitating Bodo leadership had even raised the problem of Bodos in the session of U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Population (UNWGIP) in July, 1999 separately by each group leader, but in similar tones. The groupism had created a lot of confusion among the people.

7.4.4 Developments in Karbi-Anglong and North Cachae Hills of Assam.

Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills districts had emerged as the new battle front in the never ending violence in Assam where also ethnic cleansing had begun. This cleansing however had political stakes rather than secessionist zeal. The organizations involved were:-

7.4.4.1 Dima Halam Daoga (DHD) (Dimasa Security Force)

The outfit was formed to fight for full autonomy for the two districts of North Cachar Hills of Karbi Anglong districts. With this end in view, a Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF) was formed (1992) by Bharat Langthasa, Pradeep Sengyung, Nirmal Kempari and Kanto Langthasa and others. Its strength then was around 100. However, in 1994 about 25 of them surrendered. The remaining formed (1995) the DHD and its leaders were Kanto Langkhiasa, Jewel Gortosa, Bijoy Naiding and Ronal Nunisa.

DHD Volunteers were trained by the STF Bn. of NSCN (IM) in Intaki Forest (Kohima district of Nagaland). The DHD volunteers provided a support base for NSCN(IM) in NC Hills and Karbi Anglong districts. They had reportedly a mutual agreement according to which besides training DHD volunteers, NSCN would provide shelter and advice in return for sharing of fund collection by DHD. The sharing was at
the rate of 40% (NSCN-IM), 35% (DHD) and the remaining was to be kept as common fund. There were bickerings over sharing of loot and over the idea of NCN(IM) over greater Nagaland which included areas inhabited by the Dimasa Tribe.

The strength of DHD was estimated at 100 including 15 girls and they had acquired about 15 AK-47 rifles through the NSCN.

DHD had training camps/hideouts in the hilly areas of Mahur and Maibong towns in North Cachar Hills district where the cadres were trained in guerilla warfare.

The DHD was more active in North Cachar Hills. Recently DHD joined another minor outfit viz. Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and formed a joint platform viz. United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS). Although the outfits had not much of striking power the terrains in which they operated had proved to be a force multiplier for them. The two districts of North Cachar and Karbi Anglong have common borders with Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram and NSCN had established links with them for purposes of logistics like free movement through each other’s area of influence. This made the DHD – KNV combine a force to reckon with. In fact, NSCN had raised one battalion by name Dhimasa National Security Force (DNSF). There were however allegations that the KNV had the backing of the Congress. While this was open to question, a sort of ethnic cleansing targeted at non-Karbis were taking place at the place.

There were also allegations that “State Govt. employees and institutions in the North Cachar Hills are contributing ‘in lakhs’ to the extremist coffers in the district. The process for detection of employees and offices paying the DHD in the North Cachar Hills is on”.

Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills districts presented a case of interest.

The autonomous State of Meghalaya consisting of Khasi Hills, Jaintia Hills and Garo Hills was constituted by the enactment of the Assam Reorganization (Meghalaya)
Act, 1969 under Article 244-A of the Constitution. The two districts of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills districts were then given the option to join the autonomous State or remain out of it with enhanced powers to the district councils. The members of the district councils who were empowered to take the decision voted not to join it. Meghalaya subsequently became a full-fledged State by the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganization) Act, 1971”. The same Act also provided that the provisions of Article 244-A shall continue to extend over Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills districts. Thus the doors for the creation of an autonomous State comprising whether wholly or in part Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills districts was kept open. It merely needs 2/3 of the members present and voting in Parliament in favour of a law to this effect.

At successive Parliament and Assembly elections since 1983, politicians by putting up a façade of championing the demand have routinely garnered votes of the unsuspecting masses of autonomous State cravers. And as if it was not enough to con the people of their valuable votes, the politicians had created a critical situation by engineering a wide rift amongst them.

“Today there existed two warring groups each accusing the other of throwing a spanner in the works. Their indictment of each other is propelling them to go for each other’s throats. Article 244-A may emerge not as a boon but a bane for the people of the two districts, if bridges are not immediately built over the waters of estrangement.” The activities of the terrorist groups had to be viewed in this context. The Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) had passed (August, 2000) a resolution for the creation of an autonomous State along the lines of Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Chattisgarh.

7.4.5 Bengali Tiger Force (BTF)

The BTF was formed in 1996 as a sequel to murder of several Bengalis by the NDFB. The main aim was only to protect the Bengali community from the attacks of NDFB and ULFA. This outfit was strong in Nalbari and Darrang districts of Assam.
Its founder members were:-
1. Gautam Sarkar, Kokrajhar.
2. Bappa Dutta, Kokrajhar
3. Uttar Sarkar, Barpeta

It was reportedly in possession of about five AK-47 rifles and was getting financial help from the Bengali community.

Both BTF and BODO Liberation Tigers were reportedly having strong nexus and BLT was rendering all help to BTF. On many occasions, they had conducted joint operations against NDFB and ULFA. BTF was not a banned organization.

7.4.6 Rabha National Security Force (RNSF)

The Rabhas, a tribal community in lower Assam areas had formed two outfits viz. Rava Security Force and Rava National Force (RNF) to protect its interests. Later though they merged (12.6.97) and formed the outfit (RNSF) ego clash of leaders persisted over the issue of deposit of funds with the RNSF, surrender of arms etc.

Its strength was estimated at 250. They were trained by the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). Even though the RNSF was not functioning the volunteers were supporting the BLT in its activities. BLT had however declared a cease-fire which would end on September, 14, 2001.

The RNSF had no sophisticated weapons. It had 5 handmade revolvers, 5 handmade sten guns and 3 (.303) rifles.

The fund position of RNSF was assessed at 2,50,000/- collected from contractors, businessmen, etc.
7.4.7 A.T.F (Assam Tiger Force)

This organization came to existence for the first time when it left written leaflets at a scene of crime at Nalbari on 27.10.2000 in which 10 people were killed (including two Assamese). The message read “Marvari, Bihari Bhago, Assam Bachao.” However mystery surrounded A.T.F. which claimed responsibility for the massacre. Earlier it had struck at two places at upper Assam. Its S.S. Commander Pulin Raidangiya in a faxed message to dailies of Guwahati stated that “A.T.F. was formed on January, 1 this year at a secret meeting at Guwahati in Assam by some patriotic people of Assam”. It supported the ULFA’s aim of a sovereign Assam but deferred with the definition of Assamese people. While ULFA considered only Bengali Muslims as foreigners, A.T.F aimed at freeing Assam of all those who came and settled in the State from the “Indian Sub-continent” including Biharis, Marvaris, Bengals and Nepalis. There was a suspicion that A.T.F. was fictitious and ULFA was actually using it as a camouflage at the behest of ISI.

7.4.8 Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) and Koch Rajbongshi Security Force (KRSF)

No agency had taken seriously the movement by the Kamatapuris of Assam for a separate State to be named as ‘Kamatapur’ so far. The above two organizations were spearheading the movement. As elsewhere in the North Eastern region these organizations were also not without political colours.

The Kamatapuris are none but Koch-Rajbongshis, who are inhabitants of various districts of North-Bengal areas of West Bengal like Cooch Bihar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling districts and also lower Assam districts like Dhubri, Bongaigaon, Goalpara and Kokrajhar and some adjoining areas. The professed aim of these organizations was to win the ‘right to self-determination’ of Kamatapuri people of the area because “the increasing illegal encroachment by the illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators to this particular ‘zone’ has threatened the ethnic identity of Koch-Rajbongshi community”. 

336
The KLO/KRSF volunteers were reportedly trained in the ULFA camps situated in the southern Indo-Bhutan international border. There was a secret understanding between them under which ULFA got safe passage for going to and coming from Bangladesh besides help for treatment of the wounded and the sick.

The All Kamatapur Students Union (AKSU) was also demanding the implementation of a 13-point charter of demands which inter-alia included recognition of ‘Kamatapuri’ language. This demand had gained momentum after the publication of “Bhagvad Gita” in Kamatapuri language. Kamatapuris had also intentions to publish a Kamatapuri Dictionary and a translation of the 16th century Hindu classic in verse, ‘Chandi’. Earlier they had also published a Kamatapuri Grammar book. These were reportedly done to show that Kamatapuris demand for Statehood was fully justified.

Two other outfits viz. Uttar Khand Dal (UKD) and Kamatapur Gana Parishad (KGP) had also come into being during later sixties and later eighties respectively over the issue but they died a natural death.

With the Bhutan govt. intending to drive out Indian extremist outfits like ULFA, NDFB, etc., from its land and the intention of UGs to seek refuge in Lower Assam, North Bengal areas, the area of the Kamatapuris could become a hot bed for insurgency. In such an eventuality it would also pose the biggest threat to the entire North-Eastern region as the outfits would easily be able to throttle the only supply route to the area.

The KLO/KRSF was reportedly in possession of some sophisticated weapons supplied by the ULFA in return for the help rendered. The outfits were making fund collections from local businessmen.

7.4.9 Barak Gana Parishad (BGP)

Yet another area in Assam was hotting up with the demand for a separate State. This was Barak Valley consisting of Cachar, Karimganj and Hailakandi districts. The
demand was raised by the Barak Gana Parishad (BGP) and was likely to turn into an extremist movement. The man who was spearheading it was Rati Ranjan Roy, President of the BGP. He had threatened to continue the movement for a Barakland till its fulfillment. He alleged that the successive State and Central Govts. had heaped neglect on Barakland which led to deprivation of economic growth and degradation of its cultural fabric and political environment. Assam collects an annual revenue amounting to Rs.180 crores approximately from Cachar, Karimganj and Hailakandi districts of Barak valley located in South Assam but only Rs. 30 crores approximately is re-routed to the three districts through various channels for development works which includes staff salaries. If the policy of adhocism in the context of Barakland is still pursued by the Centre today’s mass movement for separate Statehood is bound to take an unprecedented turn and may well reach a point of no return.”

Barrak Valley has a distinct existence as 90% of the population are Bengali speaking. They never liked to get assimilated with the Assamese on any major issue. They did not take part in the movement launched by the AASU (1979-85). On the other hand they had launched organizations like the Union Territory demand Committee (UTDC) \, Barrak Valley Sangram Parishad (BVSP) and the Barrak Valley Peoples Party (BVPP) and led agitations for a separate State/Union territory. Economic backwardness was also cited as reasons for separation. There were also other organizations such as All Cachar, Karimganj, Hailakandi Students Union (ACKHSU) and United Reservation Movement Council of Assam (URMCA) demanding redressal of grievances of the people of the Barrak valley. The URMCA had been demanding an autonomous region status for Barrak valley.

7.4.10 NSCN(IM)/HPC (Hmar Peoples Convention)

While both the organizations have been dealt under Manipur State they are mentioned here only to the extent of their activities in Assam.
Since 1991, the districts of Cachar and North Cachar districts of Assam witnessed joint operations launched by NSCN(IM) and the HPC. The NSCN(IM) had also further extended its activities to the Karbi Anglong and Sibsagar districts. Its cadres were known to proceed from Manipur and Nagaland through North Cachar and Cachar districts to Bangladesh. This was the traditional corridor used by insurgent outfits of Nagaland and Manipur for their egress to and ingress from Bangladesh. Consequently the whole area had become alive with hostile activities like ambush of Army/SF patrols, kidnapping and killing. Vast stretches of unmanned jungle area in this corridor provided them the much needed cover to operate.

The NSCN(IM) cadres who crossed over from Nagaland and Manipur were taking shelter in the most backward interior villages of North Cachar Hills district of Assam which are mostly inhabited by Hmars and Zomi Nagas (popularly known as Kacha Nagas). These villages were known supporters of insurgents by giving them information on movements of S.F. The insurgents had always done their regrouping in this area because of the safety provided by nature and the inability of the S.F to make inroads into the area. The Hmar Peoples Convention (HPC) volunteers fulfilled their need for weapons from this area by ambushing the S.F. columns with the help of NSCN(IM) cadres. It also indulged in killing, kidnapping for ransom and extortion.

7.5 Muslim Militancy in Assam

One of the most disquieting development in the wake of the movement launched by the AASU (1979-85) and later the ULFA was the awakening and consequent intransigent attitude of the minority communities of Assam in general and Muslims in particular. It also made them aware of their inherent strength. Though there were a plethora of Muslim organizations standing for different ideologies they displayed a unified approach aimed at protecting the Muslim interest as a whole which was altogether lacking among its opponents. Migrant as well as indigenous Muslims had jointly influenced the election results in a good number of areas and consolidated their position more than ever before and furthered the aim of leading an undisturbed life.
The coming into power by the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in 1986 led to isolation of Muslims and exacerbation of communal feelings. There was however no communal trouble even then because Muslims were wise not to indulge in suicidal activities. They however sensed the inherent danger to their very existence. It was then that Muslim fundamentalist and militant elements started consolidating their position among the community. The Muslim majority areas in the Barrak Valley, Nagaon Goalpara, Dhubri, Barpeta districts were the areas where the fundamentalist elements strengthened their holds. A number of Muslim militant outfits like (1) Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) (2) Muslim Liberation Tiger Force (MLTF), (3) Muslim Liberation Army (MULA), (4) Muslim National Volunteer Force, (5) Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), etc. became active in Brahmaputra 'Char' (river island) areas having concentration of illegal Muslims and they got help from friendly insurgent groups like NSCN(IM).

There was also other Muslim organizations like Cachar Muslim Unnayan Parishad (CMUP), Anjuman Talamiva-e-Sunnia, Anjuman-e-Tarakhi active in Barak valley and North Cachar Hills. MULA was demanding a separate Muslim State through Armed struggle. It had also sent 2/3 batches of volunteers for training to Bangladesh. The ULFA’s seeking shelter in Bangladesh was a shot in the arm for the fundamentalist Muslim elements in Assam. The clandestine support extended by the ISI to these elements was also reportedly an established fact.

In 1991 when the Congress (I) came to power the Muslims had 25% of the ministerial berths and was called a Muslim ministry thereby confirming the clout enjoyed by Muslims. This gave the required boost to the fundamentalist elements and they became vocal and aggressive. It also led to growth of BJP in the area. The rivalry between Hindu refugees and migrant Muslims for the possession of fertile, cultivable lands had also added to the communal divide. During the Babri Masjid agitation, the Muslims had indulged in communal violence including killing, looting and destruction of temples. It was then directed mainly against the Bengali Hindus in the districts of
Nagaon, Dhubri, Goalpara and Barak Valley resulting in loss of more than 100 lives. The electoral roll revision and the divergent stand of various organizations on the presence of large number of Muslims in the State had also added to the communal polarization in the State.

7.6 Crime Chart

Given below is a summary of S.F. operations against insurgents from 1991 to 1999 in Assam.

**Table XI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Incidents</th>
<th>Insurgents killed</th>
<th>Insurgents captured</th>
<th>Arms recovered</th>
<th>Ammun. recovered</th>
<th>Cash recovered</th>
<th>S.F killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>Kidnapped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>2878</td>
<td>1392536</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>426410</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>2305</td>
<td>3762635</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>2251</td>
<td>736898</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>1663160</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>4044</td>
<td>1488550</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>8699</td>
<td>2472327</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>5141</td>
<td>713648</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>1436</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>6964</td>
<td>4691236</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3871</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>9199</td>
<td>2207</td>
<td>34844</td>
<td>18347400</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart proved that as elsewhere in the North-East the civilians were worst affected in insurgency. The maximum number of incidents had taken place in 1998 (716) followed by 1999 (474) and 1997 (415). Assam came under the unified command structure from 1997.
While the above was for the whole of Assam the following were the violent incidents committed by ULFA, NDFB, NSCN(IM) and BLT during the period from 1997-2000 (April).

**ULFA**

**Table XII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>S.F. killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>ULFA killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NDFB**

**Table XIII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>S.F. killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>NDFB killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NSCN(IM)**

**Table XIV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>S.F. killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>NSCN(IM) killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**BLT**

**Table XV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>S.F. killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>BLT killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>167</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.7 Surrenders

The following number of militants of various outfits (other than ULFA which has been mentioned already) had surrendered from 1998 to 2000 (till August).

**Table XVI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>RNSF</th>
<th>DHD</th>
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7.8 Vulnerability of Police

Assam had a total of 240 Police Stations (16 were yet to function as P.S.) and 177 Police Out Posts. It had a total of 56010 personnel of all ranks to ensure law and order in the State along with other supporting forces. Assam had a River Police Organization which was having four River Police stations and six River Police Outposts with a total strength of 122 personnel of different ranks. The P.S are located at Goalpara, Sualkuchi, Tezpur and Biswanath.

Assam was the only State in the North-East which was functioning under a unified command structure. "The creation of a unified command comprising civil administration, military, para-military and State police has provided synergy and
operational flexibility in carrying out operations against militant outfits”. It came into existence in 1997.

The unified command structure was as follows:-

**Strategy Group** – This was headed by the Chief Secretary of the State. It reviewed actions every three months for proper coordination. It had the following members:-

1. GOC – 4 corps.
2. DGP, Assam
3. Addl. Chief Secretary (Home), Assam
4. IGP (SB)
5. IGP (Ops.), Assam
6. IGP, CRPF
7. IGP, BSF.

Its operational group was headed by the GOC 4 Corps and had the following as members:-

1. DGP, Assam,
2. Addl. Chief Secretary,
3. IGP (Ops), Assam
4. IGP (SB), Assam
5. IGP (BSF)
6. IGP (CRPF)

The unified command had a three-tier structure at the State Division and District level. The unified command had besides putting pressure on the militant outfits operating in Assam through armed operations and Combats made concerted efforts to squeeze fund flow to insurgent groups and to cut off logistic support. In spite of it, the militants were
continuing with their violent activities. The reason was that the insurgents had their sanctuaries in neighbouring Bhutan and Bangladesh and were running training camps there. They were also making clandestine recruitment of youth.

S.F. operations had the following objectives:-

1. Put pressure on insurgents.
2. Arrest, monitor and restrict movement of top leaders of insurgent groups.
3. Launching of operations against camps in Bhutan where insurgents take shelter.
4. Check ISI activities
5. Ensure public resistance to UGs.
7. Launch psychological war to mend the militants.

S.F./Police had to face the persistent problem of ethnic clashes making policing extremely difficult. Activities by the ULFA/NDFB/BLT had led to formation of militant outfits by minority communities for their protection. Killing of civilians was taking place at an alarming rate in such clashes which caused grave concern to the police.

In North Cachar/Karbi Anglong districts the inaccessible terrains caused great problems for police functioning. Here the terrains were inhospitable which took days to reach. Besides the insurgent outfits took advantage of the areas’ proximity to Nagaland.

The magnitude of the problem can be gauged from the deployment of Military and Para-Military in addition to deployment of State, Civil and Armed Police which were as follows:-

CRPF – 140 coy.
BSF – 41 coy.
Army – 47 columns.
IR Bn. – 4
ULFA the most dangerous terrorist outfit in Assam had been causing persistent headache to the S.F. The outfit was at its peak of power during 1989-90 and was subdued by Army action both in 1990 (Operation Bajrang) and in 1991 (Operation Rhino). There was calm prevailing over the surface but public were not without apprehension that ULFA was lying low as part of 'tactical retreat tactics'. It was reportedly fine tuning its structure and was engaged in recruitment of volunteers.

ULFA had gained an almost invincible halo and it reportedly had many informants in the police. There were also reasons to doubt that a good number of police personnel stood subverted and were helpful to ULFA. During the AGP rule (1991) "The police were outgunned and leaderless, a helpless organization cowed by the political clout of their opponents and too frightened in many places to even venture out of their police stations to investigate a complaint or report of an attack". ULFA was also restless with police then "one police official who did try to intervene and prevent ULFA's free movement in upper Assam was killed. With that killing ULFA sent a loud and clear message to the police force — mess around with us at your own risk. That one act of the outfit was enough to emasculate the police".

During the period "a police Sub-Inspector was found with about two lakh rupees for ULFA". The Army which launched the Operation Bajrang felt dejected due to lack of cooperation from police. "The trouble here is that nobody tells us anything. The police don't want us here, they are secretly supporting these fellows (meaning the ULFA) the villagers don't talk to us, they are too scared or too committed to give clear information".

A field study indicated that the morale of the police force left much to be desired. They were resigned to the fate and reposed faith more in the army/para military. Their basic training did not contain much of counter-insurgency subjects. It was time to revamp the training aimed at equipping them to face the insurgents. Making local arrangements would be of help. A bomb disposal course could be made part of such a course.
It was necessary to properly motivate the police force to effectively deal with insurgency more particularly in a place like Assam where Muslim militancy had reared its head. Assam provided the landing pad for migrant Bangladeshi Muslims to spread to other areas. The Muslim votes proved alluring for politicians which was also utilized as an effective shield to camouflage Muslim expansionist tendencies. The time would not be far off when police would be called upon to shoulder still more challenging jobs.

If any agency could tackle insurgency in its entirety, it was the police. Army and Para-military were alien and ignorant about the terrains and without police help their operational efficiency was curtailed. Local police also could collect better intelligence for use by the Army/Para-military. Even though there was substantial improvement in terms of communication, weapons, number of vehicles, etc. much more still remained to be done. Policemen remained on duty always leaving none for training. More personnel were required to remove this situation so that training so vital for policing was not sacrificed at the alter of expediency. The position of police in Assam had become very vulnerable with ever mounting problems gushing at it like a surging stream.

7.9 Co-ordination between agencies

In Assam a high degree of coordination existed. A unified command structure came into existence in Assam in 1997. This composed of Civil, Army, CRPF, BSF and the police. The Army/Para-military and the police operated singly as also jointly with effect. While they were highly successful in combating emerging situations what was not taking place was a basic change in the mind set of the people due to the joint operations. Insurgent outfits were still able to strike at will. Casualty among civilians remained high. The situation needed diligent handling more by political parties failing which no substantial improvement in situation could be visualized.
A clear definition of role of each agency would also help to further improve the coordination. Lack of it had often put a spoke in the effectiveness of the coordinated effort. For example, the district administration provided services such as accommodation/ transport/ telephone/ POL etc. to the Army/CPMF and therefore it expected them to keep it informed about their activities. Such insistence and curiosity to know smacked of intransigence. Any refusal led to intentional creation of hurdles and straining of relations affecting overall performance of the S.F. There were also instances when counter-intelligence operations and routine law and order overlapped leading to avoidable confusion.

More often than not, the judiciary had also allegedly acted in a manner not conducive to furthering operational effectiveness in sensitive areas. Veiled threats to their life or concealed allurements had allegedly made them to err on the side of justice to save the accused. Mere passing of laws therefore would be of no benefit if judiciary did not play its part in the interest of the nation. The adverse reaction of one motivated action of the judiciary proved far too serious as it acted as a damper in future operations of the S.F.

7.10 Elections and Insurgency

It would not be an exaggeration to state that if anywhere in the North-East the insurgents could capture power through elections it was in Assam. The Govt. formed by the Asom Gana Parishad in 1985 composed of leaders of the six year old anti-foreigners agitation. The AGP ended the 40 year rule by the Congress party. For the ULFA, the coming into power by the AGP was like "having a whole lot of brothers in the government". The Assam Accord signed between the AASU (All Assam Students Union) and the Govt. was touted as the document which would usher in a new era of prosperity. One of the ULFA leaders when asked whether ULFA was running a parallel government in Assam in those days stated that "we were the govt then". But soon however boys proved to be boys and instead of proving themselves frittered away all advantages making the ground ready for army action and return to power (1991) by the
Congress led by Hiteswar Saikia once again. During this election "LFA said that it neither supported nor opposed any group or political party because it did not believe in the Indian form of democracy which was exploitative of Assam, its people and resources. It said that it would scrupulously stay out of the elections but added that it supported candidates who backed its aim of an independent nation". There were then apprehensions that if AGP had returned once again ULFA should have staged a mini coup and asserted its authority over the govt.

Two factors had tilted the balance in favour of the Congress (I). One was the stand of the ULFA which made a good number Assamese Hindus turn away from voting and (2) the support given by Muslims to the Congress (I). In the 1985 elections, the defeat of the Congress (I) was attributed to the formation of the United Minority Front (UMF) by the Muslim leaders and its taking away a major chunk of the Muslim votes thereby affecting the Congress. In 1991 Congress (I) realized the importance of "Ali and Coolie factor" and won the elections with thumping majority. The communal scenario also underwent a sea change after the elections. The BJP emerged as a force in Barak valley to reckon with in State politics.

During the 13th Lok Sabha Elections (1999) ULFA preferred to remain silent. The attitude of other insurgent outfits like NDFB/BLT, etc. did not make much of an impact in elections.

7.11 Role of NGOs and Human Rights Organizations

There were a number of registered and un-registered NGOs in Assam engaged in creating awareness on ecology, promotion of scientific and technical development, improving the living condition of the poor, upliftment of women, promotion of village/cottage industries, provision of facilities during natural calamities, community development, environmental protection, promotion of games and sports, social upliftment of the poor, promotion of goodwill among the ladies of different communities, all-round
development of tribes, eradication of caste system, promotion of adult-education etc. Important registered NGOs are given below:

5. Bijini Tribal Cultural Institute (BJCI) (1967) – To preserve Culture of tribals in North-East India.
8. Centre for Youth and Rural Development.
9. Church’s Auxiliary for Social Action (CASA) (1947) – Study on important issues in North-Eastern region.
18. Asom Jatiya Unnayan Parishad (AJUP) – Floated by the ULFA as its developmental wing. It also acted as the organizational front in the rural areas. It attracted the rural youth to the ULFA. It had established a chain of youth forums throughout Assam in the name of youth activities. This was indeed a cover to recruit and groom ULFA activists. The Agricultural Farm Houses established by the AJUP became the centres
for offering sanctuary and shelter to ULFA activists. It also acted as the cover agencies for promoting the cause of ULFA and popularizes the outfit at the grass root level which enabled it to get a mass base. Through the AJUP, ULFA was able to establish (1) liberated zones (2) liquidate its enemies branding them as anti-Assamese (3) expand bases in the State (4) collect funds systematically bringing under it all sections of the society and go for sophisticated weapons (5) bring improvement in training of its cadres (6) recruit fresh hands for both its army and civil wings.

19. AWARD – NE – An NGO engaged in anti-erosion and social upliftment programme. The kidnapping and killing of one Sanjay Ghosh, a leader at the apex level of the AWARD-NE by the ULFA turned the tide of public support against it as he was a respected social worker. ULFA eliminated him suspecting and branding him as an intelligence agent. It alleged that the unified command structure came into existence on his advice. Later however, sensing the mounting anger, ULFA changed attitude and claimed that he had died while in custody but the death was caused “when he tried to escape and fell off a cliff several thousand metres high. We regret his death and apologize to the world community for the same”. (Gosh was the nephew of Arundhati Ghosh, one time Indian Envoy to the UNO and son of Shankar Ghosh, of Indian National Fund and a close friend of I.K. Gujral, former Prime Minister because of which ULFA had genuine doubts about his being an agent).

The important Human Rights organizations were:

1. Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS).
3. Krishak Adhikar Sangram Samiti (KASS)
4. All India Peoples Resistance Forum (AIPRF)
5. Committee for Coordination of Nationalities and Democratic Movement (CCNDM)
6. North East Coordination Committee on Human Rights (NECOHR)
These Human Rights organizations took up alleged atrocities committed by the Army/CPMF/Police. They argued that “Today after five decades of the rule of Indian compradors the oppressed masses and nationalities are boldly resisting the most brutal State repression. In Kashmir, North-East or A.P., Bihar, Dandakaranya every day dozens of people are murdered in cold blood by the Indian military, para-military and police forces, in fake encounters. Thousands of women were raped and every day thousands more both men and women are tortured most inhumanly. Indian security forces violated all internationally recognized conventions of human rights”.

The NECOHR holds the view that “unless the issue of human rights violations in the North-East is not addressed there cannot be peace in the region or mainland India”.

ULFA’s main mouth piece otherwise was the AASU and other student organizations like the –

(1) Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP)
(2) Tribal Students Federation (TSF)
(3) Takam Mishing Porinkebang (TMPK)
(4) Assam Tea Tribe Students Union (ATTSU)
(5) All Assam Deuri Students Union (AADSU)
(6) All Assam Maran Students Union (AAMSU)
(7) Karbi Students Union (KSU)
(8) Sadav Chutiya Jati Yuba Chatra Sanmilan

ULFA had successfully infiltrated into the organizations, particularly the AASU which enjoyed special status with the AGP govt. Very important leaders of ULFA became office bearers of the Central Committee of AASU. Whenever ULFA leaders were arrested students unions came out in the open en-masse to get them released leaving govt. no option. Even huge processions were organized to mourn death of ULFA men whether by accident or in police action.
The AJYCP particularly maintained close links with ULFA. More than half of the leadership of ULFA was from AJYCP. It exploited to advantage the susceptibilities of a number of AGP-AASU leaders.

The AJYCP and the student organizations at the behest of ULFA also demanded withdrawal of the unified command structure from the State. “They identified the Govt’s approach for a military solution to the problem of insurgency as a product of foolishness and claimed that only a political approach will be effective”.

7.12 Future of Insurgency

Having got trapped in the quick sand of insurgency Assam had been reaping the fruits of its own labour painfully. The visible effects were getting aggravated. Though ULFA had launched a liberation struggle for a ‘Swadhin’ (independent) Assam what it had inadvertently raked were also the volatile tribal sentiments, Assam being pluralistic matrix of a society. Tribals like Bodos, Koch-Rajbongshi, Dimasa, Hmars, besides Bengalis and Muslims (with ISI support) had taken to arms demanding separation, pushing Assamese to a corner. Assam was threatened with further vivisection with insurgency getting boost. Militant outfits were cheaper by the dozen. Their training, weaponisation, shelter, sanctuaries, etc. were readily looked into by the NSCN (IM) and the like.

If earlier ULFA was fighting to drive out ‘foreigners’ (meaning Bangladeshis) today it had become their spokesman as its leaders had taken shelter in their land. For ULFA that very “foreigners from East Bengal had become an inseparable part of the toiling people of Assam”. It even criticized AASU for not giving “political direction” to the anti-alien agitation. The migrant votes had helped political parties to capture power and therefore even they had to fall in line. The outcome was there for all to see but shut their eyes to realities. ISI, seeing the opportunity made deep inroads. The future would be grim. Muslim migrants from Bangladesh continued unabated. Districts where Muslims were in minority once were getting converted to Muslim majority districts. At
this rate, the making of another Kashmir was not only improbable but a stark reality. Instead of Assamese insurgents launching a liberation struggle for ‘Swadhin’ Assam it would be ISI backed ‘Jihad’ the grounds for which were getting readied and the spread out was calculated to a plan.

There were also cries for an independent Muslim State. It was not without a foundation. Overpowering of the locals by number game was launched right from ‘Grow more Food (Muslim)’ programme of Sir Syed Sadullah and the craze for migrant votes to remain in power by political parties would make ISI dream of capturing North-East without a war cry being shouted and with the dexterity of a panther stalking its prey, a reality. The inevitable outcome would be another Kashmir in North East too difficult to be countered even by the Army given the inaccessible terrains. The forebodings were amply demonstrated by developments in Assam and if Assam, as a State, and India as a nation failed the defect would be within and not without.

7.13 Conclusions /Recommendations

7.13.1 Conclusions

Much water had flown in the most turbulent river Brahmaputra since April, 7, 1979 when the United National Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was born. It would not be wrong to hazard an opinion that ULFA had pushed the once peace loving people of Assam to perpetual misery. As was the case with other insurgent groups in the North-East, ULFA also promised a Swadhin (independent) Assam through an armed revolution which resulted in two army operations in succession which broke its backbone. Army operation made the leaders of ULFA rush to the open arms of Pakistan’s Intelligence outfit ISI clandestinely operating in neighbouring Bangladesh and the cadres to the unadministered thick jungle areas of another neighbouring country Bhutan only to cause permanent headache.
Initial response to ULFA’s depredation was euphoric which hit the abysmal rock bottom sooner than anticipated. Assamese had to painfully realize that none had the right to force an insurgency on an area that was not well prepared for it.

Assam was in shambles in all conceivable ways. Administration was adversely affected as most of the time it got engaged in controlling insurgency. Policing had taken a beating and even serious cases went unreported. Huge amounts were spent to combat insurgency and developmental activities came to a standstill. Engineers, doctors and other officials risked govt. action instead of venturing to insurgency prone areas. Rural development became a thing of the past. A share of the rural development fund went to the coffers of ULFA.

The business communities, mostly outsiders, left their business and vowed never to return affecting the economic activity. Assam was caught in a vicious circle as insurgency was the result of lack of economic development and insurgency checked economic development.

Rampant extortion from rich and the poor made the society dispirited. Heightened violence from insurgents invited an equally stringent action from the govt. side and caught in the cross fire were the people who were desolate. Relief work had to be looked into on war footing adding to the problems. In Kokrajhar alone there were two lakh people who lived in relief camps.

Forest department, a source of revenue income, had come a cropper. Denudation of forests took place at an alarming rate.

ULFA’s activities antagonized and tickled the volatile sentiments of the minorities and there was mushroom growth of terrorist outfits leading to internecine squabbles and killings which put a heavy strain on the SF and the army. The once homogenous Assamese society was thrown asunder never to remain united again.
In the melee the foreigner issue, over which the insurgency was built up, got a decent burial. This was what the migrant Bangladeshis were waiting. The politicians kowtowed before them for bailing out during elections but had to pay a price. Muslim militancy struck root, backed by the ISI. "The situation in Assam is further confused and made environmentally violence prone due to the emergence of a number of minority insurgent groups to guard their respective community interests. The Bengal Tiger Force (BTF), The Gorkha Tiger Force (GTF), The All Assam Suraksha Samiti (AASS), Muslim fundamentalist organizations like the Muslim Security Force (MSF), the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) all have ISI support. With 40 lakh Bangladeshi Muslims in Assam, the task of the Pakistan ISI Directorate (ISI) is hardly difficult. Assam has an Islamic militancy in the making".

A group of surrendered ULFA volunteers nicknamed as SULFA emerged and they captured all contracts to themselves only to grab the finance caring nothing for development. Given the nature of 'laid back attitude' and 'little mindedness' of the Assamese youth nothing more could be expected from them. This was the basic reason for unchecked inflow from Bangladesh. Corruption at the levels of administration was at its worst. "A recent report published in the Economic Times has identified Assam as the third most corrupt State in the country. The school teachers are finding it quite difficult to make both ends meet deprived as they have been of their salaries for months together.

Unemployment problem has taken a colossal shape with failure to provide job opportunities. Dead end jobs seem to have a very telling effect on the minds of the youth. Development works have come to a standstill. Add to all these the secret killings the reign of terror launched by the ULFA, indiscriminate killings, bombings, kidnappings, extortions and you get a clear picture of the State of affairs going on in Assam".
Tea, the major industry in Assam remained the prime target for extortion for insurgent groups. Despite all the faults the tea industry remained the best bet for Assam’s prosperity. That was strangulated for a time. If it prospered Assam would prosper.

Insurgency, in its true form, was indeed there for a time, only for a time. It subsequently receded to the level of naked criminal terrorism punctuated by sporadic killings only to display one’s prowess. ULFA which had set insurgency in motion was down but not out. It had displayed its resilience time and again. “The ULFA’s efforts are currently centred around re-establishing its camps in Bangladesh and strengthening its bases in Bhutan and Myanmar with assured supplies of arms and ammunition from across the international borders of the State”.

Most of the UG camps had shifted to either Bangladesh or Bhutan. While Bhutan had reportedly taken action to move them out, Bangladesh had denied their existence. The reason was not far to seek. It was how ISI could spread its tentacles in Assam and the North-East. ULFA’s leaders were stationed in Dhaka and they were at its beck and call.

Infiltration from Bangladesh through porous borders (both land and river) continued non-stop. Till recent times the laws were favourable to them as the onus of proving that a particular person was a foreigner was on the complainant. Many had questioned the wisdom behind such a law (IM[DT] Act). It was repealed recently but enough ‘Bideshis’ had already entered. They had sweated out in Assam and made cultivable lands produce food for Assam. Locals could not live without them. They were occupying all available lands ejecting out the poor. They encroached ‘Char’ (river islands) first from where they spread out. Assam had all fundamental Muslim outfits to help them. They were united in this respect.

Assam youth was never known to have developed the habit of self-help. They were spoon-fed by outsiders, believed in five star culture and failed to notice the inevitable changes taking place under their nose. Assam never had any skilled worker in
any sector. All were brought from outside. Even now the situation did not change much. They wished to drive out all the 'Bideshis' without having the necessary wherewithal to replace them locally. ULFA did realize the folly but was late which made it to recognize that foreigners (meaning mainly Bengali speaking people) had become an inseparable part.

7.13.2 Recommendations

_Evolve suitable measures for economic development of Assam._

The root cause of militancy/insurgency was economic. Assam had all natural resources. If the State was exploited, the mistake was more with the Assamese. The Britishers had to highlight the cause of ‘self-interest’ to make the Assamese children go for education. The same was necessary to wake them up. Divided geography had led to migration and there was reaction which led to military presence. Still the problem remained. The only course open was to chart out a path for quick economic development starting from block level. By developing trade with neighbouring countries, rendering assistance to communities at micro level development of tourism with local help, and launching an enlightenment programme through NGOs etc. Assam could be pulled out of the self-imposed folly.

_Maintain sanctity of international borders and check infiltration/corruption_

Sanctity of borders should be maintained. With around corruption and the corrupt taking shelter under the safety valve of ‘lack of evidence’ infiltrators came in numbers. The Assamese society had been corrupted and unless one developed the will to change for the better, Assam would be pulled into the vortex of the heaving quick sand to face a certain death at the hands of the ISI. It would require Centre's direct intervention. Assam required maximum care. Splintering of Assam had started with language agitation and cries for separation were persisting. If allowed again the very Assamese identity would be lost in the maze. It was ethnic exploitation that was taking place and it was allowed to grow under the policy of appeasement. Where it would end only future would tell. Assamese should be spurred to search for avenues for economic development which only can bring peace.
Generate awareness about dangers of influx from Bangladesh

Migration from Bangladesh required deft handling. The only way was to create awareness among the locals. It was a threat to the Assamese identity and above all a threat to the national security.

Issue multi-purpose photo identity cards to locals

While borders should be sealed through wire fencing etc. the BSF posted should not be given responsibility to hold unduly extended frontages. Often BSF were withdrawn for other tasks leaving the borders unguarded. This was the time when maximum infiltrations had taken place. The country boats plying on rivers were not registered ones. This was necessary. One of the best method to check infiltration would be multi-purpose photo identity cards. The bordering areas should get first priority.

Update records of local citizens/stateless persons

Records showing details of local citizens should be updated. Similarly, records of Stateless persons should be immediately prepared.

Hand-over Chars (river islands) to forest department

The Chars (river islands) were the hiding ground for the infiltrators. They should be handed over to the forest department and trees planted on them.

Strict implementation of laws on illegal citizens

Laws on illegal citizens should be strictly implemented.

Effective neutralization of ISI activities

The network of ISI in the whole of North-East was an established fact. With fundamental Islamic religious outfits operating their operational field was sound and strong. Only an awakened Assam with a no-nonsense intelligence network could neutralise ISI. China’s supplying weapons with markings removed was also reportedly taking place. If it was true the future of North-East and Assam would be in jeopardy and that would be an additional threat to the security of India. “According to reliable sources, within 8 years, ULFA, BLT, BTF, NDFB have spent at least Rs. 34 crores in foreign countries. It has come to light that they have spent 80% collected funds purchasing weapons from China, Bangladesh (via Dhubri – Assam) and Singapore and remaining 20% have been spent towards meeting expenditure of top leaders. The expenditure
incurred by ULFA top leaders is the highest and heads the chart. Expenditure incurred by various terrorist groups is as follows:

ULFA – Rs. 11 crore
BLT – Rs. 5 crore
NDFB – Rs. 5 crore
BTF – Rs. 1.5 crore

No details pertaining to the total collection which has been made over the last 8 years is available, however, all money has been extorted from capitalists and local businessmen and now Assam is heading for an economic crisis brought upon by these terrorist groups”.

Generate political will to solve problem

Unless political will is evident corruption would continue to gnaw at the body of Assam. If not stopped now, it would be the future that would be in peril. Time had come to do something hard. Assam which had remained in the periphery with all the natural resources for far too long must expand and the expansion should be on all fronts for which guidance and help from Centre was needed.
INSURGENCY/MILITANCY IN MEGHALAYA

8.1 The State

Meghalaya, the abode of Clouds, is best known outside because of the fame of Shillong as ‘Scotland of the East’, a sobriquet bestowed on it by the British. The cascading streams rolling hills, sudden appearance of mists and rains and the salubrious climate enveloping throughout the year enchanted a visitor forcing him to visit the place again and again. With insurgency and terrorism stalking the other States, it was only natural that Meghayala too would fall a victim to its lure.

With the acquisition of the ‘Dewani’ of Bengal in 1765, the East India Company took control of the territory upto the limits of the Assam plains, beyond being the hills and the wild unknown. It should have been continued to be so had there not been the Burmese threat of war when contact was established with the Garos who had dealings with the Mughal ‘Faujdars’. A familiar cycle of tributary payments, tribal raids and dispute settlements resulted in the penetration and control over the Garo Hills by 1872 by the East India Company.

The Jaintia Raja whose territory got extended into the plains where his capital Jaintiapur was located was soon embroiled with the British who sliced off this part of his domain confining him to the hills further north.

The need to construct a road linking Sylhet to the Assam valley led the British into the Khasi hills. The killing of members of a road party by the Khasis provoked a punitive military action ending in the submission of the Khasi chiefs by 1833.

The Jaintia Hills (also called Syntengs) rose when a house tax was imposed which was crushed and the area brought under formal control by the British. Chirrapunji was
initially selected as headquarters of Khasi-Jaintia administration but being wet throughout was shifted to Shillong. Garo hills were administered from Tura. Both the districts became part of the Assam province in 1874.

The society in Meghalaya is matrilineal and avunculocal with uncles holding primordial position.

Meghalaya was made an autonomous State within Assam on 2.4.1970 and made a full-fledged State on 21.1.1972. It covers an area of 22429 sq. kms. and its population was 17,74,778 (1991 census). Religion-wise distribution was:-

1. Hindus – 2,60,306
2. Christians – 11,46,092
3. Muslims – 61,462
4. Sikhs – 2,612
5. Buddhists – 2,934
6. Others - 44,304

Table-I

District-wise area/ population/ Sub-Divisional Hq./ Towns/ Police Stations/ Outposts/ Community Development Blocks were as follows (as in 2000):-

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<th>Area in Kms.</th>
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<th>Sub-Div. Hq.</th>
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<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Shillong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ribhoi</td>
<td>2448</td>
<td>127312</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nongpoh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>West Khasi</td>
<td>5247</td>
<td>220157</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nongstoin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

362
Meghalaya is essentially a hill State. It is predominantly inhabited by three major tribes viz. Khasis, Jaintias and Garos. The distribution is as follows. Their sub-groups are:-

Khasi Hills – Khynriam, War Khasi, Bhoi Khasi and Lyngam
Jaintia Hills – Pnar or Synteng, War Synteng, Bhoi Synteng
Garo Hills – Garos (divided into a number of sub-tribes).

Regarding ethnic origin of Khasis and Jaintias ‘they are by race Indo-Mongoloid although speaking a distinct Austroic language belonging to the Mon-Khmer group’. Everything about their origin is based on conjunctures and one gets lost in the labyrinth of diverse opinions.

Kha – means ‘born’ and ‘Si’ refers to an ancient mother – therefore ‘khasi’ means born to a mother. It could be related to matrilineal system of Meghalaya.

‘Synteng’ also holds a similar meaning. ‘Teng’ was ancient mother. Synteng means children born to an ancient mother. ‘Jaintia’ seems to have been Aryanisation of the Khasi word Synteng (zeintein). “The origin of the name Garo has been subject of controversy. While this is the term used by outsiders Garos call themselves as ‘Achik’ or ‘Mande’ (hillman). According to Major Play Fair, the ‘Gara’ or Ganching first received their appellation ‘Gara’ and that the name was extended to all Hill tribes and became
"Garo" probably because the Assamsese pronounced ‘a’ as ‘o’ and ‘o’ as ‘a’). Some of the Garos admit that there is a place called Garo Pradesh in Tibet. Beyond Himalayas there is also a country called Garu Pradesh, the inhabitants of which are called ‘Garu Mandai’. Their date of migration is not known. The meaning of ‘Achik’ is hill and Mande or Mandai is ‘man’ and therefore ‘hill man’. All tribes here follow customary laws.

Earlier the Khasi and Jaintia Hills were administered by Syiemships (kingdoms). The term ‘Syiem’ is derived from ‘Mynsiem’ literally ‘spirit’. It embodied spiritual values of highest worth. Of late there was a demand for revival of the system. The Siems had a great deal of influence over their respective clans.

The Jaintia and Khasi areas which formed the Central and eastern parts of Meghalaya is an imposing plateau with rolling grass lands, hills and valleys. The southern face of the plateau is marked by deep gorges and broad slopes at the foot of which a narrow strip of plain land runs along the border with Bangladesh.

A number of rivers, none of them navigable, meander through the hilly terrains. Basically an agricultural State, 80% of the population depend on it. The State has vast potential to develop horticulture and also offers much scope for cultivation of temperate, sub-tropical and tropical fruits and vegetables.

Meghalaya is bounded by Assam on the north and east and by Bangladesh on the south and west.

The British victory over the Khasis and Jaintias brought with it Bengalis and Nepalis, the former as administrators and latter with the military and Marwari traders. The Welsh Presbyterian mission was established among the Khasis in 1841 and the American Baptist Mission in the Garo Hills in 1864. Shillong was soon turned into an education centre, summer resort and Garrison station.
At the time of independence the chiefs of Khasi states were in a quandary. They argued that “only a duly constituted durbar of the States could decide on merger with India. This was done in April, 1949”. The State had high literacy rate (75%), had no Inner Line Permit (ILP) and was outside the ambit of the Restricted Area Permit (RAP). It was once a paradise on earth for tourists and a great educational centre. Had it not been for the virus of foreigners issue haunting the State and consequent law and order problem, Meghalaya should have continued to be so. It was time that the State moved purposefully towards restoring peace and towards economic development but that prospect appeared a mirage given the situation obtaining there.

8.2 Genesis of Insurgency

Meghalaya was never known to have been suffering from terrorist fever. It indeed had bouts of violence spearheaded by the Khasi Students Union (KSU) and such violence usually coincided or preceded the Durga Pooja celebrations. Of late, however, violence had become routine in all the district headquarters, the coal belt and particularly the city of Shillong, the capital. Three militant groups had made their presence felt making the government to flounder on the side of law and order.

“As far as one can discern, there is no ideological warfare against the State. This is what makes the militants diffident to come overground for talks with the government. The ideological bogey too keeps changing from time to time. Some people have termed the entire drama as nothing but armed thuggery which has been romantically and euphemistically termed as militancy, freedom struggle, liberation movement, and so on. The unfortunate part is that this romantic notion has taken a very serious turn. All this while we witnessed private firms, shopkeepers, traders, etc. being systematically extorted every moth mainly for the upkeep of our so-called liberators (liberation from what is still anybody’s guess). The affected parties made meek protests because police could neither given them security nor the assurance that extortion would stop. Some who can still break even after paying the thugs keep a stiff upper lip and pretend that everything is fine. Others console themselves by saying that extortion is an accepted ritual in every
part of India. They claim that if they were to do business in Calcutta or Bombay, they would still have to pay ‘hafta.’

8.3 Reasons for Insurgency

Table-II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Insurgency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of other UGs in North East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greed for Easy Money</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Insurgency had sneaked in Meghalaya more because it had become a conduit to Bangladesh which replaced Myanmar as the prime sanctuary and supply base for almost all the North-Eastern insurgent outfits like NSCN Groups, ULFA, NDFB, NLFT, ATTF, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, etc.

There had been phenomenal influx of Bangladeshis, Nepalis, Myanmaris and Bhutanese into Meghalaya which was indeed a thorn in the flesh for more than two decades. In 1988 a working group was constituted to go into the question and it had unanimously recommended introduction of Inner Line Permit (ILP) regulation. But the irony was that there was hardly any local skilled work force. Earlier a large number of Khasis were expert carpenters but they became a vanishing race in Shillong. A proposal was there for issue of work permits but in such cases they overstayed by adjustment with contractors. The fact however was that infiltrators never infiltrated with the help of an ILP. The border being porous they just walked in. The Nepalis and Bangladeshis etc. were filling the vacuum of work force at very cheap rates besides serving as a vote bank. On both counts they were welcomed with open arms jeopardizing, unwittingly, the
security of the locals as also the country. Again when the situation for the infiltrators in
neighbouring States became hot they sneaked into Meghalaya where no permit was
required. In either way Meghalaya proved a victim of circumstances. In spite of it the
working group had recommended for introduction of ILP. The exact strength of
infiltration is anybody's guess. Some rough estimate was that it stood around 4 lakhs.

The unemployment problem was causing concern. It had reached 35000 mark.
This vast army of unemployed youth in a small State like Meghalaya can be compared to
a dormant volcano that can erupt any time proving a disaster for the State. The
government sector had reached saturation point. Tourists had stopped visiting Meghalaya
in view of the prevailing situation. There were cases of robbing tourists, molestation of
women tourists, etc. which were enough to turn away even willing ones and to put
Meghalaya to financial difficulties. With terrorism prevailing even the willing investors
were reluctant to take risk to start industries.

Recently a Bombay based firm, M.S. Patel Engineering Ltd., constructing the
much awaited third phase of the Greater Shillong Water Supply Scheme at Mawphlang
was reported to have been asked to shell out Rs. 5 crores by HNLC. The firm in
desperation wound up its establishment because it found the entire exercise of executing
a project which threatened to take away even the working capital, a futile one. The result
was that the GSWSS was jinxed to remain incomplete which affected whole of Shillong.

Political leadership in the State was reportedly in cohorts with organized groups
and had "lost the moral courage to speak the truth and challenge those who take law in
their own hands. The reason is every elected representative needs a job and is afraid to
lose it. Insecure men and women are dangerous because they will do anything to remain
in power even something detrimental to the common good".

The Khasi Students Union (KSU) which was behind the violent incidents against
outsiders was reportedly maintaining a jail. According to Patricia Mukhim, a Padmasree
and a Freelance Writer "The KSU has its own jail at Jaiaw. Many people are appalled at
this. But I am sure that KSU would not have the audacity to have the jail, unless it had the sanction of the State Home Minister, whoever he might have been at the time of its commissioning. KSU have apprehended several law breakers (by their books) and given them instant punishment. Nobody is kept for more than twenty four hours. Hence there is no need to feed or cloth the convicts. And therefore, no expense involved. If KSU has today become an extra-constitutional, extra-judicial authority and much feared by the government, it is only because elected representatives have given them that power. They do it to avoid unnecessary confrontation little knowing that they are creating Frankenstein's. A weak kneed govt. is in no position to handle a confrontation. It is therefore not justified to blame police for this lapses of political leaders. Some times the public is unduly judgmental about police failures. But police will only do what they are told. If they are sent to fight with their hands tied how can they catch the criminals.

If elected representatives does half the job assigned to them there would be no extra-constitutional authorities holding it to ransom on very flimsy grounds. Dereliction of duty by people in power, unchecked corruption, wealth unaccounted for, moral degeneration and lack of accountability are the only examples provided by leaders for twenty eight years. You think they can get at gun-point what powerful people in govt. get at the point of a pen. It has become extortion versus corruption. Much as we would like to see the end of the gun culture and the demolition of the radical forces which hold govt. to ransom. And much as we desire to see deserving people coming to power and setting right the distortions resulting from years of abuse such is not going to be our pleasure because we are timid to stand up for equality and justice. All of us are shirking our duties as citizens. We are either too lazy or too busy to pursue our rights and perform our duties. So we leave the dirty work to some motley group or other to fight for our cause. Every citizen's duty bound to set the wheels of justice in motion. If he evades, this grave responsibility, he has to pay for it. Confusion, communal disharmony, gun culture, extortion, blood letting are all result of a silent, passive citizenry.”
Ethnic divide between tribals and non-tribals was a perennial problem for Meghalaya. Meghalaya in general and Shillong in particular lost its peaceful atmosphere since the first communal disturbance in 1975. This was followed at regular intervals in 1987, 1992, 1995, 1996 and 1998. The otherwise cosmopolitan outlook of the people of Meghalaya had ended with the gulf between the tribals and non-tribals widening over the years. Taking a morning or evening walk along the roads enjoying the scenic beauty had become a thing of the past and people avoided for fear of being mugged. The number of incidents that had taken place were:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4 Organizations involved

The following militant outfits belonged to Meghalaya:-

Table-III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Name of Organization/Strength</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Hynniewrtep National Liberation Council (HNLC)</td>
<td>1. East Khasi Hills Dist. Particularly Shillong (Capital).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength - 100</td>
<td>2. West Khasi Hills Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Ri-Bhoi Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC)</td>
<td>1. South Garo Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. West Garo Hills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

369
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength - 200</th>
<th>East Garo Hills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. East Garo Hills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parts of East/West Khasi Hills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Shillong Town.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya Peoples Liberation Council (MPLF)</td>
<td>East Garo Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength 15-20 (Mostly persons with criminal records)</td>
<td>1. East Garo Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Shillong Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCN(IM)</td>
<td>Shillong Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Shillong Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nongpoh area (Ri-Bhoi dist.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. William Nagar (East-Garo Hills)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. West Garo Hills (some areas)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCN(K)</td>
<td>Villages in West Khasi Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Villages in West Khasi Hills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. East Garo Hills border</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Areas of MPLF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam)</td>
<td>Shillong town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Shillong town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ri-Bhoi dist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDFB (National Development Front of Bodoland)</td>
<td>Garo Hills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Garo Hills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers)</td>
<td>Garo Hills and Bodo areas along Assam border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Garo Hills and Bodo areas along Assam border.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Khnna Lup (Manipur)</td>
<td>Shillong Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Shillong Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) (Manipur)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLF (United National Liberation Front. (Manipur)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTF (All Tripura Tiger Force) of Tripura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.4.1 Hyrniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)

This was formed during early part of 1992 at a meeting held at Barapani on the initiative of some disgruntled youth who were opposed to presence of non-tribal residents in the State. The following were involved:-

1. Johan
2. Cherish
3. Julius
4. Bobby Marwein
5. Arizona Sun
6. Markus Lyngdoh
7. Lovely Kharbudon
8. Elias Jyrwa

8.4.1.1. Aim

The avowed aim was stated to be to wage an armed struggle against the State govt. to secede from the Indian Union and form an independent state. Its other aim was to compel non-tribals of the State to leave by any means including use of force. Its earlier name was HALC (Hyrniewtrep Achik Liberation Council), a brain child of NSCN and was a joint effort of the Garos also. Subsequently there was clash of interest and the two parted ways leading to the formation of the ANVC (Achik National Volunteers Council) by the Garos.

The following were the office bearers of the HNLC :-

1. Chairman – Julius Dorphang
2. General Secretary – Cherishter Field Thangkhiew
3. C-in-C John Kharkrang
A HNLC militant punishing a law-abuser.

(File photo)
4. Cadres –
   1. Bobby Marwein
   1. Arizona Sun
   2. Markus Lyngdoh
   3. Lovely Kharbudon
   4. Elias Jyrwa.

8.4.1.2 Area of influence


   Its strength was about 100 of which 43 were arrested, 6 killed and the remaining were at large. The cadres were disillusioned, unemployed youth belonging to 20-30 age group. The cadres were trained by NSCN (IM).

8.4.1.3 Weaponry

   This was reportedly kept in separate stocks at Shillong and in Bangladesh. It was as follows:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Shillong</th>
<th>In Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 – 1</td>
<td>AK-47 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine – 1</td>
<td>LMG – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stengun – 1</td>
<td>SLR – 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBBL – 2</td>
<td>.45 Revolver – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun – 1</td>
<td>M.20 Pistol – 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303 rifle – 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.38 revolver – 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.32 revolver – 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 20 Pistol – 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9mm. Pistol – 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was having two army commands viz. Central Command and Southern Command.

8.4.1.4 Activities

HNLC maintained closeness with both factions of NSCN and conducted joint operations including dacoity, kidnapping, extortion, snatching and attack on police/SF. Of late straining of relationship had reportedly taken place due to differences over sharing of the money collected during operations which was the main source of finance. HNLC targeted business communities on a regular basis.

The cadres of HNLC were mainly disillusioned, unemployed and school drop outs who had found militancy as the easiest way to become rich. In the back drop was the activities of the Khasi Students Union against outsiders.

Its main communication channel was through couriers but the leaders kept cell phones. It operated more through the channels of NSCN groups.

HNLC maintained close relationship with both NSCN(IM) and (K) and jointly operated.

8.4.1.5 External Support

HNLC was reportedly having camps in Bangladesh at (1) Chittagong Hill Tracts (2) Jaintiapur (Sylhet district) and Srimangal (Maulvi Bazar).

8.4.2 Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC)

This outfit was formed on 20.12.1995 on the initiative of one Dilash Marak, former S.S. Defence Secretary of the disbanded ALMA (Achik Liberation Matgrik
Army) along with (1) Dinesh Marak, (2) Jerome Cheren Momin (3) Billing Marak, more out of alleged vengeance against the Meghalaya Govt. as it failed to get their release from the Shillong Jail at the time of the surrender of the rest of the ALMA cadres. They, as a sequel, escaped from the Jail along with other NSCN and HNLC cadres in August 1995 in a daring jail break. They went to Bangladesh and with the help of the NSCN (IM) got regrouped to further their aim. The outfit had stated that it would not stand against the State Govt. but would struggle for expanding the territory of Garo Hills including Garo inhabited areas of neighbouring States in order to pave the way for a separate State. They would also check infiltration of non-tribals into Garo district.

This was reportedly for public consumption only. It wanted to earn money and indulged in adventurism through gun culture.

Its office bearers were:-

1. Dilash Marak @ SUSME of Rongjeng – Chairman
2. Dinesh Marak @ Wenjang – Camp Commander
3. P. Marak @ Wanding – Genl. Secretary
4. Flonath K Sanguma @ Rikchi of Damas – Finance Secretary

8.4.2.1 Area of Influence – South/East/West Garo Hills Dists and parts of East/West Khasi Hills dist. Including Shillong (capital) town.

Its strength was about 200. Its c-in-c was killed in 1997 in an encounter. Its cadres were trained by the NSCN(IM) initially at Dimapur (Nagaland). Cadres belonged to 20-35 age group mostly youth who wanted to become rich fast and the easy way.

8.4.2.2 Weaponry

Its weapon position was stated good which were obtained through the NSCN(IM). It consisted of:-
1. AK-47/56 – 30 Nos. with sufficient quantity of ammunition.
2. Stengun – 8
3. LMG – 2
4. Chinese Rifles – 8
5. M-20 Pistols – 50
6. Hand grenades – 50

Replenishment was obtained with the help of NSCN(IM).

8.4.2.3 Activities – Its major activities were -

In February, 98 it ambushed the Sub-Treasury officer of Resubelpara Sub-Treasury who was carrying Rs. 1 crore after withdrawing it from the William Nagar State Bank of India and took away 86 lakhs after killing the driver, two policemen and a civilian.

On 29.7.98 it ambushed the motorcade of S.P., East Garo Hills and killed the PSO and two policemen and took away a carbine.

In addition it indulged in other activities like kidnapping, extortion etc. The ANVC had also come to notice for issuing demand notices to non-Garo Govt. employees asking them to give up 20% of their salaries every month.

The cadres were disillusioned and unemployed youth and school dropouts who wished to earn easy money.

Its main channel of communication was through courier and telephones.

ANVC also maintained closeness with NSCN groups. Both HNNC and ANVC were banned by the Meghalaya Govt. on November, 16th 2000.
8.4.2.4 External Support

ANVC had a number of camps in Bangladesh. The camps were at:

1. Nalchapara, Netrakona dist.
2. Kanibokpara, - do -
3. Panchgram, - do -
4. Mandapara, - do -
5. Lengura, - do -
6. Ghoshgaon, - do -
7. Chingni, - do -
8. Gobindpur, - do -
9. Dumnikura, - do -
10. Malikura, Mymensing Dist.
11. Joyramkura, - do -
12. Nalkura, - do -
13. 32/B, Bahani, Biswas Road, Dhaka
15. Bihari Colony, Mohammedpur, 20/30 B, Block, Dhaka
16. Gaunch Market Sakurabad, Block-37/A, Dhaka

8.4.3 Meghalaya Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF)

This outfit was formed by a group (15-20) of persons (aged 20-30) having criminal background. This was formed in June-July, 1999 by one A. Sangma of Dist. Kamrup, Assam. He was involved in a bank dacoity at the SBI, Rongseng Branch of East Garo Hills Dist. along with one Wiber K. Sangma (he was S.S. Chief of ALMA who had surrendered) and some NSCN volunteers in November, 1989. He was arrested but released subsequently. Earlier he was associated with the HALC in 1993-1994. Between 1994-95 he was involved in highway robberies in East Garo Hills and Goalpara dist.
(Assam). During 1995-96 he was involved in timber theft cases in East Garo Hills dist. He had opened a Toll gate at the same place in the name of unemployed Garo youth during 1997-98 which was busted by the police. His wife in a Naga lady and is presently settled in Shillong. All his associates were criminals.

Office Bearers

1. Chairman : Vincent A. Sangma
2. Finance Secretary – East Garo Hills – Endal Sangma
3. Group Commander, East Garo Hills – Fekdow Sangma
4. C-in-C – Kanju Marak

It’s main aim was to collect money by any means. Its cadres were trained by the NSCN(K).

8.4.3.1 Area of influence

East Garo Hills and Shillong.

8.4.3.2 Activities

MPLF was involved (2.8.99) in a looting case of Rs.54,000/- from an employee of the office of the Director of Mineral Resources (DMR) at Shillong by killing him. The money was meant for payment to the staff.

It stormed into a forest camp near Dianadubi (East Garo Hills) on 6.9.99 and snatched away three .303 rifles and 85 rounds from the guards posted there.

When refused to pay extortion money 15 shops were burnt down by its cadres at Nagapara on 5.10.1999.
On 5.11.1999 suspected MPLF cadres attacked the P.S. at Nongthumai and killed three constables. During their escape they killed another H.C. on traffic duty. The ASI of same P.S was later shot dead while he was sitting in the shop owned by his wife. Police recovered about 15 rounds of AK-47 shells about 10 rounds of 9mm. Pistols and some live cartridges from the spot.

Later on 22.12.99 police had an encounter with MPLF activists in a village in West Khasi Hills dist. In which two police personnel sustained injuries.

MPLF was also reportedly sending notices to non-tribal persons demanding payment of specific amounts most of which were not reported to the police.

"Militants have held the public at ransom by calling bandhs on all important national holidays for the last five years. Initially the govt. made a weak appeal to people not to give heed to such calls but of late even the govt. seems to have given up. With the exception of the Minister of State for Home the other members of the government look for safer outlets. Perhaps this passivity of the govt. is what emboldened the militants to make regular heists every month on pay day and to continue their extortion bids without as much as batting an eyelid”.

8.4.3.3 Weaponry

It was able to procure weapons with the help of NSCN groups and was reportedly possessing the following with sufficient quantity of ammunition:-

AK-47 – 5 Nos.
.303 rifles – 3 Nos.
Some country made weapons.
9 mm. Pistols – 2 Nos.
Barring NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) it was not known for maintaining links with other group either within or outside.

8.4.4. Activities of other insurgents groups in Meghalaya

In addition to the above almost all the insurgent outfits in the North-East used Meghalaya-Bangladesh border for exfiltration to and infiltration from Bangladesh camps as the conditions on both sides of the border were highly conducive. The cadres also availed medical facilities available in Shillong. With the HNLC, ANVC and the MPLF having unfettered sway in Meghalaya the other groups also used it for temporary shelter/hideout. The NSCN(IM) and (K) had joint collaboration with the insurgent groups of the State and conducted joint operations including dacoity, extortion, snatching of weapons and attack on SF/Police. NSCN(IM) maintained closeness with both HNLC and ANVC and shared the money collections. NSCN(K) maintained close relations with MPLF.

The regular users of Meghalay as a shelter/hideout were (1) NDFB, (2), BLT, (3) ULFA of Assam, KYKL, PLA, UNLF of Manipur and ATTF of Tripura.

The areas used for taking shelter/hide out by the following outfits were:-

NSCN(M) : Shillong Town
Nongpoh area : (Ri-Bhoi dist.)
William Nagar : (East Garo Hills dist.) and some areas of West Garo Hills Dist.
NSCN(K) : Villages in West Khasi Hills, East Garo Hills Border and areas where MPLF operated.
ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) : Shillong Town, Ri-Bhoi dist., Garo Hills.
NDFB (National Development Front of Bodoland) – Garo Hills
BLT (Bodo Liberation Tigers) – Garo Hills and Bodo areas along Assam Border.
KYKL/PLA/UNLF/ATTF - Shillong Town

379
The exfiltration and infiltration routes were as follows:-


Table IV
8.5 Crime Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist crime compared to general crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders (terrorist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders (general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping (Terrorist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping (General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies (Terrorist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies (General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion (Terrorist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion (General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats/Politicians killed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The violence chart for five years from 1995 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SF killed by UGs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SF injured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Militants killed by SF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Killed in infighting among UGs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Militants/terrorists arrested by SF</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Militants/terrorists surrendered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Civilians killed by UGs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Civilians injured by UGs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Police causalities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack on police station</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militants/ Terrorists arrested under TADA/NSA/MPDA (Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An overall assessment showed a progressively deteriorating situation towards 1988/1999. The high levels of robberies/extortion/general murders was in consonant with the general characteristic of Meghalaya since long and majority of the victims were reportedly non-tribals. The possibility of Khasi Students Union (KSU), taking a lead role in such crimes was also not ruled out.

8.6 Vulnerability of Police

In Meghalaya there were 34 Police Stations, 19 outposts, 16 beat houses, 4 passport check posts, 4 watch posts, 10 check posts. The total strength of police personnel (including officers) was 10100. In addition, there were 12 CRPF coys posted in Meghalaya.

Meghayala once the most favoured place for a visit because of the peace, tranquility and scenic beauty it provided had now become a dreaded place for an outsider. The State was irretrievably progressing towards something more sinister and dispiriting, "something that threatens to take the civilised society into a regressive cul-de-sac. That we shall bang our heads against the wall is no doubt. But we shall also have bloody noses and not be able to help ourselves one bit". The law and order problem was causing serious concern to the police because the violent activities of the HNLC had shown an increase. Happiness and gaiety during Republic Day/Independence Day celebrations had become a thing of the past. During past Republic Day, a 35-hour bundh call by HNLC marred the functions. There were two major law and order incidents. The activities of ANVC had also shown similar increase significantly both had links with the NSCN(IM) and (K). The MPLF was an outfit composed of criminals only. The KSU was an institution unto itself before which the political masters of the State cringed.

A good number of the police personnel were engaged in protection duty pushing law and order to the background. Motivation and training of personnel to meet the threats from militants needed to be done. There was also need to improve the position of manpower and weaponry. The militants had sophisticated weapons at their disposal.
Militancy in the State was viewed with rose tinted glasses by politicians and the gun totters were so brave and could do anything.

Police welfare measures were among the pending items. Morale of police personnel left much to be desired. There were allegations that “police personnel were not sincere in their duties and most often they used to come late on duties. Besides they were not equipped with arms”. There was a jail break (November, 1999) in Tura in which 23 under-trials escaped. “There were 92 inmates in the jail at the time of the incident and lack of security arrangements were the main reason of the jail break”.

Meghalaya has a common border (423 kms.) with Bangladesh. The standard argument that the influx of foreigners can be checked solely by intensifying patrolling along the international border no doubt sounds logical but in reality does not hold good for Meghalaya. Majority of the infiltrators reportedly entered Meghalaya via Assam after having surreptitiously acquired dubious certification from some authority or the other in Assam or Tripura. “It is worth recalling that much of Assam today is practically Bangladesh – owned and the ethnic Assamese population is fast dwindling. The porous inter-State borders are an added attraction to prospective infiltrators, more so as Assam continues to be a hot bed of insurgent violence, ethnic cleansing, natural calamities, while Meghalaya offers relatively far better prospects”. This issue had also been causing major headache to the police.

8.7 Coordination between agencies

Coordinated effort between Administrative agencies existed but for the all pervasive, restrictive role played by politicians. There were constrictions therefore to break the unfettered sway of the anti-social militant/terrorist groups. No effort was made at the political level to educate the people that militancy as a means to an end was destructive and doomed to fail. Had it not been for the political/militant link up Meghalaya should have pushed other sister States to the background in the field of allround progress. The bottom line being people political leadership should have made
co-ordinated efforts to educate people about the pernicious effects of militancy especially the Meghalaya variety which was self-defeating.

8.8 Election and Insurgency

If militancy/terrorism was thriving in Meghalaya it was more because of the political leaders of the State. In the 60 member State Assembly no party was known to exercise absolute majority. Political horse trading therefore became the characteristic feature of Meghalaya politics leading to coalition govt. After elections the first ministry was sworn in during February, 1998 and since then five changes had taken place, leaving no scope for giving a thought to administration of the State. Even the fate of the latest ministry was hanging in balance and the next assembly elections was stated to be held in 2003. None of the parties had given a thought to the question whether they would go for a negotiated settlement with the extremists. The fight in Meghalaya was allegedly for loaves and not for improving the lot of the people and in such an atmosphere terrorism thrived.

8.9 Role of NGOs and Human Rights Organizations

The following NGOs were active in Meghalaya:-

1. Don Bosco Youth Centre – 1987, Aims at holistic development of the individual in society.
5. North East Coordination Committee on Human Rights – Meghalaya Chapter – D – Aims at protection of basic rights of every human being.
7. North-East India Drugs and Aids Centre – 1994 – To help cure victims of drug abuse and AIDS.


9. Voluntary Health Association of Meghalaya – 1993 – Aims at Promoting Community Health

10. World Vision East Khasi Hills Area development promotion – aims at organizing people in villages to meet basic needs.

Meghalaya was accused often as one of the great violators of human rights. The two human rights organizations active in the State were (1) Meghalaya Peoples Human Rights Council (MPHRC), and (2) The North-East Coordination Committee on Human Rights ‘Chapter-D’ which is an umbrella organization for all the H.R Organizations in the seven States of the North-east.

The MPHRC had demanded a white paper from the govt. on the prison policy. There were allegations that the jails were “helping to produce hardened criminals inside jail when it should instead be helping the prisoner to reform his ways before he is rehabilitated in society”. This issue was brought to the notice of NHRC.

The MPHRC had also taken up alleged torture of inmates inside the lockups by the police. It also demanded for a complete change in policy of the jails of the State. According to it the worst conditions existed in Jowai and Tura district jails. It also alleged rampant corruption in jails.

Meghalaya had witnessed a proliferation of hospitals euphemistically called "recuperative nursing homes" without adhering to the minimum requirements. The MPHRC had taken up this issue at all levels.

8.10 Future of Insurgency

Meghalaya had no economic development worth the name with political instability and with militants going for easy money at gun point. The militants had
already won the first phase. "The govt. had failed miserably to contain the law and order situations. Militancy has survived the first phase here. The second and third phase will be very difficult to contain". The figure of the unemployed was increasing and they looked to govt. to provide for employment. The scapegoat as usual was the Centre. "It is very convenient to blame the Centre. We need scapegoats everywhere. But what about our own accountability, our own State govt.s, of our administration for the last 28 years? We have had enough of Central funds pouring in. Have we deployed these funds according to the manner in which they were meant to be deployed or have we diverted funds to private pockets, private individuals to the business class?". (Questions of a right thinking Meghalayan).

Ethno-centricism is a product of the distorted view of a subordinate group towards a dominant group. This was being displayed in the educational field in Meghalaya, particularly in Shillong once known as the Centre for educational excellence. Barring some schools/colleges run by missionaries, the standard of education in the rural areas had allegedly taken a beating because of lack of educated teachers more particularly in subjects like science and mathematics. There were killings of teachers who were outsiders. They had obtained their jobs on merit. These killings put a stop to qualified teachers from outside coming for teaching jobs. Their appointments were treated as a betrayal of the local tribals.

After more than 50 years of independence, the Head of traditional institution called 'Sytems Lyngdohs' and 'Dollois' (Rajas) were also bracing up for the old Raj Legacy. They were seeking implementation of the "instrument of accession with India" through an amendment of the Constitution. There were 'disdainful' of the operation of the District Councils in the State and felt that though the Khasi Chiefs had signed the Instrument of Accession, they have never signed the Instrument of Merger" which meant that when the Khasi States joined India legally the status of Khasi Chiefs remained in tact. Ironically all the political parties had supported the move in one way or other "with spurious arguments which could lead the governments drifting into a minefield". An attempt to revive a sensitive issue aiming at empowering the old 'Rajas' against the tenets
of the modern system embodied in the VIth Schedule of the Constitution, that too after more than 50 years was certainly a sensitive offering. The primary unit of the Khasi Tribe was called ‘Kur’. A combination of ‘Kur’ formed the villages and the combination of villages formed a ‘Hima’. Nearly all the villages or localities of a particular village formed a village ‘Dorbar’ which was created in the spirit of direct adult franchise but debarred women participation. The ‘Himas’ were exercising both administrative and judicial powers. The VI Schedule brought these institutions under the District Councils. The Tribal Communities had different land tenure system law of inheritance, rituals, different system of marriage and divorce and lingua franca, etc. while the Rajas (Chieftains) clamoured for a return to the old there were others who argued that the Rajas enjoyed the rights on behalf of the clans they represented as was the case elsewhere and not as individuals like the feudal lords of the country. Therefore any move to please the ‘Rajas’ at the cost of democratic institutions by the political parties would be tantamount to opening a Pandora’s Box with far reaching consequences. In any case, having set the ball rolling Meghalaya was destined to churn out a bitter debate upfront which may push the State into total confusion and misrule thereby giving further impetus to terrorism.

8.11 Conclusions/Recommendations

8.11.1. Conclusions

Meghalaya presented a spectacle of a State crushed under the weight of a plethora of insurgent outfits operating in the North-East using it as a safe haven and as a conduit for exfiltration to and infiltration from their Bangladesh camps. Their continued presence and nefarious activities appeared to have fired the imagination of local misguided youth who formed terrorist outfits like HNLC, ANVC, MPLF to earn easy money. The outfits were aided by the NSCN groups for mutual benefit. The Meghalaya outfits were camouflaging their activities as liberation movements.

The coalition govt.s. formed by undependable partners were more concerned with bargaining for positions and had no time to take on the insurgents/terrorists. Since February, 1988 when Assembly Elections were held, there were five changes so far and
the next election was slated for 2003 and it was anybody’s guess, how many more changes would be in the offing in the meantime.

Ethnic divide was sharp and deep, the age old friendliness, peace and tranquility had been replaced by mutual suspicion and hatred. Flow of outside capital to Meghalaya was per-force stopped due to recalcitrant attitude of the locals which affected their own economic development. He hiatus between tribals and non-tribals was getting widened.

The Khasi Students Union (KSU) had allegedly become an extra-constitutional authority before which the govt. cringed and gave them all powers to the extent of even opening a jail and meting out immediate justice.

Infiltration of Bangladeshis haunted Meghalaya also. It was however taking place more through inter-State borders of Assam etc. than through Meghalaya international border so as to avoid detection and deportation. The Nepali infiltration also posed a serious problem. Taking advantage of the Treaty of peace and friendship between India and Nepal, the Nepalis were entering and settling in different parts of the State. The withdrawal of the Foreigners (Restricted Area) Order, 1953, left no restriction in regard to entry of the Nepali citizens. A rough estimate of migrant population in Meghalaya was placed at 4 lakhs majority of them Bangladeshis who were settled on inter-state borders.

Terrorism had taken deep roots in the once famous ‘Scotland of the East’ with no hope of a return to normalcy in the immediate future.

8.11.2 Recommendations
Evolve short-long term measures to counter insurgency

Meghalaya required both short-term and long-term measures to counter insurgent/terrorist activities. Because of local support other insurgent outfits of the North-East were moving about freely in the State. They were also reportedly using the State for treatment of cadres whenever necessary.
Neutralize ISI activities

From security point of view, Meghalaya has become the most sensitive State in the North-East with ISI spread in the region well established it is possible that it was active in Meghalaya also.

Change in mind-set of leaders

The most urgent need was to change the mind set of the politicians so as to establish a stable govt. This appeared next to impossible, given the unquenchable thirst for power. They were slipping from blunder to another. It has become directionless. The final resort would be only to hand over the State to the Army.

Modernize/motivate police to fight insurgency

If there is any agency that can effectively tackle the situation in the State, it is the State Police. They should be properly motivated, trained and provided with modern weapons to take on the militants who are well entrenched in the State. The police personnel should be made to go into the interior, educate the people about the evils of insurgency and its overall impact on the future of the State.

Seek services of the Church to solve insurgency

The church also could play a lead role in this regard. It was reportedly waiting and watching the situation. With the govt. unstable, church was reluctant to move to check the activities of the terrorists.

Pay attention to education

Once a prime education centre, Meghalaya, was losing its importance. KSU (Khasi Students Union) should be made to see reason and made to change its stand on non-tribals for the good of the State.

Develop tourism

Pay attention to tourism which was bringing good revenue in the past.

Chalk out a security scheme for Meghalayans/outsiders.

Introduction of NSA/AFSPA, etc. can be done only as a short term measure. Setting up of a Joint Command can also be thought of. But none of these would be successful without having a stable govt. Going for introduction of President’s rule and handing over the State to the Army would be helpful in the short run but what is required is a change in the mindset of the people.
There were symptoms of public awareness picking up but was muted in the absence of able leadership.

Central assistance for economic development of the State should be provided but under effective checks by Central agencies. The States in the North-East had realized that Centre was lenient and they could get what they wanted. The time was ripe to check this tendency.

Shillong had reportedly turned into a vice city. All kinds of drugs were reportedly available and consumed by youth, most of them brought by UGs from Myanmar and Bangladesh. Intravenous injections of a drug know as Proxyvon was allegedly in common use which was said to be a serious health hazard. This in addition to sex related diseases for which Shillong was famous would surely take Shillong to inevitable doom, if not checked in time.

In the end, it would be the people who would bear the cross for the misdeeds of their own elected leaders and this was taking place in Meghalaya.
Insurgency Affected States in the North-East

- Assam
- Arunachal Pradesh
- Meghalaya
- Nagaland
- Manipur
- Tripura

Bangladesh Camps:

- ANVC - 9 - Netrakona
- (MEGH) 3 - Mymensingh
  1 - Sherpur
  3 - Dhaka
- HNLC - 1 - Chittagong Hill Tracts
  (MEGH) 1 - Sylhet
  1 - Moulivibazar
- NSCN (IM) - 2 - Sylhet
  (NLG) 1 - Chittagong
  1 - Moulivibazar
  1 - Haluaghat
- ATTF (TPR) 2 - Habiganj
  2 - Moulivibazar
  1 - Comilla
  3 - Khargachari

ULFA - 1 - Dhaka
  (Assam)
- NLFT (TPR) 11 - Khargachari
  5 - Habiganj
  2 - Bandarban
  2 - Rangmati
  1 - Moulivibazar
- ULFA - 1 - Cox Bazar
  (Assam)
- NDFB - 1 - Moulivibazar

No. of Camps of Insurgent Groups in Bangladesh/Myanmar/Bhutan

Use the camps

There are 3 camps
Chapter - 9

INSURGENCY/MILITANCY IN ARUNACHAL PRADSH

9.1 The State

Arunachal Pradesh, the land of the Rising Sun, became a full-fledged State of the Indian Union on February, 20, 1987. Earlier it was a Union territory created by carving out an Administrative Area popularly known as the North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) from the then State of Assam under the North East Reorganization Act No. 81 of 1971.

The State has an area of 83,743 sq. km. characterized by high raised mountains with dense jungles crisscrossed by turbulent rivers and rivulets, factors which helped insurgents in their activities. It is situated on the extreme North Eastern tip of India in Trans-Himalayan region between latitude 26° degree 28’ and 29 degree 33’ N and longitude 91 degree 31’ E and 97 degree 30’ E and is bordered by the famous Mac-Mohan line on the East and inner line in the foothill region. The length of the international boundary is 1928 km of which 157 km is with the kingdom of Bhutan, 1030 kms forms the Mac-Mohan line and 441 km forms the Indo-Myanmar border. The length of the inner line or political boundary with Assam and Nagaland is 618 kms and 59 km respectively. The Republic of China is situated on the North, the State of Assam on the south, Myanmar on the East and the Royal Kingdom of Bhutan on the West.

The State is blessed by geography with a fascinatingly varied topography as snow clad mountain peaks of the Eastern Himalayas which include the 7090 mtrs. high Kangto peak in the North and steamy sub-tropical flat foot hill plains along its boundary with Assam endowed with equally varied flora and fauna.

Perennial mighty rivers including the Brahmaputra which originates in the snowy waters of the Himalayas meander through the most breath taking landscapes of
Arunachal till they reach Assam. An amazingly variety of wild life, ruins of ancient civilization and a multitude of charming tribal communities with their colourful songs, dances and ways of life make the State a veritable paradise on earth. At Tawang (10200 ft) in the district of same name further north of Bomdila is situated 400 year old Mahayana Buddhist monastery, the largest in Asia. A monument of the 17th Century it has 65 residential buildings, housing more than 500 lamas besides the main temple. It has a library which contains a wealth of old scriptures, some of them in Sanskrit and antique books including gold lettered copies of sacred Buddhist scriptures. The ancient ruins of Bishmak Nagar Palace in Dibang Valley which date back to 12th to 16th century or even earlier represent a synthesis of tribal and Aryan culture. In the foot hills of West Siang overlooking the Brahmaputra valley in Assam lie the remains of Malinithan noted for its rich sculpture and artistry in granite images, idols of Karthikeya, Surya, Ganesha and Nandi Bull. The capital of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, has been built on the site of a historical brick (ita) fort dating back to the 14th or 15th century. The site of Itanagar has been identified with that of Mayapur of king Ramachandra who ruled over the area during the period.

A short distance from Tezu in Lohit District is the famous Parashuram Kund. Each year on Makarasankranti Day pilgrims from all over the country congregate here for a holy dip in the Kund to wash away their sins. The tradition follows the legend of Parashuram (parashu – axe) who after killing his mother at the behest of his father believed to have washed away his sin of matricide in this Kund. The Kund thus got its name from Parashuram. There is also another place known as Brahma Kund in the lower reaches of the Lohit river where Parashurama opened a passage through the hills with a single blow of his axe which is also visited by devotees.

The history of Arunachal Pradesh ascends for hundreds of years into the mists of tradition and mythology. Local tradition regard the place around Sadiya as the ancient Vidarba (it is also identified as Berar) and Bishmak Nagar in Lohit as the capital of King Bhishma whose daughter Rukmini was carried away on the eve of her marriage by Lord Krishna himself. The ruins of a fort at Bhalukpung on the right bank of the Bhareli
river in Kamang are claimed by the Akas (a tribe) as the original home of their ancestor, Bhaluk, grandson of Raja Bana who was defeated by Krishna at Tezpur.

Regarding tribes, the earliest accounts was written by chronicler Shihabuddin who accompanied Mirjumla when he invaded Assam in 1662. He stated that the Dafla tribes did not ‘place its feet in the skirt of obedience’ to the Ahom Raja but occasionally encroached his kingdom. He also stated that the Miri-Mishmi women surpassed in beauty and grace, the women of Assam and the hill people greatly feared fire arms, that “the matchlock is a bad thing, it utters a cry and does not stir from its place, but a child comes out of its womb and kills man”.

The Ahom rulers of Assam adopted a policy of conciliation towards the tribes supporting it by a display of force when it could be effectively employed. The same was followed by the British when they took over Assam from the then ruler, Purander Singh in 1838. The British lured them through the means of ‘fairs’ where the tribals started visiting to conduct trades and slowly the distance got reduced even though it was marred by occasional depredations. In 1954 the Frontier Division was given the names Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit, Tirap and Tuensang, but in 1957 Tuensang was re-united with the Naga Hills district as the Naga Hills and Tuensang area.

Arunachal Pradesh has, as of now, 13 districts. Their names, headquarters and the tribes inhabiting them are:-

**Table-I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Name of the District</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Tribes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Tirap</td>
<td>Khonsa</td>
<td>Nocte/Wancho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Changlang</td>
<td>Changlang</td>
<td>Lisu/Yobinus/Tangs a/Singpho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Lohit</td>
<td>Tezu</td>
<td>Deuri/Khamti/ Mishi/Singpho/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the 1991 census the religion-wise breakup of total population (864558) of Arunachal Pradesh was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>320212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>11922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>89013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>111372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>332039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of this, the scheduled tribe constituted the major portion (63.66%) There are 25 recognised tribes in the State. They speak the Tibeto-Burma languages but “while some dialects are mutually understandable others diverged so far that meaningful
communication between members of different groups, not necessarily far removed from each other, is hardly possible. But this problem has been overcome because of the common link languages known as ‘Nefamese’ or ‘Arunamese’ (a term used for spoken Assamese in Arunachal Pradesh).

Each tribe has its own sub-tribes. Religion-wise, the Monpas, Sherdukpen, Memba, Khamba, profess the Mahayana sect of Buddhism while the Khamtis and Singphos profess Hinayana. Others are animistic as they believe in supernatural beings and the innumerable malevolent and benevolent gods and deities. To propitiate the spirits and deities they perform a number of rituals and ceremonies with the help of a priest variously called as ‘Nyibu’. Among the Tani group of people viz. Adi, Apatani, Hill Miri, Nishing and Tagin the sun (donyi) and moon (polo) are considered supreme beings and the religious beliefs so developed is now being called ‘Donyi Poloism’. Some little known tribes also exist viz. Tutsa (Changlang dist.), Khamiyang, Adi Souma and Charumba (also called Zakhering) all in Lohit district. At one time there was confusion in the appellations of the various tribal groups. The reason was that during the British days contact with the hill people were through the Assamese and the appellations used by them were recorded. Thus the term ‘daflas’ were used to describe the majority of hillmen of the Western part and ‘Abor’ for rest of the siang districts. The term ‘Abor’ had a somewhat ‘derogatory flavour’ meaning ‘wildman’ or ‘barbarian’ but were widely used in official reports, census reports and in ethnographic literature. With the spread of education however these usages came to be discarded and replaced by terms based on tribal languages. Thus ‘daflas’ came to be recognised as ‘Nishi’ or ‘Nishing’ (meaning human being) and ‘Abor’ came to be replaced as ‘Adi’. In general there was a tendency to identify with a larger group than a localised tribe. There is seldom a neat delimitation between the two adjoining groups normally referred to by different names. Almost all the tribes have the traditional political institutions or council of elders to decide on issues of interest (a map showing the names of the districts, tribes, etc. is enclosed). It was placed under the ‘Inner-line Permit’ system in order to check the inflow of outsiders to the State.
9.2 Genesis of Insurgency

Arunachal Pradesh was willy-nilly lured into the vortex of insurgent movement more because of its contiguity to the headquarters of the then NSCN located in “Upper” Myanmar opposite to the two districts of Arunachal Pradesh viz. Tirap and Changlang and due to the ethnic relationship of the people with those living across the international border and as such was a continuation of Naga insurgency.

9.3 Reasons for Insurgency

After the parting of ways between the Muivah and Khaplang since 1988 the group led by the latter known as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN – Khaplang) strengthened its hold in these two districts. This had an unsettling effect on the otherwise peaceful state of Arunachal Pradesh. A spurt in the insurgent activities here was visible from 1995. By this time some of the hard core elements of NSCN (K) had spread out their activities to the area. In early part of 1996 the two districts were brought under an organization known as the ‘Wangcbo Area Organization’ (WAO) by Khaplang which comprised some areas of Myanmar also. The creation of the organization gave the insurgent activities the required impetus to grow in the State.

**Table-II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Insurgency</th>
<th>Contempt for outsiders</th>
<th>Encouragement from ULFA etc.</th>
<th>Geography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic deprivation and alienation</td>
<td>NSCN influence</td>
<td>Easy money through extortions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Chakma Refugee Problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

396
In the district of Changlang particularly there was further progression of U.G activities since 1997 as the NSCN(K) started pressurizing the local leaders, politicians, shop owners, contractors and businessmen for payment of huge amounts of money. In addition, a system of tax came to be levied besides making requests for arrangements for shelter and ration. The main aims of NSCN(K) were:-

1. Amalgamation of Tirap and Changlang districts in greater Nagaland also called ‘Nagalim’
2. Conversion of the whole people of Arunachal Pradesh into Baptist Christians.
3. Recruitment of youth for the movement.
4. Collection of taxes/extortion, etc.

Its strength was believed to be around 250 in the area and had a good stock of variety of weapons. This organization has been dealt in a detailed manner under Nagaland.

Demographic pattern and natural setting of Arunachal Pradesh also helped the insurgents for getting a foothold. It would therefore be ideal to dilate on it in a detailed way.

9.4 Organizations involved in insurgency :-

With slow pace of progress of education and development and a high rate of dropouts from schools and with an organization like the NSCN making inroads into the region, there was a mushroom growth of militant outfits in other districts of Arunachal Pradesh also. Over and above ethnic affinities played a primordial role in moulding the mind of the youth. These outfits indulged in various types of nefarious activities like extortion, threats, intimidation etc. Such forms of activities became lucrative for an unemployed youth, as it provided easy money. Incidentally an insurgent had a halo of respectability in society and even if caught or surrendered he had the prospect of getting an amount for rehabilitation. To cap it was the strong underlying contempt for all that was ‘Indian’ who were treated as alien to the land.
### Table-III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl No</th>
<th>Name of the Organization</th>
<th>Area of Influence</th>
<th>Approximate Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)</td>
<td>Dealt under both Nagaland and Manipur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>ULTA (United Liberation Tigers of Arunachal). Originally L.T.A. (Liberation Tigers of Arunachal)</td>
<td>Lower Subansiri/Papumpare districts.</td>
<td>10-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>A.D.F. (Arunachal Dragon Force).</td>
<td>Lohit District</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>UPVA (United Peoples Volunteers of Arunachal)</td>
<td>Lohit/Changlang districts</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>ULMA (United Liberation Movement of Arunachal)</td>
<td>Lower Subansiri/ East Kamang/ Papumpare districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>PLAA (Peoples Liberation Army of Arunachal) – originally ULVA (United Liberation Volunteers of Arunachal)</td>
<td>East Kamang</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>ULAA (United Liberation Army of Arunachal)</td>
<td>Papumpare</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>PRAA (Patriotic Revolutionary Army of Arunachal)</td>
<td>Lower Subansiri/ Tezu Districts</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>ALTAP (All Liberation Tigers of Arunachal Pradesh)</td>
<td>East Siang district</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NLFA (National Liberation Front of Arunachal)</td>
<td>Lower Subansiri</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9.4.1 Liberation Tigers of Arunachal (LTA) now renamed as United Liberation Tigers of Arunachal (ULTA):-

This outfit was formed in December, 1996, with the following:-

1. Dasu Tassang – Self-Styled (SS) C-in-C. He was arrested by police in Sept, 1999.
2. B.K. Desri – S.S. Dy. Commander
3. Tanga Tapak – S.S. Convener

Its influence was limited to certain areas in Lower Subansiri and Papumpare districts and the strength was around 10-15 members. Most of them were school dropouts/unemployed youth ranging in age group of 18-30. It had given out its objects as:

1. Establishment of an independent confederation which would be free from exploitation.
2. Fight corruption.
3. Overall development of Arunachal Pradesh.

After the arrest of the top leader, it became dormant. It had however established links with top leaders of ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) and the MLTF (Muslim Liberation Tiger Force) in Assam. Some of its volunteers had also received training in guerilla warfare in Myanmar under the NSCN(K). Though its avowed objective was to fight exploitation it had also indulged in extortion of money by issuing demand letters. It was said to be in possession of country made guns.

9.4.2 Arunachal Dragon Force (ADF):-

The existence of this organization was known (September, 1997) when one Chow Upa Mansai of Namsai of Lohit District received an extortion notice with direction to pay Rs.50,000/-. Its self styled commander was one Nomi Namcham of same area. Its strength was around 20 of which half were youth (18-30) belonging to Lisu and Singhpho tribes of Myanmar and the Khamtis of Arunachal Pradesh. The remaining were suspected to be Assamese. A section (about 10) of them had been to Myanmar for training under the Kachin Independent Army (KIA). It also indulged in sending extortion notices and one such victim was the BJP candidate from Leking Assembly Constituency.
It was believed to be in possession of some weapons. Its aim was to fight for upliftment of Arunachal Pradesh.

9.4.3 United Peoples Volunteers of Arunachal (UPVA)

This outfit was formed in 1991 with the objective of driving away the Chakma refugees from Arunachal Pradesh and had received backing from the locals. Its recruits were trained in ULFA and NSCN(K) camps in Burma and operated mainly in Lohit and Changlang district and had about 100 members. It was also provided with some weapons by the ULFA and the NSCN(K). The police arrested majority of its members and subsequently all the remaining activists surrendered. Recently (later part of 1999) some of its members again started hobnobbing with ULFA leaders. Their grouse was that they were not properly rehabilitated by the Arunachal Pradesh government as per promises made during their surrender and therefore sought ULFA’s help. As was the case with other outfits, its volunteers also belonged to the age group of 18-30 years of age.

9.4.4 United Liberation Movement of Arunachal (ULMA)

This was originally formed in December, 1990 by one Tai Dokia Pagba of Lower Subansiri district with the aim of fighting corruption and espousing the cause of Nishing Community. Its area of operation was in Lower Subansiri, East Kameng and Papumpare districts. When it became active in 1991-92 most of its members were arrested. Since later part of 1991 one youth by name Goda Tapung had come in the open announcing revival of the organization and had been trained in an NSCN(IM) camp. Its strength was around 5 members and was believed to be in possession of weapons.

9.4.5 United Liberation Volunteers of Arunachal (ULVA) now renamed as Peoples Liberation Army of Arunachal (PLAA):-

This was formed in 1990 by an activist of the All Arunachal Progressive Students Union (AAPSU) by name Nina Kadu of East Siang district subsequent to his expulsion
from the Pasighat College on some political grounds. Getting angry over the incident he
formed ULVA and proclaimed himself as its Commander. Its activities were limited to
extortion of money from businessmen. Nina Kadu however surrendered in 1991. On his
surrender some other youths under one Yomi Eshi of Likabali tried to revive the
organization under the name Peoples Liberatin Army of Arunachal (PLAA) and all of
them had been trained in ULFA camp in Jorhat (Assam). It had a strength of 8 members
and was believed to be in possession of some weapons.

9.4.6 United Liberation Army of Arunachal Pradesh (ULAA):-

Its existence was known through the disclosure made by two Manipuri youths who
were arrested at Tripura airport during 1992 and some documents were seized which had
mentioned about ULAA and its self styled Commander Yomgi Eshi. Later the self styled
Commander was arrested and with it the organization ceased to exist. It was suspected of
having contact with PLA/RPF of Manipur.

9.4.7 Patriotic Revolutionary Army of Arunachal (PRAA):-

This outfit came in the open during May, 1997, when some of its volunteers
surrendered. It was operating in Lohit and Lower Subansiri districts. According to them
during the previous year the All Arunachal Progressive Students Union leaders viz. Tage
Lapung and Domain Loya had instigated 20 local youth belonging to Adi, Nishing and
Mishmi tribes to undergo guerilla training in an NSCN(IM) camp in Nagaland.
Accordingly they left for Dimapur from Itanagar and underwent guerilla training for 3
months in foot drill weapon training and tactics, jungle training, handling of A.K.47,
LMG, SMG, US Carbine, 2" mortar, handling of Chinese grenades etc. On their return
they had indulged in extortion of money from businessmen. They became dormant later.
They were active in Lower Subansiri and Tezu districts.
9.4.8 All Liberation Tigers of Arunachal PRADESH (ALTAP):-

This came in the open in July, 1999. It was formed on the initiative of one Tara Kancham @ Mere Kancham at Dhemaji (Assam) at a meeting of about 20 youth belonging to the foothill areas of Arunachal Pradesh. This meeting decided to form an extremist organization to find a solution to their grievances through armed struggle. The aims stated were:

1. Solve Assam-Arunachal border problem.
2. Drive away all Chakma and Hajong tribes from Arunachal.
3. To solve unemployment problem.
4. To fight for secularism and socialism. It had sent a group for training under ULFA. One Marnya Yongam was its President. It was active in East Siang district.

9.4.9 National Liberation Front of Arunachal (NLFA):-

This outfit was formed under leadership of one H. Higio in September, 99 and wanted to bring about "cooperation, integrity and fraternity among various sections of people for lasting peace" and issued a press statement (14.9.99). Its real colour however came out when it started issuing extortion notices to businessmen of Lower Subansiri and Ziro areas demanding payment of money ranging from three to five lakhs. The security forces later recovered a Belgium made 9 mm. Pistol from one of its activists and on search at his residence recovered 2 live hand grenades and some live cartridges of 9 mm pistol and a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. One Kojtara was its self-proclaimed leader and maintained links with NSCN(K). The strength was stated to be around 10 and the outfit was in possession of some weapons.

The style of formation of the outfits, modus operandi etc. amply made it clear that they were not the product of any ideological belief but were borne out of a desire to exploit the existing insurgency climate in the North-East to advantage and self
aggrandizement. Its leaders were of poor background educationally and otherwise. Most of them were unmarried and no women volunteers had opted to join them. The mission was only to become rich by quick means. Some succeeded and others failed which explained the sudden emergence/eclipse. The prospects of govt. help for rehabilitation had indeed prompted some to join the outfits but that also proved to be a failure. This however did not mean that the mischief potential was ruled out as the major group of insurgents may lure them by offering money. In that event the dormant elements would prove to be dangerous to Arunachal Pradesh.

The NSCN(K) has been targeting the youths, mostly unemployed and motivated them with an adventurous life which swayed the young minds. While doing so it maintained close links with other insurgent groups like ULFA and provided all help like protection/ration on reciprocal basis in case of need. Both NSCN(K) and ULFA had established a combined training centre in Tirap district.

ULFA activists usually took shelter in Arunachal Pradesh when confronted with army action in Assam for which it had established temporary camps/shelters at places called Letukijan and Sabotiti Paher (both in Papumpare district) and Jiadal river basin in West Siang district. The Bodo militants were also using the foothills of East and West Kameng districts bordering Assam on way to their hideouts in thick jungles. They also indulged in extortion of money, tax collection etc. in areas of their transit. The places in Arunachal frequented by underground groups are illustrated in the map enclosed.

9.5 CRIME CHART

The activities of NSCN (undivided) was manifest in Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh right from 1980 when it started making collections/recruitment from the area. From 1988 the NSCN(K) started making tax collection on a regular basis. If it was only Rs.25/- till 1988 it varied between Rs.120/- and Rs.150/- since then. But for what had been stated in respect of other militant organizations no regular tax collection
etc., was done by them. A statement of unlawful activities by the NSCN(K)/others, from 1995 to 1999 is given below:

Table-IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion notice</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping/Abduction</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack on</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF/Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF Killed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG arrested</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>All other than NSCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG killed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG recruits</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians killed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the main concerns of UGs was to create perennial sources of income. The methods adopted were (1) extortions, which provided huge sum in one go, after issuing extortion notices (2) tax collection which was not always adequate to meet needs. Abductions proved highly lucrative as the persons kidnapped were invariably rich and were useful in creating an impact on society by striking terror.

A study of the statement would show that while extortions were maximum in 1998 (50) it came down by 1999 (20) whereas kidnapping showed a marked increase in 1999 (22) which were only 4 in 1997 and 8 in 1998. Looting ceased altogether from 1997.
UG activities showed an increase in 1999 as could be seen from the increased recruitment (48), when compared to other years, an all time high. The civilians killed were 5 in 1997 with no killing in 1998 but again came to 4 by 1999. The number of UGs arrested was high only in 1997 (48) but the arrested UGs did not include NSCN volunteers, the main organisation operating in the State. There was an attack each on SF/Police in 1995 and 1996 and only one SF killed in 1996. Thereafter there was a stand off between the UGs and SF/Police. From the increased activities of UGs the only surmise could be that (1) the UGs did not take the SF as a serious threat to its existence (2) the SF did not like to challenge the UGs for its own reasons (3) there was an understanding between the ruling class and the UGs which put a spoke in the wheel of operation of the S.F. willy-nilly. It could be all of these in small measures or any one particular reason. In any case the actions to contain UG activities were limited to surface only with no concrete measure to permanently solve the vexatious problem. Implied in it was also that the youth were getting lured to the UG movement which did not augur well for future. To that extent it was a reflection on the functioning of law enforcing agencies more importantly on the police in the State.

The NSCN(K) had been maintaining friendly relations with all UG outfits except the NSCN (Isac-Muivah). It had links with ULFA, Bodo Liberation Tigers, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) of Assam, ULTA, ADF, UPVA, NLFA of Arunachal Pradesh, KIA (Kachin Independent Army) of Myanmar and the ISI of Pakistan. NSCN(K) has been behaving as the leader of all outfits in the North East and rendering training facilities and providing weapons, moral support, etc. The nature of external support included (1) training of recruits (2) supply of weapons (3) provision of shelter in times of need (4) guidance in return for reciprocity of material help. Such mutual help on a continuous basis had made the NSCN to think in terms of a common platform like the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF).

NSCN rendered training mostly in its training centre in Myanmar. Sometimes the Arunachal UGs had been to the KIA training centre at Kachin. As regards their ingress and egress no restriction was imposed as the whole of Tirap and Changlang districts of
Arunachal have common borders with Myanmar and NSCN(K) hold unfettered sway in
the area.

The routes taken by UGs outfits were:-


4. Jairampur-Khamda-Dukpo-Kamlao-Yukhi-Singwang-Riju-Rima-Ranuk-Ranghil-
   Burma.


   (Nagaland)-Khanmoi-Longkho-Kamka-Jumkha-Hnapturn-Chino-Chanlam-Jangno-
   Nopoi-Shumnu-Chisa(Myanmar)

10. Songking-Nayong-New Kamlang-Nampong-Khamkey-Thao-II (Myanmar)-Thao-III-
    Lunlo.

   Roots from Myanmar to Longding


9.6 Counter Insurgency Operations

The government of Arunachal Pradesh appealed to the UGs to give up arms and join the national mainstream. This however had only limited impact. It also made the SF/Police to launch security operations. The moves were only partly successful. A few of the insurgents who first surrendered later again made it to the UG fold having got disillusioned with Govt. steps for rehabilitation.

Surrender

The chart below shows the number of UGs surrendered from 1995 to 1999:-

1995 – 08
1996 – 10
1997 – 09
1998 – 08
1999 – 60

Of this, NSCN(K) volunteers were 20 and UPVA 55.

One of the main drawbacks of surrender was failure of govt. to fulfil promises made at the time of surrender. This had made the surrendered to again take to jungles
and indulge in extortion etc. As a UG he was given respect in villages and feared by
govt. machinery. These limited surrenders were also of no effect on the UG movement.
Some of the surrendered UGs however joined the mainstream as a normal citizen, while
some others maintained links with their erstwhile friends and helped them only to rejoin
later.

9.7 Vulnerability of Police

There were a total of 66 police stations to oversee 13 districts. They were housed
in Assam type buildings and were not secure enough to provide shelter from UG attacks.

The police personnel were not trained to fight insurgency though there were plans
to provide specialized training. This could not be done due to financial crunch faced by
the State.

There were only two attacks on the SF/Police so far in 1995 and 1996 in which
one SF was killed in 1996. The police had conducted a number of raids/searches etc. on
receipt of advance information. These attacks had emphasised the need for greater
attention on intelligence collection so as to thwart all moves of the UGs.

Arunachal Pradesh had two battalions of Armed Police who were effective. They
were provided with improved weapons, better communication facilities, but there was
need for further overall improvement.

The police personnel in general were a disgruntled lot. No basic amenities existed
for this section of the police force who bear the brunt in times of need. They were to fend
for themselves from the limited pay that they got. There were allegations that the money
meant for their welfare measures were siphoned off. This had apparently generated a
mental wedge in police force which remained difficult to be bridged unless corrective
measures taken. This had also a direct effect on the morale of the police force. The
discontent was real and nothing was reported to have been done to ameliorate it. Since
employee morale could not be seen and could be measured only through words and deeds the reflections spoke for themselves. The police personnel at junior level lived off by display of their false prestige being a police man but inwardly cursed his fate and his seniors. It had to be viewed in the background that while a few in the police force were outsiders recruited at the time when Arunachal Pradesh was a Union Territory, the rest had ethnic affinities with the UGs.

The government schemes provided adequate compensation in case of death while in action and for giving employment to the next of kin.

There was reportedly open nexus between politicians and insurgents in Arunachal Pradesh. No other agency could function independent of this fall out and to that extent police was also said to be a victim. As regards police insurgent nexus was concerned the ethnic affinity was a factor affecting in a positive way the relationship. The insurgents had gained a foothold in all fields and they do dictate terms without leaving any evidence overtly. It was for nothing that the alleged payment of protection money took place.

Arunachal State being insurgency prone and all arms of the govt. being controlled by the locals whose blood relations were in UG the principle of live and let live was said to be operating. The UGs need not have to infiltrate any arm of the govt.

**Impact of Induction of Para-Military**

The para-military was posted in the State more or less on a permanent basis except for shifting/replacement of units at intervals. They assisted the local police in maintaining law and order. There was coordination of efforts between the para-military and the police. In addition to local police and 12 companies of CRPF and 36 companies of Assam Rifles, a special force operating in the North-East also existed here. In private, however, both the police and para-military personnel ridiculed the Assam Rifles for having encouraged insurgency to grow in Nagaland and later exporting it to whole of the North-East. The pun apart it was a fact that the Assam Rifles was specially raised to
protect the North-East. Today it has 31 battalions and ironically insurgency had taken birth; was cradled and had come off age under its very nose and the ridicule, even if inadvertent, had something to convey. It was again a fact that para-military had to be brought in over and above the Assam Rifles which was trained in military fashion and commanded by army officers. It was therefore natural that questions would be asked about the efficacy of such a force and the necessity of its very existence.

9.8 Elections and Insurgency

Ghosts of Insurgents play their game during elections in Arunachal Pradesh. Their shadow representatives were also got elected. There were allegations that money collection was made and paid to NSCN(K) during elections so as not to cause any harm. A politician had also reportedly paid a huge sum as protection money to the Konyak UGs as also to Khaplang. There were also allegations that the last ministry in Arunachal was brought down at the instance of NSCN(K) leader Khaplang. The elections reportedly had the blessings of the powerful sections of UG which were appeased by payment of money. To that extent insurgency reached the level of power game in Arunachal Pradesh which did not have public support – who remained ignorant and insignificant.

9.9 Coordination between agencies

There was coordination between police civil administration and the judiciary.

9.10 Role of NGOs/HROs

The following were the important NGOs functioning in the State:-
Table V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of Est.</th>
<th>Aim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Arshang Society Pasighat</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To improve overall socio-economic condition of indigenous people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh Seva Sangh (APSS)</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>For economic development of Arunachal Pradesh, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Oju Welfare Association (OWN)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Upliftment of women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These NGOs had contributed much for the development of the local people.

9.11 Infiltration from Bangladesh

Among the Arunachal insurgents the NSCN(K) was allegedly maintaining links with the ISI. The subject has been dealt in a detailed manner under Nagaland.

Arunachal Pradesh was becoming an area for illegal settlements by Bangladeshis by way of spill over from Assam. With ever increasing unabated and unchecked inflow of Bangladeshis taking place, Arunachal Pradesh was becoming a hot bed for ISI activities. Migration to Arunachal Pradesh had also another dimension. The Chakmas and the Hajongs who were settled in Arunachal Pradesh during the Chakma crisis were posing threat to the economic development of the State and the identity of locals. They were also allegedly potential harbourers of Bangladeshi infiltrators of their own community. The approximate strength of settlers in Arunachal Pradesh was reportedly around 3 lakhs.
9.12 Future of Insurgency

But for the existence of NSCN(K) influence, the Arunachal Pradesh Govt. had more or less contained the insurgency menace. The NSCN(K) had also come to the negotiating table by declaring a cease-fire.

9.13 Conclusions/Recommendation:-

9.13.1 Conclusions

Arunachal Pradesh should not have come under the grip of insurgency fever had it not been for NSCN. It was earlier limited to only two districts viz. Tirap and Changlang because of their closeness to the NSCN Hq. in Myanmar. The virus spread to other districts more due to the presence of unemployed youth and their exploiting the situation to earn easy money. Even then Arunachal Pradesh was not fully engulfed by insurgency. NSCN was indeed making its presence felt without leaving any scope for doubt and that was a factor which cannot be brushed aside.

Since the NSCN(K) had announced a cease-fire all were sitting with their fingers crossed waiting for start and amicable conclusion of the talks. There was however a lurking fear that the moves would be scuttled by vested interests as having the State under insurgency was in their interest notwithstanding sincere wish for peace in the State among the majority. The emergence and the eclipse of certain insurgent groups at various times was not to be taken lightly. Some of them were trained by NSCN(K) and (IM) ULFA/KIA etc. and were also provided with weapons. They could be made use of at a future date if the cease-fire/peace talks failed.

9.13.2 Recommendations

1. A change in mindset of politicians for the good of the State.
2. Effective measures for economic development of the region. There was a feeling of neglect among Arunachalis.
4. Adequate measures for creation of employment opportunities.
5. Effective measures to check inflow of Bangladeshis and amelioration of grievances of Chakmas and Hajongs.
ROLE OF POLICE IN COMBATING INSURGENCY

Law and order is the corner stone of the structure of a country's internal administration and the task is the primary responsibility assigned to the police, an indispensable institution in any society. Ironically, in an insurgency, the insurgents infringe upon that very law and order throwing a challenge to the institution of police. In the face of increased insurgent activities in the North-East, a big question mark had arisen before the police which could not be brushed aside as of no significance. If, however, police could not face insurgency squarely, the reasons were not far to seek. It had an enormously difficult job to handle but lacked the wherewithal needed to deal with what was entirely a new situation to which their training, equipment, structure and conditions of service were not adequately adapted. What was considered a quite country-side once stirred up with insurgency and changed and needed more policing than ever before but the attention that it received was not commensurate with the emerging volatile situation forcing it to be a helpless spectator.

“Experience and experts suggest that the most effective way to deal with internal terrorism and small scale urban guerilla attacks against soldiers and policemen is to emphasize police work, good intelligence and judicial sanctions. Since terrorists operate in very small units and cells and are normally highly secretive, regular military forces are of marginal use because of their conventional training and operations. More over regular army uses indiscriminate violence when frustrated by their inability to cope with elusive terrorists” (Peru and Sri Lanka – 1980s).

Police work is one field which had never received proper attention from the hands of political leadership. Yet "we expect them (the policeman) to be human yet inhuman. We employ him to administer the law and yet ask him to waive it. We resent him when he enforces the law in our own cause, yet demand his dismissal when he does not
elsewhere. We offer him bribes, yet denounce his corruption. We expect him to be a member of society, yet not share its values. We admire violence even against society itself but condemn force by the police on own behalf. We tell the police that they are entitled to information from the public yet we ostracize informers. We ask for crime to be eradicated but only by the use of ‘sporting’ methods. What do we want the police for? Only by resolving the conflict and values between liberty and law enforcement can we determine the paradox of policemen’s position in our future society”. This task remains unfulfilled even to this day.

The accusing finger for all ills in society from the side of law and order was pointed readily at the police force as it had come to be treated as the proverbial sacrificial goat to be sacrificed at the altar of personal expediency by the politicians. A mere scanning of the developments in the North-East would reveal as to how politics had interfered in the working of the police to the detriment of effective law enforcement. What ailed the police none questioned, it was derided at as non-functional, shoved at when necessary showered praise only when convenient but never cared or taken into confidence resulting in induction of CPMF/Army etc. who also never spared an opportunity to take pot shots at the police instead of associating with them smoothly. Police responsibilities had never been clearly defined for the same reason but the public presumed that the ‘police’ existed to provide “protective services to society”. The role of police in the North-East in general has therefore to be viewed from this premise. Here also what was required was an attitudinal change to improve the functional capacity of the police which has to emanate from political leadership, lack of which had led to the worsening scenario.

Pfiffner feels that “the society will soon redefine the police role to include ideas, perceptions and insights which will bring the police into the area of dealing with social pathology on a scale larger than the present holding and containing operation. That role has not yet been spelled out and is not even dimly perceived by many police administrators, indeed, perhaps most would feelingly deny it to be within police purview”.

414
The term 'police' is interpreted to mean "that wing of the govt. established to maintain order, enforce law and prevent and detect crime and thereby make life of the people in society happy and worth living." It is used only to mean the local State police forces and does not include Army and Para-military. The local police only know the insurgents of the area well and can easily tackle them given the political backup. The areas in which they operate are also the turf of the local police. Insurgents are also from the same stock.

The balance of peace in society got disturbed due to many reasons, including insurgency and terrorism leading to situations not conducive to normal life. Therefore, an agency in the form of police was conceived which ipso-facto existed in society from time immemorial. The power of the police of a particular area is drawn from the society of that particular area more for the sake of that society and as such an integral part of the society. Therefore, in an insurgent situation like the one in North-East it should be the police of that area which should stand up and face the insurgents. It should be the sheet anchor to shield the people from any danger. If it, as a body, failed it is indicative of degeneration of that society and to that extent anarchy sets in. No police in any society was known to have been humbled by law breakers unless the political leadership which governs the police also sided with them as was the case in the North-East. It is again an indication of fall of the society and to that level the life and property of the people are in jeopardy. This leads to law makers becoming law breakers and slowly people lose faith in the system leading to an inevitable shaking of the ground from under the feet of the leaders themselves sooner or later.

The adage is that "Today's insurgent may be tomorrow's freedom fighter/political leader." Insurgency is too dignified a term for the developments in the North-East. They were, are and would continue to be clay footed on the side of ideology, North-East being pluralistic matrix. Mentality of the North-Easterners were anti-mainlander because of lack of emotional integration even though the poor Indian tax payers money sustained them and would continue to be so if serious efforts are not made to enlighten them about
the danger of continuous inflow of Bangladeshis like an invasion. ISI penetration through them was very genuine and a serious threat. What was taking place in the North-East was a low intensity conflict, a proxy war, aided and abetted by the Pakistani Intelligence outfit, the I.S.I (dealt separately). The simple, honest and straightforward people who had been injected with the virus of corruption and had come to adopt a laid back policy using huge govt. allotment of money as ‘grants’ would be sitting ducks if not awakened to the reality. This work can best be done only by the Central Govt./local police and not by the CPMF/Army. The time was ripe for political leadership to gird up their loins to face the danger through the police.

Because of the divisions of society on tribal lines any insurgent group harping on the theme of ‘liberation’ of any area whether be it in Nagaland, Assam or Meghalaya would prove to be a myth, the base being loyalty to one’s own tribe. Such utterances were merely to gain sympathy, support and money for existence. This was amply demonstrated time and again by the mushroom growth of so called insurgent outfits which have become cheaper by the dozen. With sophisticated weapons in hand any group could hold the society to ransom. If police is not made fighting fit to face the danger, the security of the society would be affected.

With easy money available, the growth of more and more such groups would be a certainty. The latest to join (October, 2000), the insurgent list was Assam Tiger Force (ATF) which killed ten Marwaris on ‘Diwali’ day at Nalbari (Assam) just to strike terror leading to the easing out of the Assam D.G.P. an uncalled for action which might have helped only to boost the morale of the terrorist outfits prompting them to striking again. To that extent, it might have also demoralized the entire police force in the whole region. Clash of interest had led to clashes between armed bands of ethnic groups (like the one between Bodos and Adivasis, Thangkhuls and Kukis, etc.). If this happens again in the North-East, which is highly probable, where the tribals still recalled head hunting days, the outcome would be disastrous. Only local police should be equipped to meet this eventuality. The role of police should indeed be made all pervasive (it is supposed to be
omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent) but without political backing the attainment of this aim would remain a distant dream.

The study showed that the police stood subverted because of ethnic relationship with U.Gs. This bond has to be broken by sound reasoning. “Unless basic principles of police organizations are thoroughly examined and bold steps taken to break away from the past and tackle the problems at the root, much is not likely to be achieved in the direction of a dedicated police fit to serve the people” in the region.

**Internal defence and development strategy**

It is necessary for the govt.s, both State and Central to take suitable C.I. measures based on the internal defence and development strategy—the full range of measures taken to promote growth of the area and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. This, inter-alia, includes tactical operations carried out by the Army by associating police and para-military. The utility, importance and invincibility of police was amply demonstrated during the two major army operations in Assam viz. O.P. ‘Bajrang’ and O.P. ‘Rhino’. While in the case of ‘Bajrang’ the army took it upon itself the task of dealing with ULFA without the co-operation of the police only to end the operation in ignominy. Having learnt a lesson the bitter way, it became wiser during O.P. ‘Rhino’ and took police help and came out with flying colours. As of now long presence of the CPMF/Army had only led to firing of stealth salvos, acrimony, mutual suspicion and discreet feeding of information to the press, targeting each other thereby undermining over all security of the people and other interests of the States. In the face of confirmed ISI activities this was tantamount to giving fodder to its activities. The following also required serious consideration:-

1. **Training of Local Police**

   Informal survey made in the field in this regard from among the SF/Police/Army indicated that the police suffered from—
1. Utter helplessness.
2. Lack of motivation
3. Poor training
4. Lack of ‘will power’.
5. Lack of sophisticated weapons to fight insurgents fighting with modern weapons.
6. All pervading corruption
7. Lack of improved infrastructure
8. Lack of care for police welfare measures.

As a result, morale was at the rock bottom and demanded an attitudinal change from all sides. Majority also felt that police alone should be able to fight insurgents as the CPMP/Army were from outside and their life was extremely difficult in such areas due to (1) language problem, (2) lack of knowledge of terrain (3) lack of cooperation from public and outright indifference (4) lack of knowledge of historical background of the people and the area (5) lack of a clear objective (6) mutual suspicion between police personnel on one side and the civil, CPMP/Army and the judiciary on the other.

Training of police personnel for fighting insurgency should therefore take into consideration above points.

2. Political Operations

They concern political, social, religious and economic issues. The leaders of all parties should make it their priority to present their programmes as the better choice compared to insurgency and perpetual misery. Society gave birth to insurgency, its leaders had a responsibility to counter it. The police should know the political objectives and plan operations that support them.
3. **Unity of effort in command, control and communication**

All operations should be integrated with other agencies to gain mutual advantage, with police acting as the nodal agency. Unity of efforts called for inter-agency coordination. Such coordination would generate willingness to develop new structures or methods to accommodate different situations, ones requiring careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence and regional expertise. This would also help to ensure command, control, communication and flow and proper utilization of intelligence.

4. **Maximize intelligence and reduce violence.**

Even though intelligence cannot stop insurgency, lack of it had proved costly. Lack of coordinated effort among various intelligence agencies had led to show of one upmanship by one much to the chagrin of others. Insurgency can be tackled only from within. Therefore, the best method would be induction of agents to the insurgent organizations, in order to get specific information.

5. **Tactical Intelligence Collection**

Here perhaps lies the key for outwitting the insurgents. Knowledge of the size, location and activities of UGs allow the police forces to seize the initiative and increase its confidence.

Usually insurgents operated in small bands with public support. To fight them similarly well trained small parties of police personnel assisted by CPMF /Army would be best. Such units conducting independent operations do so under a centralized control. Small units can move with more stealth and respond more rapidly and if necessary reinforce another unit. Flexibility of Commandos keep the UG groups off balance and would prevent them from developing effective tactical operations. This would give local police added advantage. These fighting units should be capable of moving swiftly either by vehicle or even by foot. In case insurgents bury themselves in a civilian area they can
be encircled and neutralized. When success is achieved quick consolidation should be ensured which should be through psychological operations which should include social, economical and political development.

Maximizing intelligence and reducing violence would help to avoid counterproductive collateral damage and help to make future transition to consolidations possible. Strike forces should not be allowed to remain in an area after accomplishing a task. In an insurgency, insurgents operated in small units (as was the case in North-East) usually under an S.S. Captain with lethal effect. They conducted area surveillance, ambushes, raids, hasty attacks and other small unit actions by informing village headman whose houses remained the bases for such operations albeit secretly. Before an operation, they knew where the S.F columns were positioned. After attack they left the area swiftly through a preplanned route, often under the very nose of the S.F under suitable cover. Police should be able to conduct searches, arrange road blocks and check points which can be deliberate or hasty. Such points should be covered by additional forces in order to avoid ambushes/surprise attacks as had happened in Manipur/Tripura and Nagaland.

Similarly police parties were better in conducting raids on getting advance information as they knew the people and the area. Conducting raid presupposes accurate, timely and detailed information but sharing of information should be selective. Such advance information also help in conducting ambushes, engaging the guerillas in decisive battles which could be forced upon them at unfavourable times to deny freedom of movement, weapons, etc.

In the North-East most of the informants of the UG were well trained in intelligence collection and could not be identified and neutralized. Army/Police patrol parties moved openly and fell easy victims to UG attacks which was one reason for large casualties. Patrol parties should be provided cover support in the hill areas by Commando groups. Insurgents were also often targeting vital installations. If police
takes up C.I. operations, CPMF could be used for protecting these installations and their physical protection could be ensured.

**Operational Security - Importance of Human Intelligence, Signal Intelligence, and Photo Intelligence.**

Protecting information was scarcely paid attention in the North-East which had resulted in the killing of police officers and leakage of sensitive information in the past. Insurgents paid serious attention to this aspect. They used Human Intelligence, Signal Intelligence and Photo Intelligence to breach the operational security of the Police/CPMF and the Army. In Tripura the hard cores of dreaded organizations like the ATTF and NLFT fearlessly entered Agartala, did money collection from high Tribal officials secretly and returned to their bases not falling to the net of police/army. How could insurgency be checked in such a situation. Police/SF/Army often indulged in predictable pattern of activity. Deception was conspicuous by its absence in most of the cases leading to even sensitive information reaching the UGs.

**Emphasize Personal Security**

In personal security the basic principles of stay alert, stay unpredictable, stay low key and stay informed were invariably cast into the wind leading to day time attacks and killing of VIPs. They were soft targets because of accessibility, predictability and surprise.

**Collect information specifically on UG style of training and change our training style accordingly.**

Almost all the UG groups in the NEI were trained by the NSCN cadres. Today's insurgents belonged to the 3rd generation but the leadership continued to be with first generation insurgents who were products of Chinese Guerilla Warfare. Many of the UG groups had also deserters of CRPF/BSF and ex-Army personnel. This along with their
motto 'do or die' 'kill or get killed' added teeth to their movement. The earning of easy money had fired their imagination.

To counter this, the police commando units should be trained in many skills and techniques. They are:-

1. Pay attention to basic psychology of people of the area.
2. Patience – more particularly at the lower levels who deal with people on a day-today basis.
3. Discipline – good behaviour on and off duty.
4. Professionalism – This promotes efficiency. If a force's observations and actions display accuracy and competence the UG groups can effectively be neutralized.
5. Impartiality – Police should display impartiality both in word and deed and should earn a reputation for evenhandedness. They should be careful both on and off duty in their actions and criticism.
6. Tact – All issues should be dealt with tact to avoid a controversy.
7. Inquisitiveness – All developments in a area should be directly enquired through informants. Presence of certain individuals at a particular area at a particular time may convey a message for an intelligence official and would prove to be warning bell for commandos.
8. Learning tactical skills like knowledge about background of the people and the area, their culture, language, habits, religion, characteristics operation of check/observation posts, patrolling, map reading, identification of weapons, equipment, environment, survival, first aid, method of Army/CPMF movements, their halting points, their activities, etc. Often illicit relationships a common feature in the North-East had led to UG attacks and embitterment of relations.
9. Maintaining close relations with all the agencies and their people without developing emotional attachment.
10. Flexibility in approach to problems.
11. Surveillance and supervision – This requires restraint tact and patience (ensuring observance of cease-fire agreements, manning of check-posts, road blocks, etc).
12. Co-ordination – State’s/Nation’s interest should be the basis and not individual likes and dislikes behind coordination. Ego has no place in counter insurgency operations. It often affects the very existence.

13. Readiness to help wherever possible without expecting anything in return. Tribals were honest, amiable and friendly. They liked to be respected and never felt shy to respect. For them, big or small it was of no consequence.

14. Building up of employee morale – This was at the rock bottom. Adequate measures were apparently never taken to boost morale of police. This was true of all the seven States. Officer – Subordinate relationship was a forced one. Officers wished to be served but allegedly never had a kind word to offer in return. With employee morale down, there was absolutely no motivation for work.

15. Proper moulding of mind to stop tendency for corruption – Emphasis on ethical values : Urge for indulging in corruption to earn a fast buck was also all pervading. Subordinates buttered the higher ranks, satisfied them by all means and in the process got what he wanted. To satisfy a policeman influential ones in the society played his part. This has become a vicious circle leaving the society in general corrupt from which there was no hope of a redemption unless an attitudinal change takes place.

16. The drug menace in the North-East region was real and had wide ramifications. This would prove to be a challenge for the police. The proliferation in HIV cases had also not received sufficient attention. These two evils were eating into the vitals of the social fabric. To counter the evils, the following measures are suggested:-

1. Strengthening of criminal justice system.
2. Implementation of intelligence agenda.
3. Increase enlightenment programmes and strengthen community actions.
4. Expand and increase effectiveness of drug treatment programme.

The North-East is on a precipice from which the fall would be certain and whether it falls back or front, a certain death awaited much to the benefit and glee of the Pakistani Intelligence outfit, the Inter-service Intelligence Agency (ISI). One agency which would
be accused for taking the region to this catastrophic end would indeed be the police. This is because the role of police in community service has taken precedence over all other roles in modern times. Defining the basic objective of police service, the International Association of Chiefs of Police desired every policeman to affirm “as a law enforcement officer, my duty is to serve mankind; to safeguard life and property to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against the oppression and intimidation and the peaceful against violence and disorder and to respect the Constitutional rights to all men to liberty, equality and justice.”
Chapter - 11

NORTH-EAST - ARENA FOR PAKISTAN (ISI) SPONSORED
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Before going into the aspect of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) the Pakistani interest in the North-East should be understood from the angles of past history, present reality and future designs. The study by the investigator unmistakably pointed a finger to a change in scenario in which the focus had irrevocably shifted from insurgency to Pakistani (ISI) designs to convert North-East into another Kashmir without even the insurgent outfits remotely alive to the impending danger.

11.1 Past History

It is now history that as a result of the partition of Bengal in 1905, Assam was merged with East Bengal where the Assamese was a minority. But then the partition was annulled in 1911 and Assam became a separate province. The real invasion of Assam by the then East Bengal Muslims can be said to have commenced from 1940s. During the period, Assam had a Muslim League Ministry headed by Sir Said Sadulla. He had shown a missionary zeal to settle East Bengali Muslims in Assam and did so under a programme known as “Grow more Food” which was described by then Viceroy Lord Wavell in his book “Viceroy’s Journal” as “Grow more Muslim” programme.

Earlier the then census Commissioner (1931) C.S. Mullan while reporting on population growth in Assam had warned the Assamese that they were an “endangered” species. This prediction could be a reality in not too distant a future as 12 districts of the 23 in Assam were edging towards it (4 were already Muslim majority districts viz. Dhubri (70.46) Goalpara (50.18), Barpeta (56.07) and Hailakandi (54.79). This aspect has been covered under Assam in a detailed way.
The eagerness of Muslim leaders to get Assam even before independence remained unfulfilled. Moinul Haque Chowdhury the then P.S to Mohd. Ali Jinnah had promised to hand over Assam in a ‘Silver Platter’ and later Jinnah had boasted that Assam was in his kit. Chowdhury was subsequently a Minister in the Assam and Union Cabinets.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his book “Myth of Independence” wrote “it would be wrong to think that Kashmir is the only dispute that divides India and Pakistan though undoubtedly the most significant one at least nearly as important as Kashmir dispute is that of Assam and some districts of India adjacent to East Pakistan. To these, Pakistan has a very good claim”.

Even a pro-India leader like Sk. Mujibur Rahman in his book “East Pakistan – Its population and Economy” observed “because East Pakistan must have sufficient land for its expansion and because Assam has abundant forest and mineral resources, coal, petroleum. etc., East Pakistan must include Assam (then undivided) to be financially and economically strong”.

Since early 1990s Bangladeshi thinkers were speaking about the theory of “Lebensraum” (German word – meaning living space). In fairness they argued “if consumer benefit is considered to be better served by borderless competitive trade of commodities why not borderless competitive trade of labour” There is reason for this argument as in this competition Bangladesh would outwit other countries because of unbridled population growth and they have no right to control it as it was against religious tenets “the runaway population growth in Bangladesh resulting in suffocating density of population in a territorially small country presents a nightmarish picture – 114 million (Bangladesh Govt. figure) within an area of barely 55000 sq. miles making for a density of 1054 to the sq. mile. What is worse all projections point to an inexorable growth leading to 137 million (density 2470) by the year 2000. No other people except in a city State like Singapore is so packed like Sardines in a can”. Bangladesh population was growing at the rate of 2.8 million per year. In every year 1/3 of Bangladesh got
inundated by floods displacing on an average 19 million people. 60% of the people lived below poverty line. This explained the reason for invasion by Bangladeshis to the North-East. The above clearly indicated the fate in store for the North-East, a trend no force on earth would be able to reverse, a reality given the developments that were taking place. The Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) connection has to be studied from this angle.

North-East insurgents had lived by the adage ‘enemy’s enemy is my friend’ and looked to Pakistan for all help. None was more happy than Pakistan to help them. The seed for the relationship was sowed by A.Z. Phizo leader of the Naga Insurgency which was nurtured by Pakistan with care and caution never allowing for a slip up. During Bangladesh war (1971) there was a small break but resumed subsequently particularly after ULFA also prostrated before the ISI seeking help.

How the influx problem was handled

While this topic has been dealt in a detailed manner under Assam it is touched here in a passing manner to connect the events. The North-East leaders had invariably put personal interest before national interest as the emigrants provided a powerful vote bank. In the early stages it was beneficial for the Congress, the then ruling party both in the States and at the Centre. In this connection the famous saying of Dev Kanta Barooah one time All India Congress President that “so long as Ali’s (Muslims) and coolies (plantation labour) are with the Congress it did not care for anybody”. In 1990 Hiteswar Saikia had declared in the Assam Assembly that “there was not a single foreigner in Assam” making derision of the agitations launched in this connection over the years and the sacrifices made by the youth of Assam on the foreigners issue.

In 1991, the Congress-I Ministry which had 25% Muslim Ministers was nick named as Muslim Ministry. Migrant as well as indigenous Muslims had jointly influenced the election results. This gave the required boost to fundamentalist elements
and they became vocal and aggressive. The rivalry between Hindu refugees and migrant Muslims over possession of fertile cultivable land had added to the communal divide. During the Babri Masjid agitation the Muslims had indulged in violence, including killing, looting and destruction of temples, resulting in more than 100 killings in Assam. The electoral roll revision and the divergent stand of various organizations on the presence of a large number of Muslims in the State had added to the communal polarization in the State.

In 1996 the secret of Assam Gana Parishad’s (A.G.P) return to power after being in the wilderness for five years was its ability to play the Congress game in the matter of using the clandestine vote bank of Bangladeshi emigrants. The voters’ list had also shown the changes taking place. What no agency wanted to do was enforcing a check on the inflow.

While this was so, what further encouraged the inflow was ready availability of menial jobs in the North-East. The people of the North-East were in general lazy, lethargic, easy going and adopted a laid back policy. This got aggravated with the Centre pampering them and treating them like patients in an ICU without prompting them to stand on their own legs. Insurgency movements struck at the root of initiative as possession of a gun brought money in lakhs. Overall security aspect and their own very existence was never given a thought. Identification of Bangladeshi can be done only by the locals but they were not doing so. North-East has got about 2000 kms. porous border with Bangladesh. There was talk of strengthening border fencing construction of roads along borders and posting of more S.F but fencing was cut roads were crossed and guards were bribed. The argument of Bangladeshi thinkers for a borderless trade of labour was in reality upheld in the North-East, the only difference being the trade was from and not to Bangladesh. It was not surprising that ISI could make forays into the jungles of the North-East to prepare a grand plan of action.
Muslim Population in North East

Assam

According to 1991 census the figure of Muslim population stood at 63,73,204 (total 2,24,14,322). A sharp increase in Muslim population was reported between 1951-1971 period when it was 41.89 for Hindus whereas Muslim growth was recorded as 77.42. If this growth rate continued Assam would be a Muslim majority State in not too distant a future. To quote some cases between 1994-97 enumeration of election list in Assam by the Election Commission showed more than 30% increase in 17 Assembly Constituencies and more than 30% increase in 40 others. The all India average for the three year period was 7% whereas that of Assam was 16.4%. In the case of Assembly Constituency viz. Mangaldoi where a bye-election was to be held, it was pointed out that 1/6 of the total electorate (45000 voters) were declared as foreigners by the competent courts. In fact, this incident set in motion the Assam agitation by the AASU and subsequently led to the birth of ULFA.

Nagaland

In spite of the Talisman of Inner Line Permit the influx of outsiders particularly Bangladeshis to uninhabited areas along Assam-Nagaland border was taking place creating heat on the Nagas. The Nagaland population which was 7,74,930 in 1981 rose to 12,51,573 in 1991 a difference of 476643. Such a high rate of growth among Nagas within ten years was next to impossible, the only explanation being influx of outsiders. According to Naga Students Federation (NSF) there were 5000 Bangladeshis in Mon district alone. The tribals being honest the cunning Bangladeshis got easy foot hold and they sweated it out in the jungles to make a livelihood.

A report sent by Nagaland Govt. summed up the emerging scenario even for the North-East as a whole. Captioned the “demographic invasion” it made out that “the Bangladeshi immigrant population has grown in alarming proportions in the last decade.
It is as if there is a demographic invasion. They are now infiltrating into the very socio-economic fabric of the land by –

1. Rewards for marriage to locals
2. Systematic take over of all available land in the foothills and disputed areas adjoining Assam and Nagaland.
3. Systematic take over of business and economic activity in almost all urban areas, including the retail and wholesale business of agriculture, vegetable and fish/meat business. Should this development be allowed to continue they will monopolize all trade in Nagaland. With economic power in their hands, they will make the local people an easy prey to their anti-India views.
4. They are actively involved in gun running for the various insurgent groups and are even inciting them to fight each other.
5. They are deliberately abetting political instability and turmoil in the region.
6. They were forming underground terrorist groups and specially targeting the Indian nationals doing business in the State.
7. They are building up effective propaganda machinery to win over the minds of the tribals and create anti-India feelings among the people”.

Meghalaya

Meghalaya provided a safe haven for all migrants as no permit was required here. All those who faced problem of permits elsewhere flocked to Meghalaya. With all the Insurgent organizations operating in the North-East using Meghalaya as a dancing ground none paid attention to the Bangladeshis. Some rough estimate place the figure of outsiders (mostly Bangladeshis) at 4 lakhs (total population – 17,74,778 (1991). With common borders with Bangladesh the ingress and egress of Bangladeshis was an established fact without any check and no agency could estimate the actual figure of Bangladeshis.
Meghalayans were also smarting under discontent over the unabated in-flow of Nepalis taking advantage of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal, 1950. The withdrawal of the Foreigners (Restricted Area) Order, 1963, by the Govt. of India also helped the Nepalis.

**Mizoram**

The official figure of Muslims was placed at 10,000 but it had gone up roughly to one lakh indicating an influx. The Mizoram govt. was seized of the seriousness of the situation and was taking action. It has both land and river routes with Bangladesh.

**Manipur**

The Bangladeshis in Manipur were difficult to be identified. They were everywhere. A rough estimate of their number was around 6 lakhs (total population - 18,37,149 (1991). According to official figures the Muslim population was 1,33,535 (1991).

**Tripura**

It has common borders with Bangladesh and the ingress and egress took place unhindered. The exact figure of Bangladeshis was difficult to be assessed. The 10th August, 1998 issue of India Today quoting Home Ministry sources had however given the breakdown of illegal migrants by States in which the figure for Tripura was quoted as 8 lakhs. The Muslim population was 1,96,495 to a total population of 2,757,205 as per 1991 census. During 1971 – 1981 period the population growth of Tripura was to the tune of 31.92% as compared to all India average 25%. In the next decade (1981 – 1991), the growth was even higher at 33.69% whereas the all India figure was 23.5%. This increase was attributed to Bangladeshi emigration. Besides, geographical contiguity factors like common language, cultural affinity, open border and suppression of minority in Bangladesh also helped the inflow.
Arunachal Pradesh

The total Muslim population was a mere 11922 (1991) to a total population of 8,64,558). But there had been a demographic invasion by Bangladeshis who were everywhere. It was roughly put at three lakhs. As already stated elsewhere the problem of Chakmas and Hajongs was also posing a threat to Arunachal Pradesh, as they were allegedly potential harbourers of Bangladeshi infiltrators belonging to their own community.

Thus Bangladeshi population had come to invade the North-East. Ironically no religious census was reported to have been carried out at any time. In any case the real estimated figure of Bangladeshis in the North-East was anybody’s guess as even in the normal case they had never given their actual number and address. When chased they took shelter in Chars (river islands) or bluffed their way only to return again. The Bangladeshi spread was evenly placed to the whole of the North-East and no State was free of the threat of the silent invasion. One should also visualize the growth of the ISI in equal measure as none of the Bangladeshi would shy away from becoming a ‘Jihadi’ when the need arose.

11.2 Present Reality

In order to understand the present reality a peep into Muslim politics would be helpful. Though directly not connected with insurgency Muslim politics in Assam was to a great extent a contributing factor to the growth of Islamic fundamentalist militancy which had its echoes throughout the region.

Muslim politics underwent a dramatic change with the arrival of Hiteswar Saikia as Chief Minister of Assam (1990). The times were such that ULFA activities were at its peak, Operation Bajrang ended in a fiasco and he was ready to take help from any source to come to power little realizing that he was putting Assam’s neck to a millstone. With
ILLEGAL MIGRANTS FROM BANGLADESH TO NORTH EASTERN STATES - 2000 AD (Approx.)

40 - 45% (of this about 20% is Bangladeshis)

Arunachal Pradesh
3 Lakhs includes Muslims, Chakmas and Hajongs from Bangladesh

Nagaland
5 Lakhs - Majority Bangladesh Muslims

Manipur
6 Lakhs - Majority Bangladesh Muslims

Mizoram
1 Lakh - Bangladeshis

Tripura
8 Lakhs - Majority Bangladeshis

Meghalaya
4 Lakhs - includes Bangladeshis and Nepalese
his coming to power the Muslims put pressure on him. This lobby cutting across party lines saw to the interest of the Muslims. Some of the vociferous were:-

2. Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Believes in ‘Jihad’ for the protection of Muslims without any compromise.
4. Tabligh-Jamaat. It was successful in spreading its activities to all areas of North-East.
5. Aval-e-Sunnat-Vat-Jamaat. It taught Quaranic way of life. IT is a pan-Islamic organization.
6. Cachar Muslim Unnayan Parishad (CMUP)
7. Anjuman Talmiva-e-Sunniya
8. Anjuman-e-Tarakhi

All active in Barak Valley

These organizations along with others could snatch a lot of benefits which included (1) reservation in govt. service as per population percentage, (2) OBC Status (3) setting up of Minority Commission, minority parishad, minority corporation, etc. exclusively for the Muslims. With reservation on the basis of population came the admission that their population was not 20% as claimed earlier but 40%. This naturally included Bangladeshis. The actual percentage was reportedly around 40-45% or even more.

With mushroom growth of militant outfits in the North-East, the Muslims also thought of safeguarding their interests which saw the growth of a number of Islamic fundamentalist militant outfits (mostly armed). Prominent among them were:-

Assam

1. MULFA – Muslim ULFA (100 armed)
2. MULA – Muslim United Liberation Army (50 armed) – demanded formation of separate Muslim State through armed struggle and sent 2/3 batches of volunteers for training to Bangladesh with ISI backing.
3. MULTA – Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam (250 – armed)
4. ILF - Islamic Liberation Front (50 armed)
5. IULA – Islamic United Liberation Army (details not known).
6. IRF – Islamic Revolutionary Force (details not known).
7. AMLA – Assam Minority Liberation Army (100 armed).
8. SIMI – Students Islamic Movement in India (750)
9. MLFA – Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (100 – armed)
10. MNVF – Muslim National Volunteer Force (250 – armed)
11. IRA – Islamic Revolutionary Army.
12. MLTF – Muslim Liberation Tiger Force (details not known).

Manipur

13. PULF – Peoples United Liberation Front (250 armed.) – having units at Dimapur (Nagaland), Agartala (Tripura) and Guwahati and Nagaon (both in Assam).
14. NEMF – North Eastern Minority Front (250)

This development sent a clear message to the people of North-East that Muslims were not to lie low and would hit back. The significant factor was that Muslims displayed unity in fighting for their interests which was conspicuous by its absence among other communities, even among various militant outfits. These outfits were backed by the ISI.

The intransigent attitude among Muslims can be attributed to the obsequiousness displayed by insurgent outfits of North-East before the ISI operating through the Director General of Foreign Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh where these outfits had established their camps. The following major insurgent/terrorist outfits of North-East had their camps in Bangladesh:-
1. NSCN(IM) (Nagaland) – 5 at Sylhet, Chittagong, Moulvi Bazar and Haluaghat.
3. HNLC (Hymniewtrep National Liberation Council) (Meghalaya), 3- Chitagong, Sylhet and Moulvi Bazar.
4. ATTF (All Tripura Tiger Force) (Tripura) – 8. 2-Habiganj, 2-Moulvi Bazar, 1- Comilla, 3-Khargachari
5. NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura (Tripura) – 21. 11-Khargachari, 5- Habiganj, 2-Bandarban, 2-Rangmati, 1-Moulvi Bazar.
6. ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam (Assam) – Dhaka – 1.
7. NDFB (National Development Front of Bodoland ) – 1 – Cox Bazar.

Almost all other splinter – minor terrorist outfits either took shelter or were based in Bangladesh independently. If the ISI or Bangladesh Govt. wished to send them out the insurgency movements in the North-East would be finished. Given the scenario one can surmise why no agency, political parties running the govt.s and insurgents launching the movements was vociferous about the influx from Bangladesh. No barbed wire, no roads, no amount of legal measures and no amount of S.F can cut through a determined mental block.

11.3 Future designs

According to disclosures made by arrested ISI agents at various times the stated objectives of ISI were:-

1. Train large number of Muslims to wage holy war to liberate North-East.
2. Make use of ULFA and other militant outfits for creating large scale disturbances.
3. Make use of ULFA and other militant outfits for destroying public property like oil pipelines refineries, etc.
4. Launch two pronged economic warfare (1) siphon off money by UG elements to Pakistan and other countries (2) pump large quantities of fake currency to North-East.

5. Foment communal trouble in North-East by inciting innocent law abiding Muslims by creating misunderstanding and hatred against non-Muslim population.

Is it a Low Intensity Conflict at the Instance of the ISI?

The answer is indisputably in the affirmative, the situation being what had been stated.

The term ‘LIC’ has often been applied by experts and military strategists for the insurgency movements in the North-East. It is also recognized as a ‘War by Proxy’ aided and abetted by Pakistan through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

LIC as a term came to be used by the Americans essentially after the Vietnam War. “Between peace and war we find these vague conditions and uncertainties that Americans called LIC”.

LIC is described for the purpose of the study as “wars of attrition launched in an unconventional manner aimed at wearing down an enemy that are protracted, localized and often ending in use of regular forces against bands of irregulars”. It is below conventional war and above peaceful competition. It is also referred variously as Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs) Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and non-military modes of conflict by Americans for liberation struggles in 3rd world countries. LIC usually will have backing from outside forces as was the case in the North-East.

Pakistan (ISI) had been assisting the insurgent groups with weapons/shelter, advice, etc. since inception (1956). It started with Naga insurgency considered mother of all insurgencies. For a time it looked to China where some batches were trained in guerilla warfare but subsequently turned to Pakistan and the relationship grew to the extent that keeping the powerful splinter group National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (Isac Muivah) as the bulwark ISI could rope in all insurgent groups of the North-East. Though NSCN(IM) has come to the conference table by declaring a ceasefire ISI would not be without its strangle hold. It was reportedly fine tuning ULFA to head the UG pantheon in the North-East.

*What ISI could achieve*

1. Convert the insurgent movements as LIC at its behest.
2. Convert all insurgents as its proteges ready to obey its command by supplying them sophisticated weapons/shelters and advice.
3. Enforce silence on them over the issue of continuous influx of Bangladeshis on a quid pro-quo basis.
4. Encourage original Muslim settlers of North-East in general and fundamentalist Muslim outfits in particular to take the lead in trumpeting about threat to minority communities and get concessions.
5. Bring about unity in approach to safeguard Muslim interests from the side of Muslim outfits.
6. Whip up anti-mainlander feelings, launch attacks against them and take it to feverish pitch of killing and driving them out.
7. Turn the people into drug addicts, drug peddlers, gun trotters and channels for fake currency distribution ready to do anything at its bidding.
9. Force the Govt. of India to dump more and more money to the North-East without being able to put a damper on insurgency.
10. Pin down large number of SF without any useful effect and force them to make demands for more and more.
11. Trap the North East in its vicious grip with a leash on the insurgents for use when necessary. It can choke the chicken neck (Siliguri tract) at any time of its choice, thereby delink mainland from the North-East.
12. Prepare the ground for “Jihad” without much effort, all at the cost of India and using Indian insurgents.
13. Bring in China to the North-East by making them to supply arms (unmarked).

It has been a win-win LIC for ISI all the time. It would bid time till Muslims normally outnumber locals all over which would not take more time. Next step would be capturing assembly seats and in number game Muslims would win. Then only the local insurgent outfits would know who was wiser, whether they or the ISI.

No amount of conventionally trained force would be able to thwart efforts of a well entrenched, well armed Islamic Commando “Jihadis” that too in a jungle area of the type of North-East. Add to this the surprise element which would serve as a force multiplier. “Revolutionary warfare exploits it to carry the principle of economy of force to lengths unimaginable to the conventionally military mind. Irregular operations of every kind constitute the most likely form of future armed conflict, they should be understood and acknowledged for what they are – a way of war”.

If left unchecked, ISI would get North-East for Pakistan without having to put regularly trained army to invite a retaliation from India, without having the fear of a nuclear holocaust without incurring huge expenses to affect the economy of Pakistan without having to invite international criticism and stoppage of financial aid and would be able wreak vengeance on India for the wars of 1965 and 1971. They would get North-East on a ‘Silver Platter’ for a song.

What favoured the ISI most was that the insurgents were also engaged in LIC with India but they kowttowed before it. Among themselves also insurgents fought to the benefit of ISI. NSCN(IM) and (K) fought among themselves leading to killings, Kukis and Thangkhul militant groups fought bitterly NDFB and BLT were at each others throats, HNLC and ANVC were not seeing eye to eye, ATTF and NLFT killed each other. Tripuris hated Bengalis, Bodos hated Santhals. Arunachalis hated Chakmas, Mizos hated Brus (Reangs). Not enough, Bodos want Bodo Land, Karbis want Karbi Land, Koch Raj Bongshis want Kamatapur, Assamese want Swadhin Assam, Barak
Valley want Barak Land, Garos want Garo Land, Nagas want Nagalim with all Naga inhabited areas and none was prepared for conciliation more because of irreconcilable, religious, deviationist tendencies. It was amply clear that they were not fighting ‘liberation wars’ but were going for MAD (Mutually Agreed Destruction). In the face of it Muslim outfits stood united to fight for ‘Lebensraum’ for Bangladeshis through a Jihad and none including political parties dared to challenge for they were vote providers.

While this was so the North-Easterners were hell bent on their traditional hate India campaign by attacking mainlanders woefully ignorant about the impending disaster awaiting them much to the exultation of the ISI.

ULFA leadership enjoyed Bangladesh patronage at the instance of ISI and the trap was woven long ago. If any leadership of any insurgent movement had acted unwisely it was the leadership of ULFA as it had failed to realize the base of Assamese society, a pluralist matrix and no single community could claim to be a spokesman for others which ULFA did and therefore failed. Assamese had committed blunder by encouraging vivisection of Assam on language basis earlier. The ULFA movement had finished whatever was left of their very freedom which would in no distant a future be dictated by Muslims as the study had proved. At stake is India’s security. To ISI’s advantage, China had also come to notice for wading in North-Eastern waters.

The North East situation had gone worse mainly because of pampering and appeasement. As was often the result in such cases they got spoiled, corruption rose to unimaginable levels and they refused to see reason. Pamper to spoil, chastise to discipline. Unless reality hits them in their face, realisation would not dawn but that would be late. Unfortunately the mental link of North Easterners with mainland was as tenuous as the land link.

Intelligence should have been the weapon with which insurgency/LIC could have been neutralized. The approach was allegedly lackadaisical which was not able to check the onward march of a determined hound like the ISI. ‘Intelligence’ should have also
been converted into action through political will of the narest kind. Developments in the North-East had brought both China and Pakistan much more closer to the mainland to pose still further threat. In an insurgency only two options were there (1) nip it in the bud or (2) turn the area into a desert. For India only the second option remained. Any piecemeal fire-fighting exercise limited to a group of insurgents in a particular state would not make even the slightest of difference. A well coordinated massive operation involving every sinew of law and order of the State Govts. of all the Seven States may prove successful to turn the tide for the benefit of North-East, failing which the downward economic slide already in motion would pick up further momentum and none would be able to save the region from its inevitable economic doom and ultimate fall to the receptive arms of the ISI. As per the study such was the seriousness of the problem from security point of view for on the one side what was taking place was mere terrorism and on the other the outfits propagating insurgency were mere pawns in the hands of the Pakistan Intelligence Agency, the ISI which was furthering its aim of ‘Jihad’ through a Low Intensity Conflict. The worst problem in the North East was reportedly to distinguish friends from foes and keeping real time information about movements of terrorist outfits. The problem was serious and required deft handling which can be discarded at India’s own peril. A Kashmir like situation was in the making and if allowed to develop any further what one would witness in the North-East would indeed be a repeat with much more severity.
Chapter – 12

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

12.1 Introduction

In this chapter the following aspects are being covered:-

➢ Analysis and interpretation of data – Response of the officers and men of the CPMF/Army/Police on the questionnaire on insurgency in the North-East and the conclusions drawn.
➢ Opinions of the experts interviewed and the conclusions drawn.

12.2 Response on questionnaire on Insurgency in the North-East

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which the State has been affected by insurgency/militancy in the following domains. The response were fed in computer by using SPSS package. The analysis and interpretation of data yielded the following results:-

12.1.1 Law and Order

The results from the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12.2.1.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response on attitude statement No.1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Extent to which the State has been affected |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law &amp; Order</td>
<td>22 (21%)</td>
<td>47 (44.7%)</td>
<td>22 (21%)</td>
<td>8 (7.6%)</td>
<td>6 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>Mean 3.67 Mode 4 S.D 1.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of response</td>
<td>To a considerable extent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

441
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Everyday Life</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply of Essential Commodities</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important Festivals</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between communities</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental Activities</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Activities</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Police</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To a considerable extent.
To some extent.
To a little extent.
To a considerable extent.
Table 12.2.1.5

TO WHAT EXTENT THE STATE HAS BEEN AFFECTED BY INSURGENCY/MILITANCY IMPORTANT FESTIVALS

- Fully: 23%
- To a Considerable Extent: 10%
- To Some Extent: 7%
- To a Little Extent: 22%
- Not at all: 38%

Figure - 5

Table 12.2.1.6

TO WHAT EXTENT THE STATE HAS BEEN AFFECTED BY INSURGENCY/MILITANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITIES

- Fully: 17%
- To a Considerable Extent: 27%
- To Some Extent: 4%
- To a Little Extent: 28%
- Not at all: 24%

Figure - 6

Table 12.2.1.7

TO WHAT EXTENT THE STATE HAS BEEN AFFECTED BY INSURGENCY/MILITANCY DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES

- Fully: 17%
- To a Considerable Extent: 14%
- To Some Extent: 9%
- To a Little Extent: 7%
- Not at all: 53%

Figure - 7

Table 12.2.1.8

TO WHAT EXTENT THE STATE HAS BEEN AFFECTED BY INSURGENCY/MILITANCY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

- Fully: 10%
- To a Considerable Extent: 34%
- To Some Extent: 34%
- To a Little Extent: 19%
- Not at all: 27%

Figure - 8
Response to statement No.2: To what extent police has been successful in combating insurgency/militancy. The results from the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.2.

**Table 12.2.2**
Response on attitude statement No.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Fully (n)</th>
<th>To a Considerable Extent (n)</th>
<th>To some Extent (n)</th>
<th>To a Little Extent (n)</th>
<th>Not at all (n)</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent police been successful in combating insurgency/ militancy</td>
<td>3 (2.9%)</td>
<td>19 (18.1%)</td>
<td>28 (26.7%)</td>
<td>40 (38.0%)</td>
<td>15 (14.3%)</td>
<td>Mean 2.57 Mode 2</td>
<td>To a little extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagramatic representation of data is presented in Figure-11
12.2.3. Response on statement No.3: How effectively police has been trained to fight insurgency.

The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.3.

Table 12.2.3.

Responses on attitude statement No.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Fully (Percentage)</th>
<th>To a considerable extent (Percentage)</th>
<th>To some extent (Percentage)</th>
<th>To a little extent (Percentage)</th>
<th>Not at all (Percentage)</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How effectively police has been trained to fight insurgency</td>
<td>8 (7.6%)</td>
<td>11 (10.5%)</td>
<td>27 (25.7%)</td>
<td>43 (41%)</td>
<td>16 (15.2%)</td>
<td>Mean 2.54, Mode 2, SD 1.11</td>
<td>To a little extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12.2.4. Response on statement No.4: To what extent police morale remain high during insurgency operations.

The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.4.

**Table 12.2.4.**
Response on attitude statement No.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent police morale remain high during insurgency operations</td>
<td>8 (7.6%)</td>
<td>14 (13.3%)</td>
<td>31 (29.5%)</td>
<td>37 (35.3%)</td>
<td>15 (14.3%)</td>
<td>Mean 2.66 Mode 2 SD 1.12</td>
<td>To a little extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12.2.4

TO WHAT EXTENT POLICE MORALE REMAIN HIGH DURING INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

- Fully: 14%
- To a considerable extent: 8%
- To some extent: 13%
- To a limited extent: 36%
- Not at all: 29%

Figure – 13

12.2.5: Response on statement No.5A – To what extent public has been helping the police to fight insurgency.

The result of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.5

Table 12.2.5.

Response on attitude statement No.12.2.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent public has been helping the police to fight insurgency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Mean 2.07</td>
<td>To a little extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.9%)</td>
<td>(3.9%)</td>
<td>(13.6%)</td>
<td>(57.3%)</td>
<td>(22.3%)</td>
<td>Mode 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SD .882</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12.2.5

TO WHAT EXTENT PUBLIC HAS BEEN HELPING THE POLICE TO FIGHT INSURGENCY

Figure-14

12.2.5.1. Response on statement No.5B: Response on statement your views to improve public cooperation:-

83.41% stated the (1) Police should remove fear from public mind and it should take initiative.
16.59% did not offer any comments.

Diagramatic representation of views to improve public cooperation is presented in figure-15

Table 12.2.5.1

Your views to improve public cooperation

Figure - 15
12.2.6: Response on statement No.6.A: To what extent police has been a match to insurgents.

The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.6:-

Table 12.2.6.
Response on attitude statement No.6.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent police has been a match to insurgents.</td>
<td>5 (4.8%)</td>
<td>42 (40%)</td>
<td>38 (36.1%)</td>
<td>15 (14.3%)</td>
<td>5 (4.8%)</td>
<td>Mean 3.23</td>
<td>Mode 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SD .935</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To a little extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table – 12.2.6

TO WHAT EXTENT POLICE HAS BEEN A MATCH TO THE INSURGENTS

- Fully
- To a Considerable Extent
- To Some Extent
- To a Little Extent
- Not at all

Figure-16

12.2.6.1: Response on statement 6.B.: How should police reform be made more effective.

57.36% Stated that by providing better service conditions/better welfare measures/training/motivation.
21.26% Overall improvement of police force and motivation.
21.38% Did not offer any comments.
Diagramatic representation of data is presented in Figure-17.

Table 12.2.6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How should police reform be made more effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Stated that by providing better service conditions/welfare measures/training/motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overall improvement of police force and motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Did not offer any comments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure - 17

12.2.7.: Response on statement No.7.A. To what extend induction of para-military to fight insurgency was effective.

The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.7.:--

Table 12.2.7.

Response on attitude statement No.7.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent induction of para-military to fight insurgency was effective.</td>
<td>5 (4.8%)</td>
<td>42 (40%)</td>
<td>38 (36.1%)</td>
<td>15 (14.3%)</td>
<td>5 (4.8%)</td>
<td>Mean 3.23, Mode 4, SD .935</td>
<td>To a considerable extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

451
12.2.7.1: Response on statement No.7.B

Your views/suggestions/comments on para-military.

86.8% suggested that CPMF is necessary to assist local police. 13.2% wanted total withdrawal of CPMF as they tortured Civilians.

Diagramatic representation of views on induction of para-military to fight insurgency is presented in figure 19.

Table – 12.2.7.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Views/Suggestions/Comments on induction of para-military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure - 19
12.2.8 Response on statement No.8.A: How far induction of para-military/army has distanced people from police.

The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.8

Table 12.2.8

Response on attitude statement No.8.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| How far induction of para-military/army has distanced people from police. | 10 (9.5%) | 28 (26.7%) | 43 (41%) | 17 (16.2%) | 7 (6.6%) | Mean 3.16
Mode 3
SD 1.03 | To some extent |

Table 12.2.8

HOW FAR INDUCTION OF PARA-MILITARY/ARMY HAS DISTANCED PEOPLE FROM POLICE

![Pie chart]

Figure-20

12.2.8.1 Response on statement No.8.B

Any Suggestions:-
68.34% wanted police to launch anti-insurgency measures so as to be effective. 31.66% did not offer comments.

Diagramatic representation of data is presented in Figure 21.

**Table – 12.2.8.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Any suggestion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wanted police to launch anti-insurgency measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not offer any comments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure-21**

12.2.9. **Response on statement No.9.**
How could insurgents/militant groups consolidate their positions. Who helped them?

74.42% stated (1) Insurgency paid (2) Political Support (3) Unemployment  
22.55% (1) Because of foreign help (2) Easy money.  
5.03% Did not give opinion.

Diagramatic representation of data is presented in Figure 22.

**Table – 12.2.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How could insurgent militant groups consolidate their positions. Who helped them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stated (1) Insurgency paid (2) Political Support (3) Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated (1) Because of foreign help (2) Easy Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated (1) did not give opinion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure-22**
12.2.10: Response on statement No.10
How have foreign agencies been able to influence insurgents/militants?

91.24% by offering shelters/advice. 8.76% did not offer comments.

Diagramatic representation of data is presented in Figure-23.

**Table 12.2.10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How have foreign agencies been able to influence insurgents/militants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9% By offering shelters/advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91% Did not offer comments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure-23**

12.2.11: Response on statement No.11
To what extent in weakening insurgency, Govt. measures have been effective.

The result of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.11.

**Table 12.2.11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response on attitude statement No.11</th>
<th>Response Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domains</td>
<td>Fully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent in weakening insurgency Govt. measures have been effective</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table – 12.2.11

Figure-24

12.2.12: Response on statement No.12.
How have surrenders weakened the movement?
68.80% stated that surrenders had not weakened the movement.
23.02% stated it was effective in Assam.
8.18% did not give any comments.

Diagrapic representations of data is presented in figure-25
Table – 12.2.12

Extent to which govt. measures have been effective in weakening insurgency

- 8% Surrenders had not weakened the movement
- 23% It was effective in Assam
- 69% Did not give any comments.

Figure-25

12.2.13. Response on statement No.13
How political interference has been affecting the functioning of police in insurgency prone areas?
71.96% said it was political interference which affected functioning of police.
19.16% stated that there was political interference to some extent.
8.88% did not offer any comments.

Diagramatic representation of data is presented in figure-25

Table- 12.2.13

How political interference has been affecting the functioning of police in insurgency prone areas

- 9% By interference in police administration
- 9% There was political interference to some extent
- 72% Did not offer any comments.

Figure-26

Which of the following communities have been affected by insurgency in the North-East?
100% stated that all the communities were affected.

12.2.15. Response on statement No. 15

To what extent following were responsible for insurgency?

12.2.15.1 Economic backwardness:
The results from statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.15.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Fully (Response)</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic backwardness</td>
<td>53 (50.4%)</td>
<td>35 (33.3%)</td>
<td>13 (12.4%)</td>
<td>1 (1.0%)</td>
<td>3 (2.9%)</td>
<td>Mean 4.27 Mode 5 SD 0.925</td>
<td>Fully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy</td>
<td>18 (17.1%)</td>
<td>17 (16.2%)</td>
<td>39 (37.1%)</td>
<td>25 (23.8%)</td>
<td>6 (5.8%)</td>
<td>Mean 3.14 Mode 3 SD 1.147</td>
<td>To some extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influx of Outsiders</td>
<td>38 (34.3%)</td>
<td>38 (36.2%)</td>
<td>24 (22.8%)</td>
<td>5 (4.8%)</td>
<td>2 (1.9%)</td>
<td>Mean 3.96 Mode 4 SD 0.975</td>
<td>To a considerable extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire for separation</td>
<td>27 (25.7%)</td>
<td>30 (28.5%)</td>
<td>22 (21.0%)</td>
<td>23 (22.0%)</td>
<td>3 (2.8%)</td>
<td>Mean 3.52 Mode 4 SD 1.177</td>
<td>To a considerable extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other reason (unemployment)</td>
<td>4 (3.8%)</td>
<td>6 (5.7%)</td>
<td>43 (60.0%)</td>
<td>33 (31.4%)</td>
<td>19 (18.1%)</td>
<td>Mean 2.43 Mode 3 SD 0.994</td>
<td>To some extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12.2.15.5

TO WHAT EXTENT ANY OTHER FACTOR (UNEMPLOYMENT) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR INSURGENCY

- 41%
- 4%
- 6%
- 18%
- 31%

Figure 31

12.2.16: Response to statement No. 12.2.16. To what extent the influx of foreigners from Bangladesh could be solved. The results from statistical analysis are presented in Table 12.2.16.

Table 12.2.16

Response on attitude statement No. 12.2.16

Response Percentage
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent the influx of foreigners from Bangladesh could be solved</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29 (27.6%)</td>
<td>26 (24.8%)</td>
<td>32 (30.4%)</td>
<td>Mean 2.36</td>
<td>Mode 1 SD 1.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table - 12.2.16

**Figure-32**

12.2.17: Response to statement No. 12.2.17.

To what extent rivalry between Hindus and Muslims is affecting peace in the State. The result from statistical analysis are presented in Table-12.2.17

**Table-12.2.17**

Response on attitude statement No. 12.2.17
Response Percentage
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent rivalry between Hindus and Muslims is affecting peace in the State</td>
<td>6 (5.7%)</td>
<td>11 (10.5%)</td>
<td>15 (14.3%)</td>
<td>39 (37.1%)</td>
<td>34 (32.4%)</td>
<td>Mean 2.20  Mode 2  SD 1.18</td>
<td>To a little extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table – 12.2.17

![Pie chart showing the distribution of responses to the statement.](image)

Figure-33

12.2.18: Response to statement No.12.2.18
To what extent police has been able to persuade militants to surrender.

The results from statistical analysis are presented in Table-12.2.18.
### Table 12.2.18

**Response Percentage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Fully</th>
<th>To a considerable extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a little extent</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
<th>Mode of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent police has been able to persuade militants to surrender.</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>5 (4.8%)</td>
<td>33 (31.4%)</td>
<td>45 (42.8%)</td>
<td>21 (20%)</td>
<td>Mean 2.23 Mode 2 SD .861</td>
<td>To a little extent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table – 12.2.18

**TO WHAT EXTENT POLICE HAS BEEN ABLE TO PERSUADE MILITANTS TO SURRENDER**

- Fully: 1% (1)
- To a Considerable Extent: 5% (5)
- To Some Extent: 31% (31)
- To a Little Extent: 43% (43)
- Not at all: 20% (20)

Figure-34
12.2.3 Opinions of Experts Interviewed and the Conclusions drawn

Under this head structured interviews/questionnaire for experts conducted by the investigator are presented. A total of 12 experts were interviewed. Among the interviewed were a Governor, a Major General, an Additional D.G./IG and D.I.G of Police an Army Colonel, all serving in the insurgency prone areas, a Senior Reporter of a newspaper of the North-Eastern region and an ex-Administrator of Nagaland. Their views were as follows:-

Q. What is the genesis of the problem of insurgency? What are the reasons?

A. All were unanimous in their view that lack of economic development was in general the major reason. In the case of Nagaland however two experts stated that the problem was political in which missionaries played an active role. One of them also felt that lack of direction was responsible.

Another stated that "unabated infiltration of Bangladeshi nationals has added a new dimension to the problem of insurgency, as a number of Islamic militant outfits have cropped up in Assam in recent years and as per information available with the security forces they are getting help from the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). In fact, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) according to Government reports, is also getting help from the Pakistani Agency which added gravity to the situation".

Conclusion

Lack of economic development and infiltration from Bangladesh were responsible for insurgency.

Q. What are the visible effects of it on governance of people?
A. All were unanimous that governance of the people had become difficult. Government had become direction-less, police got demoralized, administration was inexperienced and politicians made use of insurgents. One felt that there was money and both politicians and anti-social elements were benefited. Another felt that because of pre-occupation with fight against insurgents due importance could not be given to regular policing. This led to further depletion of faith in administration. People became victims of demands/ extortions and were afraid to complain. When security forces acted the people were between the extremists and the S.F. Developmental activities had come to a standstill and various elements exploited the situation resulting in difficulties for the people.

"Because of insurgency, investors from outside were not too keen to set up their industries in Assam and the State was yet to get the desired results of the new industrial policy aimed at attracting investment. Assam had entered into a vicious circle as lack of development was fuelling insurgency, while on the other hand insurgency was affecting development".

Conclusion

Governance of people became difficult.

Q. What may be the future repercussions if the problem is not solved?

A. The unanimous view was that the result would be that more and more people would join the winning side. Unemployment would increase tremendously. One expert stated that 67% of the Budget allotment was going for payment of salaries, 27% for debt servicing and only the remaining was left for development. This was happening all over the North-East.

"This problem would very soon affect the country as a whole as it would pose a serious threat to the unity and integrity of India. If the Govt. reports that the Pakistani ISI
is fuelling insurgency in the North-East region are true, it would have very serious implications in the near future as it is a well known fact that the Pakistani agency is trying to create disturbance in India and Assam and other parts of the region may soon face a Kashmir like situation”.

**Conclusion**

More and more people would join the winning side.

Q. Do you feel that there should be a national consensus and a national policy on the issue? If so what should be the nature of the policy and how far it would be useful?

Six of the twelve experts felt that there should be a national consensus and national policy to solve the problem.

Four felt that the State police should be able to solve the problem. The local people knew who the insurgents were, their hide outs and activities. The local police had been raised from among them. They had ground knowledge. Army/CPMF were only short term solutions. Using them for long was bad. Police however required support by way of trained men and materials and money. What was important was intelligence. It was intelligence which actually defeated Punjab terrorism backed by political will. It could be done in North-East also.

Those who wanted a national consensus and national policy suggested that the North-Eastern States should join together to find out a solution with Central Govt. acting as the anchorman, whether autonomy would be a solution, etc. The infiltration from Bangladesh would pose serious problem if a consensus could not be reached. To solve the problem a political decision would be necessary.

One expert added that ‘ego’ problem was spoiling the administration to a very great extent. Two experts did not any comments.
Conclusion

The majority was of the view was that there should be a national consensus and a good number felt that the State Police should be able to solve the problem.

Q. Do you feel that the insurgency problem is out of control of the State administration? Yes/No. What are the reasons? What will be the consequences for the nation/State?

Seven of the twelve experts felt ‘No’. They felt that ‘Will’ to solve the problem was lacking.

One expert opined that none wanted to solve it as it brought money and with all pervasive corruption all enjoyed.

Three felt that the problem was out of control of the State administration. The issues included autonomy demands which had to be solved at the national level. Insurgents were getting help from foreign countries which had to be dealt by the Central Govt.

All the experts were unanimous that if the problem was not solved, security of the country would be in jeopardy and disintegration would take place.

Conclusion

If the problem is not solved, security of the country would be in jeopardy and disintegration would take place.

Q. Do you feel that there is genuine co-ordination of efforts between civil police and para-military/army to contain insurgency. How it could be further improved?
A. While three of the twelve experts stated that there was no genuine co-ordination, nine stated that there was a great amount of coordination but needed improvement. Earnest and sincere efforts were missing and ego clash hampered proper co-ordination.

One expert felt that judiciary was one agency which was more a nuisance than of use in the North-East. They were scared of the bad elements because of the gun behind them and the money that came easily. Even passing stringent laws would be useless, unless judiciary played its part in the interest of the nation. This was just not there in the North-East. This would be dangerous for the country.

Another expert stated that problems arose when respective roles were not clearly defined, e.g., Army/CPMF tended to treat District Administration as a provider of services such as accommodation/ transport/ telephone, POL, etc. but expected to be kept informed about the jobs performed. This had been resisted by the Army/CPMF on the ground that they were under no obligation to keep the District Administration informed. This area had not been clearly defined. Similarly confusion was created in matters of C.I. operation vis-à-vis law and order. These areas should be clearly defined to improve co-ordination.

Conclusion

There was no genuine coordination because of lack of clear definition about respective roles of agencies.

Q. What action/Steps should State take for coping with the problem?

A. The consensus was that the problem should be solved politically for which, there should be a 'political will' which was lacking. Other issues included (1) development of the area (2) fulfillment of justifiable demands (3) improvement of police and CPMF.
One expert highlighted that the biggest problem was corruption which took place in two ways (1) extortion by UG (2) corruption by people masquerading as UGs. Both politicians and police jointly and singly used UGs and indulged in corruption. It had become a national malaise. It was one of the causes of insurgency. Effective measures would be necessary to stop it, “otherwise the future is there for all to see”.

**Conclusion**

The problem should be solved politically for which there should be a political will.

Q. Your comments on the following aspects for coping with the problem?

**A. (1) Re-organization of Police**

Three experts stated that police force should be reorganized with modern, sophisticated equipment, proper training and adequate motivation. Families of those killed in action should also be taken care of.

Another expert stated that “the police has lost self-respect. First, direction has to come from political leaders. 75% of the problem is with administration. The entire police force should be pulled out. They are corrupt and inefficient. Force needs leadership quality. There is no motivation. No first class equipment is necessary but what is required is first class men”.

Eight others did not offer any comments.

**Conclusion**

Modernization of police was necessary. Direction has to come from political leaders and the police has lost self-respect.
(2) Training arrangements for Police Personnel

There was consensus among the experts that the training was not imparted on proper lines. The basic training now given did not contain much of elements of counter insurgency. One expert suggested imparting training locally. Another expert suggested provision of adequate men so that persons could be spared without affecting normal duties.

Yet another expert stated that no good officers came to police and basic elements were wrong and training was not done on proper lines.

One expert added that Army was prepared to give police whatever training was necessary if requested. This was done in Punjab and that would be good.

Conclusion

Training for police personnel was not given on proper lines.

(3) Public Participation in Police

All the 12 experts highlighted the importance of this aspect. According to one expert, this was tried in Guwahati through citizen committees which reduced burden on police. In some parts of the city the committees also carried out house to house surveys to prevent the ultras taking shelter in the guise of common tenants. In Nagaland the public tended to keep away from police. In general the public response to overtures from the police was not encouraging.

Conclusion

Public participation in policing was considered necessary.
(4) **Intelligence Function**

The unanimous view was that since inception intelligence was treated in a lopsided manner. As the intelligence operatives faced threat to their lives they preferred to withdraw to their shells and intelligence dried up. The preference was to have an intelligence policy which would have the essential ingredients of intelligence collection analysis and dissemination.

**Conclusion**

Intelligence was treated in a lop-sided manner. Intelligence policy should have the essential ingredients of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.

(5) **Media’s Role**

All the experts emphasized on its importance. One expert stated that the media was playing a positive role. Another criticized it for being negative. One expert alleged lack of cooperation from the Govt. side for proper reporting. Another stated that a section of Media provided ‘Oxygen’ to the insurgents by lionizing it and espousing their cause while yet another stated that the media played a positive role.

**Conclusion**

Role of media was emphasized. It however, tried to lionize the insurgents.

(6) **N.G.Os Role**

All experts expressed the opinion that the NGOs could play a positive role but this was not taking place. One alleged that the NGOs tended to be partisan towards the
insurgents. One expert felt that a sort of “political quackery is going on”. Another expert alleged complicity of Human Rights Organizations in covertly supporting insurgent outfits. He preferred a positive role for NGOs in the rehabilitation of surrendered insurgents.

**Conclusion**

NGOs could play a positive role.
Chapter – 13

SUMMARY FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

13.1. Summary Findings

1. North East with its distinct land-locked geographical set up is known for its remoteness and backwardness. Barring Mizoram, all the States in the region are in turmoil. It has become synonymous with insurgency.

Even though nature had placed North-East delicately for insurgency to flourish the precipitating reason was isolation and deprivation. Naga insurgency was rooted in their feeling of being separate with no political, cultural, economic binding with mainland. Whatever link was there got severed with British exit. After independence even though political and economic link was established emotional link was conspicuous by its absence. Others had followed in the footsteps of the Nagas.

Mizos were the first to join Indian Union but felt neglected during the great famine of 1959-60 leading to a revolt. Meiteis of Manipur felt deprived compared to other tribal communities who got protection under the new policies. Similarly Assamese and Bodos also felt deprived which made them to revolt. The tribal insurgency in Tripura was due to demographic and social imbalance manifested in the alienation of tribal land. Others in the region felt economic deprivation. In spite of persistent Central assistance, this feeling had not been assuaged and the demand was for more and more Central aids but without any visible development on ground.

2. The area had traditionally nurtured a sense of alienation. No worthwhile effort was ever made to bring them closer to the mainland psychologically. National leaders remained distant and were unaware of realities. The complexity of the
problem and intensity of feelings of the people of the region were never appreciated in proper perspective. Instead of having an overall policy and joint strategic planning by associating local people problems were dealt piecemeal as law and order with induction of CPMF and Army which had a countervailing effect.

3. The first State caught in the web of insurgency was Nagaland. When India attained independence Nagas had reached a fair stage of development which was unknown to the outside world. Others had drawn inspiration from Naga insurgency. The Shillong Accord of 1975 was to have ended the problem but a section that was then in China for training repudiated the Accord. This group did not come back to Nagaland and sought and received help from the then Burmese insurgent groups and regrouped. It came to be known as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and played the pivotal role in giving encouragement and help to other outfits to launch insurgent movement.

4. In each State there were a number of insurgent outfits which were not strong on ideologies and aspirations. Occasionally there were inter-group rivalries due to polarization of ethnic differences ending in detrimental fall out. Each group had its own political end to pursue which varied from State to State. Groupism came to the fore more because of politics and group loyalties gained importance but in course of time the groups consolidated position at the cost of political parties to increase bargaining power. A stage had reached when the armed groups, however small they might be refused to listen to political bosses. Their resilience was more because the State failed to win over the people and marginalise them. The overground vested interest also wanted to keep insurgency alive. This led to disorientation of the insurgent movements and their leaning towards criminal acts of partisan and ethnic killings/extortion/moral and material corruption and easy money.
5. There was plenty of money, weapons, manpower and a blood thirsty mind set with the UG groups. Their main target of attack was S.F. However the casualties on the ground whether advertent or collateral were predominantly civilians who had to bear the brunt of their wrath.

6. Violence, adventure and easy money had attracted and brought forward anti-social and criminal elements, school drop outs and militant sons of the soil to the UG fold.

7. Insurgency had paid North East both politically and economically. After its start the Centre had gone the extra mile to prop up and appease the region. It was given the most favoured treatment both under plan and non-plan schemes which reached enormous proportions. There was however no proportionate development on the ground. The extra-favouritism instead led to unseemly demands backed by threat of increased insurgency.

8. This region would beat any country in the world in corruption. Assam was categorised as the third most corrupt State in India “Nagaland beats the rest of India in corrupt practices. Every tier of the administration reeks with graft. On top of it is the extortion by the UG. Heads of departments deduct salary at source to pay to the underground. Shops and other establishments have a fixed amount to give and they clear it regularly”. Situation was not different in other States. CBI was to have enquired many cases/scandals but due to lack of permission from State Govts. such enquiries remained in limbo and ultimately either dropped or pushed under the carpet giving fresh lease to corruption.

9. Showing an accusing finger at the Centre for all ills of the North-East was a time tested ploy. This region had enough Central funds pouring in. A mere scanning through the budget allocations would be enough to prove the point. The only fact was that they were not spent in the manner in which they were meant to be spent. The money was poured without taxing the area (although gas, oil and other
minerals were drawn). There was indeed some neglect initially but then the assistance came without strings. Morarji Desai, once Finance Minister of India stated succinctly "much had been granted including safeguards and generous concessions. The subsidized border States virtually shopped in Delhi for Central projects and the requisite funds preferably as grants." In spite of all forms of assistance all that existed was insurgency. The reasons for such an absurd situation to prevail are not difficult to identify. Though elected govt's were in power in all the States overground politics were determined by underground politics. UGs run parallel govt's. and they spoke with gun. The principle was live and let live. A vested interest syndrome had gripped the agencies operating in the North-East. Initially it was developed by politicians to secure minority votes. Later everyone whether it was politician, bureaucrats, businessmen, contractors, wished to have insurgency within acceptable limits. It was also considered the best way to extract disproportionately large annual budgetary allocations or funds. None of these agencies wished similarly for the insurgency to end. The blame for this malady had to be placed squarely on the shoulders of local leadership.

10. North-East went awry in social and economic terms. Cruel and interlocking disparities of a very serious nature was persisting between urban vs. rural sections of society in addition to gender inequalities and ethnic and racial inequalities. Due to the 'fear and favour complex' that has been allowed to grow in the North-East there was splintering and mushroom growth of insurgent outfits. The State had failed to provide protection to minorities/small ethnic groups resulting in their seeking self-protection by forming militant groups and seek political patronage. One of the major allegation was that most of the Accords were the products of political expediencies and therefore proved to be Accords of discord. "They lacked credibility, sincerity and political will as well as machinery for implementation". The mushroom growth of insurgent outfits in each State and each nurturing hatred against the other had also made it impossible for them to work out a comprehensive plan of action. The political patronage extended by different political parties, payment of protection money and the UG leaders making best use of it for their five star life style had made the lower ranks to
indulge in more heinous crimes. Against the background the bureaucracy had come to adopt a 'soft option' attitude thereby weakening the administration in the States to the extent of lacking ‘fire fighters’ willing to take risk and become unpopular. UGs had the local bureaucratic – politician combine at their beck and call. Only the Central Forces stood on their way but they became the “Fall Guys”. “Know yourself and your enemy and you will be able to win a hundred battles” (Sun Wu Tzu – 600 BC). In the North-East the administrative actions were criticized for lack of clarity, direction and aim. If anything they had only taken the problems to a point of no return which led to growth of corruption, gross incompetence, alround inefficiency and served as manure to insurgency.

11. In Assam the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) had to contend with many other outfits important of which was the National Development Front of Bodoland (NDFB) demanding a separate Independent Bodoland. Though they had agreed not to target each other it was unlikely that they would return to the olden day camaraderie to live in peace. Similarly the minority communities which were posing no problems at all were chased, beaten and killed by Bodos only to make them aware of their strength and they retaliated. In Karbi Anglong district the Dimasa Tribes had started targeting Nepalis vitiating the atmosphere. The UG movement in North-East was sliding to the stage of ethnic cleansing. The migrant Muslims though worked under organizations believing in different ideologies united when challenged under militant outfits and spoke in one voice to fight against the enemy. The Bengalis also got united more than ever before. The Adivasis took to arms to protect themselves. In the process what was at stake was the very Assamese identity. Further splintering of Assam was on the cards, all because of ULFA.

12. In Nagaland the NSCN which was a formidable outfit once split. They came for negotiation after declaring a cease-fire. It was open to question whether their eyes would meet at the negotiating table as such was the nature of their bitterness. Nagaland had been a bloated balloon. Press on one side, it will bulge on the
other, press from all sides it would burst. Divisions on tribal lines persisted and tribal loyalties outweighed other considerations.

13. In Manipur even though the Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF) has been formed with the three major outfits viz. (1) United National Liberation Front (UNLF), (2) Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and (3) Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) there were many other minor outfits which did not subscribe to their ideology. MPLF was close to NSCN(IM) but it was totally opposed to the Greater Nagaland concept, a condition raised by it for further negotiations on cease-fire with the govt. If it pursued the demand further there would be mayhem in Manipur. The Naga-Kuki clash had left deep scars. Any further trouble would be having far reaching repercussions. Tribals were never known for forgiving and forgetting and the bitterness got etched in memory. Feuds of this nature had encouraged incitement, fund collection to finance agent provocateurs and exploited tribal feelings among political leaders and bureaucrats.

14. In Tripura the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) both Tribal outfits made Bengalis to unite under the United Bengali Liberation Force (UNLF) and the result was ethnic cleansing in tribal dominated areas. There were indications that Bengalis were going for arms.

15. In Arunachal Pradesh the NSCN(K) had unfettered sway in Tirap and Changlang districts. Arunachalis were opposed to Chakmas and Hajongs of the State. ULFA cadres also made forays into Arunachal.

16. Meghalaya was a hot bed of activities of all insurgent groups in the North-East as it was the conduit for going to and coming from their Bangladesh camps. The Khasi Students Union (KSU) was targeting outsiders. The State gave birth to three other outfits viz. HNLC, ANVC and MPLF the last comprised of criminals.
While HNLC stood for a separate independent Meghalaya, ANVC was for a separate Garoland incorporating all Garo inhabited areas.

17. The democratic process in the North East had only helped to generate and nurture hatred and animosity between parties and individuals and they sought help of UG groups to silence the opponents. This was done only to garner votes during elections and to remain in power. All parties and leaders had overt and covert understanding with UG groups. The UGs also availed the opportunity. It had twin benefits. It not only ensured safety of their channels of fund collection including extortion but also brought additional income by way of protection money. UGs, Contractors, Politicians and Bureaucrats were allegedly accomplices in the game. What was sacrificed in the process was development projects of the region and people were pawns on the chess board of insurgency.

18. North-East has common borders with China, Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh and all were aiding and abetting insurgency in the North-East. There was unhindered movements of people between North-East and Myanmar and Bhutan while from Bangladesh barring the to and fro movement of UGs there was only infiltration. All the seven States were receiving this unwelcome guests much against their wishes. They came in hordes and just stayed. They had become a formidable force. Foreigners’ issue had enough potential to explode like a volcano. While the exact figure of infiltration was not available, the rough estimate was around one crore now. As far as Assam was concerned they were in majority in 4 districts viz. Dhubri, Goalpara, Barpeta and Hailakandi and between 40 to 50 percent in 3 districts viz. Karimganj, Morigaon and Nagoan, 30 to 40 percent in 3 others viz. Bongaigaon, Darrang and Cachar. It would only a question of time when the above six district would become Muslim majority. Ironically foreigners issue had ceased to be an issue at all over which much blood had been shed. At this rate the dream of Zulfikar Ali Bhuto, Sk. Mujibur Rahman, Intellectuals of Bangladesh and their theory of ‘lebensraum’ and the
latest plan of Nawaz Sherif for ‘encircling India’ would come to fruition in not too distant a future.

19. North-East holds considerable oil reserves, gas, forest wealth, coal fields (unexplored fully), has high potential for tourism, tea plantations, agro-horticultural products, power and water development, transport and communication, manpower development etc. The scope for development remained unlimited. But the greatest drawback was lack of local manpower skilled and unskilled to do the work. It was here that the migrants filled the vacuum. Among them the majority was Bangladeshis and they were making best use of the situation. Without them, the people of North-East would find it hard going. North-East could be India’s space but it was slowly turning into the living space of Bangladeshis. What had started as a trickle had reached alarming proportions but for politicians they were mere vote banks.

20. The insurgency movements in the North-East were supported and bolstered by outside support from China, Bangladesh and Pakistan through the ISI. The China-Pak friendship is a time-tested one. Almost all insurgent outfits were at the mercy of the ISI and the link had reached even Afghanistan. The LTTE had also been maintaining links/helping the insurgents, The ethnic militants in Myanmar like KIA were traditional supporters of the insurgents. Islamic radicalism strengthened by militancy was also at play. A significant aspect was that while the UG outfits fought against each other and destroyed themselves the Muslims displayed unity in approach. They would bid time till they attain majority and then by ‘Jihad’ capture the North-East. The Madrasas served as the nodal points for their nefarious activities. A Kashmir was no doubt in the making in the North-East. In Kashmir, India was able to hold on but in the North the terrain would make it difficult unless turned into a desert.
21. Weapons flowed to the North-East non stop. Three routes were basically used. The weapons were first brought to Nagaland from Cox Bazar in Bangladesh through porous borders and distributed. Their source of supply was Thailand, Cambodia, etc. and brought to Bangladesh through sea route. Small arms were reportedly in great demand.

22. Two other evils which played with the life of the people of North-East was drugs and counterfeit currency behind which hand of ISI was suspected. Drug menace was more in rural areas and the number of drug addicts was increasing. The unemployment problem in the regions was reaching alarming proportions. If only the resources available could be harnessed, if only they could be motivated North-East would turn into a heaven on earth. As of now, it lacked everything from good leaders to lead, lack of environmental policies, a will to crack the whip on corruption, to develop the area industrially and above all failure to make the people feel included in the mind set of India. They felt that they were dictated which they hated. Paternalism had provoked bitterness and made the area dull and weak.

23. North-East is of geo-strategic importance for India from security point of view. It can certainly claim to hold the key in South-East and East Asia just as West Asia. It is connected with the mainland by a tenuous land link through the Siliguri corridor. Assam controls the eastern end of this neck. Therefore loss of Assam would mean loss of the entire land mass in the North-East with its natural resources. It is truly a gold mine and we can ill afford to ignore it. The region is a thriving example of pluralism.

24. About 2 lakh security personnel (approx.) composed of local police, Assam Rifle, CRPF, BSF, IR Bns and Army operate in the area to meet the challenge of about fifteen thousand insurgents. It was involved in a war of attrition with the UGs
with no winning mode. The Govts. in the region were in a "lose-lose" situation. The UG had the advantage of local support. Tribal/ethnic affinities ran deep.

25. Surrenders were few and far between and cannot claim to have made a dent in the UG movement. The surrendered were used for tracking UGs which made them targets of attack. The surrender benefits were not lucrative enough to lure the UGs to accept. There were many cases when after accepting the money they went back to the UG fold. In reality, the entire scheme proved wishy-washy.

26. Meaningful coordination between various agencies existed when the heads were of the same mental mould. Allegations and counter allegations were often traded in case of a failure much to the glee of the insurgents.

27. In sum the situation in the North-East was grim and exceedingly complex. No single conflict situation was similar to the other. For example, if the greater Nagaland issue of the Nagas was to be accepted, Manipur and Assam would not agree to include Naga inhabited areas in their States with it. Assamese demand for a Swadhin Assam (independent) would remain a myth if demands of Bodos, Dimasas, Koch Rajbongshis and Barakland were to be accepted. HNLC demand for independence of Meghalaya would not be accepted by the Garos nor the demand for Garo land would be acceptable to Assam. Such irreconcilable demands defy solution.

28. Insurgency in its pure form was dead. What was seen was a struggle for supremacy on ethnic lines and when obstacles stood in way ethnic cleansing was resorted to.
Another dangerous trend in the North-East was a suicidal tendency to grab easy money by not trying to do anything through one's own labour of a productive nature. None had any strategy or the vision to tackle the problems. When violence did not abate the victims, naturally hit back as was the case between Thangkhuls and Kukis, Pangal – Meitei, Assamese and Bodos, Bodos and Adivasis, and Bodos and Muslims. All formed militant outfits to safeguard their interests. More outfits would take birth if the situation does not improve. If allowed to happen again, it would be a repeat of mindless slaughter that had happened in Nellie and Barpeta (1983) in which around 4000 people were butchered (mostly Bengali speaking). By far this was the most vicious fall out of the insurgency movements in the North East. The ultimate beneficiary in the melee would be ISI which was conducting a proxy war without much ado and the promised handing over of Assam (undivided) on a "silver platter" would prove a reality.

Overwhelming majority of the hill tribes in remote villages of the North-East were backward. They still followed their own traditional way of life and in general resisted any attempt to change which they thought would jeopardize their hereditary independence. They differed from their far advanced brethren in towns who changed with time. The educated did not make any serious efforts to change the rural set up. The govt. agencies also failed to maintain continuous contact with them. There was thus a communication gap which was used by the insurgents to advantage.

In certain areas like Tripura, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh there were indications of religious centricity developing which gave rise to hatred on religious lines. There were allegations about Christian Missions using to advantage the defects emerging out of communication gap. "According to sources the insurgency in Tripura is gaining inspiration from the Underground Seven States United Liberation Army (SSULA), a secessionist tribal organization, demanding independence from India. The organization consists of mainly the hard core tribal insurgents committed to Christianity from Nagaland, Arunachal
Pradesh, Mizoram, Assam and Tripura. The organization’s aim is to fight unitedly for independence under the cover of anti-foreigners agitation.” In Tripura, while the NLFT is pro-Christian, the ATTF is pro-Hindu which had made them not to forge unity. Similarly, in Assam, while the NDFB stood for Christianity, the BLT did not support the idea.

13.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Development of a place or the pace of development of a region is directly proportional to the level of awareness of its masses. The history of development of humanity is nothing but the development of the forces of production particularly the means of production. Industrial revolution in England came with a complete social transformation. This is a unique law of development and the North-East India is no exception. Unfortunately the level of awareness among the people of the North-East on the one hand and the awareness of the Central agencies looking after the North-East about its problems on the other, left much to be desired leading to a number of problems going beyond control.

1. Change of Mind-set

The mindset of the people particularly political leaders needed to be changed. It was not conducive enough for translating any vision to a reality. For reasons – geographical, historical, social, political and economic the people of the region are interdependent from time immemorial. Their own mindset segregated them without realizing the importance of remaining united. All of them share a common destiny. Particularly, the practical needs of economic prosperity underlie the inescapable truth that in spite of the regions disintegration into seven separate political units none of them can live in isolation from one another about which there was a fresh awakening, a welcome step. This alone would enable North-East to make a giant leap.
2. **Evolve suitable strategy to solve insurgency**

Tackling insurgency in different States of the region should be through a strategy which takes into account all the areas of the conflict, all parties involved in the conflict. As far as fulfilling the aspirations of the common people of the region, no single group, be it the NSCN, ULFA, ATTF, NLFT or the MPLF, Congress or Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) or MNF can claim to be more patriotic. Many strategies, piecemeal were suggested and tested but insurgency raged indicating that all was not well. The thinking process should emanate from the core of the heart of every true lover of the North-East and should not be confined only to paper.

3. **Learn from history and evolve policies for future**

There were much to be copied from the old which could be used in modern system of administration with effect and make it development oriented. Tribal societies had no caste structure. They were egalitarian and self-reliant. In the changes that had taken place the old society got seriously fractured. The traditional rural leadership of Gaonbura headmen, Chief/Raja who were true democrats devoid of selfishness were replaced by the new urban, corrupt, ruling politico-bureaucratic class. Increased modern education and exposure to outside world broke traditional values and social work culture. The vastly educated youth came to shun physical work and wanted money, status, power by fair or foul. Once they were wearing limited cloth in that place three piece suit came to be used. Christianity taught many good things from the West but the Western culture and values bewildered and confused the simple people leaving them in a vacuum which insurgency filled.

Tribal societies were self-governing. The system of Indian centralised administration clashed with the old system. The Central leaders and officials did not understand the people, their aspirations and moods. The educated felt shy of visiting rural areas and help the simple folks which the insurgents did. With insurgency money flowed and they did not like to give up arms. Development became the casualty.
In order to overcome this, a comprehensive master plan for development has to emerge, implementation of which should be through participation of the local people. NGOs could be of great service.

4. **End Corruption**

Corruption and waste were part and parcel of any government system. In this region, however the scale of corruption was mind boggling. Enough money had been paid by the Centre. A close scrutiny of the Centre of utilization of funds would contribute to development. Money flow should be linked to stoppage of insurgency/terrorism.

6. **Ensure Accelerated Economic Development through Proper Co-ordination**

S.F was successful in containing insurgency for a time but the peace accrued was not utilized for ensuring adequate and parallel socio-economic development. One important point that the govt. and other agencies like the North-East Council should keep in mind was that an economic blueprint for one area would have almost equal impact on other States. No single State can develop in isolation. It is also equally true that no single State of the North-East can afford to move towards disaster in isolation. The seven sisters share a common destiny. Problems and fruits of development have to be shared by all the States. Nature had not segregated the people and people would do themselves good if they look to nature for guidance.

6. **Sever Political Patronage to Insurgents**

If this does not make place neither insurgency would cease nor development take place. Almost all insurgent groups had the support of political bosses either openly or secretly. This emboldened them and checked the efficiency of the administration to contain insurgency. There were instances when leaders of parties in power had openly
criticized S.F on issues thus playing into the hands of the UGs. The time had come to make a change from real politic to ideal politic.

7. Launch Awareness Programmes to bring people mentally and psychologically closer to India

People of the North-East treated the mainlanders as foreigners. Each State called them by different names. Had it not been for the tax payers money from India the region should have been starving. Pay them and take the kick was not an acceptable proposition. No effort was ever made to educate the people about the benefit of having mainlanders in their midst. In short it is necessary to bring them mentally and psychologically closer to India.

8. Pay immediate attention to law and order as and when take place

Internal threats from low (breakdown of law and order) to high (insurgency and secessionist movements) were invariably ignored till too late. Response also came on adhoc basis and as a fire fighting exercise which gave leverage to lawless elements.

9. Generate Political Will for Effective Governance

Administration in the North-Eastern States left much to be desired. There were parallel governments in Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura and Meghalaya. “It is often the imponderables that count the more” which is ‘seigneurs’. Administration of North-East should be vested in those who have the good of the people at heart.

10. Check Illegal Infiltration and ISI activities

As far as infiltration was concerned there were certain aspects (1) support from politicians, local Muslims and early settlers from Bangladesh. (2) Lack of local manpower to do menial jobs in the region. This being the case the best way would be to
set a cut off year beyond which all those who had come should be detected and sent out. What was required was political will. Sadly this did not exist because of vote factor. What was sacrificed in the process was State’s and the nation’s security.

Bengali speaking population (mostly Muslims) had become targets of attacks leading to their becoming militants with the support of ISI. They also engaged in gun running, drug trafficking, flesh trade, etc. They had come to form the major chunk of rickshaw pullers/ manual labour right from Arunachal Pradesh. In a way, the ISI support base had grown tremendously. Even though all cannot be ISI, they would offer a support base. If left unchecked a Bosnia would explode in the North-East and would prove to be much more serious than Kashmir. Fundamentalism had got armed with modern weapons through ISI. It can create havoc if not neutralized effectively. They were united others were not and that was a significant factor.

12. Settle Ex-Servicemen on Borders

The existing strength of B.S.F on borders with Bangladesh to check infiltration was inadequate. As a result, it was given responsibility to hold unusually extended frontages. Added to this, they were also withdrawn often for other tasks, leaving the borders unguarded. A solution could be found by settling ex-servicemen on borders on a voluntary basis.

Besides helping the BSF this would be a second line of defence. Corruption was allegedly an evil on borders using which infiltrators got easy access. Only stringent action can help to remove this menace.

13. Modernize Local Police Force

Modernization of local police force is of primordial importance in the North-East. The job of local State police had become the most difficult. It lacked the support and wherewithal to weather the storm that was brewing for meeting which their training
equipment, structure, conditions of service were not adequately adapted. Criminal justice system had failed. North-East had become a melting pot with ethnic convulsions. Urban policing had come under severe strain with rapid urban growth, the rise of new settlements with Bangladeshi changing social profile of cities, unemployment and the youth taking to organized crime, drugs, squalor, ever widening disparities in society etc. Resulting frustration spawned crime and new forms of criminality. The emergence of crime syndicates and their all pervading influence in layers of administration questioned the very moral basis of the society. A breed of extortionist turned well to do criminals wielding highly sophisticated weapons struck terror all over before whom police just could do nothing. Ethnic cleansing and its concomitant problems added colour to the gory picture.

Police was also engaged in VIP security duties adding pressure to their normal duties. The vehicular traffic had increased manifold.

There was surprise at the frequency with which Army/CPMF had to be called to assist the local police. The fact that local police had come to the position of walking with the crutches provided by them was not a welcome spectacle. It had become weak and disheveled.

Local police should be able to tackle insurgency, failing which lasting peace and development would simply evade the region. Police, and police alone, should be made the sheet anchor to fight insurgency.

Political interference had thrown the police out of professionalism and also threatened the chain of command, eroding discipline. Without policing no society can exist else anarchy sets in which was the case in North-East. It was high time to de-link police from politics and allow them to function independently.

The local police force also contained a good number of 'moles' of UG because of ethnic relationship and therefore stood subverted. They should be motivated to change
attitude in their own and the good of the nation. What was required was a merely a change of mind set of politicians and bureaucracy, the remaining would be a matter of time.

14. **Other Methods**

14.1 Launch specific commando operations on UG camps in Bhutan and Bangladesh. The existence of well established camps in these countries were confirmed facts. Bangladesh had refused to accept it. The only way therefore was to take the attack to the enemy camp on our own.

14.2 Raising the issue at SAARC meetings and the UN Forums would draw International attention. The main UG groups had already done so in the UNPO etc. Wean away public opinion through psychological operations for which politicians should adopt a favourable attitude.

14.3 Raising of like size units to engage UG groups in their style and spread them out in areas of UG activities. This would save the Army from becoming an enemy of people.

14.4 Utilize CPMF to guard very vital installations.

15. **Ensure Transparency and Sharing of Information**

All development projects, other schemes proposed, actually taken up, amount sanctioned and spent, real progress on ground, etc. should be prominently published for public consumption. A greater transparency and information dissemination should form part of psychological operation.

16. **Strengthening of intelligence machinery**

It may not win the war but surely in the North-East lack of it proved disastrous. Collecting intelligence about guerilla activities of tribal insurgents (there are about 200 tribal groups) proved Herculean if not impossible. What was lacking was "processed accurate information" to suggest possible line of action. Informants, even a simple doubtful case, were summarily executed which dried up the channel for ever. It cannot be said safely that the set up did not have tribal-non-tribal and State – Central services deviational loyalties which checked unhindered, accurate unreserved flow of information.
to the higher formations. The way out would be to handpick loyal local persons from both Central and State organizations. The improvement in technology, use of courier service, etc. had affected intelligence collection. The best way here would be to possess the State of the art technology on the pattern of the UG groups so as to take a thorn by a thorn.

17. **Interchange of State Police and CRPF**

Mutual interchange of police and CRPF personnel for training and improved performance of police, first as an experiment and if successful on a regular basis may prove useful both for training and equipping local police.

Recruiting locals for CRPF and motivating them on sound lines to work in their own areas.

18. **A separate Ministry for North-East** – to work as an effective machinery to implement policies. A separate Ministry for North-East with a Minister who is above political bias and corruption would go a long way in streamlining the system. In the ultimate analysis the mindset is all that matters without which the entire system would go haywire. The Ministry should declare a policy to establish legitimacy, credibility and transparency in the functioning.

19. **Bind mind and energies for public good.**

A government exists only for people's welfare. "The State is an individual writ large." There is urgent need in North-East to reform and restructure institutions. It is a question of good governance, inclusiveness, policies of equity and justice. Army has come to be used frequently. It is to be used as a last resort. It should be used only in rarest of the rare cases against its own people. In the North-East the cry was for deploying army and when Army was posted others were simply reduced to nothing. Even though Army was to act as standby in reality it went roughshod to invite the ire of other agencies. There were also allegations of the UG and the Army working at tandem
leading to emergence of vested interest. Army should be used with "exactitude and proportionality follow moral law within and without."

Piecemeal process had never helped in the past. Reconciliation and surrender is the best way to ensure peace. All, UGs, Politicians, Bureaucrats, students and youth and the people should endear themselves for development of the region and surrender to this principle, failing which the region would be in eternal ferment devoid of peace.

20. Associate Church to contain insurgency

Christianity as a religion and Christian fathers as individuals were having great influence over majority of tribals. There were allegations that efforts were afoot to convert whole of tribals in North-East into Christianity. As per the study, the Christian Fathers were subtly provoking the insurgent outfits following Christian faith to adopt separatist attitude forcing them to take on their own brethren following a different faith. This ensured their hold on such insurgent outfits and continuation of insurgency. It would not, therefore, be out of place to include the Church in any action plan to contain insurgency in the North-East.

21. Action Suggested

The muddle, strategic, psychological, communal, ethnic, religious, administrative, social and political in the North-East is a fact and not a fiction. North-East is a powder keg. Time is not in favour with ISI making deep inroads and there is need to take stern action with utmost expeditiousness. A well-coordinated massive operation involving all the North-Eastern States and the S.F may prove successful to turn the tide against the insurgency which would be in the overall good of North-East and the nation.
QUESTIONNAIRE
ON
INSURGENCY IN NORTH EAST

Name/Age _______________________________ Designation __________

Place ________________________________

Please give your open minded answers to the following questions by marking ( ) at the appropriate column:-

1) A. To what extent the state has been affected by insurgency/militancy in the following aspects:-

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<td>Considerable Extent</td>
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1.1. Law and Order
1.2. Everyday life
1.3. Supply of essential commodities
1.4. Transportation
1.5. Important festivals
1.6. Relationship between communities
1.7. Developmental activities
1.8. Political activities
1.9. Movement of Police
1.10 Movement of VIPs

1) B. Any observations/comments/suggestions.

2) A. To what extent police been successful in combating insurgency/militancy

B. Your reactions/views/suggestions

3)A. How effectively police has been trained to fight insurgency.

B. Your suggestions for better training.
4. To what extent police morale remain high during insurgency operations

5. A. To what extent public has been helping the police to fight insurgency?
   B. Your views to improve public cooperation.

6. A. To what extent police has been a match to the insurgents?
   B. How should police reform be made more effective?

7) A. To what extent induction of para-military to fight insurgency was effective?
   B. Your views/suggestions/comments on induction of para-military.

8) A. How far induction of para-military/Army has distanced people from police?
   B. Any suggestions?

9) How could insurgent/militant groups consolidate their positions? Who helped them?

10. How have foreign agencies been able to influence the insurgents/militants? Any clues found?

11) A. To what extent in weakening insurgency Govt. measures have been effective?
   B. Comments if any?

12. How have surrenders weakened the movement?

13. How political interference has been affecting the functioning of police in insurgency prone areas?

14. Which of the following communities have been affected by insurgency in North East?
i) Hindus
ii) Muslims
iii) Tribals
iv) Christians.

15. To what extent following were responsible for insurgency?

15.1 Economic Backwardness 5 4 3 2 1
15.2 Illiteracy 5 4 3 2 1
15.3 Influx of outsiders 5 4 3 2 1
15.4 Desire for separation 5 4 3 2 1
15.5 Any other 5 4 3 2 1

16. To what extent the influx of foreigners from Bangladesh could be solved.

17. To what extent rivalry between Hindus and Muslims is affecting peace in the state.

18. To what extent police has been able to persuade militants to surrender.
ROLE OF POLICE IN COMBATING
INSURGENCY/MILITANCY AND
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS
IN THE NORTH EAST

OBSERVATION SCHEDULE
(FOR DATA COLLECTION)

N. PADMANABHAN
POLICE RESEARCH FELLOW
SVP NPA, HYDERABAD
OBSERVATION SCHEDULE

1. What is the genesis of Insurgency/Militancy in Assam/Nagaland/Manipur/Tripura/Meghalaya/Mizoram/Arunachal Pradesh.
2. State community-wise figures of population.
   i) Hindus
   ii) Muslims
   iii) Christians
   iv) Influx from other States
3. Which are the organizations involved in insurgency/militancy? What is their organizational structure, (Political/Armed Wing, Rear Head Quarters, aims and objects, Geographical and functional areas, target groups and nature of activities/Public support).
4. What are the tangible and intangible elements of the organization?
   (i) Tangible:-
       (a) Mobilization
       (b) Struggle
       (c) Organization
       (d) Resources
       (e) Patronage
   (ii) Intangible:-
       a) Leadership
       b) Cause
       c) Goals
       d) Ideology
5. Recruitment/Procedure for Recruitment.
   ➢ Training/Training Providers.
   ➢ Training Domains.
   ➢ Base camps.
   ➢ Edge over Police and paramilitary forces.
6. What is the profile of insurgents?
   (i) Age Group
   (ii) Sex
   (iii) Socio Economic Background
   (iv) Educational Qualifications
   (v) Values/beliefs/ideology
   (vi) Marital Status.
   (vii) Mission.
7. Weapons available, source of supply, quantity/quality.

CRIME-CHART
YEAR-WISE

10. What are the means of Communication?
(Within/Outside — Other States & Countries)
11. What are their Publications?
   - Source of supply
   - Publication place
   - Dissemination
   - Police response
12. Relationship with similar organizations within the State and outside and with public?
   Use of Internet & computers.
   (Training Centres abroad, batches gone for training — did they have documents — routes taken
   — police interception, if any).

**COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS BY GOVERNMENT**
14. What are the key steps taken to bring insurgents to national mainstream — success/failure.
15. Surrenders: Surrender by insurgents. Their rehabilitation. Reactions from other insurgents —
   (give year-wise report).
16. Activities of surrendered ‘insurgents’.
17. Vulnerability of Policemen.
   Number of police stations — strength — State of P.S. building — Pucca or Kutcha — Are they
   secured).

Training of police personnel to fight insurgency.

*Present status:*

*Futuristic Plans:*

18. Attack by insurgents on policemen and police stations.

**Statistics:**

**Nature of Attacks : (Modus operandi)**

**Nature of encounters with police:**

**Success rate of Police in encounter:**

**Preventive measures by the police:**

19. How many Raids/Search operations were launched?

*Success rate:*

*Failure rate:*

*Reasons for failure: Any personal attack on police personnel (Reasons)*

*Lessons from Success & Failures:*

20. Any special Task Force formed? If so details about its activities — Search/Raid/Patrols/
Ambush.

498
21. What are the Preparations made to fight insurgency? Government response in terms of:

In terms of:
1. Newly established Police stations.
2. Availability of manpower.
4. Better communication facilities.
5. Infrastructure

22. What are the welfare measures for Police in insurgency prone areas?
(Accommodation near P.S., water/electricity supply, schooling, medical/leave/ promotions scope/ compensations in case of death in action/ rehabilitation of family.).

23. What is the frequency of induction of paramilitary/army in the fields – its impact on insurgency/police/public/its exploitation by insurgents.

Frequency
Coordination Areas
Success
Causes of failures of coordination

24. During assembly/parliamentary and local elections what kind of insurgency activities take place?
(i) How many candidates were killed?
(ii) How many got support from insurgents?
(iii) Whether election brought them to mainstream or not?
(iv) If elections had been postponed?
(v) What is the percentage of polling?

25. What is the political influence on police and its impact on functioning of police?
(i) Is there any Insurgent-Politician Nexus? (Nature)
(ii) Is there any Insurgent-Police Nexus? (Nature)
(iii) Is there any Insurgent Police Nexus? (Nature)

26. Coordination with other agencies (Civil Administration/Judiciary).

Native
Strong Points
Weak links

27. What is the extent of infiltration into government services by insurgents? What was the action taken by police?

28. What is the role played by Human Rights activists and NGOs? What was its impact on police functioning?

29. What is the role of ISI/Bangladesh Intelligence. Is it a Proxy War/Low intensity conflict?
What was the action taken by police?

30. Muslim factor and insurgency.

31. What is the future of the insurgency/militancy from police point of view. What are the actions envisaged?

32. Conclusion/Assessment.
Appendix-C

INSURGENCY/MILITANCY AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS IN NORTH EAST
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE/QUESTIONNAIRE
(FOR EXPERTS)

1. (a) What is the genesis of the problem of insurgency? What are the reasons?
   (b) What are the visible effects of it on governance of people?
   (c) What may be the future repercussions if the problem is not solved?

2. Do you feel that there should be national consensus and a national policy on the issue? If so
   what should be the nature of the policy and how far it would be useful?

3. Do you feel that the insurgency problem is out of control of the state administration?
   Yes/No. What are the reasons? What will be the consequences for the nation/state?

4. Do you feel that there is genuine coordination of effort between civil police and para
   military/army to contain insurgency. How could it be further improved?

5. What action/steps should state take for coping with the problem?

6. Your comments on the following aspects for coping with the problem.
   6.1 Re-organization of police.
   6.2 Training arrangements of Police Personnel.
   6.3 Enhanced coordination among Police/Para Military Force/Army/NGOs.
   6.4 Public Participation in policing.
   6.5 Intelligence function.
   6.6 Media's Role
   6.7 NGO's Role

500
THE HYDARI AGREEMENT

THE NINE POINT AGREEMENT (THE HYDARI AGREEMENT) ARRIVED AT BETWEEN THE NAGA NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNOR OF ASSAM IN JUNE, 1947

The right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes is recognised.

1. Judicial

All cases whether civil or criminal arising between Nagas in the Naga Hills will be disposed of by duly constituted Naga courts according to Naga customary law, or such law as may be introduced with the consent of duly recognised Naga representative organizations, save that where a sentence of transportation or death has been passed there will be right of appeal to the Governor.

In cases arising between Nagas and non-Nagas in (a) Kohima and Kokokchung town areas, and (b) in the neighbouring plains districts, the judge if not a Naga, will be assisted by the Naga assessor.

2. Executive

The general principle is accepted that what the Naga National Council is prepared to pay for the Naga National Council should control. This principle will apply to the work done as well as the staff employed.

While the District Officer will be appointed at the discretion of the Governor, Sub-division of the Naga Hills should be administered by a Sub-divisional Council with a full time executive President, paid by the Naga National Council, who would be responsible to the District Officer, for all matters falling within the latter's responsibility, and to the Naga National Council for all matters falling within their responsibility.

(a) Agriculture – The Naga National Council will exercise all the powers now vested in the District Officer.
(b) PWD – The Naga National Council will take over full control.
(c) Education and Forest Department – The Naga National Council is prepared to pay for all the services and staff.

3. Legislative

That no laws passed by the Provincial or Central Legislature which would materially affect the terms of this agreement or the religious practices of the Nagas shall have legal force in the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga National Council.

In cases of dispute as to whether any law did so affect this agreement, the matter would be referred by the Naga National Council to the Governor who would then direct that
the law in question should not have legal force in the Naga Hills pending the decision of the Central Government.

4. Land

That land with all its resources in the Naga Hills should not be alienated to a non-Naga without the consent of the Naga National Council.

5. Taxation

That the Naga National Council will be responsible for the imposition, collection, and expenditure of land revenue and house tax, and of such other taxes as may be imposed by the Naga National Council.

6. Boundaries

That present administrative divisions should be modified so as to (1) bring back into the Naga Hills District all the Forests transferred to the Sibsagar and Nowgong Districts in the past, and (2) bring under the unified administrative unit, as far as possible, all Nagas. All the areas so included would be within the scope of the present proposed agreement.

No areas should be transferred out of the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga National Council.

7. Arms Act

The District Officer will act on the advice of the Naga National Council in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Act.

8. Regulations

The Chin Hills Regulations and the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulations will remain in force.

9. Period of Agreement

The Governor of Assam as the agent of the Government of Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of ten years the ensure the due observance of this agreement; at the end of this period the Naga National Council will be asked whether they required the above agreement to be extended for a further period, or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at.
The Sixteen Point Agreement

THE SIXTEEN POINT AGREEMENT ARRIVED AT BETWEEN THE NAGA PEOPLE’S CONVENTION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN JULY 1960

The points placed by the delegates of the Naga People’s Convention before the Prime Minister on 26 July, 1960, as finally recast by the Delegation in the light of discussions on 27 and 28 July, 1960 with the Foreign Secretary.

1. The Name

The territories that were heretofore known as the Naga Hills Tuensang Area under the Naga Hills – Tuensang Area Act 1957, shall form a State within the Indian Union and be hereafter known as Nagaland.

2. The Ministry Incharge

The Nagaland shall be under the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India.

3. The Governor of Nagaland

(1) The President of India shall appoint a Governor for Nagaland and he will be vested with the executive powers of the Government of Nagaland. He will have his headquarters in Nagaland.

(2) His administrative Secretariat will be headed by a Chief Secretary stationed at the Headquarters with other Secretariat Staff as necessary.

(3) The Governor shall have special responsibility with regard to law and order during the transitional period and for so long as the law and order situation continues to remain disturbed on account of hostile activities. In exercising this special responsibility, the Governor shall, after consultation with the Ministry, act in his individual judgement. This special responsibility of the Governor will cease when normalcy returns.

4. Council of Ministers

(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with a Chief Minister at the head to assist and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions.

(2) The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Naga Legislative Assembly.

5. The Legislature

There shall be constituted a Legislative Assembly consisting of elected and nominated members as may be deemed necessary representing different Tribes. (Further a duly constituted body of Experts may be formed to examine and determine the principles of representation on democratic basis).
6. Representation in Parliament

Two elected members shall represent Nagaland in the Union Parliament, that is to say one for the Lok Sabha and the other for the Rajya Sabha.


No Act or Law passed by the Union Parliament affecting the following provisions shall have legal force in the Nagaland unless specifically applied to it by a majority vote of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly:
(1) The Religious or Social Practices of the Nagas.
(2) Naga Customary Laws and procedure.
(3) Civil and Criminal Justice so far as these concern decisions according to Naga Customary Law.
   The existing laws relating to administration of civil and criminal justice as provided in the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills District shall continue to be in force.
(4) The ownership and transfer of land and its resources.

8. Local Self-Government

Each tribe shall have the following units of rule-making and administrative local bodies to deal with matters concerning the respective tribes and areas:
(1) The Village Council;
(2) The Range Council; and
(3) The Tribal Council.

These Councils will also deal with disputes and cases involving breaches of customary laws and usages.

9. Administration of Justice

(a) The existing system of administration of civil and criminal justice shall continue.
(b) Appellate Courts:
   (1) The District Court-cum-Sessions Court (for each district), High Court and Supreme Court of India.
   (2) The Naga Tribunal (for the whole of the Nagaland) in respect of cases decided according to Customary Law.

10. Administration of Tuensang District

(1) The Governor shall carry on the administration of the Tuensang District for a period of 10(ten) years until such time when the tribes in the Tuensang District are capable of shouldering more responsibility of the advanced system of administration. The commencement of the ten-year period of administration will start simultaneously with the enforcement of detailed workings of the constitution in other parts of the Nagaland.

(2) Provided further that a Regional Council shall be formed for Tuensang District by elected representatives from all the tribes in Tuensang District, and the Governor may nominate representatives to the Regional Council as well. The Deputy Commissioner will be the Ex-officio Chairman of the Council. The Regional Council will elect members to the Naga Legislative Assembly to represent Tuensang District.
(3) Provided further that on the advice of the Regional Council, steps will be taken to start various Councils and Courts, in those areas where the people feel themselves capable of establishing such institutions.

(4) Provided further that no Act or Law passed by the Naga Legislative Assembly shall be applicable to Tuensang District unless specifically recommended by the Regional Council.

(5) Provided further that the Regional Council shall supervise and guide the working of the various Councils and Tribal Courts within Tuensang District and wherever necessary depute the local officers to act as Chairman thereof.

(6) Provided further that Councils of such areas inhabited by a mixed population or which have not as yet decided to which specific Tribal Council to be affiliated to shall be directly under the Regional Council for the time being. And at the end of ten years the situation will be reviewed and if the people so desire the period will be further extended.

11. Financial Assistance from the Government of India

To supplement the revenues of the Nagaland, there will be need for the Government of India to pay out of the Consolidated Fund of India:

(1) A lump sum each year for the development programme in the Nagaland; and

(2) A grant-in-aid towards meeting the cost of administration.

Proposals for the above grants shall be prepared and submitted by the Government of Nagaland to the Government of India for their approval. The Governor will have general responsibility for ensuring that the funds made available by the government of India are expended for purposes for which they have been approved.

12. Consolidation of Forest Areas

The Naga delegation discussed the question of the inclusion of the Reserve Forests and of contiguous areas inhabited by the Nagas. They were referred to the provisions in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, prescribing the procedure for the transfer of areas from one State to another.

13. Consolidation of Contiguous Naga Areas

The delegation wished the following to be placed on record:

The Naga leaders expressed the wish for the contiguous areas to join the new State. It was pointed out to them on behalf of the Government of India that Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution provided for increasing the area of any State, but that it was not possible for the Government of India to make any commitment in this regard at this stage.

14. Formation of Separate Naga Regiment

In order that the Naga people can fulfil their desire of playing a full role in the defence forces of India the question of raising a separate Naga Regiment should be duly examined for action.
15. Transitional Period
(a) On reaching the political settlement with the Government of India, the Government of India will prepare a Bill for such amendment of the Constitution, as may be necessary, in order to implement the decision. The Draft Bill, before presentation to Parliament, will be shown to the delegates of the NPC.
(b) There shall be constituted an Interim Body with elected representatives from every tribe, to assist and advise the Governor in the administration of the Nagaland during the transitional period. The tenure of office of the Interim Body will be 3 (three) years subject to re-election.

16. Inner Line Regulation

Rules embodied in the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873 shall remain in force in the Nagaland.
Appendix - F
THE YEHZABO OF NAGALAND

Preamble

We, the people of Nagaland, solemnly acknowledging that the sovereignty over this earth and the entire universe belongs to Almighty God alone, and the authority of the people to be exercised on the territory is a sacred trust from God, who sustained our forefathers, the National workers and our people through the years of trial, and

Having our attachment to the truth of popular sovereignty as declared on 22 March 1956, and in the articles in the provisional Yehzabo of 1962, and following the amended Yehzabo of 1968, to establish national institutions based on the common ideals of democracy, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity among the people composing it,

Do hereby adopt in our National Assembly the (Amended) Yehzabo of Nagaland this 6th March in the year of our Lord Nineteen Hundred and Seventy one.

Part-I

1. The territory of Nagaland shall comprise all the territories inhabited by the indigenous Naga Tribes and such other territories as Tatar Hoho may, by law, admit on such terms and conditions as it deems fit.
2. This Yehzabo shall apply to the territories as defined in Article I.
3. (a) Nothing in the Yehzabo or by any law shall allow any tribe to secede from the Nation.
   (b) The Tatar Hoho shall, from time to time, make laws for ensuring and preserving the unity and integrity of the Nation.
4. Each village is a republic having its territory, full authority over its own affairs including land, community organization, social and religion, customs and practices.
5. Each area or territory inhabited by the communities of a tribe shall be constituted into a federated Unit to be called a Region and each of the Regions shall be given autonomy to the extent of management of local affairs and administration.
6. Some persons or group of persons belonging to other communities living in such area or territory which is inhabited predominantly by a larger tribe or community, shall be duly associated along with the latter for the purpose of the administration of the areas.
7. The demarcated boundary between regions or sub-regions from the day of the British shall continue to have legal recognition of this Yehzabo.
8. The name of the National Government shall continue to be called "THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND".

Part II
Citizenship and Rights of Citizens

9. There shall be but one citizenship throughout Nagaland, that is to say, there shall be no citizenship of the Unit as distinct from that of the Nation.
10. At the commencement of this Yehzabo any person who was a citizen of Nagaland immediately before the commencement of the amended Yehzabo shall become and be a citizen of Nagaland.

11. Notwithstanding the provision contained in Article 10, nothing in the Yehzabo shall derogate the power of the Tatar HoHo to make such laws for admission of new classes of citizens or for the termination of the citizenship of any existing classes.

12. All citizens irrespective of birth, religion, sex or race shall be equal before the eyes of the law.

13. There shall be no discrimination against any citizen in political, economic and social relations because of social status or family origin.

14. There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters of public employment, appointment, promotion and recruitment, irrespective of clan, tribe and family origin.

15. No titles other than academic distinction shall be recognized by any citizen of Nagaland except with the approval of the Government.

16. Free profession and practice of religion shall be guaranteed to any citizen.

17. Subject to the security of Nagaland, public order, morality, contempt of Court and defamation, all citizens shall have the right to enjoy freedom of speech and expression, to form assembly and association, to move freely throughout Nagaland, to carry on any procession and to use, enjoy and dispose of any property in accordance with local usage and practice.

PART III
EXECUTIVE

18. There shall be a President of Nagaland.

19. The Executive power of the Federal Government of Nagaland shall be vested in the President and shall be exercised by him with the Council of Kilonsers in accordance with the provisions of this Yehzabo and laws.

20. The President shall be elected by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of the Tatar HoHo.

21. The President shall hold Office for a term of 3 (three) years from the date on which he enters upon his office.

22. The President shall be removed from Office on impeachment for violation of the Yehzabo and conviction of treason, sedition, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanours.

23. (a) The President shall, by writing under his own hand addressed to the Vice-president, resign his Office. Any resignation addressed to the Vice-President shall forthwith be communicated by him to the Speaker of the Tatar HoHo.

(b) If the Office of the President is caused vacant the election to fill the vacant seat shall be completed before the expiration of that term.

24. The President shall, after the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his Office.

25. Any citizen of Nagaland who is born of Naga blood and has completed 40 (forty) years of age, and is qualified for election as a member of Tatar HoHo, shall be eligible for election to the Office of the President.

26. Any person who holds or has held Office of the President shall be eligible for re-election for the Office for more terms.
27. Every person acting as President or discharging the function of the President shall, before entering upon his Office, make and subscribe the following oath in the presence of the Chief Justice of Supreme Court or any person appointed in that behalf: "I... do solemnly declare and affirm that I will faithfully execute the Office of the President of Nagaland, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Yehzabo of Nagaland and that I will dedicate wholly myself to the service and welfare of the people of Nagaland."

28. When a President is to be impeached as defined in Art 22, a proposal shall be moved in the form of resolution in writing signed by not less than one-fourth of the total number of the House. When such a resolution has been passed by a majority of not less than 2/3 (two-third) membership of the House, such resolution shall have the effect of removing the President from his Office, with effect from the date on which the resolution is so passed.

29. In case of the removal of the President from Office, or of his death or resignation, the Vice-President shall act as Acting President, until a fresh Presidential election takes place.

30. (a) The President shall be the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces of Nagaland, and (b) In exercise of his powers as Supreme Commander, the President shall have power to issue directives for disposition of Armed Forces, for planning and execution of military campaigns, to deal with emergencies like foreign invasion and any matter appertaining to the conduct of war.

(c) The President shall have the power to confer commissions on the Officers of Armed Forces.

(d) The President shall not have power either to declare war or conclude peace without the consent of the Tatar Hocho.

31. The President shall have the power to grant pardon and reprieve, to suspend or remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted in criminal offences.

32. (a) The President shall have the right to exercise Emergency Powers when the security of Nagaland or any part thereof is threatened by external aggression, internal disturbances or failures of constitutional machinery.

(b) In exercise of the foregoing powers the President shall issue Ordinances by proclamation and use such forces for meeting the situation for a period of six months unless extended by Tatar Hocho.

33. The President shall also have power to exercise such extraordinary powers which the Tatar Hocho may, from time to time, empower him to exercise.

**VICE PRESIDENT**

34. There shall be a Vice President of Nagaland.

35. The Vice President shall be elected in accordance with the provision contained in Article 20.

36. The Vice President shall hold Office for a term of 3 (three) years from the date on which he enters upon his office.

37. The Vice President shall be removed from his Office on impeachment in accordance with the provisions contained in Articles 22 and 28.

38. (a) The Vice President shall, by writing under his own hand addressed to the President, resign his Office.

(b) If the Office of the Vice President is caused vacant, election to fill the vacant seat shall be completed before the expiration of that term.
39. The qualification for election to the Office of Vice President shall be the same as the provision contained in Article 25.
40. If and when a member of the Tatar Hoho is elected to the office of the Vice President he shall after his election be deemed to have vacated his seat in the House.
41. The Vice President shall before entering upon his Office, make and subscribe, before the President or a person appointed in that behalf, the following oath — “I... do solemnly declare and affirm that I will faithfully execute the Office of the Vice President of Nagaland, and I will faithfully discharge the functions and duties conferred on me by the Yehzabo and the laws.”
42. The Vice President shall, during the absence of the President from his Office, discharge and perform the powers and functions of the President as Acting President.

PART IV
COUNCIL OF KILONERS

43. There shall be a Council of Kilonsers, with equal status, to aid and advise the President in exercise of his powers and functions.
44. (a) The Council of Kilonsers shall consist of such numbers as may be determined by Tatar Hoho from time to time from amongst its members and shall hold office for a term of 3 (three) years.
   (b) There shall be Deputy Kilonsers to assist the Council of Kilonsers.
45. The Council of Kilonsers shall perform and discharge such duties and functions as may be assigned to them by the President collectively of individually from time to time.
46. The President shall preside in the meeting of the Council of Kilonsers and shall have the right to vote in case of a tie.
47. A Kilonser of Deputy Kilonser shall remain in Office till the expiration of his term, unless:
   (a) he is removed from the Office by a resolution of the House on ground of his inefficiency or committing such offences against the Yehzabo or the State.
   (b) he resigns on ground of personal disability.
48. Any member of Tatar Hoho when he is elected to the Office of Kilonser or Deputy Kilonser shall be deemed not to have vacated his seat in the House.
49. Every Kilonser or Deputy Kilonser before entering upon his Office, shall make before the President or a person appointed in that behalf the following oath — “I... do solemnly declare and affirm that I will faithfully and sincerely perform the duties assigned to me to the best satisfaction of the people of Nagaland.”
50. There shall be a Central Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General. Establishment of the Central Secretariat shall be regulated by law.

TATAR HOHO (PARLIAMENT)

51. There shall be a Federal Parliament consisting of one House known as Tatar Hoho (National Parliament).
52. All the legislative powers of Nagaland shall be vested in the Tatar Hoho.
53. The Tatar Hoho shall be composed of:
   (a) Representatives of the Regions elected by the people thereof, on proportionate population, on the basis of one representative per 15,000 population.
Notwithstanding clause (a) any Region or regions whose population is less than
15,000, shall send one representative to the Tatar Hoho.

(b) Two members to be nominated by the President.

54. (a) Any Naga citizen who has completed 25 (twenty-five) years of age and is not
otherwise disqualified by the law of the land shall be eligible for election to the Tatar
Hoho.

55. Every Tatar elected to the Tatar Hoho shall, before taking his seat, take the oath before
the Speaker in the following prescribed manner: “I... solemnly and truly declare and
affirm that I will be faithful and bear allegiance to the Federal Government of Nagaland
dedicating wholly myself to the service of the Nation.”

56. (a) The Tatar Hoho shall be summoned to meet at least twice in every year.
(c) Nothing in the Yehzabo shall preclude the President to call an Emergency session of
Tatar Hoho.

57. (a) The Hoho shall, unless sooner dissolved, continue for two years and at the expiration
of the said period it shall be deemed to have been dissolved.
(c) Notwithstanding clause (a) of this Article, during operation of Emergency by
proclamation, the said period may be extended by the Tatar Hoho for a period of six
month. Provided further, if the operation of Emergency is ended, the extended
period shall also be reduced.

58. The Tatar Hoho shall, from amongst its members, choose one Speaker and one Deputy
Speaker.

59. (a) The Deputy Speaker, in the absence of the Speaker shall preside over the session and
shall conduct the business of the House.
(b) In case of the dissolution of the Hoho, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker shall
continue to hold their respective Office until the newly elected Hoho assembles.

60. (a) There shall be a Secretariat department.
(b) The Secretaries or Secretary shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the
Speaker. Non-Tatars are qualified for the appointment.
(d) The Secretaries or Secretary shall be responsible for the business of the House.

61. The Tatar Hoho shall make the rule of procedure and the conduct of business in the
House.

62. 2/3 (two-thirds) in case of general session and 1/4 (one-fourth) in case of Emergency of
the total number of members in the Tatar Hoho shall constitute a quorum to transact
the business of the House.

63. All matters in the Tatar Hoho shall be decided by a majority of the members present, the
Speaker or any person presiding in the House shall have a casting vote in case of a tie.

64. When a resolution for the removal of the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker from Office is
discussed and debated in the House, the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker shall not preside
in the House.

65. No person shall be a member of the Tatar Hoho unless he/she is so elected by the
Regional Leacy in that behalf.

66. The Tatar Hoho shall have the power to expel any member or members from the house
if he/she commits any offence against the House or the State.

67. If a member of the Tatar is absent from the session for three consecutive sessions
without sufficient cause, his/her seat shall be declared vacant.

68. When any seat in the House falls vacant the Speaker shall inform the Regional Leacy
concerned with a request to send a new representative to fill the vacancy within a
stipulated period.
69. The Regional Leacy shall have the power to withdraw any of its representatives from the Tatar Hoho for want of confidence and shall have power to send a new member in place of the member so withdrawn.

70. (a) No member of the Tatar Hoho shall be prosecuted, arrested, detained or tried for the opinion expressed or vote cast by him in exercise of his function in the House.
(b) The members of Tatar Hoho shall, except for treason, sedition, felony or breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the Tatar Hoho.

71. (a) The Tatar Hoho shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. During trials the members who bring the charges of impeachment shall be examined on oath.
(b) During impeachment no person shall, without the concurrence of 2/3 of members present, be convicted.
(d) When the President of Nagaland is impeached the Chief Justice shall preside.

72. Judgement in case of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from Office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour or trust under the authority of Nagaland.

**LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE**

73. President shall have the right to address the House at the opening session of the Tatar Hoho.

74. The President shall place reports and statements (including financial statements) on matters of National or public importance before the House.

75. (a) Every Bill which has been passed by Tatar Hoho shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President for his assent. The President may give his assent to it or send it back with his objection to the House for reconsideration within three months.
(b) If any Bill is not returned within the stipulated time the same shall be deemed to have become a law.

76. (a) Any Bill except money Bill shall be introduced by any member in the Tatar Hoho.
(b) Any Bill shall be deemed to have been passed if it is passed by the House, with or without amendment.

77. (a) A money bill shall be introduced in the Tatar Hoho.
(b) The President shall prepare estimate of receipts and expenditure of the Government for every financial year and shall present them to the Tatar Hoho for consideration.

78. The submission of estimate of expenditure, the appropriation of the revenues and all other matters connected therewith shall, in so far as provision in not made in that behalf by this Yehzabo, be regulated by law made by Tatar Hoho as it seems fit.

79. (a) All estimates of expenditure shall be submitted in the form of demands for grants to the Tatar Hoho and the House shall have power to assent to or reject any demand with such requisition of the amount.
(b) No demand for a grant shall be made in the same session except on the recommendation of the President.

80. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provision the Tatar Hoho shall have power:
(a) To make any grant in advance in respect of the estimated expenditure for a part of any financial year;
(b) To make a grant for meeting an unexpected demand such as for defence or for a military undertaking etc.

81. (a) The Tatar Hoho shall have power to levy and collect taxes and revenues.
(c) The Tatar Hoho shall also have the power to take loans on the credit of the Government and to pay debt.

82. The Tatar Hoho shall have powers to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain service, to lay down rules covering the organization and maintenance of the Military Forces.

83. The Tatar Hoho shall have the powers to make Laws on the following subjects: Foreign Affairs including entering into treaties, agreement and contracts with other countries, war and peace, communications, census, all Federal Services, audit of accounts of Federal Government, Supreme Court, Elections, Preventive detention, amnesty, etc.

PART V
FEDERAL JUDICARY

84. There shall be a Federal Supreme Court of Nagaland consisting of a Chief Justice and four other Judges.

85. The President shall have power, with the advice and consent of the Tatar Hoho, to appoint the Chief Justice and other Judges.

86. Any person who is a citizen of Nagaland and has special experience and knowledge in legal realm of customs, traditions, social practices or academic laws, shall be eligible to be appointed as Judge of the Supreme Court.

87. A Judge of the Supreme Court or other subordinate Court shall not be removed from Office for proved misconduct or incapacity.

88. (a) A proposal to prefer a charge for removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be adopted by Tatar Hoho except upon a resolution of the House supported by two-thirds majority of members present.

(b) Where a charge is preferred against a Judge, a Special Tribunal, consisting of the members of the Tatar Hoho, shall be appointed to investigate the charge.

(d) The decision shall, on the report of the Special Tribunal, be taken by the Tatar Hoho for or against removal of the Judge.

89. The Judges of the Supreme Court shall, while entering upon the Office, take an oath in the manner prescribed as follows: "I,... having been appointed Chief Justice (Judge) of the Supreme Court, do hereby solemnly declare and affirm that I will faithfully and honestly perform the duties assigned to me, and to the best of my knowledge and judgement I shall administer justice to the people of our land and that I will uphold the Yehzabo and the laws."

90. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over the following matters:

(a) All matters arising under the Constitution and involving its interpretations,

(b) Between regions or between the State and the region or regions,

(c) Such other matters, if any, as may be defined by law.

91. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction from the decision and judgement of the Regional Courts, and shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the decision of other tribunals appointed by the Tatar Hoho for exceptional cases.

92. (a) An appeal shall lay to the Supreme Court from any judgement, final order or sentence, any criminal proceeding of a Regional Court if the Regional Court certifies that the case is fit for appeal to the Supreme Court.

(b) (i) An appeal shall lay to the Supreme Court from any judgement, decree or final order in any civil proceeding of a Regional Court if the Regional Court certifies that the value of the subject matter of the dispute is not less than Rs.3000.
(ii) The claim of title respecting property is valued at not less than Rs.3,000.
(iii) Notwithstanding clause (a) and (b) of this Article the Supreme Court shall, in its
discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgement, sentence or order made by
any Regional Court or Tribunal, where, (a) gross injustice has been done in criminal
proceedings, (b) in civil cases the question of general interest or public importance is
involved.

93. The Supreme Court shall be barred from interfering in any proceeding of cases pending
in other Courts.

94. The decision, order or judgement made by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all
Courts, within the territory of Nagaland.

95. Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Tatar Hoio the Supreme Court shall,
with the approval of the Tatar Hoio, be empowered to make rules and procedure of the
Court.

PART VI
REGIONAL LEACY

96. There shall be a Regional Leacy for each Region consisting of members elected by Sub-
Regional Committee.

97. Each Regional Leacy shall have the right to determine the number of its members.

98. (a) There shall be a Speaker and Secretary in the Leacy elected from amongst its
members.
(b) The tenure of Office of the Members in Leacy shall be 3(three) years with effect
from the date on which they enter upon their office.

99. Any member of the Regional Leacy shall be removed from his Office by two-thirds
majority of the members present for offences against the State or the law.

100. The Leacy shall have the power to make legislation on the following matters of local
affairs such as:
1. Maintenance of Public Order, regional administration, regional finance.
2. Organisation of Sub-Regional Committee and Courts.
3. Reformatory Institutions.
5. Rehabilitation.
7. Agriculture.
8. Water and irrigation
9. Protection of wild animals
10. Forests
11. Gambling

101. The Regional Leacy shall have the power to make legislation on the matters of local
interest which are not specifically enumerated in Article 100, but in case of any
inconsistency of the Regional legislation with the Federal Law the latter will prevail.

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE

102. There shall be an Executive Head in a Region called Midan Peyu.
103. The Midan Peyu shall be the Agent of the President and be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Regional Leacy for a term of three years, and he shall remain in office till his successor takes over the office.

104. Any citizen of Nagaland shall be eligible to the Office of Midan Peyu.

105. The Executive power and function of the Region shall be vested in the Midan Peyu and shall be exercised by him through the Regional Executive.

106. The Midan Peyu shall, in a Region, be responsible to perform the duties towards the Federal Government of Nagaland.

107. There shall be a Regional Executive the number of which shall be determined by the Regional Leacy concerned.

108. The members of the Regional Executive shall be elected by the Regional Leacy from amongst its members.

109. The Regional Executive shall advise and assist the Midan Peyu in discharge of his functions and duties.

**SUB REGIONAL COMMITTEE**

110. There shall be more than one Sub-Regional Units in a Region and a Sub-Regional Committee shall be composed of the representatives of Village Councils.

111. The Village Council shall, in the Sub-Regional Committee, be represented by its Runa Peyu or any person authorized in this behalf.

112. (a) The Sub-Regional Committee shall have the local administrative powers in the area under the direction of the Regional Leacy, and the administrative power for the Sub-Regional unit shall be exercised by the Runa Peyu as its Administrative Head.  
(b) The Runa Peyu shall be appointed by the Midan Peyu on the recommendation of the Sub-Regional Committee.

113. The Sub-Regional Committee shall remain subordinate to the Regional Leacy and its functions and duties shall be regulated by the rules made by the Regional Leacy.

114. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in the foregoing Articles 110 and 11, where the formation of Sub-Regional Committee is not practicable the Regional Leacy shall have the powers to formulate its own administrative arrangement according to the convenience of the Region concerned.

**REGIONAL COURT**

115. There shall be a Regional Court for each Region.

116. (a) The number of Judges in the Regional Court shall be determined by the Regional Leacy and the Judges shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation and advice of the Regional Leacy through Midan Peyu.
(b) The President shall appoint one from amongst the Judges as Presiding Chairman of the Court.

117. The Judges shall hold office during their good behaviour in Office.

118. A Judge of the Regional Court shall be removed from Office for his proved misconduct by a resolution passed by two-thirds majority of the members in the Leacy.

119. The Regional Leacy shall have no power or jurisdiction in the interpretation of the Yehzabo.

120. The Regional Court shall have original jurisdiction on any matter that arises between two or more Sub-Regions.
121. The Regional Court shall have appellate jurisdiction to hear disputes on appeals from the decisions, orders or judgement of the Sub-Regional Courts.
122. The Regional Court shall have the power of Superintendence over the Sub-Regional Courts.

SUB-REGIONAL COURT

123. There shall be a Sub-Regional Court for each Sub-Region and the number of Judges shall be determined by the Regional Leacy.
124. The Judges of the Sub-Regional Court shall be elected by the members of the Regional Leacy and the Runa Peyu and shall act as Presiding Officer of the Court.
125. The Sub-Regional Court shall have original jurisdiction over disputes that arise between two or more villages or between persons or groups of persons of different villages.
126. The Sub-Regional Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over the dispute that arises from the decision of the Village Court.
127. The Village Court shall be the lowest Judicial Court in Nagaland and the administration of Justice shall be regulated according to their customs, traditions and usage.
128. (a) In exercise of the foregoing Article 127, no outside interference shall be allowed by the Yehzaboo and by law.
(b) No appeal from the jurisdiction of the Village Court shall be entertained in the Higher Court except a certificate for appeal was granted by the Village Court.

PART VII
OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

129. The Official Language throughout Nagaland shall be English and all Official business of the Government shall be transacted in English. (Other languages shall be used as medium of common understanding).
130. Regional language shall be used as Official Language in the Region for Official transaction of business of local Government.

PART VIII
DEFENCE

131. The Federal Government of Nagaland shall maintain a standing National Army.
132. The Organization of Defence shall be regulated by the Tatar Ho Ho in consideration of the situation prevalent in the country.
133. Subject to the provision of Article 54(b) the Speaker of Tatar Ho Ho is empowered to allow two Naga Army representatives to participate in the deliberations of the House, particularly on matters of defence.

PART IX
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

134. The Federal Government of Nagaland shall maintain Diplomatic Relations with Nations.
135. The relationship of the Federal Government of Nagaland towards all Nations shall be one of peaceful coexistence.

PART X
RELIGION

136. Protestant Christianity and Naga Religion are recognized Religions in Nagaland.

PART XI
YEHZABO

137. The Yehzabo of Nagaland is flexible in nature and as such amendment in respect of any Article or Clause can be effected if and when a Bill is passed to that effect by two-thirds majority of Tatar Hoho.

PART XII
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

138. The Naga National Council shall be the only recognized Political institution in Nagaland.

139. The Naga National Council shall work on the following principles:
There shall be:
1. A Central Executive Council which will guide and control the politics and decisions of the Nation.
2. Regional and Range Council which will deal with organisational activities and problems in the respective Regions.
SHILLONG ACCORD

THE SHILLONG ACCORD OF 11 NOVEMBER 1975 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE UNDERGROUND NAGAS

1. The following representatives of the underground organizations met the Governor of Nagaland Shri L.P. Singh, representing the Government of India, at Shillong on 10 and 11 November, 1975.

   1. Shri I. Temjenba
   2. Shri S. Dahru
   3. Shri Veeniyi Rhakhu
   4. Shri Z Ramyo
   5. Shri M Assa
   6. Shri Kevi Yallay

2. There was a series of four discussions. Some of the discussions were held with the Governor alone; at others, the Governor was assisted by the two Advisers for Nagaland, Shri Ramunny and Shri H. Zopianga, and Shri M.L. Kampani, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. All the five members of the Liaison Committee namely Rev. Longri Ao, Dr M. Aram, Shri L. Lungalang, Shri Kenneth Kerhuo and Shri Lungshim Shaiza, participated in the discussions.

3. The following were the outcome of the discussions:

4. (i) The representatives of the underground organizations conveyed their decision, of their own volition, to accept, without condition, the Constitution of India;
(ii) It was agreed that the arms, now underground, would be brought out and deposited at appointed places. Details for giving effect to this agreement will be worked out between them and representatives of the Government, the security forces, and members of the Liaison Committee;
(iii) It was agreed that the representatives of the underground organizations should have reasonable time for formulate other issues for discussion for final settlement.

Dated, Shillong
11 November, 1975

I Temjenba; S DEHRU;
Z Ramyo; M ASSA;
KEVI YALLAY
On behalf of the representatives of Underground organizations.

L P SINGH
On behalf of the Government of India

ANNEXURE ‘G’
SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT TO THE SHILLONG ACCORD ON 5 JANUARY 1976

1. It was decided that the collection of arms initially at collection centres, would commence as early as possible, and will be completed by 25 January, 1976. Initial places of collection to be decided through discussion between Commissioner, representatives of underground organizations and the members of the Liaison Committee.

2. Once all arms are collected, these will be handed over to Peace Council team at the respective places of collections.

3. Peace Council team will arrange to transport the arms from collection centres to Chedema Peace Camp and arrange guards, etc. for safe custody of arm.

4. Similar arrangement at agreed place/places will be made in Manipur with concurrence of the Manipur Government.

5. The underground may stay at Peace Camps to be established at suitable places, and their maintenance will be arranged only by the Peace Council. Any voluntary contribution from any source will be made to the Peace Council, who will utilise the fund according to necessity.

BISETO MEDOM KEYHO; PUKROVE NAKRU; Z RAMYO; I TEMJENBA

L.P. SINGH
Governor

Dated, Shillong
5 January, 1976
APPENDIX – H

MANIFESTO OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND

PREFACE

The concept of ‘Human Race’, internationalism and the myth of nations could in no sense deprive the Nagas of the basis of being a family and a nation of their own existence. This self-determination is their righteous cause and Nagas shall always be the people of this noble cause. It is, however, to be admitted that, notwithstanding the feat of patriotism and valour, Nagas found themselves being self-defeated now and then. It is purely due to, in the first place, parochialism practiced in the highest circle of national affairs. Also, the path the people have to tread was not illuminated, the sine qua non of clarity of the way to their salvation was absent. The masses were, by and large, led along in the name of nation alone.

It is the bounden duty of every sensible citizen to be concerned about the necessity of evolving the sure way to save the nation from such treacherous mess of conditions. It is time to enlighten the people and meet them with a clear cut Manifesto that they be led out of their precarious helplessness, that potentials may be sublimated and channelised towards the salvation of their country.

Isak Chishi Swu
Executive Chairman
National Socialist Council
Of Nagaland

Oking
MANIFESTO OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND

Nothing is more inalienable for a nation, big or small, than her sovereignty. No moment, either, is more challenging for a people than the time when their free existence is challenged. The Naga National Council has failed. The sovereign existence of Nagaland is more at peril than ever before. It is high time for the revolutionary patriots to declare their national principles, their views and their aims.

I. NAGALAND AND THE NAGA NATIONAL COUNCIL

We live in a world of constant change. But the forces causing the change are not always the same. They develop and perish according to the different given conditions, stages and times.

To us, the forces that defend the righteous cause of sovereign national existence and further the just cause of the people along the inevitable course are alone patriots and revolutionaries. All forces standing in opposition to this are traitors and reactionaries, in that they try to pull the wheels of history back. All the reactionary traitors lean upon one another; all revolutionary patriots stand as one, supporting one another; there is no via media.

The Naga National Council was the only authentic political organization of the people of Nagaland. It was this council that boldly too up the historic national trust, that is, the safeguarding of the right of the sovereign existence of Nagaland. With all its resoluteness, the Council faced ups and downs and it was never deterred by setbacks here and setbacks there. It had withstood the bitter period of the past three decades or so, turning neither to the right nor to the left - although there had been marked degeneration in its integrity and vigour. Our country could exist and we owe it to the National Council and to the thousands of patriots who have unsparingly laid down their lives and to the unprecedented endurance of the people, thanks to the leadership Naga National Council had given to the people in their past national trials and tribulations till the time of its failure to condemn the treacherous Ministry and the Accord of treason of 1975.

The sober reality, however, is that our country is still under heavy occupation of the enemy troops. What are we to do with this? The enemy will never withdraw of its own accord. In no circumstances should we allow ourselves either to count on the sensibleness of the enemy. Because it is always suicidal. History has sufficiently warned us against the possible repetition of such error. Politics is successful but only when backed by arms. We are safe so long as we fight to save ourselves. Therefore, we have to fight and back the enemy out at all hazards. If negotiations, however, would be indispensable, they should be done only from a position of strength. Any attempt, therefore, at negotiated settlement at the moment would undoubtedly mean doing away with oneself, if not, it is traitorous in motive.

Facts must be acknowledged in spite of whatever turn the world might take; people must be told the truth so that they may understand their country and know what is what.

521
The enemy is superior, therefore, out war will have to be a protracted one. We are in the course of active defence. Who will lead us through this long war? It is the most decisive issue. Is this the Naga National Council still? It has got to be reasoned out.

True, facts must be admitted and it is a fact that the most ignominious sell-out in the history of Naga people ever since the time the first bullet of freedom was fired, is beyond dispute the notorious ‘Shillong Accord’. That Accord deserved an outright official and open condemnation by the Ministry that surrendered arms and consented to such sell-out. This failure left the country in a dangerous political mess. National-wide danger was thus brought about. Any earnest appeal in a time like this for guidance, and letters of determination to fight to the last were never vouchsafed; no imperative given. The helpless unyielding were left entirely to themselves.

Of course, being resolute in purpose, we were able to make shift for ourselves. Any bold and genuine act of competent people in the forefront, in the name of the National Council, to save the country from the tragedy of the Shillong Accord by condemning it and the Ministry concerned was adversely reacted to. Any correct and required stride given in the matter of policy to salvage the country from the dead-end of the leadership was often brushed aside. The aloofness of the leadership from the people all through the difficult years, despite the earnest appeal of the people to come back and lead them, was justified on selfish considerations. Dissensions, misunderstandings and failures naturally arising therefrom were often imputed to the people. Essential men were often toppled by intrigues and their lives were treated as mere stuff. Only relatives were confided to and the hard-won glory and honour of the nation and the sacrifices and untold sufferings of thousands of patriots and the people, were appropriated and the highest office of national trust was used for the glory and gains of a family or two and their relatives. Any criticism to that effect was dealt with at gun-point, family and relatives were placed above the nation. Who can deny all this? Indeed, the truth is suppressed; that is the problem.

What is more, the delegation of downright traitors was warmly welcomed and met time and again before the eyes of the whole world. The use of the exalted name of the only national institution by the traitors was deliberately consented to and resolutions of anti-national aspiration were countenanced. Apparently, modalities and terms for another fresh capitulation are being worked out in close collaboration with the rank traitors. Surely traitors are collaborated with, patriots despised. Traitors are propped up, patriots condemned and the principle of upholding the freedom of every inch of Nagaland is deliberately withdrawn. These are the unfolding realities of the day and not of long ago. Because traitors are always from within and they lean upon one another in due time. One naturally wonders, if such conduct of affairs would commend itself. What can such state of affairs assure to the people? Nothing but danger. It is only heading for fresh capitulation from the highest level. But this is Nagaland and we are the people, we claim your promise; where is it?

Indeed, the Naga National Council is spent; it has turned out to be treacherous and reactionary. Any effort to revolutionise it is stifled. It has neglected to carry its solemn national trust through to the end. It has totally failed. The resort being made to ‘piece’ and ‘unity’ is simply a desperate attempt at covering up and making virtue of their obvious treason. No matter in how many ways you would try to pass yourself off as saviour, you would be discovered. We declare the issue is sharp between the reactionary traitors on one
side and the revolutionary patriots on the other. No identity exists between the dross and the grain whatever. Lovers of the nation and the people are driven to a state where a breakthrough is a must and it has to be promptly done if Nagaland and the Naga people are to be saved at all for what is their due on earth. Truly, the historic moment of saving Nagaland from the failure of the Naga National Council has come as the most crucial challenge to one and all.

II. ON POLICY

Every problem has a solution and to effect it, there is always the most realistic way. In the words of Chairman Mao, ‘Policy is the life-line’. Therefore, any problem that is not handled precisely in the way the objective conditions warrant, is bound to meet with failure. It is policy that decides the outcome of any contest apart from strength. Thus, the question of making the right approach is, above all others, to be pondered over in the light of practical investigations.

(a) Policy and the leadership

The defeat of a people is not always brought about by the superiority of the adversary in strength but through incorrect leadership and the pursuit of unfounded policy. We should take this fact into serious consideration in order to avert the danger of self-defeat. A people that fails to admit the maxim that national victory is impossible without correct policy and correct leadership, is doomed to ultimate ruin. It is not uncommon that often leaders act at the dictate of their feelings and whims and suffer setbacks one after another, for any policy that is independent of the objective conditions is without basis and as such, is bound to suffer failure. Policy could only be realistic when it is based on the actual conditions of the people concerned and the enemy, and the world in general.

It is, therefore, not a matter of one’s voice but that of necessity that leadership should have correct assessment of any situation through close investigations. It necessitates that he should be at the core of the situation, that is, he has to be with the masses, mobilising and working in close association, to lead them through all the critical stages with policy that is warranted by the conditions. It is in this way that the people could appreciate the wisdom of the leadership and his concern for the nation. They could confidently rally round him. Moreover, they could learn the knack of analyzing problems and discover the right and the wrong for themselves. They could also acquire practical experience to handle the situation, enhance confidence in themselves and raise their cause. Such perfect harmony between the people and the leadership makes them invincible.

It is deplored that the leadership acted, in the past long period of nation-saving, completely independently of the actual conditions and in total isolation from the people. No amount of attempts to explain away the aloofness of the leadership on the ground that he was sent out by the people could hold water any longer. Obsolete views should be shaken off. We should be realistic because it is the politics of saving the nation and not that of justifying one’s position.

We do not think it proper either, on the part of the leadership, to stay away from the people even when there is fatal danger at home and against the appeal of the people to come
back and illuminate their way. It should also be borne in mind that when he failed to understand the people and vice versa, both would lose their bearings. However far he may make his way ahead, however high he may soar, he is bound to be pulled back and be down if he does not pull the people along with him. He should see that there is no adverse gap between him and the people. Indeed, in a problem of this nature, nothing could be accomplished apart from the people.

The contention that a particular leadership staying in a foreign land has sustained the existence of Nagaland thus far and that he alone will bring the final victory too, needs immediate correction. It explicitly means that a policy, though it has no bearing on the objective conditions, could be correct and a nation could be saved without the support and sacrifices of the people. This is the basic erroneous conception that has bred internal strife which have brought the Nagas down to this ebb. Such a view categorically rules out the support of the people and ignores their untold sacrifices.

It has placed the leadership who has lost the confidence of the people above the people, above the nation and above righteousness. This section of the people, in no way, stands for the national cause since it is the line of direct negation. They are treacherous; they have to perish with the leader whom they blindly worship. Probably, their leader would bring them the golden plate of Nagaland's freedom from the hidden deep blue sky! Facts are stubborn and have no regard for anyone, although we acted often times in deference to the elders. Things are now more in perspective and Nagas are no longer in their 1950s. We have to put an end to the reactionary mentality of interpreting the correctness of policy in terms of personality. We are revolutionaries; we do not believe in fantasy and absurdity; neither could we ever be persuaded of the talisman of any helpless leadership. We shall not fly in the air; we shall walk on the ground and work with the people, for it is our experience that correct policy could only be determined in the right perspective of a given situation and correct leadership could emerge only in the course of the struggle along with the people.

In addition, the conduct of national affairs through the intermediary of the family and relatives through the past years has naturally alienated the people and the Government. The refusal of the leadership to keep correspondence with the Home Government on official terms and his meagre and perfunctory pieces of advice, the correspondence between him and his family and near relatives, who are mostly traitors, often despising the home authority, the subjection of Government communications to the virtual censorship of the family, who maintain an air of hauteur, the practice of viewing the home situation in the light of self-motivated information from the family and his ultra vires utterances on some national issues—have made a mess of everything in us. Such arrogation to themselves of the authority to conduct affairs exclusively and the shameless, self-made notion of being above others in respect of nationality and ownership of Nagaland, has deliberately relegated altogether the people and the nation far to the background.

Who can question these facts? Nagas are made to see a strange centre of power, being created out of the family and relatives of the leadership and a few others with whom he has apparently formed an aristocratic circle, above the Government, above the people and above Nagaland. He has practically forgotten the people and their immeasurable sacrifices. He does not count on the people's support but seeks the backing of his men who are mostly traitors. Accordingly, he has acted irrespective of the involvement of the
question of national principles. The people are alienated; he has dug a chasm between himself and his henchmen on the one side and the people of Naaland on the other.

It will be a wonder of wonders if such policy is to be the wisdom to save a nation. Of course, if one knows the people, the people would know him too; if one despises the people, the people would certainly despise him too; if one respects the sanctity of national cause, the nation would honour him too; and this is the way of the world. We are revolutionary patriots; we do not allow ourselves and our people to be imposed upon by empty rhetoric. We are vehemently opposed to the politics of any family or tribe that attempts to lord it over Naaland. Parochialism of any form shall be done away with and the nation's integrity safeguarded. We cannot bluff heaven and earth too long; the people know who is who and what is what. We will never relinquish Naaland to anyone. It is high time to sum up our past and take a concrete approach to the problems confronting us. Naaland has got to be liberated from prejudices, injustice and from all sorts of aristocratic snobbery.

(b) Rectification of basic erroneous views

Since the inception, there has been a persistent view that it is too much for the Nagas to resist the colossal invading might of India and Burma, and that some sort of settlement by peaceful means should be arrived at. Unfortunately, the failure to grasp the reality of the problem has made many a well-intentioned national worker turn opportunist.

While admitting elements of truth in this view, one should as well realise the national danger involved in the possible inference to be made from it. The issue is not a contest of strength but of upholding our historic right against the aggressive forces. In this society of human frailty, we do not discount the impact of might on any issue. Nevertheless, the trend of viewing the world from the angle of power alone, ruling out the question of right and wrong, obviously leads to the conclusion that the weak are born to be rules by the strong and the poor by the rich.

In other words, the world is for the monster, and not for the people. This view represents the mentality of the lower nature of man, especially when taken over by an aberration. It makes the existence of human society meaningless. Men of sense look at problems from the viewpoint of right and that decides more approvingly the outcome of conflicting issues. The strong make might their resort. They are more easily prone to the use of force in settling problems. They are able to do much harm and can even annihilate many of the weak and win battles; but it is perseverance and the act of undaunted confrontation with the eventuality of death for the truth one knows that win the war in the long run.

Victory is, thus not in the power to kill but in the fearlessness to face death for a just cause. The logic that the strong win over the weak is foul if it is taken at its face value without taking into consideration the other side of the experience of history. The strong are often defeated by the weak if they persevere for their just cause to the end. The outcome of the US-Vietnamese war may serve as a clear example.

The rulers of India and their strong men could understand Naaland and her people. They only knew that the Nagas were 'naked' and on this account, despised them and
disregarded all their historical rights. However, 'Naked Nagas' also have their homeland and it has never been conquered by the Indians nor by the Burmese. Neither have the Nagas ever joined the Indian Union nor that of Burma by consent. As the Indians and the Burmese took recourse to force, Naga people knew for certain that the problem had involved the challenge on our stand on the basic issue of principle, to face which, we have come into being. Indians demanded 'total surrender'. They also boasted stating that to finish the Nagas was a matter of a day, and took pride in it. The generals and the strong men who were the hope of India were sent one after another into Nagaland to conduct the unprecedented theatre of cruel war. Hundreds and thousands of troops operated and ravaged the land, indiscriminately putting out thousands of lives. They resorted to endless devices of torture and killing.

They did their worst. But are the Nagas finished and are they no more now? Have the Indians won the war? By no means. They had to change their stand from 'total surrender' to negotiations; the 'one day' has turned out to be a quarter of a century. The Shillong Accord, by virtue of which India claimed victory, is a dead letter. From the relentless resistance of the people, totally condemning the Shillong Accord and its predecessors, it is proved that any agreement that may be entered into on Indian terms can never be the solution to the problem.

However, it is clear that India would muster all the traitors and organize them into an active puppet front to attain their objective which is expressed in lucid terms by Morarji Desai, a one-time Prime Minister of India, as "I will exterminate the Nagas without any compunction." But the prospect of winning the war in the years to come is still worse as the force fights a wrong cause can never be strong ad finem. The longer they fight the greater would be their loss, for it is a mere false hope that is encouraged by the acts of the traitors to nurture. Moreover, it is evident from the present-day phenomena that India, not to speak of forcing the Nagas into the Union, would not be able to hold together all its component parts for all time to come; the discontented peoples and nationalities are bound to rise up to save themselves from perishing altogether in Indian society where suppression, discrimination and all sorts of corruption abound. India would soon be bound up with her internal turmoil. The mighty problem of poverty and hunger shall loom ever more. India can gain no ground to defeat us.

As regards the possible settlement of the problem it is an ill-time by all considerations, because our adversaries, relying on their might are intransigent and are not prepared to recognize the fact of our distinct existence. Whatever solutions they might talk about are nothing but terms of surrender. Secondly, though we have been able to establish ourselves on more solid ideological grounds, at present, we are not yet able to present ourselves formidable to make the adversaries admit that we can fight a long war to their detriment.

And so to seek a solution in a time like this would evidently be suicidal. An honourable solution is only in our preparedness to fight a protracted war to the victorious end. Our righteous cause would unfaillingly back us up; it cannot be otherwise. Although might, in its own way can be formidable, it is the truth and our resoluteness for it that would inevitably triumph in the long run.
(c) Principles and expediency

It is principle on which the meaning of life takes root. When it is shaken, everything is forced afloat on the evil side of the world; the purpose of life is discarded and society is set out of scruples. The conduct of such a permissive society is governed by the philosophy of the Fallen Angel. It is beyond forbearance to see the fate of any people being wafted on towards that end.

It is by keeping the principles that objectives are attained through policy and the meaning of life is pursued to its reality. To save a nation or a society one must, above all, be established on the solid rock of principle. We should know that whenever expediency is stressed there is always the danger of principle being sacrificed. It is like running with both feet off the ground leading to a fall. Opportunities get circumscribed where expediency is resorted to.

We, Nagas, have suffered much from this, we have to struggle to come round from such grievous hurt. It stems, in the main, from failure to know the exact prowess of the enemy. When the enemy’s power is overestimated, there is always a fear which consequently leads one to embark upon unfounded, feeble policy through which the adversary could come to know of him and have the advantage of taking the offensive on all fronts. It is most dangerous when we do not know both ourselves and the adversary; until we know the adversary, paradoxically we cannot know ourselves either as we are, to deal with him.

The leaders at home did not believe in the resisting power of the people, they did not comprehend the fact that, for all setbacks, the force of the people could make its way to the final victory. They feared that continued fighting would bring terrible consequences, nay, that India could even annihilate the people of Nagaland and argued – “what would freedom mean if people are finished; it has, therefore, involved the question of humanity.” They accordingly discouraged fighting and the efforts to strengthen the defence line. The cause of the nation was no more in them. They carried within them only the defeated hearts.

It is also an open secret that they had been playing an underhand game with the enemy to get the area of their occupation free from military operation and directed the spearhead of the operation to the stalwart patriots to soften them in their line. Unfortunately, many a well-intentioned national worker became victim of it. They always overestimated the enemy in spite of his practical inability to crush us in the past twenty-five years and made importunate, fear-ridden overtures here and there which they considered expedient at the time when Nagas were worst situated.

This nature of unrealistic and ill-timed approaches exposed our helplessness to the adversary. He had got what he wanted. Now knowing for sure that Nagas were no longer in a position to hold their own both in battle and at the negotiating table, the Government of India launched a timely offensive and successfully had his terms dictated. It was, it should be acknowledged, a splendid catch hauled ashore.

In their vain attempts to foist the treacherous Accord on the people, they have employed all sorts of political black arts, calling heaven and earth, now here, now there. They do not cease to talk at large of their at – “Our conscience is clear; we have done it to
save our nation.” Words of valour and honour are profusely used in their politics of prostrate capitulation.

We wonder if a man could fight better with a monster by jumping into his jaws, nay, by permitting to be swallowed deep into the stomach, than from a free position! Are we to experiment upon the sovereign existence of Nagaland by concluding an agreement of treason, and bury it for expedience’ sake? Is this expedient, as claimed by the Accord-makers, who once boasted of themselves as the oracles of the country? It is no more than saving one’s own life at the expense of the nation. Your philosophy is — “let it be, even though everything of the nation is lost, if I am saved.”

Nagaland would not be so cheap as it was disposed of in your agreement. You will come to know the hard fact that Nagaland belongs only to the people and you cannot defraud them of it. The leadership who still harbours the notion that people could be led by the nose has overshot himself and has fallen astern of time. We, the revolutionary patriots, shall at no time view our free Motherland through the eyes of a traitor. Whatever noise you may make, it will be only your helpless cry from the bottomless pit into which you have jumped of your own accord. You are there and your doom is sealed there.

On the whole, we cannot approach the world without clarity, neither could we ascertain the actuality of any condition through fear. Accurate appraisal of what the enemy and ourselves can and cannot do is essential for prudent dealing. Whatever might be the superiority of the enemy, there is no power on earth that dates annihilate the Nagas.

Therefore, we should never allow ourselves to be carried away by the baseless view that the adversary could wipe out the whole population. This is a mere phantom projected through the fear-ridden shallow politicians, now traitors, to intimidate the people into accepting their line of capitulation. We should not yield to blackmail of whatever kind. We should never lose sight of the truth that victory is in our resoluteness and correct policy, for Nagaland can definitely fight for the just cause of her freedom so long as the opponents are able to fight the wrong, being mindful of the fact that overestimation of the adversary causes fear and makes one commit right opportunism, while underestimation leads him to be presumptuous and makes him commit left opportunism. It is the correct reassessment of the actual condition that makes a correct approach possible.

III. NAGALAND AND THE INFLUX OF INDIAN CAPITAL AND INDIAN NATIONALS

The pouring in of Indian capital in our country, for political reasons, has shattered the Naga people into a society of wild money. Its accumulation in the hands of the reactionary traitors and the rich has accelerated the process of exploitation and suppression of the people. The appropriation of the vast means of production, distribution and exchange and other means of profit-making by this exploiting class and by the Indian parasites has drawn a distinct line between them and the people. The struggle between the two classes would ever assume greater magnitude with the exploiting class and the Indians defending all the time the untenable status quo and the people directly opposing it. This antagonism is not a small problem and no Naga would be free from it.
In addition, the involuntary influx of Indian nationals from overpopulated India into our country has set all Nagaland under constant threat of eventual submersion. In this connection, it may be recalled that before the year 1947, there was not a single Indian in Nagaland. It has now more than two hundred thousand Indians. If, with a greater ratio of influx, another twenty years would go, what would be the state of affairs? The expropriation of vast tracts of public land and other means of capital-making everywhere by the exploiting class by using the Indian nationals as labourers and their votes in the election contest have given a clear aspect of certainty to the constant and rapid exploitation of the Naga people at large by the reactionary traitors and the Indians.

The massive exploitation of mineral resources by the Central Government of India with the bureaucrats and the exploiting reactionary traitors in the puppet state power and the constant flow of swarms of Indians into the small area of Nagaland, will in a short period of time completely overwhelm and uproot Nagaland, depriving thereby the Naga people of all jobs and their just due and of their means of life. Because exploitation has no temperance. This is how a people is exploited to the worst of fates — the fate or becoming the helpless exploited foreigners in their own motherland. What does this lost world hold for the Naga people? Nagas are, indeed, faced with the irreconcilable fate from which we have to deliver ourselves. But deliverance from such imminent doom decisively calls for a revolutionary force.

IV. NAGALAND AND THE EFFETE INDIAN AND BURMESE CULTURE AND THEIR FAITHS

Along with the occupation of Nagaland by sheer military might, one started witnessing the process of Indianisation of the Naga people on full massive scale. The rulers of both India and Burma knew well that force alone could never serve their purpose of making the Nagas the component parts of their communities. As they knew that anything Indian or Burmese was detestable to the Naga, they had to undergo a tough course of time to have the Nagas assimilated to their culture and ways of life. Persuasion was not possible either, only the process of subjecting them to assimilation was essential. For this reason, massive introduction of decadent Hindu culture and literature and those of the Burmese, in the social and individual life of the Naga people through public institutions and mass media, started all-Nagaland pervasiveness. Thus being conditioned entirely to and swamped by the waves of Indian and Burmese influence, one could only see the precious verities of the Naga people in jeopardy of eventual extinction.

New problems bring new omens. The spread of Hinduism and the queer noises have reached our homeland. Although, as a doctrine Hinduism is not a recruiting force, it is not to be easily dismissed, since it is backed by a Hindu Government. The forces of Hinduism, viz., the numberless Indian troops, the retail and wholesale dealers, the teachers and the instructors, the intelligenzia, the prophets of non-violence, the gamblers and the snake-charmers, Hindi songs and Hindi films, the rasogula makers and the Gita are all arrayed for the mission of supplanting the Christian God, the eternal God of the Universe. The challenge is serious, there is no hiding; no pretension.

The preachers of the Gospel, the holy men of God and the demagogues, are you prepared to resist these surging waves of the Hindu world upon our country? This danger
flows from India and the vulnerability of the Church leaders and the pliable demagogues has added to the problem. To join the Indian Union as they insisted, is to allow ourselves to be drowned and perish in these waves of dead doctrine. Whereas, to defend Nagaland’s Independent Existence as we have been doing with our lives and our all, is to assure ourselves safety from the doom of Hinduism.

This is simple logic. The failure of the Christian leaders to grasp the way the evil forces work and their failure to face them in the way they should has, indeed, placed Nagaland on a most serious trial. We are not only confronted with a war of physical force but also with the more dangerous insidious war of assimilation. A war of such nature does not admit of a shallow approach; it demands of us thorough combat.

We live in a sophisticated world but our religious leaders take a shallow view of it. They do not apprehend the fact that the hard realities are always beneath the surface. In spite of the long political bloodshed, they have never realized the immense significance the politics of defending one’s own national freedom has on the question of spiritual salvation. They believe in the illusion that the constitutional sanction of India would safeguard the freedom of their faith. They failed to realize that any written constitution could be thrown overboard by the majority whenever expediency arose. The recent ‘Freedom of Religion Bill, 1978’ introduced in the Indian Parliament which forbids further conversion to Christianity is a clear example to this effect, and it would serve as an eye-opener to all those who trust in the constitutional guarantee.

Yet the Church leaders would persist in joining the Indian Union of their own volition. You, good fellows, want us to resign ourselves to the wrong world which, to us, is the hardest of all. This is very wrong and you have done it. Harmful brains work harmful things. Preachers of all ranks have gone after the blessing and the ‘awards’ of Indian bosses. Spiritual uprightness is pushed into the background, pliable demagogues are out, dressed in ‘dhoti’ with that queer red mark of foreign goddess on their broad foreheads, preaching reverence for cows – half absorbed, full devil! O Nagaland, whither goeth thou!

One is urged to ask, if Jesus, the Christ, is not sufficient to save the Nagas and the world and how the question of taking help from the Hindu goddess has ever arisen. The keeping of a substantial area of Nagaland and the Naga people therein under the so-called Arunachal Pradesh exclusively for the influence of Ram Krishna Mission over the innocent is a long-range design to wreck the Nagas among themselves on different religious faiths and thus perpetuate their occupation of Nagaland.

Furthermore, the abundant amenities of life accorded to them are only sinister seeds of dissension being sown in the Naga family. Whatever it may be and wherever they may be, Nagas are Nagas and we shall prove the evil of this policy before long. India’s “Ahimsa”, “All Roads Lead to Rome,” and “No Religion Has the Monopoly of Righteousness” are, no doubt masterpieces of philosophy, but the way to eternal Life is not philosophy. The time has come for you and for us either to shrink back or prove thorough. God wants us right now to stand for Him. Now is the time to hold firm our ground with Christ and face this tick and carrot policy and persecutions of all Indian type. Real sacrifices of the soldiers of Christ are called for to make our country for Him and for Him alone. O men of God, lead us to Saviour Christ, for He alone is the Way, the Truth, and the Life that leads to God, the
Father. Our Saviour taught us saying, “and thou shalt be hated of all nations for My name’s sake.” Truly, it is time we pose the question, “Who is on the Lord’s side?” Come for Christ, come for Nagaland’s freedom. We are here and you will find us here always. Or you go for India and Burma and their goddesses. There is no third way, for “he who is not with me is against me and he who does not gather with me scatters.”

V. NAGALAND AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

A country is always to be saved by its population but population as such is not a force until it is organized and brought into solidarity. It is, therefore, first and foremost that there should be solidarity and single organization of the people. In other words, a nation is most secure when its citizens are kept instituted against any possible influence of the anti-national elements. Party politics proceeds in the main, from party interests, and as such permitting party politics in any form in times of national emergency, is in many ways obviously affording opportunities to the opponents to have a hold on some of the antagonistic parties. Any force that may have the tendency to disintegrate the solidarity of the people must be removed at the first opportunity.

In a country like Nagaland, particularly at the present time, party system could never accomplish anything except leading to ruination. It would mean only the game of the traitors and the exploiting class. The stage where there could be conducive practice of party system is still a long way off. The nature of the problem with which we have been confronted necessitates concerted efforts of the people through an organization, if our country is positively to be saved from danger of any kind. The dictatorship of the people through an organization is, therefore, indispensable.

Nevertheless, it is to be admitted that the constructive criticism of any erroneous policy is as much indispensable as the dictatorship of the people itself. Hence the dictatorship of the people through a single political organization and the active practice of democracy within the organization is unquestionable for the salvation of Nagaland. Will not party system then be essential in normal times hereafter? Whether it is normal time or not the kind of existence that our society will have cannot approve of parties of anti-nationals and exploiting class. In short, there can be no room for anti-people elements to function in our society.

The damage done to the healthy body politic and the upright characteristics of the Naga people as a whole, through the practice of Indian party system by the traitors, is beyond easy description. In their contest for the rein of state power all the parties involved in it indulged in all evil practices. To win the favour of the Central ruling party, ‘the mithun’, and ‘the cock’ alike promised in their words the annihilation of what they called ‘hostiles’ and the ‘miscreants’. At the same time to ingratiate itself into indirect favour with and dupe the national defenders, ‘the cock’ showed superficial leniency to the common people and to those unfortunate national workers who fell victims of arrest. Both favour the inflow of Indians and exploited them for votes.

The accumulation of Indian money in their hands and the corrupt ubiquitous practice of bribery and the purchase of votes for money has left the people to the tender mercy of money. It is money that works, it is money that represents the ‘Assembly.’ All are
shaken down before money that has no sentiment and are taken over. These ‘parties’ are formed mostly out of the traitors and the deserters from Naga National Council. Now the notorious Shillong Accord makers in direct collusion with these parties, paradoxically, in the stolen name of the people, are merily pulling the NNC back to their traitor’s home, to save and enhance their parties and status at the expense of the National right. It is because they all are status mongers and renegades; they have no ideals to give up. Quo vads, NNC! You cannot conceal for long years your treacherous inclination; you cannot shift the blame on to the people. We advise you to stop presuming upon the people’s forbearance of you. We, the Nagas of today, do not permit any easy calculation on us.

The mithun and the cock, the ‘honest brokers’ and the hypocrites, the holy men of peace and the prophets of non-violence, and the latest Accord makers, all without exception have joined hands with one another in the noble enterprise of instituting the modernmost Vanity Fair in the puppet society where freedom, power and reality of life all end up in money, wine and women. Is this the system of society the Nagas are to seek their salvation from? Certainly no. On the contrary, this is a system that must be done away and the Nagas delivered from this nether gloom for a society of higher order free from the fear of domination, exploitation and suppression.

VI. THE INDO-BURMA ISSUE WITH NAGALAND AND THE MEANS

The fate of a nation is never decided by spinning a coin. Neither our means is determined by the influence of any divine principles nor by our wishes. To us, there is no violence or non-violence as such in respect of policy, but it is the nature of the objective conditions that has to do with the means. To break a stone we use a hammer, to reap a field we use a sickle and to deliver Nagaland from the preposterous occupation of Indian and Burmese military might, we need arms.

When Gandhi was there the Nagas were happiest to talk of the Indo-Naga issue and even came to initial agreement. But the authorities post-Gandhi tore up the agreement and the worst was forced upon the Nagas thereafter. Shooting down the Nagas at will started despite peaceful approaches. In the circumstances, the Nagas could not be expected to face Indian bullets with Gandhi’s Ahimsa. Nagas had to fire back in self-defence.

At any rate, could we make it the turn of Nagaland to be devoured? Never reason with a monster. Gandhi’s Ahimsa posed to be liberal Englishmen might have led into the gas chambers if it had been posed to Hitler, the Fuehrer. We shall in no case meet invasion of our country with non-violence. It is coward’s politics, heading only for the jaws of the monster. Force to force, reason to reason. It is your aggression on us that had given rise to this spell of armed conflict; it is your killing of us that had touched off bitter retaliation. The problem is with you, it is not with the Nagas.

A political issue needs a political solution. The issue between India and Burma on the one side and Nagaland on the other is a political one. Therefore, it requires a political solution. But India and Burma seek military solution and this is the crux of the problem. Our freedom is forced into the battle field; we have to pick it up with the gun. How long India and Burma continue their occupation of our homeland, that long we are bound to fight. We permit no power on earth to disturb our home and dictate terms to us.
And to you, who shout aloud for 'peace' and 'unity' we make our position unequivocal. If peace is the issue, we are for peace and that with freedom, and not for the peace you mean in capitulation. If unity is the question, we are definitely for unity but on the correct line alone. Those who shouted 'peace,' 'unity,' 'compromise,' 'reconciliation,' 'humanity' and so on: where have they all gone? These and more are the slogans of the traitors and the hypocrites combined. No nation is ever rescued by high sounding empty slogans. It is arms that save a nation. We are revolutionary patriots; we shall hold fast to our gun. He who lays down his gun, lays down his freedom. This is the Gospel truth of our politics. We declare we will never lay down from our hands our arms, our freedom and our country.

VII. NAGALAND AND THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE

No country is prepared for the worst until its people are settled down to the practice of self-reliance. In other words, the people that have no determination to struggle by themselves have practically no motive force to sustain the meaning of life they have to live; they are left adrift only waiting for the unknown destiny to be driven to. It is the practice of relying on oneself that gives reality to one's existence.

The most dangerous harm affecting our politics today is that ab initio the people were made to believe in foreign help for their survival. This policy of settling the people on the hope of external help sapped the initiative to save themselves. Such policy is opportunist and treacherous in that the people are driven to despair and capitulation when things would not turn out as they expected. We have to see to it that people are educated and built up on the realistic line. Without putting into practice the principle of self-dependency, the essence of being revolutionary vanishes. The revolutionaries being mindful of the truth that their efforts alone are decisive, have to struggle to stand on their feet. They should be well established with the people as one and teach them to realise that their future is assured only in their preparedness to save by their own efforts and abandon the idea of making external aid decide their course. They should also cultivate themselves to make the best of the conditions they are in and struggle against the conducive tendencies such as indulging in tastes, acting at the dictate of whims or being dissipated, which the revolutionary state or condition can never approve.

It is hard to consolidate ourselves on foreign assistance. There could be no consolidation of our position without the practice of self-reliance, and without consolidation, it is idle to think of the final victory. We have to struggle and it is in the course of struggle that we acquire the experience essential for surmounting the inevitable problems on our way to final victory. Consolidation of home-front by our own efforts and the determination to fight through to the end could certainly win the favour of other countries and make their help worthwhile. He who does not realize the significance of the practice of self-reliance could not be a revolutionary patriot to the last.

Upholding the principle and shouting that 'Nagaland belongs to the Nagas' alone will not do. It requires of us far beyond that. Every vigorous effort must be made to realise it. We should not believe in parroting the principle; we must be prepared with the people and practically chart our way through. Mere words should not be our strategy; Nagaland has
experienced enough of it; it has not yet recovered from the crisis of faith created by the strategy of bombastic utterances.

However, without the centralised system it is quite a problem to achieve anything good. It is in the centralised system that unity could be fostered and save the country from the persisting internal nuisances and fight for the freedom of every inch of Nagaland. The policy of relying on ourselves could also be best implemented in this system. We should also change our tactics and strategy. Persistent fighting, as in the past, is an area where the enemy could do better; it should not be encouraged. We should find out the weak point of the enemy and consolidate ourselves there and that should be our base area. In this way, we can wrestle and have initiative almost all the time in our hand in dealing with the enemy, however superior he might be.

VIII. NAGALAND AND THE POLICY OF UNITED FRONT

The problem before us is how to confront an enemy of superior force and defeat them. The practical wisdom of the leadership lies in solving this problem. In order that the adversary may be defeated, he needs to be confronted on all fronts, which is pretty well impossible for a much weaker opponent. We should, however, know that we are not alone, because it is the world of conflicting historical forces.

Therefore, the question of the strategy of United Front with all the forces that could be united with it in some way or other cannot be dispensed with. In other words, we should by no means ignore or underestimate the necessity of a united front so long as there is the danger of isolated forces being defeated one after another. We should learn to help one another so that we are able to stand against the common enemy. Two men are always stronger than one and fighting on several fronts is more effective than fighting on a single front. We should be so united that there is coordination in our action.

There should be firm coordination with the forces that are within the enemy line too, and struggle to wreck the enemy from within. Enemy forces are most effectively disintegrated only when they are confronted from within and without. The old style of fighting single-handed like a bull should be avoided. We are to see the conditions around jointly exploited against the enemy. Until that is done, we cannot claim that we are confronting him precisely in the way by which he could be defeated. It amounts to leaving the field to the opponent alone with all the initiative in his hands to defeat us.

We have to rectify our policy from being indifferent or opposed to the formation of united front. We are revolutionaries; we should not be confined to ourselves alone, we should not just fight about without the tactics and strategy of winning over the enemy. We should even forgive the traitors and the mistake of being on their side provided they repent of their mistakes and cooperate with us in the task of saving the nation of us all. We declare we will unite with all the forces, God-fearing and Godless, that can be united with and fight against the monster in packs.

It is a pity that the leadership persistently harps and counts on the tantalising boon of some particular imperialist country and bosses and the sensibleness of the adversary by making antagonistic pronouncements against the countries which are sympathetically sharing
with us the weal and woe. We cannot refuse to ask ourselves: By so doing, has he gained them as he calculated? Definitely no. It is just beating about the bush. As a matter of fact, he is held up in a predicament by his own boomeranging. The option before him now is either to go on parroting the principle or come back empty-handed. And then, en route to...? Disloyalty to friends in their critical time has done much damage to mutual confidence. When open war broke out between our friends and our adversary, the leadership betrayed cooperation for the wanton purpose of winning the favour of the adversary. The ambivalent policy of the enemy was often miscalculated. Wounds caused by such perfidy are not easily healed. Friends are wounded, the adversary is gladdened and strengthened against us.

This is a total failure of policy, resulting from the inability to know the forces that would be on our side and the forces that are against us. It is the failure to understand Nagaland the world around. It is self-isolation and self-antagonism; it is rightist and cowardice; and treacherous in the ultimate analysis. It is self-defeat on both fronts, internal and external. It is a sad thing that we are led into such adverse state of affairs. The good old times are gone, we cannot call them back. We have to have the damages repaired, however long it may take, and bide our time. The world is not ended here; it keeps evolving. We should endeavour to adapt ourselves to and catch up with the forces at work. It is not for the world to wait for us; it is for us to struggle and to keep pace with the march of time. We should also correct ourselves from the past mistake of being out of step with the forces that are in our favour.

IX. NAGALAND AND THE SYSTEM OF SOCIALISM

What existence must our society have in this material world is the cardinal issue before us. We are to know that it is the world where there is the problem of exploitation of men by men and we are not an exception to this. It is altogether due to the system we live in. Therefore, it is true that the problems of disparity and poverty, and the concomitant evils, which have resulted from exploitation cannot be solved by any amount of benevolence and benefactions. It is the system that has to be abolished and lead the people into a new one where there is freedom from the fear of economic exploitation and political domination and suppression. Of course, we shall not struggle for the stage of perfect equality, simply for the factual reason of impossibility.

Nagas are living in a society of free enterprise and it is this system that amply affords the reactionary traitors and the rich a free hand to exploit the poor and the masses in general. The naked armed invasion on us by India and Burma marked the beginning of enormous influx of Indian capital and its prominent role and activities in our society have created wild conditions. The concentration of capital in a few hands and its constant investment for acquiring more capital has set the whole society into a tremendous swing of exploitation of the Nagas by all Nagas and by the Indian parasites.

The existence of class distinction is more prominent than ever before. The exploiting class consists mainly of the reactionary traitors, the bureaucrats, a handful of rich men and the Indian vermin. They have practically no concern for the masses nor for the survival of the nation, but interest themselves in exploitation of the people and retention of their status. Their identification of interests with those of the exploiting rules of India, has led them to be identified with the Indians in various walks of life; and as they are
accomplices, the Government of India is always behind them. On the other hand, the masses are the victims; they bore the brunt of the long attack. It is undoubtedly to their unyielding endurance that we owe the survival of the nation today and it shall be so for all time to come. They are also the victims of exploitation; they are daily exploited everywhere. The contradictions that exist between the two classes are such that there could be no meeting point whatsoever.

From the above brief analysis, two outstanding points emerge: In the first place, the free existence of Nagaland is a must for the salvation of the people. In the next, the abolition of exploitation of the people is imperative if people are to assure their future.

The fact that the sacrifices and the efforts of the people alone could withstand and save the nation from external invasion is beyond dispute. But in spite of this standing fact, we are posed with the question — For whom would the nation, saved by the sacrifices and the efforts of the people, be? No doubt, it would be for the people alone. However, the actuality of this would be borne out solely by the system that would be implemented.

To us, it is definitely SOCIALISM alone that can assure the fairest deal to the community as a whole as it is the only social and economic system that does away with exploitation and oppression. Moreover, we are profoundly convinced of the course of human society to Socialism, that is, the inevitability of Socialism from the struggle of the two irreconcilable classes. Without this salvation in Socialism, we promise no future to the people; we betray them to no hope; they are made beasts of burden.

However, to achieve the salvation of the people in Socialism, the dictatorship of the people through a revolutionary organization is indispensable. It is because the revolutionaries alone stand out for the political freedom of Nagaland, against the system of exploitation of the Nagas by the Nagas, and further the cause of the people to Socialism, where virtually all the means of production, natural resources and their distribution, transportation and communication, and other essential functions are to be owned by the State or by the community as a whole. It is only in the dictatorship of the people through a Revolutionary Council that the principle of people’s supremacy is upheld to its meaning, the free existence of Nagaland could be safeguarded and socialism could be realized. Therefore, any force opposing it would obviously amount to being anti-national and anti-people.

X. NAGALAND AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL

The world is changing fast but the Naga National Council has failed to keep pace with changing conditions. It has not understood the world and Nagaland; it has isolated itself from the people; it has not promised the people any future from the danger of the forces of domination, exploitation and assimilation. All the old forces have yielded and are drowned without a trace and any contrary claim is just a claim to save one’s face, and not to save the nation. All have fallen and Nagaland remains to be saved. Where is the way to save our nation now? Where is the Council that upholds the cause of the sovereign Nagaland and the salvation of the people?

We declare we are revolutionary patriots. Let no traitorous nor reactionary bounds be on us. To us the sovereign existence of our country, the salvation of our people in
Socialism with their spiritual salvation in Christ are eternal and unquestionable. It is because life has meaning and that is in freedom alone. Only the revolutionary patriots are diametrically opposed to all the anti-national, anti-people forces. Because: We refuse Nagaland to be gotten to gold; we refuse Nagaland to be weighed in terms of silver, wine and women; we refuse Nagaland to be valued for one's status. Indeed, our Nagaland shall forever refuse to perish together with any leadership or organization that has failed and betrayed her cause, that has no promise of future for her people. Time moves on, and we have to move along, although the Naga National Council does not, for we have to redeem Nagaland. Therefore, in this irreconcilable world, our National Socialist Council declares:

(a) National existence

We stand for the unquestionable sovereign right of the Naga people over every inch of Nagaland whatever it may be and admit of no other existence whatever.

(b) Political institution

We stand for the principle of people's supremacy, that is, the dictatorship of the people through the National Socialist Council and the practice of Democracy within the organisation.

(c) Economic system

We stand for Socialism. Because it is the only social and economic system that does away with exploitation and ensures fair equality to all the people.

(d) Religion

We stand for the faith in God and the salvation of mankind in Jesus, the Christ, alone, that is "NAGALAND FOR CHRIST." However, the individual freedom of religion shall be safeguarded and the imposition of this faith on others is strictly forbidden.

(e) Means

We rule out the illusion of saving Nagaland through peaceful means. It is arms and arms alone that will save our nation and ensure freedom to the people.

(f) Self-reliance and the policy of United Front

We stand for the practice of the principle of self-reliance and for the policy of United Front with all the forces that can be united with.

SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF NAGALAND:

Ask not what the Maker has in store for us. In His righteousness, He has given us all that is ours. Let us understand our country and our freedom and hold them fast, for what have the people that doubt their freedom and that of their country? They are only fit to be ruled, nay, they are already ruled. They are the people to be pitied most. Without her freedom
Nagaland too has nothing. Truly, when freedom falls, everything falls. Your country is
challenged; your freedom is in peril. Arise and look! It is time; it is our today; we should
never fail her, for no amount of sermons and lamentations can save her tomorrow. We have
chosen Nagaland and her freedom forever; we will never part with them. Indeed, it is the
war we have to fight; it is the war we have to win. We shall accept to summons to bow
down; our Nagaland shall never put her hands up. We shall live only in freedom. This alone
is the way to our salvation. Praise the Lord! We hold the promises of history.

LONG LIVE NAGALAND!
LONG LIVE THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST COUNCIL OF NAGALAND

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Appendix XI
Mizo Accord (1986)
(Memorandum of Settlement)

Preamble

1. Government of India have all along been making earnest effort to bring about an end to the disturbed condition in Mizoram and to restore peace and harmony.
2. Towards this end, initiative was taken by the late Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi on the acceptance by Shri Laldenga on behalf of the Mizo National Front (MNF) of the two conditions, namely, cessation of violence by MNF and to hold talks within the framework of the Constitution. A series of discussions were held with Shri Laldenga. Settlement on various issues reached during the course of talks is incorporated in the following paragraphs.

Restoration of Normalcy

3.1 With a view to restoring peace and normalcy in Mizoram, the MNF party, in their part undertake within the agreed time-frame, to bring out all underground personnel of the MNF with their arms, ammunitions, and equipments, to ensure their return to civil life, to abjure violence and generally to help in the process of restoration of normalcy. The modalities of bringing out all underground personnel and the deposit of arms, ammunitions and equipments will be as worked out. The implementation of the foregoing will be under the supervision of the Central Government.
3.2 The MNF party will take immediate steps to amend its Articles of Association so as to make them conform to the provisions of law.
3.3. The Central Government will take steps for the settlement and rehabilitation of underground after considering the scheme proposed in this regard by the Government of Mizoram.
3.4. The MNF will not undertake to extend any support to the Tripura National Volunteer (TNV), People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) and any other such group by way of training, supply of arms or providing protection or in any other matters.

Legal Administration and other Steps

4.1. With a view of satisfying the desires and aspirations of all sections of the people of Mizoram, the Government will initiate measures to confer Statehood on the Union Territory of Mizoram subject to the other stipulation contained in this Memorandum of Settlement.
4.2. To give effect to the above, the necessary legislative and administrative measures will be undertaken, including those for the enactment of Bills for the amendment of the Constitution and other laws for the conferment of Statehood as aforesaid, that will come will into effect on a date to be notified by the Central Government.
4.3. The amendment aforesaid shall provide, among other things, for the following:

I. The territory of Mizoram shall consist of the territory specified in Section 6 of the North Eastern Areas (Reorganization) Act, 1971.
II. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, no act of Parliament in respect of (a) Religion or social practices of the Mizos, (b) Mizo Customary Law or procedure, (c) Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice involving decisions according to the Mizo Customary Law, (d) Ownership and transfer of land, shall apply to the State of Mizoram unless the Legislative of Mizoram, by a resolution, so decides.

Provided that nothing in this Clause shall apply to any Central Act in force in Mizoram immediately before the appointed day.

III. Article 170 Clause (1) shall, in relation to Legislative of Mizoram, have effect as if for the word sixty the word forty has been substituted.

5. Soon after the Bill of Conferment of Statehood becomes Law, and when the President is satisfied that normalcy has returned and that conditions are conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, elections to the Legislative Assembly will be initiated.

6. (a) The Centre will transfer resource to the new Government keeping in view the change in status from a Union Territory to a State and will include resources to cover the revenue gap for the year.
(b) Central assistance for Plan will be fixed taking note of any residuary gap in resources so as to sustain the Approved Plan outlay and the pattern of assistance will be as in the case of Special Category State.

7. Border trade in locally produced or grown agricultural commodities should be allowed under a scheme to be formulated by the Central Government subject to international arrangement with neighbouring countries.

8. The Innerline Regulation, as now in force in Mizoram, will not be amended or repealed without consulting the State Government.

Other matters

9. The rights and privileges of the minorities in Mizoram as envisaged in the Constitution, shall continue to be preserved and protected and their social and economic advancement shall be ensured.

10. Steps will be taken by the Government of Mizoram at the earliest to review and codify the existing customs, practices, law or other usages relating to the matters specified in Clauses (a) to (b) of para 4.3 (ii) of the Memorandum, keeping in view that an individual Mizo may prefer to be governed by Acts of Parliament dealing with such matters and which are of general application.

11. The question of Unification of Mizo inhabited areas of other State to conform one administrative unit was raised by the MNF delegation. It was pointed out to them, on behalf of the Government of India, that Article 3 of the Constitution of India describes the procedure in this regard but that the Government cannot make any commitment in this respect.

12. It was also pointed out on behalf of the Government that as soon as Mizoram becomes a State:
(i) The provisions of Part XVII of the Provision of the Constitution will apply and the State will be at liberty to adopt any one or more language to be used for all or any of the official purposes of the State.
(ii) It is open to the State to move for the establishment of the separate University in the State in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
(iii) In the light of the Prime Minster’s statement at the Joint Conference of the Chief Justices, Chief Minister and Ministers held at New Delhi on 31st August, 1985 Mizoram will be entitled to have a High Court of its own if it so wishes.

13. (a) It was noted that already there is a scheme in force for payment of ex-gratia amount to heirs/dependents of persons who were killed during disturbances in 1966 and thereafter in the Union Territory of Mizoram. Arrangement will be made to expeditiously disburse payment to those eligible persons who have already applied but who had not been made such payment so far.

14. (b) It was noted that consequence on verification done by a joint team of officers, the Government of India had already made arrangement for payment of compensation in respect of damage to crops, buildings destroyed/damaged during the action in Mizoram, and rented charges of building and land occupied by security forces. There may, however, be some claim which were referred and verified by the above team but is not yet settled expeditiously. Arrangement will also be made for payment of pending claim of rented charges on land/building occupied by the security forces.

Sd/-
Laldenga
On behalf of
Mizo National Front

Sd/-
R.D. Pradhan
Home Secretary
Government of India

Sd/-
Lalkhawa
Chief Secretary
Govt. of Mizoram

Dated: 30th June, 1986

Place: New Delhi.
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF KANGLEIPAK
REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES FRONT (PLP)
UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

JOINT DECLARATION

01 March, 1999

In pursuance of the effort for unity reflected in the joint yearly campaigns in the last few years, several rounds of meeting of the representatives of the three parties at the highest level were held from 20 February to 01 March, 1999. The meeting reviewed the past, the present and the future prospects of the national liberation struggle of our Manipur and the region as well. Many problems which the three parties could not understand together before were discussed openly and frankly and understood together. Especially, the three parties discussed threadbare the slow pace of progress of our liberation struggle because of lack of unity among the revolutionary parties and the consequent confusion among the people. Thus, as a result of the ten-day long deliberations, the three fraternal parties have achieved the ultimate goal of unity.

We, the undersigned representatives of the three Parties, have the privilege to make this declaration highlighting the basic points of the agreement reached among the three Parties.

1. The three Parties have agreed, in principle, to merge together into a new unified entity. The unification into a single Party will be achieved in step-by-step approach.
2. As a first step towards unification, a permanent body having two representatives each from the leading organs of the respective Parties has been formed to formulate common policies and programmes of the three Parties. The permanent body has been named as ‘MANIPUR PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT – MPLF’ in abbreviation.
3. An EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE has been formed to execute the decisions of MPLF.
4. Henceforth, all works relating to financial matters of the three Parties shall be integrated. To formulate the integrated financial policies and programmes, a FINANCIAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE has been formed.

These policies and programmes shall be implemented by a FINANCE SUB-COMMITTEE a short, from now on the three Parties shall not raise separate funds. Now we will raise our funds collectively and utilise in it collectively for the liberation struggle.

Thus, we sincerely believe that our three Parties have fulfilled a longstanding desire of our people to see unity among the revolutionary organisations of Manipur. In fact, it is the moving spirit of our people for unity that provided the inspiration and conviction for unity among our revolutionary parties.
Along with the achievement of unity, we cannot but address the problem of taking ransom from our own people as a means to raise fund thereby tarnishing the image of our liberation struggle. We hereby appeal to other organizations to refrain henceforth from using this method of fund-raising. On the other hand, we strongly feel that it is now time on the part of our people to take a firm stand in rectifying such wrong methods.

Dear Compatriots! Now, we firmly believe that with the realisation of unity our national liberation struggle shall make significant progress under the united leadership. Our three Parties have firmly resolved to remove the wrong ideology of factions and fratricidal conflicts. This is a stand, and also a vow, which our three Parties shall uphold together through to the end.

We, therefore, appeal to the entire people of Manipur for their valued support and blessing for the new unity so that our national liberation struggle can march ahead with the strength of our people.

Unity is Strength, Unity is Courage"
‘Victory to MPLF!’"
“Victory to Our People!”

People's Revolutionary Party of Kanglepak

Revolutionary People’s Front

United National Liberation Front

Achinmao
Chairman

President
Chairman

Signed on 01 March, 1999
PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF KANGLEIPAK
REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES FRONT
UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

DRAFT RESOLUTION
Feb. 1999

The following resolutions were taken up in the Joint Session of High Level representatives of PREPAL, RPF and UNLF held during 20th Feb’ 99 to 23rd Feb’ 99.

1st Resolution – To amalgamate the three like minded revolutionist groups. For this, all the problems are to be solved at all cost and the units together.

2nd Resolution – To check out the programmes which can be performed jointly by the three sections. To make negotiation in the differences so arise a permanent body namely Manipur Peoples Liberation Front (MPLF) was formed. The body consist of 6 (six) persons, 2 persons from PREPAK (General Secretary and another), 2 from RPF (Secretary General and another one) and, 2 from UNLF (Chairman and another one).

3rd Resolution – To keep a common annual work programme of the three sections.

4th Resolution – To execute the work programmes of the permanent body, an excadre committee was formed. The body will be constituted by 3 persons from each section. The body will include Home Secretary from PREPAK, Secretary General Central Bureau from RPF and Asst. Secretary Organization from UNLF. They will be the permanent members in the body.

5th Resolution – The three sections, for uniting to one, and for betterment of public constitute a Financial Affairs Committee. Each party will give up their own ways of earning. A Sub Committee to execute the financial programme will be constituted from the Finance Section of each party (Section).

6th Resolution – To .....the financial and economic grievances faced by the people, the three groups resolve to form a National Economics Policy and to start with this policy, the three parties agree to make out some undisputed points.

7th Resolution – Resolved to constitute a combined Educational Policy. This will make the students fit for the nation by segregating them from the social and unavoidable duties of the society.

8th Resolution – The three parties will uniteley stand for the difficulties faced by the people from the ethnic crisis, instigations from the persons having no morality and faith
to his nation and persons who wanted to destroy the integrity. There will be a combine approach to suppress the ethnic clashes and to improve the relations between various classes. In this regard a publicity announcement will be made.

9th Resolution – To work for the unity and understanding of the different opinion with the other sections/groups it is resolved not to resort to right, etc.

10th Resolution – To make a combined policy for purchasing weapons so that it will safe from excess expenditure incurred in the individual purchase and also safe from the apprehending danger caused by individual, weapon dealers. For this purpose a station will be opened at Moreh, prepare a price list of Arms and ammunition. The purchase will be made after negotiation of the parties.

11th Resolution – To turn the resolutions to task an orientation campaign to the Executive Committee of the Districts and to Commanders level is to be taken up.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN RPF, PREPAK AND UNLF IN RESPECT OF UNIFICATION

Introduction :-

The three revolutionary groups viz. PREPAK, RPF, UNLF in principle agreed to the unification.

This is to eradicate the colonial rule of India and to restore the independence of Manipur :-

This is with the hope of keeping integrity of mother country and unity of different sections of community.

This is with the hope of building up people's rule and a balanced society, freedom from the colonial rule, with the hope that all the sections spending the slavery life will come forward and join the war of independence.

With the hope that armed revolutionary will be the only means of independence.

PART – II. The first step of the unification is to form a high level body comprising of 2 representatives from each party. The name of the body will be MPLF. To execute the decisions of the body another Executive Committee represented by 2 persons from each party will also be constituted. In case of requirement, and on the approval of the Higher Body the executive committee may create sub-committees in the district level.

PART – III As the first step to the unification of the three groups, collections of money will be done collectively and distribute it after words. To perform the work smoothly in a planned way the three groups will constitute a Financial Affairs Committee comprising of Finance Secretaries of the groups 9FAC). All the ways and means of earning will be discussed by FAC. A sub committee of representatives of finance section of the three groups will take up the task of collection of money. And further, sub-committees to the division/district level will also be established.

PARA – IV Joint steps will be taken up to avail the reaching of Arms procured by arms traders from outside the boundary in the hands of unlawful groups. For this a joint team will be posted at Moreh and they will purchase the weapons from the traders. If there is chance back purchase of arms will be made for the unified group.

PARA – V To propagate the idea of unification to the District/Division cadres an orientation course will be taken up by a committee constituted in the Executive Committee.

PARA – VI To strengthen the war of independence the three revolutionary groups will show their firm actions. To gain confidence from the people to the unification, the party will keep a good image. For the present, other groups of revolutionary will not be
included but individuals from another group may be allowed to join the group (subject to the acceptance of one of the groups).

This is only for the public to judge the performance of the group.

**PARA – VII** In respect of Army, orientation course to the NGOs and officer will be given. And if there is facility, combined training course and camp will be opened.

**PARA VIII.** All out efforts will be done to protect the integrity and boundary of Manipur. The party will render full support to the identity of the small sections in Manipur.

**PARA – IX.** The agreement will come into force on the coming 1st day of Cheitra (Cheiraoba) the 18th March, 1999.
MANIPUR PEOPLE’S LIBERATION FRONT (MPLF)

The policy and programme of the committee.

01. ORIENTATION COURSE: The first and the foremost task to be done by the Executive Committee (E.C.) is to motivate the party cadres the idea of unification, i.e., by orientation course. The orientation course will continue for a period of 7 days at a place where the three groups think the best. The important points to be imparted in the course:-

1.1. MOTIVATION (a) The idea of unification: The first point to be imparted to the cadres is why war of independence is necessary. In this regard the positive contribution of different groups of revolutionaries and their experiences/limitations while they are fighting for independence, will be discussed. One of the limitation is that different groups of revolutionary could not geared up unity as they have taken up different kinds of policy and programme of their own though they have the same goal. Rather they create disunity to the general public. And it could not give full offensive to the enemy. The enemy is taking the chance of this situation. In short, the different group cannot geared up unity and the different group cannot make much harm to the enemy India by their divided actions. Therefore, to get independence and for its success a united force under the same rule and programme by uniting all the revolutionary groups into one is necessary. So union of the revolutionary group is a must in the war of independence. Unification is the only way to liberate the mother country from slavery and colonial rule of India. (b) Means of unification: The success in the unification of the three revolutionary parties is because of the understanding of the parties to the above noted points and abandoning the idea of partyism for the same of the mass people. This is a success and a turning point to our war of independence. The steps to be taken up by the union while performing the programmes will clearly be intimated to the cadres of MPLF, EC, FAC and also to the Finance Sub-committee.

The following are the steps to be taken up in the unification:

01. The general body/congress/general assembly of the group will give their consent in time to the principle of unification.
02. In the meantime, matters relating to finance of the three groups will be dealt unitedly.
03. Compulsory and unavoidable, advantage programme will be performed by a team for the three groups.
04. Combined training will be imparted to the armies by the three groups at an opportune time and place.
05. When the consent of the general body to the unification was received the party will discard the name of their party. Only the name MPLF will be used.

C) The cadres are to be encouraged by giving full knowledge of the unification and also the cadres are the agents for performing the programmes of the unification. Further more they are to be instigated for determination to their duty and programmes of the unity.
1.2: Some points to be noted pertaining to unification:

a) Unity is strength and unity is courage is the idea of MPLF. For this we should sacrifice “Apuuba”. Unity is created by us. It should be protected forever and wherever.
b) The culture of unity will be created by working together at all times and places.
c) The errors and fault committed by the activist during the past should not be pointed out.
d) Never speak ill of any fellow activist or of the any party.
e) The discipline and character to be maintained by an activist is to be learnt with the principle of unification.
f) While performing works together each individual has to due respect to his fellow man with the idea that they are all sacrificed for the mother country.
g) One should listen to other while he is expressing his idea and it should be discussed for the truth.

1.3: Public Selection:

a) General public is the foundation of our revolution. It is necessary to set up a good relation with the public. Some of the important points are as follows:

(i) Always respect in accordance with the custom and age. It is to be shown to the general public,

(ii) It should not be forgotten that the confidence of the people is to be gained by only the ingredients, i.e. good behaviour and exemplary character of the revolutionary activist.

(iii) They are to be motivated that they are also a part of the revolutionary by exposing the right and wrong doings of the revolutionary. However, we are not to be influenced by the wrong views. Rather we should try to convince them that they are with the wrong view.

(iv) Always we shall try to keep a firm relation with the public and our leaders as well as our soldiers.

(v) We should discuss the past happening which will help in creating good relation with the public.

(vi) Lastly, we shall have the courage or declaring our fault in case we are in fault.

1.4: Some points to be abide by:

(i) In case of unwanted happening in the public we should say that whether it has effect to the revolutionary and any other point for which our enemy may take the chance. We will try to avoid any instigation from the army and will subside the matter amicably.

(ii) But if the cause is from the enemy we will try to publicise the matter against the mayang (non-Manipuri) colonial rule.

(iii) If the mayang larme (Indian army) tortured the public and consequent to the encounter between us and the Indian Army we should disclose to the people that it
was a policy of the Indian Army to deter the co-operation of the people to the revolutionary.

(iv) Our stand is no killing amongst the revolutionary. But in case of killing, we should try to stop it without any favouritism to any party.

02. Programmes to be executed by the Executive Committees:

   An another point to be added to the following is being taken up after the politbureau decision.

2.1 Matters of Society: We should not directly deal with anti-social crimes, civil case etc. except the cases in between one leikai and another, and between one village and another village. In such cases we will try to solve the matter by entrusting it to the local meira paibi, club and renown citizen of the area. Though the complaint is made to us we will try to settle the case to the community level and to give protection while conducting the negotiation/solution. Another point is that we will not take up prohibition or liquor so the procedure of giving punishment to the vendors and drunkards is stopped. Instead social awareness campaign is being introduced and we will see that cooperative earning system for those who sell liquor for livelihood. But selling of liquor in the public place will not be allowed and selling of liquor as a side business will be restricted.

2.2 Matters in respect of women folk: In the matters of women it will be entrusted to the women representatives of the three revolutionary groups. This should be under the guidance of executive committee.

2.3 Issues of general public: In matters of general public related NGOs will be contacted. In case of any approaches made by NGO for a purpose and if there is reasonable ground for their approach he will be allowed to perform the work otherwise not.

2.4 Mobilisation of public will be done by MELF. However, for the recruitment of activists will be done by the party separately till the unification is completed.

2.5. Ethnic Clashes: We will render possible help to the victims of the ethnic clashes. We will try our level best to solve such problems by discussing with the party or group.

2.6 We will take 30% of the money release from India relating to the Development Projects and also we will look into the matter to complete the project.

2.7 Annual Calendar. We will talk to the concerned NGOs to celebrate the 12th December, as ‘Women’s Day’ in a general way. This was not included in the earlier calendar.

2.8 Students Section:

a) Programmes to be taken up immediately:
(i) To show the unity of the AMSU (All Manipur Students Union). The Executive Committee will call all the factions and try to unite them into one.
(ii) An academic calendar will be formed according to it the students are to be educated.
(iii) To check out a plan/situation for the education and to stop the students' long strike, if possible an alternative means to the strike are to be choke out.
(iv) To include the guardians while choking out a good atmosphere of education we will try to form a guardian body.
(v) To stop the strike of teachers while demanding their wants.
(vi) We will try to find out a way of selecting fit students for office bearers of AMSU and not to incur any expenditure.

C. Working Calendar

In addition to the celebration of 17th April, 27th August, the campaign from 21st Sept, to 14th October will be entrusted to AMSU.

Strike or anybody and AMSU will not be allowed from 15th October.

2.9. Sending a combined team to Moreh:

For the security, expenditure of the team:-
A report will be submitted by DC to the P.B., thereby a decision will be taken up.
The works to be done by the team at Moreh.
The team shall try to restrict the arms brought by dealers to reach the hands of the unwanted group. For this the dealers are to be warned. They are also to be informed that if they sell the arms to us they will be benefited in the future. The arms brought by them are to be purchased at reasonable price.
(ii) The team shall try to settle any problem at Moreh through NGO or Moreh.
(iii) The team will not make link with the workings of the unified group at Awa (Myanmar). This is in security point of view. But the movements are to be intimated.
(v) The task of restricting drugs Heroin No.4 while importing to Manipur through Moreh will be entrusted to the team. A publicity will be made to the general public that if anybody round carrying drugs more than 100 grams will be killed.

2.10: A combined team at Jiri.

The P.B. will give a decision to the B.C. for the team to be posted at Jiri after concerning the situation and security reasons.

2.11: Campaign to integrity: The task taken up by the group wanted to destroy the unity of Manipur by talking the chance of the election to be held at Manipur in the last part of 1999, will be faced. The mass will be motivated by mobilising the campaign that the integrity of Manipur will be protected by the unity of the mass. After completion of mobilisation, the party will discuss with the political leaders and Meitei officers of Manipur about the issues that Muiva group is trying to merge the Naga inhabited regions of Manipur to greater Nagaland.

(iii) Steps will be taken up to the apprehending outcome of the expiry of cease-fire agreement between India and IM.
03. Some other issues:
3.1 The convenor team of EC will continue their service till the unification if completed.
3.2 There will be direct link with EC convenor and PB convenor.
3.3 A fund will be accorded for the expenditure of EC. For this EC can select one of them as Cashier. The estimated expenditure of EC is to be sent upon 30th every month to the P.B. P.B. will sanction the amount on or before 5th of every month.
3.4 E.C. will try to settle any issue arising out of misunderstanding amongst the party. However, E.C. will report to P.B. when the case is of serious nature. The P.B. will decide the matter in the level of the three groups.
Collection of money from the valley people by then Hill Extremist is wrong.

MPLA decided to sheen out the idea.

So, the work is entrusted to the Executive Committee. There is an important point to be noted, while the work is going on. That is, it should not create enmity between the Hill and PB. Because at the starting of modification we will not be able to divert our mind and strength towards it. It is confirmed by P.B.

The way of proceeding:-
1st – Their activities create a confusion to the general mass. So they will be asked not to do this. The tribals inhabiting in the valley will be convinced that, the doings of Hill extremist are wrong. For this relevant papers may be issued.
2nd – In this, we will not resort to use weapon, for the present. They know that they are wrong. So we will react it physiologically.
3rd – If it is failed in the above approach, EC will report the matter to P.B. And in turn as will decided for further step.

THE RULES OF COLLECTION OF MONEY (FINANCE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, M.P.L.F)

The reason for introducing the rule by MPLF is for strict compliance of the rule by the activists collecting the money so that the relation between the Union and donor be good.

The main target of the MPLF is to liberate Manipur and other neighbouring States under the Indian colonialism. To achieve the target two main important aspects i.e., law of ruling and Army are essential. For strengthening the two aspects money is required. Therefore, money and the two aspects are co-related and cannot be separated. Over and above the freedom war is based to the general mass and money is also only for general mass. So it is necessary to have good relation with the general mass for which freedom is demanded.

The law or ruling requires the general mass to share the issue of revolution. Freedom war is the wealth of general mass. This will give shelter to the general mass. To convince the general and to fulfill the demands of the people, are the duties of the revolution. Only then we will be able to insist the general people to join the freedom war. Such deeds should not be neglected while collecting the money. If we neglect the
rule of law and system of governance, we may be blamed for extortion of money from the public.

For the existence of revolution and for strengthening it, moral support, money support of the public without any instigations are required. So, our activists should know everything so that the monetary relation between us and the public may not be destroyed.

Therefore, the charter of EAC for collection of money in addition to other charter of the party should be strictly observed.

**Rule – I** : At the time of collection, strict discipline, respect of elders should be observed.
**Rule – II** : The subscribers are to be convinced and should insist to donate the money.
**Rule – III** : The life and wealth of the public should be protected.
**Rule – IV** : The approach of the subscribers are to be heard and it is to be discussed with senior members.
**Rule – V** : Money is not to be forcible taken from any individual.
**Rule – VI** : For collection of money, a list of persons is to be prepared. In that the occupation of the person, income, expenditure, number of dependants are to be entered.
**Rule – VII** : Number of employees is to be collected from the department.
**Rule – VIII** : Care should be taken to avoid cheating persons in giving wrong informations while preparing the list.
**Rule – IX** : To avoid repetition, the list of collection is to be filed in a proper way.
**Rule – X** : Whenever a member of MPLF is found in a house at the time of collection of money he is to be heard and the matter is to be referred to the higher authority.
**Rule – XI** : For getting money nobody’s property should be seized or forfeited.
**Rule – XII** : When there is some incident in the family such as death, marriage, etc. the time of collection of money is to be deferred.
**Rule XIII** : While remitting the money, names of the two subscribers and their signatures are to be written.
**Rule – XIV** : The receiver is also to be given a receipt to the subscribers.
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