TRAINING INTERVENTIONS FOR INDIAN POLICE IN HANDLING TERRORISM- A STUDY

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Guide

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"This work is dedicated to those Police (State and Central) personnel and their kith & kin, who died valiantly, fighting the blood thirsty terrorists; for the sake of the nation and society, not withstanding lack of numbers, training, equipment and above all uncharitable criticism"
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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PREFACE

Terrorism has taken a heavy toll, the world over. Social scientists and intellectuals have mostly been working on the phenomenon of terrorism—definition, nature, causes and cures. The debate has mostly been on apportioning the blame on societies and governments for perpetuating/allowing injustice which drove the affected to take to terrorism, thereby providing justification and giving respectability to those indulging in heinous and abhorring crimes. If some governments had taken firm stand to curb terrorism, it has been branded as State terrorism and the security forces have been accused on Human Rights violations. The human rights violations of the victims of terrorism, and that bearing a genuine grievance for future terrorism was the focus. Some sense of clarity about the nature and dangerous of terrorism and the need for firm handling, dawned only after September 11, 2001.

Though India has been in the thick of terrorist on slaughts for about five decades the State's response has been that of allowing situations to go out of control by indifference and exploiting it for electoral gains, and when it becomes too hot, resort to kneecapped reactions and adhoc firefighting measures by deploying the Paramilitary forces and the Army in large numbers to claim that the Government was doing its best. That handling terrorism is a complex job, the the fight is a long drawn one, it requires a carefully drafted policy, plan of action, the best suited agency is the police which is always in the field, that this instrument has been blunted after independence owing to degrading political interference, dangerous decline of professionalism and leadership, abject neglect of training and development not to speak of lack of modernization of weapon, equipment, and lack of modernization of weapons, equipment, and working. Yet it is these poorly staffed, ill-equipped, routinely trained and badly treated State police forces that have been fighting against odds, to keep terrorism under control.

It pains to see many a policeman, with no special training and equipment killed, kith and kin, who have no protection being butchered and families living in daily fear (terror ?). Yet they get blamed for alleged failures. The police are paying heavy price, for no fault of theirs or to be precise for the fault of the powers that be,
for not planning and providing the warewithall, to be fighting fit. The basic thing like police training is in absolute neglect in the States.

Finding that efforts to training police are half hearted in many terrorism affected States, that what ever training is being given, is based on the perceptions of the training head, that training content and standards varied from institution to institution, that though some research is done on police training, but none on training for handling terrorism, I have ventured to do my humble bit in this area. I am aware of my limitations and limitations of the study. The study provides well researched training modules for police personnel. Those modules, may be implemented for further validation. It is my fond hope that, it will help in further and better studies, to provide the training managers, the basis for training in handling terrorism.

Views, however critical, would be gratefully accepted.
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CHAPTER - 1
TERRORISM - AN OVERVIEW

1.1 TERRORISM - THE HYDRA HEADED MONSTER

The world has lost its peace! At least in the foreseeable future. Wars against poverty, disease, illiteracy etc. have paled into insignificance. These are the days of "war against terrorism". "Terror", "Terrorism", "Terrorist" are the most commonly heard/uttered words. The incremental increase of the literature on terrorism is phenomenal in recent times. There is a galore of websites on the internet.

Terrorism is no longer a phenomenon of the oppressed, suppressed or exploited people, taking to violence/arms. Gone are the days of ideological, nationalist, secessionist or ethnic based movements which fought 'Just war'. To say 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is no longer valid. These are the days of "New Terrorism", "Mega Terrorism", "Catastrophic Terrorism" or "Asymmetric warfare". The September 11, 2001, World Trade Centre attack, has stunned the world and sent shockwaves of fear. The enormity, the precision, the dimension and the spectacular nature of the simultaneous suicide attacks, eclipsed any thing previously seen in terrorism. Two civilian aircrafts were able to deliver a kilo ton of explosive power into the Twin Towers, with deadly accuracy. Terrorists are quick to harness advances in science and technology to assemble more destructive weapons and materials. Cell phones and internet allow terrorists to coordinate their activities. Even lone individuals can communicate, with their
compatriots faraway on the globe and trigger actions synchronizing time for maximum 'terror' effect.

The Anthrax scare in U.S. (Oct, 2001), the Saringas leak in Tokyo (Japan), Subway (3/95) most recently the SARS scare S.E Asia (April, 2003) may be small experiments. There are doubts even about Surat plague, whether it could be small scale experiment in biological warfare. Think of the following chilling scenarios:

(a) A single warhead of anthrax spores landing in Washington on a day of moderate wind could kill up to 1,000,000 people.

(b) Less than half-a-kilogram botulin put in water supplies around the world could kill half of the world population in a few days.

The emergence of 'faith based' terrorism, the domination of Left wing extremist, other insurgent, secessionist, and ethnic movements by 'lumpen' or psychopathic elements has, drastically altered the scenario. Irrationality is their creed, nihilistic are their means. They are just bent on destroying the entire system. A much grave and far more potent threat awaits us. The prognosis of many global experts was that ‘the worst is yet to come’. Brian Jenkins, International expert on Terrorism, who in his 1975 essay, observed that 'at some point in the future, the opportunity and capacity for serious nuclear terrorism could reach those willing to take advantage of it', has in his 1998, essay concludes "As we approach the 21st century, we are closer" (to nuclear terrorism).

Meticulous planning, flawless preparations intensive training, state of the art equipment die hard commitment and ruthless execution, are their forte. They have built the capabilities to exploit modern technology, global diversity and connectedness to 'asymmetric warfare'. The scale of warfare is not merely extensive, it is mind boggling involving major and important terrorist partnerships. The degree of connectivity and concentric circles of terrorist linkages have created a ‘multiplier effect’ as far as their destructive capabilities are concerned. (M.K. Narayanan, 2003).
Post September 11, 2001, world scenario, has dramatically changed. The New Terrorism's message "anytime, anywhere, anyone" can be the target, led to frenzied activity for protecting from terrorists' onslaught, mostly among the western countries, particularly U.S.A. Billions and billions of dollars are committed to strengthening the systems and the agencies tasked to protect national security, life and property, and vital installations; recession in their economies not withstanding. It has become 'number one priority'.

For years to come, if not decades, the 'war on terrorism' will be the defining paradigm in the struggle for global order. September 11, has taught us, that we can't assume, for the foreseeable future that tomorrow will be like today. (KenBooth and Tim Dunne, 2002). Terrorism is a monster, like Frankenstein's creation that is too horrible and terrible, to be accepted by any civilized nation and any civilized person. People are under perpetual threat of fear, innocent lives are lost in hundreds and thousands, precious properties are destroyed, civil liberties and human rights trampled upon laws are privatized and archaic laws imposed and the entire development process comes to a grinding halt.

Despite differences in approach, most scholars and observers tend to agree that present day terrorism is a negative political phenomenon with grave consequences for the individual, society, political regimes, international community and to the human race as a whole.


![Casualties Graph](Source: Punjab Police)
India is the worst sufferer of terrorism, bleeding incessantly for about five decades. The following charts show the damages. Much more are the costs to the nation, its security, economy, development and the social fabric.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Table A. Terrorist incidents and Persons killed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Incidents (1990-2003)</th>
<th>Since 1990 to 2003**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilians Killed*</td>
<td>11119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFs Killed</td>
<td>3527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Killed</td>
<td>16213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Militants killed</td>
<td>2866***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Members of VDCs and SPOs.
** Upto 31st January, 2003
*** Upto December, 2002

Table B. Recovery of Arms and Explosives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Since 1990 to 2003***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK Rifles and Pistols</td>
<td>34290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMG's</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher(s)</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDX (in Kgs)</td>
<td>7081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>24284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED (Improved Explosive Devices)</td>
<td>4854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>47675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>4211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Upto 31st January, 2003
### TABLE C. Destruction of Property By Terrorist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Incidents</th>
<th>Govt. Buildings</th>
<th>Educational buildings</th>
<th>Bridges</th>
<th>Hospitals</th>
<th>Private Houses</th>
<th>Shops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 1990-2003</td>
<td>5269</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10729</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NORTH-EAST

#### TABLE D: Total Number of Terrorist incidents and persons killed in the North East from 1997-2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Head</th>
<th>Assam</th>
<th>Nagaland</th>
<th>Manipur</th>
<th>Tripura</th>
<th>Meghalaya</th>
<th>Mizoram</th>
<th>Arunachal Pradesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>2607</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>2701</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Extremists Killed</td>
<td>1162</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Extremists Arrested</td>
<td>2737</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1538</td>
<td>2233</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Security forces killed</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arms looted</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Arms recovered</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Extremists surrendered</td>
<td>3083</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Civilians killed</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE E: LEFT WING INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE SINCE 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assam Pradesh</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Orissa</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>West Bengal</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Other States</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source – MHA Reports)
1.2 TERRORISM – THE UBIQUITOUS PHENOMENON

HISTORY

Though terrorism is as old as civilization, its origin in the present form dates to the French Revolution (1793-94) when Maximilien Robespierre practiced ‘regime de la terreur’ to unearth traitors and send them to guillotining, which had a positive connotation then. But in time, Robespierre was executed, and Edmund Burke, a staunch critic of the revolution, described the proponents of the revolution as ‘terrorists.’

The Thugs and Chambal dacoits of India, resorted to terrorist methods. There were nationalist and independent movements, all over the world in the 18th and 19th centuries, which in the course of their struggles resorted to terrorist methods, but seldom the civilian non-combatants were deliberately targeted. 1960s signified the advent of systematic terrorism, spread world wide, particular in Latin America. Carlos Marighella’s “Mini manual of the Urban Guerilla” (1969) became a popular, practical guide, world wide for the terrorists.

Today terrorist groups are wide spread geographically and diverse ideologically “In its long history terrorism has appeared in many guises; today society faces not one terrorism, but many terrorisms.” (Walter Laquer, 1999)

DEFINITION

There are over 100 definitions of Terrorism, and no one definition is acceptable to all. According to Brian Jenkins, terrorism is the threat of violence, individual acts of violence or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear, to terrorise. Benjamin Natanyahu says, “terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.” Yonah Alexander defines it as “the use or threat of violence against random or civilian targets in order to intimidate or create generalized pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals.” However, most definitions of terrorism hinge on three factors: the method
(violence) the target (civilian or government) and the purpose (to instill fear and force political or social change).

THE PHENOMENON

Understanding the ubiquitous phenomenon of terrorism - its complexities, dynamics and nuances - is a sine-qua-non, for its effective handling.

Academicians, particularly sociologists and political scientists, hold the view that terrorists are not born, that they are a product of socio, economic and political injustices, suppression, oppression and state terrorism, and that the only or main way of handling terrorism is to understand the factors contributing to terrorism and to remove them. They contend that combating terrorism through the brute use of state power is not the solution and would be counter productive.

It is obvious that the international world order today contains, certain socio, economic and political characteristics that are conductive to the growth of terrorism. Terrorism offers meaning and excitement to the marginalized, rootless, jobless, alienated young people without hope of opportunity in legitimate occupations. Terrorism has always been a source of power, a means of ego reinforcement, an outlet for propensity to violence (Harvey H. Kushner, 1998). Given the situation, there are and will be, ample 'causes' for them to take up, with some degree of overt or covert support from a section of people, whatever be the Government policies to remedy those 'causes'. “It is clear that inequalities, and hence injustices and grievances, will persist in one part of the world or the other, well into the foreseeable future. While sympathy and correctives definitely need to be directed towards those, who loose out ............, these cannot be accepted as justifications for terrorism. We must, of course, understand the causes and the motives of terrorism in order to bring this evil to an end, but “the intellectual enquiry into the causes of terrorism ought never to be allowed to be used to condone terrorism, to
become an excuse, a justification, for terrorism”. They fail to realize that terrorism, in explicitly targeting non-combatants in gruesome mass murders, will be a justification for future terrorism. (Ajai Sahni, Faultlines Nov. 2002).

To find an explanation for militancy, one should go back to the subject of psychological types of fanaticism, of violence, of aggression and of, hate. Being absolutely convinced of the rightness of his cause, the fanatic needs an enemy and they are not difficult to find. Hate plays a central role in his personality structure. Burning passion is primary, ideological content is secondary. An element of paranoia can be found in most contemporary terrorist groups, regardless of their ideology. This is more pronounced among the extreme right, where worldviews are more removed from reality. For this reason, terrorists of the extreme right are more likely to acquire and possibly use W.M.D. in the future.

There is now a consensus in the international community that direct actions to combat terrorism cannot be postponed until root causes are examined and eliminated. Terrorism is an act, not an ideology. Its instruments are assassination, mass murders, hijacking, hostage taking, bombing, kidnapping and intimidation. Terrorism once raises its head, hardly dies away. It is an endless war. Therefore, terrorism is a phenomenon which must be condemned, fought, resisted, controlled and eventually eliminated, at any cost.

**TERRORIST’S MIND SET/ PERSONALITY**

Mind set profiling of a terrorist group and its leaders is an essential mode of analysis for assessing the threat posed by the groups. This has to be done on a continuing basis, based on database analysis. A counter terrorism policy should be tailor made for a particular group, taking into account all aspects the group stands for. Each terrorist group must be examined with in its own cultural, economic, political and social context, in order to better understand the motivations (Shiva SK, 2003). Current profiles of terrorist groups present a unique blend of rigidity in commitment to the cause and
flexibility in operation—that makes the task of counter terrorism difficult (Strategic Analysis, December, 2001).

To begin to understand the mindset of the new breed of terrorist, his cruelty and hate, the shedding of all moral restraints, the great rage about everything, and nothing in particular, the joy generated by killing and destruction, one has to go over the familiar ground: fanaticism and paranoia. Today’s terrorists have no compunction about whom they kill—male, female, children, enemies or innocent, by-standers, members of another ethnic group or their own kind.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISTIC BEHAVIOUR.

1. Is premeditated and designed to create a climate of fear and anxiety?
2. Is intended to impress a much wider audience than its immediate victims or witnesses.
3. Is wont to strike at random as well as carefully selected or symbolically significant targets?
4. Deliberately fractures social norms, for shock value.
5. and, overall, endeavours to influence political behaviour.

Modern terrorists invest much time and effort, as well as extensive resources into methods of psychological warfare. They carefully observe their target population, to find weaknesses and cracks, which can be widened and exploited. They study the target country’s media, to learn how best to get their threats across and how to magnify the fears of the population, and stimulate or amplify criticism of the Government and its policies. Dissenting views in the society are carefully collected and used to undermine the population’s beliefs in the rightness of its own ways.
Through the above mentioned behaviour, terrorists seek to achieve:

- To provoke the Government/Security Forces (SF), to over react and thus make it appear repressive. Hence a calm and calculated response to fight terrorists on all fronts is needed.

- Continued terrorism, discredits the Government by demonstrating that it cannot protect its own people, their property and maintain Law and Order.

- Terrorists do not hope to over throw a Government by terrorist tactics alone. They aim to weaken the will of the Government and the people by creating a fear psychosis and with cumulative effect make government/people to concede their demands.

- They aim to render administration ineffective and make their own authority felt leading to liberated areas.

- It forces Government to commit scarce resources, to the detriment of developmental agenda.

- To influence peoples’ minds by direct strikes and skilful propaganda, and make them feel that they should look to the terrorists for their security, rather than to the Governments.

- Send message that anyone, anywhere, at any time may be the next target of attack.

- Manipulates psychological states, to achieve political aims.

They try to operate as a State within a State. They draw their frameworks of operation and code of conduct themselves, which often are archaic, mediaeval, dreadful and are aimed at setting up a jungle rule. Their basic ideology rejects the use of peaceful, political and democratic means for
the redressal of their grievances. In fact they want the grievances to continue, so that they can legitimize their terrorism. Over a period of time, it leads to societal changes impacting the social psychology of people, particularly the youth. People become incommunicable, individually and collectively, society gets reduced to a stock of dumb driven cattle, offering least resistance.

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Terrorists in the past, organized themselves, typically, on corporate/bureaucratic structures, which made the task of Intelligence agencies less difficult, to infiltrate/penetrate the terrorist organizations. THE NEW TERRORISTS are un-orthodox, prefer a collaborative cellular network. Individual networks have access to local, regional and even global setups. Cells tend to be small, much smaller than previously. They are loose knit, rely on “state of the art” communications, have greater freedom and latitude to innovate and take spot decisions. Many cells are located in places other than target countries to escape detection and action. In short they are fluid, not organized in any systematic way and usually there is no discernible power structure. Registration is not relevant to informal groups, mainly because they operate only as offshoots of a formally organized larger group (umbrella organization). The average life of these informal groups, is not more than 2-5 years, within which they get dismantled and reorganized.

TERRORISTS TRAINING

Terrorists, generally, are a well-trained lot and most of them better trained and equipped than the counter terrorist agencies. The types of training required for terrorists vary widely, as indicated by the diverse published accounts by trainees and by observers. CAROLSMARCHELLA’S, “The Mini Manual of Urban Guerilla Warfare” (1969) is a training manual, which was followed by many terrorist groups. Later many of the major terrorist

Training is imparted at carefully selected training camps. Training ranges from physical and mental toughening to marksmanship to use of explosives, use of various communication equipments, besides field craft and tactics. Incase of faith-based terrorists, existence of standardized course curricula, at various training camps, in different countries, points to a common origin. It contains detailed information on how to carry out ambushes, assassinations, use remote controlled explosive devices, employ booby traps, better bombs, as also lessons on infiltration, street fighting techniques and even frontal assaults.

How organized and professional is the training of J&K terrorists, is evident from the following: “Training, most of which is conducted through camps run by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate falls into three phases. First there is a six-month induction period where recruits learn basic field craft and weapons handling. This is then followed by four to five months of advanced training that focuses on language proficiency, urban warfare and small unit tactics, sabotage and assassination. The most able cadres go on to a tertiary stage of specialist instruction, which, according to statements from captured militants, covers suicide assaults, computer skills, field communications and advanced explosive techniques.” - Peter Chalk and Chrisfair, specialists in South Asian Security issues, in “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba leads the Kashmir insurgency” Jane's Intelligence Review, Nov. 2002). It is estimated that there are over 110 training camps in Pakistan and about 150 in Bangladesh. Some of them are mobile camps to escape detection, and have moved into the Kashmir valley.
METHODS/TACTICS OF TERRORISM

To achieve their objective of striking terror the commonly resorted terrorist tactics are:

1. Bombings aimed at civilians, police and military targets, V.I.Ps, or selected physical structures or critical infrastructure for their symbolic value. Produces fear and gets publicity.


5. Assassinations: Assassination of selected high profile targets in the Government or a public figure. Aims to intimidate Government and dramatize their cause.

6. Extortions/Robberies: To secure funds and also to create a sense of insecurity among the people, industry, business and commerce.

7. Suicide attacks: One or two terrorists attacking a target mostly the police, military or high value government establishment, to kill as many as possible or destroy/damage as much as possible, before getting
killed: gets high publicity and demoralizes security forces.

8. **Ambush:** To kill security force personnel, dignitaries etc. using I.E.Ds, for publicity, creating terror, embarrassing the Government.

9. **Sabotage:** Of critical infrastructure, rail tracks, food supplies - for degrading the economy.

**CATEGORISATION OF TERRORISM/EXTREMISM/INSURGENCY**

Many analysts have attempted to classify terrorism. Some early writers have classified as “whole sale terrorism” practiced by fascist regimes and “retail terrorism”, resorted to by insurgents. Thomas P. Thorton (1964) distinguished between “enforcement terror” and ‘agitational terror’. The main categorization is on the following lines.

1. **National Terrorism:** Employed by people with a common identity to help achieve independence from a ruling power. eg. Palestine Liberation Organisations’ (PLO) terrorism against Israel.

2. **Revolutionary Terrorism:** Terrorists seeking to overthrow a constitutional government as part of social transformation. Left wing political movements are the obvious examples. There can be right wing revolutionary movements also like the Nazi Party in 1930s Germany. Revolutionary terrorism has its roots in a political ideology.

3. **Racist Terrorism:** Radical right wing parties/groups resorting to terrorism based on the beliefs of racial or national superiority over other and are also known as “ethnic cleansing’ and ‘race war’ eg. Italian terrorism, and German nazism.

4. **Religion/Faith based terrorism:** This is the latest and far more dangerous form of terrorism. Apart from the terrorism practiced by cult groups like ‘Aum Shinrikyo’ of Japan, the Pan Islamic Muslim
fundamentalists belong to this category, Al Quida being the well known international outfit.

5. **Single Issue Group Terrorism**: Activists in single issue groups, which have chosen to focus on a specific concern, they believe demands immediate attention. It is a concern for the 'one issue' above all else that separates them from other terrorist groups. eg. Anti-abortion terrorism in the west.

Terrorism is also classified as **Domestic and International** depending on whether the effects of terrorism are confined to a single nation or extend to other nations as well. The other classification are:

**State Terrorism**: The state machinery resorting to terrorism against its own people to suppress dissent or aspirations of sections of people. eg. Iraq's terrorism against Kurdish population of Iraq.

**State sponsored terrorism**: A nation state overtly or covertly supporting terrorist movements in other states, the support may be psychological, material or financial. This is also known as proxy war or Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).

Yet another classification is **urban and rural terrorism**. Terrorism in the countryside is called **rural terrorism** and in the thickly populated urban areas as urban terrorism.

### 1.3 EMERGING FORMS OF TERRORISM

The advent of 'New Terrorism' has sent chills down the spines of many nations and its population. The New Terrorists' ability to exploit science and technology and the connectivity, has opened up new forms of terrorism with disastrous consequences which are described as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or CBRNE (Chemical, biological, Radiological, nuclear and Explosive). Cyber terrorism is yet another dreaded form of terrorism.
BIO-TERRORISM

"The biological warfare capabilities of state and non-state actors are growing worldwide. The risk is not diminishing, it is increasing."

Senator Bill Frist (Rep-Tenn)

Biological weapons (B.W.) are devices that use disease producing micro-organisms, toxic biological products or organic biocides to inflict death or injury. Biological weapons are the oldest weapons, used all through history. Terrorists have used, bioweapons before. The U.S. based Rajneesh Cult in 1984, and the Japan based Aum Shinrikyo in 1993-94, did use them. To assess the magnitude of the bio-terror threat it is vital to understand how biological agents can be used as deadly tools and how terrorists might use them to instill fear or inflict heavy causalities.

A single warhead of Anthrax spores landing in Washington, on a day of moderate wind, could kill upto 100,000 people (ii) less than half-a-k.g. of botulin, put in water supplies around the world, could kill half the world population in a few days.

The basic principles of threat assessment are:

- What is the actual threat and to what extent should it be taken as valid?
- If the threat is real, how do you prevent it, if not prevented, how to protect against it?
- What are the implications of the emerging bio-medical technologies for national security and disaster management, and how to integrate them into our planning?

Dr. P.M. Bhargava, Founder Director, C.C.M.B., Hyderabad, an expert of international repute, felt that the threat of B.W. is very real, that India is a likely target, B.Ws are easy to make, easy to hide, easy to transport and easy to use, and hence called “poor man’s atom bomb”.

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He strongly advocates the following steps, adding that it brook no delay.

- There should be a committee, at the national level, consisting of selected experts in biological toxins, law enforcement, defence and medical professions, to lay down and implement our policy in regard to B.Ws, and devise monitoring mechanisms.

- There should be a legal requirement to report to a designated authority, the production and sale of biological media by the Firms/organizations and a fool proof mechanism to detect sales to unauthorized persons.

- Selected labs like NICD, the Centre for Bio Technology, Delhi should be tasked to develop quick detection kits' for agents of B.W on a war footing;

- Selected organizations like ECIL should be made to develop equipment that would detect powder in postal articles and separate them automatically. Machines such as ISOMED, developed by D.A.E. should be supplied to sterilize the powder containing letters.

- A strategy to identify, manufacture and make available medicines/vaccines required in real time.

- Setup a center to collect all information on biological weapons collate and document it. It should be a place where any information on B.W. is readily available when required.

- Setting up of an organization like the 'Centre for Disease Control' in the U.S. for monitoring emerging/mysterious diseases suspected to be caused by B.W.

- Protective equipment required for the first responders should be identified and procured.

- First responders should be trained periodically in handling situations of B.W.
• The best way to contain B.W, if not eliminate it; would be to have as well informed a public as possible. For this a long-term education programme, using appropriate publicity strategies and material, targeting different categories of people, should be worked out.

To drive home the seriousness of the threat Dr. Bhargava mentions that we have not taken any steps to guard our airspace or protect our water supply systems and he warns that, B.W. may cost us very dearly if we are not prepared to deal with it. He pleads that bio-terrorism, is as matter of national concern and should fall outside the purview of political expediency. The mail borne anthrax attacks in U.S. in October-November, 2001, demonstrated that every nation, even one as powerful as U.S, is at risk from terrorists using biological or toxin weapons. The attack also revealed that even the U.S. did not have effective plans to deal with such an attack.

While much of the preparatory work has to be done by other agencies, for the police the implications are to (i) look for intelligence about terrorists preparing to use B.W., in order to forewarn and if possible to foil the attempts and (ii) to be prepared, as first responders in a disaster management situation.

CHEMICAL TERRORISM

Chemical weapons are devices that use chemicals to inflict death or injury. Chemical weapons can be dispensed using bombs, artillery shells, aircraft sprayers or missiles carrying hundreds of ‘bomblets’ and have been used earlier in large-scale warfare. Like biological weapons the use or threatened use by terrorists- is most frightening. The advantages to the terrorist are that, nerve agents are cheap and easy to obtain, no training is required in their use, and production of the crude agents is straightforward. Terrorists can steal them from laboratories or manufacturing plants. They may use even commercially available insecticides such as parathion.
In the 1980s Saddam Hussein of Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurds of northern Iraq, in one incident killing 6000 Kurds in two days. In 1995, Aum Shinri-kyo, a Japanese cult, used sarin gas in Tokyo subway, killing 12 and injuring 5,500, and created an unmanageable panic. Taking the cue from Bhopal gas tragedy in 1984, which killed over 4000 people, terrorists bombing a chemical plant, could cause toxic material leak into a city's water supply or into the atmosphere, causing thousands of deaths and creating huge panic. In August, 2002 dozens of Al-Qaeda video tapes were obtained by U.S. media, revealing, among other training tactics, images of lethal chemical gas experiments on dogs, at a remote camp in Afghanistan.

Among CBRNE terrorism, chemical and biological weapons are more likely to be used, than others and the enforcement, health, emergency agencies have to be prepared for a possible disaster management, scenario.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Fortunately it is not easy to make a nuclear weapon despite the fact that, numerous books, articles and websites provide information about how it can be done. The most difficult part is obtaining the fissionable material. It is highly improbable, that a terrorist organization, that did not have the support of a government, could produce the fissionable material nor could it take irradiated nuclear fuel from a reactor. The technologies involved are too complex, dangerous and expensive for small terrorist groups to master. However, the following threats can't be ruled out:

1. It may be possible to obtain low quality fissionable material and assemble a crude nuclear explosive that can be delivered by truck, rail car or container in a ship, which if exploded can cause extensive damage to life.

2. The possibility of nuclear 'suitcase bombs' i.e., small nuclear weapons, falling into the hands of terrorists, particularly from the constituent States of erstwhile Soviet Union, does exist and they can be carried by one or two people.
3. The large number of nuclear power reactors in the United States, Europe and Asia, presents terrorists with attractive targets. An attack on one of these reactors, if succeeds in releasing large quantity of radioactive materials, would threaten down wind populations as well as those in the vicinity. The Chernobyl accident is a case in point.

ATTACKS WITH IMPROVISED RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A radiological weapon is an improvised device designed to spread radioactive nuclear material over a wide area. They are referred to as “dirty bombs” and would not require a great deal of technical sophistication. The magnitude of damage inflicted by such an attack would depend on the quantity and radioactive half lives of the materials released and local wind and weather conditions. It can definitely cause enough panic and flight in a densely populated area, and in some cases can cause a few deaths.

NARCO TERRORISM

The term ‘Narco Terrorism’ was coined in 1983, to describe attacks on the anti-narcotic police in Peru. Now the term is used to mean forms of terrorism that are linked to the production of illegal drugs, either through (a) the use of drug profits to fund political violence or (b) use of violence and terror to protect and pursue illegal drug production.

Most of the terrorist groups, have direct or indirect links with drug trade.

CYBER TERRORISM

“One of our biggest concerns is cyber security”

*Michael Armstrong, Chairman & CEO, AT&T*

Cyber Terrorism is terrorism, through the exploitation of computerized systems, deployed, by the target. It is a digital weapon, far more damaging and far more violent than any major act of terrorism we see today. It does not
require dangerous substances of any kind, hence poses no danger to the terrorist. It can be planned and executed from the terrorist’s home, office or hide out, whether the target is next door or on another continent. He is out of bounds, for arrest or prosecution, and detection is pretty difficult. The tools are readily available, inexpensive and user friendly. In all, efficacy, low cost, case of use, attack from afar, provides a strong incentive for use of Cyber Terrorism, particularly with the hardening of physical targets.

**New Perspectives for Cyber Terrorism**

The following concepts must be considered in order to fully understand Cyber Terrorism threats:

1. The motivations behind a Cyber Terrorist may be the same as any other type of terrorist attack. Cyber Terrorism is another tool, as are explosives and automatic weapons.
2. The individuals or organizations executing these acts may not necessarily be those committed to the outcome of the act. Cyber Terrorism can require technical expertise that exists outside the realm of a terrorist organization.
3. Like many terrorist attacks, there may not be warning. However, with Cyber Terrorism, one may not even know that the act has taken place until sometime after the attack.
4. The cost of such an act is minimal, and the tools and information are ubiquitous.
5. Intelligence gathering on Cyber Terrorism is difficult. Tradecraft and intel gathering is complicated by virtual meetings, drop sites, encryption, and steganography.
6. Finally, the prevention of attacks requires more coordination than almost any other form of terrorism.
Cyber Terrorism Targets

Cyber terrorism will occur where we are most vulnerable; where we are dependent on systems that exist at the convergence of the physical and virtual world. Where cracking means damage, injury and death. The reliance on systems – be it with regard to energy, transportation, communication, medicare, finance etc – is on the increase, which means increased dependence on computerized systems. Unfortunately the tendency to put as much information, regardless of its sensitivity, on the Internet frequently provides roadmaps for the planning of cyber terrorism acts.

Examples of Cyber Terrorism Acts

These examples are not potential acts we may see in the future. These are all situations that could happen today, with today’s technology.

- A Cyber Terrorist will remotely access the processing control systems of a cereal manufacturer, change the levels of iron supplement, and sicken and kill the children of a nation enjoying their food.

- A Cyber Terrorist will place a number of computerized bombs around a city, all simultaneously transmitting unique numeric patterns, each bomb receiving each other’s pattern. If bomb one stops transmitting, all the bombs detonate simultaneously.

- A Cyber Terrorist will disrupt the banks, the international financial transactions, the stock exchanges.

- A Cyber Terrorist will attack the next generation of air traffic control systems, and collide two large civilian aircraft. The Cyber Terrorist will also crack the aircraft’s in-cockpit sensors.

- A Cyber Terrorist will remotely alter the formulas of medication at pharmaceutical manufacturers. The potential loss of life is unfathomable.

- The Cyber Terrorist may then decide to remotely change the pressure in the natural gas lines, causing a valve failure, and a block of a sleepy
suburb detonates and burns. Likewise, the electrical grid is becoming steadily more vulnerable.

As can be seen any thoughts that Cyber Terrorism is non-violent, or is basically just “hacking”, are false. Cyber Terrorism is a new form of terrorism that exploits the systems we have put in place. Acts against only the virtual world, can be an inconvenience. Acts against the convergence of the physical and virtual worlds, can kill.

In all, Cyber terrorism is a powerful weapon of its own. When integrated with other, more conventional weapons or when used as an adjunct to a separate terrorist act, the concomitant destruction may be greatly increased.

**Cyber Terrorism threat can’t be ignored**

The following will indicate that the probability of cyber terrorist acts, will increase with time.

- The attacks have already begun- Attacks on key government systems have occurred increasingly over the last decade. Recently, the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency (“DISA”) reported over a quarter of a million hacks into government systems, with perhaps a third of them being successful. Unfortunately, we frequently do not even know that systems are hacked because the perpetrators erase their footsteps as they proceed. Attacks on private sector industries, particularly critical systems, is commonplace, and cost millions of dollars in damage and loss each year.

- The tools for cracking are ubiquitous – Not long ago, if a terrorist organization wished to execute a Cyber Terrorism attack, they would have to either train one of their own for this very complex task, recruit a cracker for their cause, or utilize a “cracker for hire”. Today, the software tools for cracking
systems to gain access are available for free throughout the Internet.

**Building Counter Cyber Terrorism Team**

Building a counter-cyber Terrorism team does not necessarily require a platoon of computer gurus. It does require an understanding of counterterrorism, an interest in gathering intelligence online, and an appreciation for the systems for which there is responsibility.

**Requirements for a Team**

A counter-Cyber Terrorism team must have members chosen from multiple areas including:

- Counterterrorism Analysts;
- Information Security Personnel;
- Systems Administrators from each Critical System;
- Incident Team Members; and a
- Team Leader.

Representation from each of these areas is critical to the success of the counter-Cyber Terrorism team.

**CONCLUSION:**

The building of a counter-Cyber Terrorism team must be real-time and dynamic, as the weapons will continually change, to morph, in an attempt to beat you, your systems, and your people. There is no re-machining, and unlike other terrorists, if the Cyber Terrorist loses today, he does not die-he learns what did not work, and will use that information against us tomorrow.

Now is the time to take action. Counter-terrorists of all backgrounds are duty-bound to save property, and more importantly, save lives. However, we are not isolated. We are all increasingly connected, dependent, and vulnerable. The very basic things we take for granted, like food, medicine, energy, air, freedom of movement, communications, and freedom from violence, are being threatened by the new weapon of Cyber-Terrorism.
Counter-Cyber Terrorism teams must start today, as the black hats are already far ahead. If we fail to be ready, then all that will be left will be terror-in one’s and zero’s.

**SUICIDE (FIDAYEEN) TERRORISM**

Suicide attacks are increasingly becoming the standard technique of a number of terrorist/extremist outfits specially when the targets to be struck are important and if successful would provide considerable propaganda mileage. While the Palestinian Hamas outfit was the first to adopt this technique, later the L.T.T.E. used it, with maximum effect. The main objective is to publicise ‘terror’ and invite international attention for the ‘cause’.

In India suicide attacks were unknown till the Rajiv Gandhi assassination (May, 1991) by LTTE. The second was that of Beant Singh (August, 1995) killing by Sikh terrorists. Of late, it is increasingly in evidence in Jammu and Kashmir, as part of "Jehadi" sponsored by the Pakistan ISI. Indigenous terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir, have rarely been involved in suicide attacks, and mainly the highly motivated and trained foreign terrorists largely from Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Hizbul Mujahideen outfits, are involved. The recent frequent incidents have, created situations of uncertainty and high degree of panic, putting the State and Central Governments, in a tight spot. It can’t be said that the suicide attacks of the type of September 11, 2001 on World Trade Centre, New York, can’t happen in India. Earlier (1995) Pakistan ISI is known to have tasked a Babbar Khalsa militant to ram a plane into the Bombay High platform. The attack on Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in Srinagar (Oct 1, 2001) followed by the one on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi (December 13, 2001) portend grim forebodings.

Suicide attacks, by their very nature, are most difficult, to predict or prevent. The outfits involved, choose their targets, the timing, the operatives, the method; carefully and with utmost secrecy. It is extremely difficult for
security and intelligence organizations to penetrate such groups. Those tasked are specially selected for their commitment to the ‘cause’, readiness to sacrifice and are given intensive training in near real situations, in the training camps across the boarder. Elaborate and careful planning marks the preparatory stage like, how and where to look for accommodation, equipment, vehicles; familiarisation with use of weapons, forged documents, computers, cell-phones etc. Ways and means of getting access to protected areas, with contact persons addresses are also included.

While no efforts should be spared to collect intelligence in advance, about suicide attack plans, so as to prevent such attacks, it is of utmost importance to devise measures to foil the attack, and should they occur; minimize the impact of such attacks.

Some suggested measures are:

(i) Reviewing the list of possible targets for suicide attacks, categorizing them, and prescribing scale of security, given the constraints of manpower and resources.

(ii) Reviewing the vulnerability, difficulties in securing and taking remedial measures to reduce vulnerability or improve its securedness, like access control, residential buildings etc. Parking lots should receive special attention.

(iii) Training the personnel, tasked to protect the targets, should be professional and given top priority.

(iv) Providing latest equipment and weapons to the personnel guarding the target.

(v) Intelligence generation including sharing, needless to say, should receive top most attention.

(vi) Ensuring stringent/fool proof verification procedures of documents like driving licenses, passports, passes, badges, identity cards, car stickers, must be emphasized.
(vii) Upgradation of disaster management schemes of vulnerable locations, and their rehearsals under simulated conditions.

(Kalyan Rudra, 'Measures Against Suicide Strikes', The Indian Police Journal, July-September, 2002).

What is needed is a study of the suicide attacks in India and abroad, why they succeeded and we failed in case of successful attacks, and why and how we could foil incase of unsuccessful ones, and from them drawing lessons. The training institutions and faculty has to take the initiative, in collecting the data, analyzing, and arriving at conclusions, with the help of those who were in the field.

1.4 EMERGING TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Assessment of most of the analysts, researchers and the main intelligence agencies is that; terrorism will continue to be a serious threat on both the strategic and tactical level. Growing instability of the international environment and, of the internal environment in India (political, social, regional and economic levels) aids and fuels this trend. The following are some of the projected trends:

- The Anti-American and anti-globalisation movement will probably become one of the main field of protest, resulting in American interests, multinationals and places of garrulous entertainment becoming the targets.

- Right wing radicals will continue and expand the strategy they call “leaderless resistance” whereby militants and groups operate independently of each other, without reporting to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction.

- Strategic assassination of important political and religious leaders could continue.
- Far reaching technological changes will provide a fertile ground to be exploited by the terrorists.

- The use of Internet and computer networks as a propaganda tool as well as means of communication, will pose a major challenge in the near future. The internet will increasingly become the place where much of the virtual clandestine activity takes place.

- Mass hostage taking

- Attacks in places of worship/Religious congregations.

- Group/families of ethnic, caste, religious denominations, to foment social dissentions and communal flare up.

- 'Cyber terrorism' is - yet another emerging trend, leading to cyber attacks on the essential, civilian, commercial, communication and military facilities.

- The likelihood that terrorists may use WMD is becoming high. Sarin gas attack in 3/95 in the Tokyo Sub-way has broken the taboo in the use of WMD. The Afghan immigrants plan (8/2000) to attack a nuclear reactor near the Olympic capital, Sydney, if carried out would have been the first attack ever on a live nuclear reactor.

- Lethality of the attacks has increased dramatically. Suicide and vehicle bomb attacks are the main methods to increase lethality.

- Left wing extremism, supposed to be on the wane, is on the increase in South-East Asia, particularly in India and Nepal and their resort to terror tactics.

- 'Terrorism' as a tool, is spreading to many areas of conflict.
• The civilian is not only an easy target for the terrorist, but also an effective one. The message is: anyone, anywhere, any time may be the target of the next attack. (Shiva, 2003)

B. Hoffman - a top ranking international terrorism expert, has this to say on future threats and potentialities.

Rather than asking what could or could not happen, it might be more profitable to focus on understanding what has not happened, for the light this inquiry can shed on possible future al Qaeda attacks. This approach actually remains among the most understudied and in turn conspicuous lacunae of terrorism studies. Many academic terrorism analyses- when they venture into the realm of future possibilities if at all-do so only tepidly. In the main, they are self-limited to mostly lurid hypotheses of worst-case scenarios, almost exclusively involving CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear) weapons, as opposed to trying to understand why-with the exception of September 11- terrorists have only rarely realized their true killing potential.

Among the key unanswered questions include:

• Why haven’t terrorists regularly used man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs/MANPADS) to attack civil aviation?
• Why haven’t terrorists employed such simpler and more easily obtainable weapons like rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to attack civil aviation by targeting planes while taking off or landing?
• Why haven’t terrorists used unmanned drones or one-person ultra-light or micro-light aircraft to attack heavily defended targets from the air that are too difficult to gain access to, on the ground?
• Why haven’t terrorists engaged in mass simultaneous attacks with very basic conventional weapons, such as car bombs, more often?

• Why haven’t terrorists used tactics of massive disruption—both mass transit and electronic (cyber) — more often?

• Why haven’t terrorists perpetrated more maritime attacks, especially against cruise ships loaded with holiday makers or cargo vessels carrying hazardous materials (such as liquefied natural gas (LNG))?

• Why haven’t terrorists engaged in agricultural or livestock terrorism (which is far easier and more effective than against humans) using biological agents?

• Why haven’t terrorists exploited the immense psychological potential of limited, discrete use of CBRN weapons and cyber attacks more often?

• Why haven’t terrorists targeted industrial or chemical plants with conventional explosives in hopes of replicating a Bhopal with thousands dead or permanently injured?

• And, Finally, why – again with the exception of September 11 – do terrorists generally seem to lack the rich imaginations of Hollywood movie producers, thriller writers, and others?


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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF STRATEGIES FOR FIGHTING TERRORISM

2.1 DEMOCRACIES - HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM

Democratic societies are most vulnerable and are also the least able to cope up with the new phenomenon of terrorism. The very principles and institutions, which civilized society considers as strengths of democracy, are exploited by terrorists as weaknesses. Human rights and individual freedoms, are likely to be curtailed or violated in the process of fighting terrorism. It must be noted that only the democratic countries provide the liberal atmosphere and rule of law, which paradoxically enable the terrorists to survive and operate. Yet their supporters scream foul, when their legal rights are infringed by authorities. There was either no terrorism under fascism, communism or military dictatorships, or terrorists were terrorized and put down ruthlessly.

Unity and integrity are of paramount importance to nations and they should be preserved at all costs. Robert E. Osgood Jr. has observed that national security "necessarily denotes a nation's determination to preserve certain interests at all costs. Foremost among these national interests are: Nation's integrity, Political independence and fundamental political institutions. It embraces not only the survival of the nation, but its ability to survive". The compulsions of national integrity and security create what is called "Lincoln's Dilemma" - should a Government violate human rights to preserve nation's integrity or sacrifice integrity to protect human rights? This is not a theoretical formulation, but a dilemma faced by policy makers in every country. Lincoln answered his dilemma: "No government, however
democratic and liberal, could be expected to stand by and see itself destroyed by the lawless; who place no restriction on their own violence”. He fought the ‘civil war’ to preserve nation’s integrity. Richard Nixon, who ruthlessly crushed the ‘Black Panther’ movement in early 1970s wrote in his memoirs “when the issue juxtoposes the lives of innocent citizens and the possible curtailing of personal liberties we all cherish, the answers are never easy”.

2.2 PREMISES FOR EFFECTIVE HANDLING OF TERRORISM IN FEDERAL DEMOCRACIES

First and foremost is the existence of a stable democratically representative Government at the National and the States level, willing to come to grips with the problem, coupled with the “political will” to launch a multipronged drive. History, all over the world, and particularly in our country, is replete with instances that whenever the political executive was weak or dependent on a large number of political or vested interest groups for survival, its capacity to govern had become weak and fissiparous and violent groups not only raised their heads, but also thrived exploiting the politically weak governments at the center and the States. “A regime in too much disarray to adopt harsh measures; is the best the terrorists can hope for” and “Having to make a choice between chaos and dictatorship, the great majority of people will opt for the latter”. (Walter Laqueur, 1999).

Unfortunately for the last decade or so, in India the political executives at the Center and in many states, are coalitions of disparate political complexions led by egocentric leaders, coming together with the single idea of sharing power. Compromising and contradictory polices and inability to take bold decisions is the result. These uneasy coalitions survive on day-to-day basis, and do only fire fighting exercises, whenever a serious situation is faced. This is definitely not conducive either for ensuring good governance or for protecting national unity and integrity. This weakens our fight against terrorism. Not only the enemical forces in the external and internal environment get strength but also the forces responsible for fighting
terrorism will be indoubt about continuity of policies and the will to fight of the security forces which is most important, gets diluted.

The second most important premise is the existence and demonstration of "National Consensus" with regard to the policies and strategies of fighting terrorism. In democracies there will be ruling and opposition political parties with different political stances each trying to discredit the other, whenever an opportunity arises. However in mature democracies both the ruling and opposition, agree on keeping certain issues above politicking, by developing a consensus. The foremost among such issues is national unity and integrity and the firm handling of terrorism, which impacts both. America, has time and again demonstrated this political consensus, the latest being on September 11, 2001. So is the case with Israel. Despite the glaring fact that there was bungling at the policymaking level, and failure at the intelligence collection and analysis, the whole nation stood behind Mr. Bush in launching a grim fight against terrorism, not indulging in mudslinging and one-upmanship.

But unfortunately in our country no issue is above politics, and every issue however grave or trivial, is made use of by political parties to gain political mileage. The big question for debate, after each major terrorist strike, is not how India should respond, But whether the attack would help the ruling or the opposition. In the wake of the December 13, 2001 attack on parliament, wiser counsels had to prevail, to stop criticizing the Government and intelligence and security agencies, despite the fact that we in India, did not face the ignominy of a successful attack on parliament, the attackers were killed and the security force personnel did foil the attack, sacrificing some of their lives. Even in enacting and implementing the POTA law there is no agreement. Jammu and Kashmir the State that is worst affected by terrorism, does not accept and implement POTA ! When do our politicians put certain issues of national concern like handling of terrorism above petty politics? Why not, the intelligentsia and media heavily come down; whenever such petty political stances emerge? What is the message that is being sent to the enemy
within and without, by such criticisms and the message to the security forces? This major weakness has to be remedied, if our fight against terrorism has to be meaningful, and effective.

The third, important pre-requisite is the development and orchestration of a clear and consistent counter-terrorism policy to ensure cooperation from external agencies and coordination within, of different agencies at the State and Central level. “Terrorism is usually calibrated ….. so too must counter-terrorism policy and strategy be calibrated and integrated”. Terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless struggle. For success against terrorism, efforts must be as tireless innovative and dynamic as that of the opponent. Hence the need for a long term counter-terrorism policy. May be such a policy cannot possibly include all the details for obvious reasons, still a clear and coherent policy, with the concurrence of, as many political parties as possible has to be developed. There is no, one uniform approach for dealing with terrorism that could be put up, yet orchestration of a basic policy, not only serves as the benchmark for officials handling terrorism, but also serves the purpose of being transparent and consistent to the public.

Here again, despite five decades of experience in fighting terrorism, we haven’t, formulated a pro-active counter terrorism policy. Of course, such a policy should not only be generic but also territory or issue specific. A policy that is good for Jammu and Kashmir, may not be good for the North East. In the absence of such a policy, the security forces are often handicapped, some time even embarrassed, as different groups or individuals are propped up by the powers that be, at different times. It happened in the North-East, and in Jammu and Kashmir. About hostage negotiations, ceasefires, and release of apprehended terrorists also, there is no clear cut policy. Expediency dictates the policy. It is exceedingly difficult to resist terrorist demands, but to do otherwise is to invite further terrorism. When the security forces are in doubt, or if the public is not aware of the policy, the former would find it difficult to fight, and the latter to extend support. A
primary goal of any counter terrorism policy should be, to de-politicize terrorist acts and treat them as purely criminal acts.

An effective Criminal Justice System is another pre-requisite to prevent as well as successfully handle terrorists and terrorist attacks. It is not enough, if the Police alone is proactive and effective. The Judiciary has to be equally alive to the implications of Terrorism and be effective in speedy and firm disposal of terrorist cases put up before it.

It has been the experience in Punjab that following threats from terrorists, even judiciary was afraid of trying terrorist cases, with the result police effectiveness was nullified. Even in Kashmir, the situation is not different. A mechanism has to be worked out through which the Police, the Prosecution, Judiciary and Jail Administration work in tandem, to achieve the overall objective of combating terrorism. Recourse to setting up of special courts, should be taken liberally.

2.3 INDIA – HEADING TO BE FAILED STATE

States, that are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty, have come to be known as failed states. Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Somalia are the classic examples. Failed States have come to be feared as reservoirs and exporters of terror, and that is what Pakistanis now. The existence of these kinds of countries and instability that they harbour, not only threatens, the lives and livelihoods of their own people but endangers world peace. This governance is closely linked to rise of terrorism. Though India is not a failed State as of now, there are disturbing trends-like loss of faith in politicians and indiscipline of the States, rising religious, regional, ethnic, political and sectarian hostilities, vested interests and mafia type gangs calling the shots – indicating drift toward becoming a failed State. It can no longer be taken for granted that India will survive intact (Walter Laqueur, 'The New Terrorism, 1999). The warning signals continue to be overlooked by the political leaders and intellelgentia.
The unending political wrangles in Parliament and Assemblies, which does not recognize any discipline and rules, the denigration of institutions and authority figures in the media, day in and day out, widening rifts between castes, communities, religions, divergent and conflicting agendas of political parties and groups, growing vested interest groups and mafias, projects the image of India being in a state of permanent civil war. This creates an impression in the mind of enemies of India that the country is very close to disintegration and a few well-aimed terrorist blows, would bring about that result!

2.4 FIGHTING TERRORISM – A NATION’S JOB

It is rather unfortunate that, there is a general impression that it is the job of the police or security forces to fight terrorism, and are blamed for every incident, by the politicians, the media and the citizens, adding to the woes of the police/security forces. Fighting terrorism is a complex job and the police and security forces can achieve successes only with the active support of the Govt., the politicians, intelligentsia, media and citizens. In fact, simultaneously the politicians, the intelligentsia, the media and the citizens have to fight their own battles against terrorism, which weakens the will of the terrorists and degrades terrorism as such.

2.5 STRATEGY

What we need is a strategy that reflects multiple goals vis-à-vis the complicated phenomenon called ‘terrorism’. The starting point is to recognize that the threat of terrorism can’t be completely eliminated, that the fight against terrorism will be long, costly and difficult. The soundest strategy consists of (a) perseverance (b) patience (c) resolve and will and (d) clarity about the dangers and challenges of terrorism, i.e. a calm and calculated strategy to fight the terrorists on all fronts is needed.
Firstly there should be a strategy to deny terrorism a soil in which it can find root, then the nutrients and the protective mechanisms that enable it to thrive. Foremost in this is to ensure that the terrorists get no support from outside material or moral. Terrorist groups that operate without outside support rarely cause as much damage, as that gets outside help. Then strategies should be devised to deny (a) causes/breeding ground (b) potential recruits (c) arms, ammunition and equipment (d) training camps and hideouts (e) finances (f) publicity (g) support from individuals/ groups and (h) the target they wish to attack. As Sheehan pointed out, there has to be a strategy of “draining the swamp” (Sheehan Michael, 2000). Secondly a comprehensive strategy of winning the peoples confidence and cooperation of the media is an essential element of such a strategy.

A Beham and M. Palmer, experts on international terrorism put toward five basic elements as part of the strategy to combat terrorism.

(i) Comprehensive and coordinated prevention and response capabilities.

(ii) A firm negotiating policy of ‘no concessions’ on substantive terrorist demands.

(iii) An operational and negotiating policy aimed at maximizing uncertainty for the terrorists.

(iv) The maintenance of effective national criminal provisions, where terrorism, is always treated as a crime.

(v) The maintenance of effective international instruments that ensure the prosecution of terrorists without exception and safe havens.

Considering the latest trends of the 'New Terrorism' including the propensity to use W.M.D., there is need for proactive counter terrorism measures to prevent terrorist attacks. It necessitates strategies to (a) forestall the terrorist attacks before they materialize into an attack, because once materialized, it is impossible to avoid devastating consequences (b) to be prepared for the worst - in case the terrorist is able to defeat the preventive efforts - with measures and machinery to maintain effective crisis and consequence management capabilities.

Strategies aimed at increasing the costs of terrorism to the terrorist individual/groups, keeping him on the run always and improving defenses, thereby decreasing the ease of terrorist actions, should be constantly worked out. Terrorism is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It must constantly move forward to survive and indeed to succeed...... Success is dependent on overcoming the defenses and physical security barriers designed to thwart attack....in order to stay one step ahead of the counter terrorism curve, compels terrorists to change, adjusting and adopting their tactics, modus operandi, and sometimes even their weapons systems as needed. (Bruce Hoffman, 'Inside Terrorism', 1998). Strategies of covert action, which is the prime preventive measure, should be carefully developed.

2.6. INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is the real key to success against terrorism. Improving/increasing the intelligence quotient- both in quality and quantity, to aid counter terrorist operations, has to be constantly explored (Naryanan, M K 2003). Without hard intelligence, pro-active counter terrorist policy and preventive strategies cannot be drawn up and implemented. Experience has shown that major terrorist attacks have taken the intelligence agencies by surprise. The threat of large-scale act of terror conventional and asymmetric greatly enhances the need to prevent terrorist schemes, and give warning before such acts happen. In the case of Nuclear or Chemical Terrorists Acts,
without warning, even the first responder teams could be destroyed before they act.

Innovative strategies for collecting intelligence through human sources (HUMINT) and upgrading technology for intelligence collection through gadgets (TECHINT) and communication systems (COMINT) is the need of the hour. The aim should be to collect intelligence, through which an accurate picture of terrorist groups, networks, membership, strategies, weapons and equipment, safe havens, links inside and outside the country, potential targets; can be had.

Intelligence collection in the field of counter-terrorism is different and in many aspects, a more arduous task, than the collection of classical intelligence. The lives of many people are in continuous danger - the intelligence personnel and the terrorists involved. The latest trend of giving up formal organizations, and the resorting to small groups and cells of highly motivated people, often acting anarchically makes it highly difficult the work of penetration and infiltration. The task of preventing proliferation of WMD is the most formidable task, posing two-fold challenge. On the one hand the necessity of penetrating and monitoring the activities of various groups/organizations in their attempt to acquire or use the WMD. On the other hand the need to identify, monitor and neutralize the providers of raw materials, technology, and know-how for the preparation of such weapons. Another important point is law enforcement agencies-police and non-police collect, in the course of investigations, or other activities considerable amount of information which is neither fully exploited by documentation nor is it shared to analysts and policymakers.

The intelligence apparatus of the State Police, is not tuned to the requirements of intelligence collection for counter terrorism. State agencies are totally under equipped to intercept radio, e-mail and telecommunications. Providing technical capabilities at the cutting edge level is an urgent need. (Narayanan MK; 2003)
A very disturbing trend is, different intelligence outfits engaging in a ridiculous game of operating in the same area using the same asset to gather essentially the same information and then pretend that they alone have pulled off something valuable. They keep their cards close to their chest in common forums, without sharing. Some clever sources encash merrily on this one-upmanship game.

All this calls for an urgent major over-haul of the intelligence apparatus particularly at the State level, and underlines the need to train and maintain an important pool of capable and highly professional intelligence officers. The possibility of attaching trained and equipped intelligence support teams with the active police units to maximize operational success, also needs consideration.

2.7 PSY-OPS/INFORMATION OPERATIONS

It must be recognized that terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological warfare. It is important to note that terrorism is designed, as it has always been, to have profound psychological repercussions on the target audience. Fear and intimidation are precisely the terrorists’ timeless stock-in-trade. Significantly, terrorism is also designed to undermine confidence in government and leadership and to rent the fabric of trust, that bonds society. It is used to create unbridled fear, dark insecurity and reverberating panic. Terrorists seek to elicit an irrational emotional response counter measures, therefore must be designed not only to blunt the threats but also to utilize the full range of means to counter it psychologically. (B.Hoffman; Rethinking Terrorism and Counter Terrorism 2002).

Thus Psychological Operations (Psy-Ops) or Information Operations (I.O.) are a most important component of counter measures. Terrorists aim to weaken the will of the government and the people by creating fear psychosis. It aims to influence peoples’ minds by direct strikes and skilful propaganda and make them feel that they should look to the terrorists for their security rather then to government. When terrorism succeeds in creating such anxiety
within a society, that daily life becomes impossible, then that society has lost its war against terrorism. Hence an aggressive, well thoughtout, and well coordinated Psy-ops/ I.O. should be an integral part of the counter measures.

The aims of Psy-ops/I.O, are:

1. To play up the negative aspects of terrorism, terrorists.
2. To highlight the suffering of innocent victims.
3. To highlight the loss to Government and private property and its consequences to the economy.
4. To educate the public as to how to counter the manipulative tactics of terrorists on contentious issues.
5. To deter alienated youth from joining terrorist camps, through education and propaganda.
6. Restoring morale and confidence of the public, in what the Government is doing to counter terrorist violence.
7. To counter, protagonists of terrorist groups who influence the media and other public figures, who shower political and moral respectability upon terrorist leaders and terrorist causes.
8. To correct wrong impressions about terrorism, terrorists, police operations.

   It is to be done with extreme care, with the help of professional media personnel and psychologists.
2.8 FIGHTING TERRORISM IN OTHER COUNTRIES

For the purpose of this study, the response to terrorism of three countries, is examined.

1. The Israeli Model

Since its establishment, the state of Israel has had to cope with waves of terrorism and terrorist activity at its borders, inside Israel itself and in the Territories. These terror attacks have necessitated the swift and consistent development of technological means, military doctrines, and general policy for counter terrorism. Many years of experience in dealing with terror and terrorist activity has crystallized into accepted Israeli strategy.

Israeli Counter Terrorism Response

The Israeli response to terrorism is a unique ‘no holds barred, all out offensive’. Israeli counter terrorist activities can be categorised as offensive, defensive or punitive in nature. While any one action may not be simply categorised, the distinction can help in assessing the effectiveness of different strategies.

Offensive activities are generally carried out by military or paramilitary forces against terrorist leaders and infrastructure to pre-emptively disrupt attacks at their planning stage. Defensive activities tend to involve creating obstacles for terrorist elements already enroute to their targets and, as a last resort, the disruption of attacks at their final stage by active and passive means. In contrast, punitive activities are not directed against specific attacks but are intended to deter future attackers and those who plan attack, by taking measures against leading terrorists, their supporters and ideological inciters.

Overall, the offensive strategy has so far failed to prevent further attacks and has come at a political, psychological and public cost. That said, it cannot be known how many more attacks might have been planned and
launched if operations 'Defensive Shield' and 'Determined Path' had not been carried out.

As is clear from the number of attacks foiled by Israeli security forces, defensive measures can prevent successful attacks. However, it is equally clear that even intelligence systems as experienced, focused and determined, as Israel's cannot stop all attacks.

Punitive action includes the controversial targeted killing of leading terrorist activities and planners. While the preferred option would be to apprehend perpetrators alive in order to interrogate them for valuable information, this is often impossible, or too costly to implement in a high-risk environment, such as a densely populated urban area.

Psychology and counterterror

Dr. Boaz Ganor, executive director of the Institute of Counter Terrorism, Israel (ICT), places great emphasis on the psychological aspects in terrorist warfare. The terrorists' message is that "anyone, anywhere, at any time may be the next target for attack". According to Ganor, these messages are intended for three different audiences. To the terrorist organisation's supporters in their home population, attacks demonstrate that, inspite of the personal misery under which many Palestinians live, their fighters are hitting back at the enemy. This constantly encourages the enlistment of new candidates to fill the ranks of the fallen and captured. At the same time, attacks send a message to the target population that 'despite all your defences, military incursions into our territory and military hardware, you fail to defend your own population against our attackers'. A third message is sent to the international community by drawing wide media attention to the continuing conflict and the political demands being made.

In order to counter this threat, Dr. Ganor argues that it is important to avoid repeated, often only vague, warnings by the security forces over impending attacks since, when these are not imminent, they only cause confusion as to how the public should act and tend to spread panic. Also
security forces tasked with counter terrorism should concentrate their efforts not only on physically preventing terror attacks, which is their primary task, but also on examining the intricate methods by which terrorism manipulates psychological states to achieve political aims. Failing to do this, Ganor concludes, will mean that security authorities “risk winning the battle by succeeding to foil the specific attack, while losing the war”.

Israeli Counterterrorist Units

Israel’s counterterrorism forces can be categorized as takeover, engagement and assisting units. Takeover units are charged with the primary counterterrorism tasks and are trained, and equipped accordingly. Engagement units have counterterrorism training as a secondary expertise. Their task is to close and secure a raid zone, gather Intelligence and cover the entry of takeover units, and they will be the first units to respond in a counterterrorism emergency. Assisting units have particular skills, receive extensive counterterrorism training, and assist the other types of unit during complex operations.

The Naval Commando Flotilla, which has a primary mission in maritime operations and specialises in maritime rescue, also undergoes counterterrorism training and can carry out land-based counterterrorism missions. The Israeli air force operates a unit called Shaldag (Kingfisher), which was reorganized to meet counterterrorism requirements and is currently operating with airborne assault missions as an engagement unit. All of the regular service brigade reconnaissance units are also trained in counterterrorism warfare techniques and operate in engagement missions when necessary.

Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Counterterrorism Forces.

Takeover forces include the special undercover Mista’arvit formations. Unit members, when operating undercover, wear Arab dress, are trained to speak the local dialect and blend into the public environment without arousing attention. Manned by carefully selected national service
soldiers, these undercover units carry out covert sorties to gather information, seek out and identify terrorist leaders and provide precise information for armed raids. These are carried out at short notice, when the intelligence is still reliable and fresh and the targets remain unaware in their hideouts.

The existence of undercover units in the Israel Defence Force (IDF) was kept secret until the early 1990s when the chief of Staff General Ehud Barak publicly revealed the existence of two Mista’arvim units, one codenamed Duvdevan (Cherry) formed in the West Bank, and another known as Shimshon (Samson) in the Gaza Strip. Following the 1993 Oslo accords and establishment of the Palestinian National Authority security forces, Shimshon was disbanded, but it recently reformed as a special reserve counterterrorist unit to operate undercover in the Gaza Strip. Duvdevan, however, remained active throughout and has become the IDF’s most experienced undercover counterterrorist unit and has been instrumental in disrupting the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank during the present Intifada. Operating almost nightly in response to real-time intelligence provided by the Internal Security Agency (ISA) or IDF combat Intelligence, the battalion-sized formation has performed nearly a thousand complex nighttime sweeps into high-risk environments in raids, arresting or killing leading Palestinian activists.

Another IDF special force with a takeover capability is the Sayeret Matkal (GHQ Reconnaissance Unit), primarily trained for foreign missions. Most of the unit’s missions are still secret, but it demonstrated its capabilities in the 1992 Sabena hijack when the unit rescued passengers at Ben Gurion airport and in the 1976 Entebbe raid. Sayeret Matkal was the designated takeover unit at Entebbe airport terminal, tasked with the actual hostage rescue and killing of the terrorist guards, while Sayeret Golani (Golani Infantry Brigade Reconnaissance Unit) worked the outer circle of the airport perimeter in an engagement role, preventing Ugandan troops from closing in on the terminal and interfering with the operation.
Police and Border Guard Units.

In 1990, the Israel National Police formed its own undercover unit, Yamam, based on volunteers from the Border Guard. Originally formed as an elite hostage rescue team, it was reformed to specialize in counterterrorist work, mostly in Israel. However, due to the overload of counterterrorist missions in the occupied territories, Yamam received special authorization to operate in the West Bank and Gaza as well. Organised on the lines of the German GSG-9, Yamam is manned entirely by long-service volunteers, many of whom are former IDF undercover unit officers who, after retraining to Yamam standards, drop rank to become senior NCOs in the Border Guard. The typical age of a Yamam operator ranges from 26 to 35. They are expert in various weapons skills, long-range precision sniping, fieldcraft, navigation and crosscountry driving as well as other counterterrorist expertise. Many serving members are recruited from minorities, such as Druze and even Arab Muslim Bedouin, who ideally fit into these units.

The police operate other overt and covert units, most of them with the Border Guard. The overt teams, patrol vulnerable locations, such as bus or railways stations and airport perimeters. Wearing full-combat gear, their role is to deter attackers from entering secure compounds and they provide on-the-spot response when an emergency arises. Covert teams are deployed inside the actual objective and nearby environment, wearing civilian clothes, blending in with the population and carrying concealed weapons.

The police, paramilitary Border Guard operates in units consisting of 80 officers divided into six tactical teams. Three teams are detectives handling undercover work, covert intelligence gathering and investigations. Three others are combat teams performing tactical missions by rapid deployment using heavily armed backup for the In-place operating detective teams. Their equipment ranges from light mobile rapid deployment tactical weapons to fully armoured SWAT equipment.
The police also deploys its own intelligence unit, called Matilan (Intelligence Observation Interception and Mobile Warfare Unit). Matilan units are deployed mainly around the highly complex Jerusalem outer perimeter, in order to prevent the entry of hostile infiltrators. The observation teams use sophisticated day and night electronic surveillance equipment to detect infiltrators at long range, so that reaction forces can respond in time to full potential attackers.

(David Eshel _Specialist in Middle Eastern Defence and Political Affairs, in Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 2002).

2. The U.S.A. Model

Before the 9/11 attacks, although the U.S. faced terrorism in a big way, it handled the threats by collecting intelligence on terrorist organizations, networks and terrorists and by carrying out several military operations against terrorist groups and terrorist sponsoring States. More than the pro-active response, it was more of responding to terrorist actions after the act. Immediately after 9/11 attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the Department of Justice (DOJ) the country’s primary Law Enforcement Agency “must shift its primary focus from investigating and prosecuting past crimes to identifying threats of future terrorist attacks, preventing them from happening and punishing would be perpetrators for their plans of terror”. On September 20,2001 U.S. President George W. Bush, enunciated, what came to known as the ‘Bush Doctrine’! “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”, and detailed the guiding principles in the U.S. War against terrorism, They are:

- The defeat of terrorism worldwide, would now become the most important goal of the United States.
- States that harbour terrorists would be subject to U.S. military action.
- Military action alone, while important, would not be sole or even the primary means of fighting terrorism.

- The war on terrorism will be an extremely complex and lengthy battle, which may take many months or years to win, and which will not be over when those responsible for the September 11 attacks are stopped.

- The war on terrorism would bring many changes within the United States as well as outside it, especially in the areas of defense, national security, and intelligence gathering.

It enacted the U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT 2001, and assembled an international coalition, of over 100 countries, to fight terrorism, first in Afghanistan, and later in Iraq, with lesser number of countries supporting it.

Recognising that there were failures, particularly in the areas of coordination among the numerous enforcement agencies and intelligence sharing, President Bush created (October, 2001) the office of Home Land Security, later upgraded as Cabinet Department. The mission of the Department was to develop and coordinate, the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the U.S. from terrorist threats or attacks, more specifically, to coordinate the effort to detect, prepare for prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks within the U.S. With a budget of $37.4 billion, the Department is organized into four divisions:

i. Border and Transportation Security
ii. Emergency preparedness and Response
iii. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear counter measures and
iv) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
3. The UK Model

The United Kingdom’s response to terrorism, in the post colonial era, has been a mix of use of force and peace initiatives, mainly because of the location and nature of terrorism.

U.K. has been facing a major problem of terrorism in Northern Ireland, earlier a British colony with protestant majority. The Irish Revolutionary Army (I.R.A) championing the cause of merger of Northern Ireland with the catholic majority Republic of Ireland, has been resorting to terrorist methods from late 1960s. The I.R.A. came to rely on the bomb as its main tactic, particular the car bomb. With the split to solid in I.R.A. in 1972, the rebel I.R.A., calling itself Provisional I.R.A., launched a violent struggle, viewing the British Military Presence in Northern Ireland as the most important obstacle to Irish reunification. They targeted British military installations, soldiers, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and Northern Irish Politicians, loyalist para military forces and sites in mainland England in an effort to force the British to withdraw. The year 1972 saw 479 people killed and more than 500 injured.

In 1973, the British government made its first attempt to establish peace, resulting in ‘Sunnigdale agreement’ with moderates. But the hawks, despised the agreement and launched massive strikes in 1974, killing 43 people, of whom 21 were killed in the November 1974 Birmingham pub bombing. Following this, the British Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, which gave the police sweeping new powers. The British government began to change its anti-terrorism tactics, adopting a new ‘criminalisation’ strategy-reducing military presence, restoring civil authority in the form of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and taking terrorist offences as criminal acts to be handled by police and courts, not as a form of political rebellion to be put down militarily.
Following an aggressive intelligence campaign, the I.R.A. began to suffer defections, and arrests, and its military capabilities were severely damaged. However it could bomb in Oct 1984, Brighton, which killed five people and very nearly killed Prime Minister Thatcher and her entire cabinet. Using the new arms supply from Libiya, in 1985-86, the I.R.A. began attacking RUC stations in the country side, with a view to driving the security forces from the country side and thus establish a secure area from which to attack the cities. However the British counter intelligence was able to thwart this plan. This led to negotiations between the British Government and the IRA resulting in December 1993 “Downing Street Declaration” and in August 94 the I.R.A. declared ceasefire. The ceasefire ran into trouble in 1995 and 1996, and in 1997 after the election of Tony Blair as Prime Minister, peace negotiations resumed which culminated in the ‘Good Friday Accords’ on April 12, 1998. Nonetheless, Sporadic violence and rioting continue in some areas of Northern Ireland, and peace remains fragile.

Initially, British army was deployed in considerable strength in Northern Ireland. The Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) established in Great Britain during World War II, was considered to the best-trained counter-terrorism unit with the motto “Who dares, wins”. An elite special operation force was known as the best in ending hijack and hostage situations with minimum loss of innocent lives. In May 1980, the SASR rescued 19 hostages held in Iranian Embassy in London with in minutes. Most other commando units including the U.S. NAVY SEALS are modeled after the British SASR.

However, following heightened resentment and increased attacks on the army personnel, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) the Provincial Police of Northern Ireland was strengthened and used in operations against I.R.A. Unlike the other police agencies of U.K. the R.U.C. is armed and trained in combat fighting procedures and for this reason I.R.A. later targeted R.U.C. Camps.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, the U.K. has initiated steps to sharpen the counter terrorism skills of the British army as well as the police, in a big way.

2.9 FIGHTING TERRORISM - INDIA

2.9.1 India has been facing the problem of terrorism/extremism for over five decades now; in different states and in different forms. As described, elsewhere, in this report, India’s fight against terrorism was in the nature of knee-jerk reaction, and fire fighting. For most part, whether it is in the North-East or Punjab or Jammu and Kashmir, it was characterised by political indecision and political game playing. In the absence of a clear policy of countering terrorism, and political will the police was playing a reactive role. When things became hot, the para military forces and even the Army was rushed in, mainly to prove that the government is acting, while in fact reacting. There was no prior planning of the strategy, no role clarity for each of the agencies and no mechanisms for coordination and the support measures from the political and administrative side. Mostly the Army and the Security forces, held the ground, doing the minimum, or some times playing games of one upmanship. With the result, there was heavy loss of life of civilians, members of the police and security forces, apart from damages to property and the economy. Though Punjab terrorism was defeated in 1993, after innovative strategies by the police and security forces and the role of leadership etc, the required lessons have not been drawn from the failures and success in Punjab.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Jammu and Kashmir has been caught in the vortex of militancy for over a decade. During this period, the militancy has changed its hue and character. Initially, it was characterized by rise of pro-Azadi groups. In its second phase, pro-Pak groups took command of militancy in the State. In the current phase, from 1996-97 onwards, foreign mercenaries have gradually
taken over the mantle of terrorism marginalizing the local militants. It is estimated that about 60% of the militants operating in the State today are from outside.

Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir has taken a toll of more than 27,000 lives including over 10,000 civilians since 1990. It has also caused enormous damage to the Kashmiri people and the economy of the State. Since the year 2002, the Pak ISI, through pro-Pak militant outfits, has been trying to step up violence with a focus on demonstrative actions aimed at demoralizing/destabilizing security forces and creating a communal divide. The year 2000 also witnessed changes in the militants’ operational techniques/tactics, which included—

- Audacious attempts to target security forces locations/camps through fidayeen attacks.
- Improved weaponry including use of area weapons.
- Increasing use of explosives (RDX) and IEDs to target security patrols and convoys.
- Increased killing of minorities with a view to exacerbating the communal hatred.
- Targeting/killing of auxiliary security apparatus, Special Police Officers, counter insurgency militants and informers.
- Using mosques as shelters, with the intention of whipping up communal passion.

With the US Administration declaring the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Centre as an act of war and calling for immediate retribution, a sense of apprehension descended on terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir. However, militant organizations, such as Laskar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Muzahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Osama Bin Laden. To keep the morale of their cadre high and show demonstrative action against a symbol of India’s democracy, a fidayeen attack on the State
Assembly in Srinagar was launched on October 1, 2001 in which 38 persons were killed and 60 others were injured. The attack within the premises of Parliament House in New Delhi on December 13, 2001 was another brazen attempt by Pak-based militant organizations in that direction. Though, in the aftermath of September 11 attack in USA, some of the militant training camps have been closed in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and instructions are reported to have been issued to ISI units training militants to cease their activities for the time being, this move appears to be tactical in nature on the part of Pakistan Government and there is nothing to suggest that the closure is permanent and it is not merely a change in strategy.

NORTH EAST

North East India comprises the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. The region accounts for 8.06% of the total land surface of India and has a population of 385 lakhs, which is 3.75% of the total population of the country (as per 2001 provisional census).

Militancy in the North East is more than 50 years old. It continues to plague Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura in varying degrees even today. Militancy of moderate intensity is raging in Meghalaya. On account of its geographical contiguity with Assam and Nagaland, some parts of Arunachal Pradesh are also disturbed. The demands of various militant groups in the North East vary from creation of separate States within North East in the Indian Union to secession from India. The region is geo-politically most sensitive and has a tenuous surface link through the Siliguri corridor with the Indian landmass. The armed hostilities have been consistently fueled from the trans-border bases across the long and porous international border. The propaganda of the militants has been largely drawing its sustenance from influx of illegal immigrants (mainly Bangladeshis), perceived or actual demographic distortion of tribal communities in their homelands, disruption of natural trade routes following partition in 1947, inadequate social and physical
infrastructure, relative economic deprivation and loose emotional and cultural links with the Indian mainstream.

Militancy in the North East remains deeply complex. The contemporary forces of social and economic change have been contributing to unrest in certain segments of tribal communities. The Pakistan-backed ISI has also been pursuing its evil designs by misleading people and also by providing training and arms to militant outfits in the region. Due to agricultural, industrial and infrastructural backwardness of the North Eastern region, the level of unemployment remains high. The frustrated and unemployed youth become victims of militant outfits and misguided to waging an armed struggle against national unity and social harmony.

LEFT WING EXTREMISM

The quantum of Left-wing Extremist violence witnessed an increase for the first time since 1996 with 1209 incidents (564 deaths) being reported during 2001 as against 1179 incidents (550 deaths) reported during the previous year. In 2002, also the trend has continued.

Left-wing Extremist groups, which have strongholds in pockets of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Maharashtra, are trying to spread their tentacles to other areas while they continue to indulge in violent activities in their traditional strongholds. Apart from enlarging their geographical spread, they are also trying to militarize their cadres. Of the Left-wing Extremists: groups, CPML-PW and MCC account for the highest number of killings and violent incidents. They have also been restructuring their organizational frame-work to establish their domination in certain identified areas. CPML-PW and MCC are reported to have reached an understanding to eschew violence against each other in areas of overlapping territorial concerns. After the understanding, violent clashes between the outfits in Bihar and Jharkhand have reduced drastically. This may lead to joint attacks on common targets, especially the police, by both the outfits. The ominous alliance between the two prominent Left-wing Extremist
groups is a matter of concern. (excerpts from M.H.A. Annual Report 2001-2002)

2.8.2. Lessons from Punjab

The movement, for the creation of 'khalistan', one of the world's most virulent terrorist campaign launched in early 1980s, was completely defeated in 1993. It costed heavily for the State and Nation, with 21, 469 people being killed, many thousands injured/maimed, administration paralysed, and economy badly affected. The movement, its highs and lows, the handling etc. has many lessons for not only India but also for the world to learn. They are (i) how a religious identity can be cleverly exploited through perverse logic by a group of bigots, sidelining the majority (2) how, Police, in the absence of proper leadership in the department and direction from the political leadership, gets demoralized and abdicates its responsibility (3) how dithering, political expediency and striking deals with some terrorist groups/supporters can be dangerous (4) how the extremes of paralysis and over reaction costed the security forces and the State badly and fueled the terrorist campaign (5) how, given the leadership and political support, the police and security forces, can turn around and give a valiant fight, in the face of odds (6) how systematic study, proper planning, equipping and leading from the front, and coordination, makes a difference between success and failure (7) how the traditional doctrine of 'minimum use of force', by the security forces becomes impracticable and irrelevant, in the fight against terrorism (8) how measures to enlist public cooperation like the Village Defense Schemes (VDS) and appointment of Special Police Officers (SPOs) and others did make a difference (9) most importantly the use of coercive force through counter terrorist measures, was not just a necessary expedient, but a fundamental obligation and duty of the government, neglecting which is betrayal of the people and the nation unforgivably and 10) given the challenge and leadership the civil police was an effective counter terrorist force, even in the most extreme circumstances.
While Pakistan had put her whole might behind the Punjab terrorists, the response of the Indian government was marked by indecision, an abject lack of political will, rank opportunism, and a yawning police vacuum. All institutions of the State were in full and open flight; only two forces were operative: the terrorists and the security apparatus, with every other wing of the government paralysed. Yet one of the most dramatic victories in the history of world terrorism, was that of Punjab. (Adopted from "Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993" by K.P.S. Gill, Published in "FacultLines", May, 1999).

The one man who made the difference was Shri KPS Gill—he gave the nation its integrity and unity foiling the meticulous plan of Pakistan to dismember the Indian State, restored Punjab to its rightful place in the Indian Polity, showed to the police what it can do even in a no-win situation and to the top echelons what leadership is. It is sad and painful that he and those who stood behind him in the fight, making huge sacrifices, are forgotten. A couple of officers, who were in the thick of fighting terrorism making personal sacrifices and who were later made to face litigation, wondered, during my interview, whether they fought for an ungrateful nation!

State Police - the best suited agency

State Police, is legally empowered, geographically spread, and strategically suited, to effectively handle terrorism, vis-à-vis the armed forces or the Central ParaMilitary Forces (CPMF). Law and order being State subject, preventive, detective and prosecuting functions relating to terrorism can be done only by the State Police, unless specifically authorized to others. Local Police are invariably the first responders and take the main brunt of managing any terrorist incident. Whether it is collection of intelligence, knowledge of local people, language, culture, terrorism, etc., it is the local police that is better placed.

Yet, time and again, whenever terrorism raised its ugly head above the tolerance threshold, devoid of any clear understanding and plan of action, the government at the Centre and States resorted to firefighting or knee jerk
reactions, by deploying in large numbers, the Army and Para Military Forces. It was for sheer area domination and without any clearcut plan of action, demarcation of responsibilities, and coordination procedures. This led to resentment among the population and sometimes acute criticism at the high handedness of these forces as was the case in North-East, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

The Army being trained in its primary responsibility of fighting external aggression, in conventional warfare mode, with its mind set, operational drills and procedures, is ill suited to fighting terrorism, the enemy within. When they move in column with heavy weapons mounted on vehicles and tanks in the villages and urban areas, the populace instead of feeling secure is frightened and develop repulsive feelings. On top of it, if any harassment, molestation or destruction takes place, it leads to permanent estrangement. It is for this reason Army has time and again shied away from its frequent deployment on Internal Security duties. Same is the case, though to a lesser extent with the Central Para Military Forces (C.P.M.Fs). While, it can’t be said that Army, Border Security Forces (B.S.F.) and Assam Rifles, which function as military units, should never be deployed, on Internal Security (I.S.) duties, as there will be occasions, when situations go so much out of control, their deployment becomes inevitable to bring the situation under control, but such deployments should not be frequent and for long durational. Otherwise it sends wrong signals about the state of internal security, the capabilities of police and the functioning of democracy itself. At any rate, terrorism can’t be fought, without the active involvement of the State police.

It can be argued that the State Police hasn’t the required: numbers, training equipment, the independence to act and its loyalties are suspect etc. Yes, that is precisely the point. Over the years, after independence, willy nilly the police machinery in the States has not only been neglected but degraded. While the Army, and to some extent the CPMFs, get additional manpower and equipment liberally, the State Police which fight battles everyday, is starved
of funds, equipment, training and encouragement. It is a wonder, inspite of that, the police forces perform at the level they do today, to keep a semblance of law and order, and to keep the country together.

Adding more and more battalions to C.P.M.Fs is no answer. If only a part of that money can be spent in strengthening the state police – in numbers, equipment and training – not only terrorism/insurgency can be handled effectively, the general law and order would improve dramatically. That, terrorist and extremist violence was brought under control, whenever the State Police, under competent leaders, took up the challenge, is amply proved by the Punjab example and later the Jammu and Kashmir example. Unfortunately no lessons are learnt, and we go back to the old game of allowing situations to drift, and resort to fire fighting whenever they go out of control.

If the powers that be, at the Centre and in the States, are serious about fighting terrorism, which is going to be a long drawn one, the State Police, have to be strengthened immediately, with additional man power, modern training and equipment, selected leadership at the top, and supportive political and bureaucratic environment. The State police should be the lead agency, with the CRPF assisting the State Police. In exceptional circumstance, the assistance of Army or other CPMFs should be given, if requisitioned. It is pertinent to remind here, that an effective police is as much important – if not more, in ensuring not only unity and integrity of the country, but also in the socio-economic development, as is the role of defence forces in preserving the territorial integrity and fighting external aggression. The only way of ensuring an effective police is to implement the main recommendations of the National Police Commission. Strong, professional, State Police forces, unaffected by the political machinations of the government of the day, is a sine question for not only preventing and fighting terrorism, but also for better quality of democracy.
The present research is aimed at recommending the appropriate training interventions for the State Police, in the fight against terrorism.

2.10 TRAINING OF THE POLICE IN HANDLING TERRORISM

1. U.S.A.

Policing in the U.S.A. is a three tier system with Federal, State and Local Police Agencies performing law enforcement. Prior to 9/11/2001, Federal Police, the F.B.I in particular was the lead agency in combating domestic terrorism. While the federal police and the Defence services were being trained extensively in counter terrorist operations, the State and local police agencies, did not pay enough attention to counter terrorism as such. To the question 'Have Police agencies been training enough in response to the threat of terrorism', Harvey Kushner Ph.D., Chairman of Criminal Justice at Long Island (N.Y) University said “No, no, no”. He likened the level of C.T. training in law enforcement versus what is needed, to the New York Yankees playing the local high school team.

September 11, has changed the world of policing forever in America. A separate fullfledged office of Homeland Security was created directly under the President and huge amounts are committed for counter terrorism training of the law enforcement personnel. Before 9/11, the local law-enforcement personnel thought that 'terrorism' was somebody else’s responsibility- the F.B.I, the Joint Task Force, the Bomb Squad. That is not the case anymore. The regular duties of local police from the most important part of counter terrorism. There is a realization that a single police officer can make a difference. He might catch them doing what they are going to do 2/3 years later. (Sanford Wexler, “The NYPD : On the Frontlines, in the War against terrorism”, Law Enforcement Technology, September, 2002). Uniformed officers are now on the front lines keeping a watchful eye out, for potential terrorist activity. That is why, the N.Y.P.D. has integrated counter terrorism training into its In-service Tactical Training Programme, also known as ‘In-Tac’. Every uniformed police officer and precinct detective is required to
participate once a year in their training programme. Most of the training is in real-life scenarios. Every police officer is fully aware that their job is a dangerous one. "Terrorists could be conducting dry runs right under your noses". "We must never ever let our guard down"; were the watchwords.

It is now firmly believed that a single law enforcement officer can indeed foil a devastating terrorist attack. "We need to get them (local law enforcement) into the fight. They have played no role, other than a reactive role in counter terrorism" (Kallstrom, former head of FBI's New York Office). There is also greater realization about coordination and sharing of intelligence. It is now felt imperative that: all local and State law enforcement officers work closely together, in the war against terrorism, and that the federal government must do a better job of sharing information about potential terrorist activity with local agencies. Most of the police agencies do not have any intelligence operations, whatsoever earlier, though they are the eyes and ears of the cities and states, and are the ones that are patrolling the street. Having realized that the only way to successfully fight terrorism, is for law enforcement agencies to gain clear understanding of the adversary and that Home land security is in the hands of local enforcement on a daily basis, sweeping counter terrorism programmes are designed for them to prevent, detect, terrorist attacks and deal with their effects (Law Enforcement; Jan2003).

State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT) a joint effort of the Institute for intergovernmental Research (IIR) and the F.B.I., funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (B.J.A.) of the U.S. Department of Justice, has stepped in, in a big way in training the American Police. SLATT program provides training in detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist/extremist activity.

SLATT specialized courses are designed for State and Local Law Enforcement executives, command personnel, intelligence officers, investigators, training directors and prosecutors, covering the gamut from
street level officer safety to executive policy making issues. SLATT’s services include the coordination of training logistics, selection and development of instructors, preparation of training and resource materials, selection of training sites, liaison with potential trainees and co-sponsors and close coordination with the F.B.I.’s National Security Division Training Unit. SLATT provides a public source research database and research products such as publications, videos and multimedia applications that are disseminated through training classes. It convenes focus groups (experts) to evaluate law enforcement and prosecution issues to ensure that training and related activities are timely, relevant and responsive to the needs and requirements of the law enforcement community. They identify issues emerging from terrorist and extremist movements and review and refine SLATT’s training curricula, products and research agenda. It has established a pool of anti-terrorism experts who deliver specialized training and research products in response to requests from law enforcement agencies and referrals from the FBI and BJA.


The New York State, Division of Criminal Justice Services has the following counter Terrorism Training for its Law Enforcement Officers.

The Mission

To ensure that law enforcement officers of all ranks have the information and skills necessary to prevent terrorism; respond to terrorist attacks; and to identify, gather, and report relevant information in a safe, effective and professional manner.

Identified Needs

- Comprehensive Partnership of Local, State and Federal Agencies.
- Identify subject matter experts.
- Develop an Introductory “Need to know” Training program.
- Identify and utilize the Best Trainers.
• Deliver Training utilizing Multiple Formats.

The Challenge: Training Content

Officers have little or no training in key topics.

• Terrorist Groups (Foreign and Domestic)
• How Terrorists Assimilate into the Community.
• Hate Crimes.
• Immigration and Naturalization Documents.
• Commercial vehicles.
• Roles of INS, Customs and other Federal Agencies.

Key Course Topics

• Terrorism operations.
• Suicide Bombers.
• Information Gathering.
• Fraudulent Documents.
• First and Second Responders.
• Hate crime.
• Legal updates.
• Commercial Vehicle Awareness.
• Acute Traumatic Stress Management.
• Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Specialty Courses

• Document Fraud and Identification.
• Commercial vehicle Enforcement and Terrorism Interdiction
• Incident Command
- Weapons of Mass Destruction.
- Chemical and Biological Terrorism.
- Cyber-Terrorism.
- Terrorism Issues for Telecommunications.
- Terrorism and Extremist Groups.
- Interviewing and Interrogation.
- Responding to Terrorist Bombings.
- Developing Intelligence Officers.
- Acute Traumatic Stress.
- Hate Crime.

**Training Design**

- CEO Training.
- Train-the-Trainer Basic Course.
- Specialty Courses.
- Web-based secure discussion Groups.
- Teleconference.
- Video
- Media Resource Center.
- Computer-Base Learning.

**Training Support**

- Powerpoint Slides and Lesson Plans on CD.
- Student Manuals.
• Quick Reference Cards.

• Counter-Terrorism Brochure.

Institutionalize Training

State Mandated Courses:

• Basic Course for Police Officers.

• Course in Police supervision

• Security Guard and Peace Officer Training.

Continuous Improvement

• Evaluation.

• Feedback- "The Breakfast of Champions".

• Survey-Needs Assessment.

• Independent Professional Review.

The study revealed that, in the U.S.A., Police training is an important area, that training is a researched and planned intervention, that anti-counter terrorism training has assumed considerable importance after 9/11,2001, and that training is sought to be made as realistic and purposeful as possible, by continuous interaction with the field officers and review periodically. The training institutes provided latest equipment with field officers and infrastructure. With regard to faculty, this is no dearth of experienced in-service and retired officers apart from academies, to be available.

Another noteworthy feature of police training in the USA, including counter terrorism training is, numerous organizations in the public and private sector, conduct training for police officers. Apart from universities, some of the organizations are: Terrorism Research Centre, National Interagency Civil-Military Institute, National Tactical Officers Association (NTDA), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), Senior Management Institute of Policing (SMIP) are some such organizations.
2. TRAINING THE POLICE IN HANDLING TERRORISM - INDIA

In the Post-Independent era, despite several well-meaning attempts like the National Police Commission Reports, the Gore Committee Report on Police Training, Police training continues to be badly neglected with states. No doubt in a few states, owing to the proactive leadership in the Police and in the political executive, police training looked up like in Andhra Pradesh. In many States, the situation is pathetic to say the least, with many vacancies in training institutions remaining unfilled, those posted unwilling or unsuitable and with inadequate budgetary support etc. There are still police training institutions that do not get any training allowance for its faculty. Even the mandatory motions of routine, in the beaten track. Training at present, is neither realistic nor research oriented. Neither training is based on Training Needs Analysis (TNA) nor on any research study. It is still based impressions. What is worse is, there are no updated training manuals, Prescribed minimum standards in every area for qualifying and standard operating procedures for different field activities/operations.

"Failing to prepare is preparing to fail" said Benjamin Franklin. Terrorists do not want to fail. They prepare meticulously for their attacks. A typical global terrorist attack involves a year long preparatory phase developing new capabilities, recruiting operatives, training them, marshalling resources and positioning them and planning the attack. Terrorist has the advantage of taking initiative and giving the element of surprise. To counter such attacks, we should, no doubt, be prepared; prepared better than the terrorist. Despite the country facing terrorism for over four decades, despite loss of thousands of policemen and their family members, loss of lives of thousands of civilians, and loss of thousands of crores of rupees worth property in destruction, not to speak of the thousands of crores of rupees spent in fighting terrorism, there is yet to be a focus on the very basic thing, like
training the police in handling terrorism. The counter-terrorism experts in our country, or the police training managers have not addressed this aspect. "Policing in general and counter terrorism operations in particular have, in India, remained trapped in low technology 'cul de sac' for decades" (KPS Gill, Faultlines vol.3 – Nov.99). The primitive lathi (bamboo stick) and .303 rifle are still the main weapons of the police arsenal, though terrorism and organized violence with access to latest weapons and technology have become a permanent feature of India’s internal security scenario. Police have been denied the latest weapons, the protective equipment and the training.

While some efforts are made by individual police officers to orient police personnel for counter terrorism/counter insurgency or anti naxalite operations, either it was sporadic or half heartened. Andhra Pradesh is an exception. The training is mostly confined to theory in the indoor classes and to the firing ranges and parade ground. Importantly, it was not based on any well thought out comprehensive strategy of counter terrorism, required for handling the problem in each State, still worse, the training institutes that impart counter terrorism training, mostly use their own faculty which lacks specific field experience and trainer skills or depends on guest faculty which doesn’t come forth in good measure.

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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN OF STUDY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a crime against humanity and a threat to democracies. Whatever be the declared objectives—howsoever laudable they may be—the intentions of terrorists are questionable and their tactics despicable. The calculated way in which terrorists shed innocent blood should be repulsive and unforgettable to all-September 11, 2001 incident is a case in example. Terrorism—domestic or international, deserves to be dealt with firmly. Yet there are sections within and outside the country who extend support to terrorist groups. Even nations do it overtly or covertly compounding the complexity of the problem.

Democracies, particularly the plural ones like India and the U.S.A. are the most vulnerable. Rule of law, Human Rights concerns, ethical stances, and political compulsions dilute the will to fight terrorism firmly and consistently. While it is not denied that terrorism cannot be eliminated by mere use of force, it is and remains a police problem till a political solution is found, if it can be found at all. No Government worth the name, can remain passive when innocents are killed like flies, law enforcement personnel and VIPs are assassinated, and normal life is disrupted, with threats to destroy the very state, itself.

Depending on the nature and extent of terrorist threats, they are classified as "War" or "Crime". Whatever be the classification and even when armed forces are actively involved, the main brunt of the problem is faced by the State Police assisted by Central Police Organisations, as terrorists operate inside the country, taking shelter among civilians and acting as
individuals or as small groups. Incidents perpetrated by terrorists like mass killings, bomb explosions, hijacking, kidnapping drug trafficking, money laundering etc. are crimes in penal laws and threaten internal security. Given their knowledge of the people, their language and culture, the terrain and of crimes, criminals and their hide outs, the State Police is not only in a better position to handle and contain terrorism, but the best option for democratic governments, as collateral damage will be the minimum.

3.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

It is the preparedness of the State Police-civil and armed, that impacts the success of counter terrorist efforts in a significant way. India has been in the thick of combating various types of terrorism, for over five decades since independence. Huge resources-manpower, financial etc – are committed, to handling terrorism. Large number of civilians, military and police personnel have been killed over the decades. Yet the terrorist problem persists; posing serious threats to national security and integrity. While solutions have to be found to cross border/enemy sponsored terrorism through diplomatic or military options, the day to day handling of terrorism, with a view to limiting the damages to the extent possible, is to be done by the State police. To manage this, police has to be empowered and enabled. Given the situation, the existing responses to terrorism by police-despite inadequate numbers, lack of focused training and poor equipment- is highly commendable. However with increased sophistication in the terrorist tactics and to advent of ‘mega terrorism’ threatening mass destruction, there is dire need to calibrate police response. The requirement of focussed training for police in handling terrorism, has to be studied in depth and appropriate remedies have to be found. It brooks no delay. Hence the need for the study.
3.3 THE STUDY PROJECT WAS WORDED AS:

"Training Intervention for Indian Police in Handling Terrorism – A Study”.

3.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The investigator defined the study objectives as under:-

(i) To do extensive literature survey for identifying the priority areas in training for handling terrorism.

(ii) To critically examine the existing training intervention (for handling terrorism), for the Indian Police in all the States and the C.P.Os.

(iii) To do extensive literature survey for studying the training systems for handling terrorism in U.K., Israel, and the U.S.A.

(iv) To study institutional arrangements for imparting training in handling terrorism at State and National level Police Training Institutions in India with regard to:

- Curriculum design
- Training Methodology
- Training Infrastructure, and
- Faculty resources.

(v) To elicit opinions of top leaders in Police, Academicians, Army and Para-military personnel regarding training interventions in Police.

(vi) To recommend training strategies and modules for effective handling of terrorism, for police personnel of various ranks.
3.5. DATA GATHERING TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES:

For collection of data following tools and techniques were used:

(i) Literature Survey
    - Books
    - Periodicals
    - Report
    - Newspaper clippings
    - Websites

(ii) Critical Appraisal of the Training Course Designs from various training institutions.

(iii) Questionnaire for studying institutional arrangements for training in handling Terrorism.

(iv) Opinionnaire to elicit opinion of top leaders.

3.6 SAMPLE:

The sample was as under:

(i) The stratified random sampling procedure was adopted for collection of data.

(ii) Training Institutions of Terrorist affected States viz. J & K, Punjab, North-Eastern States, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, apart from the training institutions of the following Central Police Organisations, were studied:
    - B.S.F.
    - C.R.P.F.
    - N.S.G.
    - N.E.P.A.
    - N.P.A.
(iii) Opinions of experts/specialists were collected as per the following sample

- Police 20
- CPOs and Army 15
- Academicians 10
- Media 5

**Total 50**

(iv) For eliciting information on the institutional arrangements, in the Police for imparting training to handle terrorism, a comprehensive questionnaire was constructed.

(v) For eliciting opinions of experts/specialists and selected non-police knowledgeable people, an opinionnaire was constructed.

(vi) Structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with few selected eminent people.

### 3.7 PROCEDURAL STEPS:

Following procedural steps were adopted for the completion of study –

**Step 1** :  Literature Survey

**Step 2** :  i) Construction of opinionnaire on training in handling terrorism in India for Police/Army/CPMF; Officers/Academicians/Media persons etc.

ii) Data Collection

iii) Content analysis of data for formulating framework and guidelines for study. It also helped in construction of other questionnaires.
Step 3: Construction of questionnaire for assessing the institutional arrangements for training in handling terrorism.

Step 4: Selection of Sample

Step 5: Collection of data by sending questionnaire by post and personally contacting interviewing some for obtaining responses and interviewing some.

Step 6: Tabulation of data.

Step 7: Analysis and interpretation of data.

Step 8: Report preparation.

3.8. DELIMITATIONS OF STUDY:

The study mainly focuses on the training interventions for the State Police and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which are the main agencies entrusted with Internal Security (I.S.) duties vis-à-vis the handling of terrorism. The training interventions needed for the other paramilitary or central police forces are not the focus of the study, as their charter of duties, as enunciated by the Group of Ministers (G.O.M.) Committee Report, precludes them from being deployed on Internal Security duties.

3.9. DEFINITIONS:

Training Interventions: means any event that is deliberately planned by those responsible for training, to assist learning to take place. It includes a wide range of activities from formal courses to structured work experiences, and those activities are referred to as ‘strategies’. It is first to be determined as to what is sought to be achieved by a training intervention i.e. formulating the objectives, then decide the best means of achieving those objectives, select a strategy and plan the training accordingly.
Terrorism: There are a plethora of definitions and no one definition is acceptable to all. For the purpose of this study, it is taken to be any premeditated and unlawful act of violence by individuals or groups, against innocent people or non-combatants, 'irrespective of its cause or motive'.

Catastrophic Terrorism: Terrorism that causes or designed to cause fatal human causalities of say more than a 1000, or which involves the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or which involves a serious act of cyber terrorism, causing medium and long term damage to the economy and other vital infrastructure.

Anti-Terrorism (A.T) means defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks and includes limited response and containment by the local police and other law enforcement agencies.

Counter-Terrorism (C.T) means the full range of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism including those by specialised forces.

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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA – I

4.1 In this chapter, the views of selected senior officers of police, Central Paramilitary organizations and Army and a few other knowledgeable persons are being presented. An opinionnaire with twelve questions was constructed and circulated for data collection and the data was compiled for analysis –

The questions focused on:

- Threat perception from the growing 'terrorism' in our country.
- Competency of our police forces in handling/countering terrorism.
- Strengths of our police forces in handling terrorism.
- Weaknesses of our police forces in handling terrorism.
- The knowledge, skills and attitudinal domains in which the police force needs development for handling terrorism.
- What should be the main strategies for training in handling terrorism.
- Desirability of training into three modules preventive, incident handling and detective and prosecuting functions and the training inputs needed there of.
- The institutional arrangements (including equipments and facilities) required for imparting training for handling terrorism.
On the job training required.

Nature of training at the induction level for various ranks.

Whether the training should be in teams (officers and other ranks together) in respect of those who are actually deployed in handling terrorism.

Nature of training required for senior officers (SPs and above) in handling terrorism.

The 'very specific' leadership roles for providing institutional as well as 'on the job training in handling terrorism'.

50, selected officers, either in-service or retired constituted the sample of the present study, some of them were personally interviewed, for their views.

4.2 QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES FROM SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS, ARMY PERSONNEL AND OTHERS

Research Q1) What threats do you perceive from the growing "Terrorism" in our country?

Response: Following threats were perceived by the Officers, from the growing terrorism in our country.

- To the unity and integrity of the country,
- To the intended socio-economic development and to the secular and democratic values;
- Through
- massive loss of life and property;
- ethnic and communal flare-ups;
• committing scarce resources to fighting terrorism; instead of for socio-economic development;
• affecting the quality of life; owing to security requirements/restrictions.
• tiring out the security forces and the Army;
• subversion, infiltration of inimical forces into our political system,
• And by giving teeth to secession movements.

The threats mentioned are:
- Low and high intensity bomb explosions targeting civilians at or in Railway/Bus stations in congregations.
- Highjacking.
- Hostage taking.
- Kidnapping/Abduction/Extortion.
- Assassination of selected targets for symbolic value.
- Ethnic cleansing.
- Attack on carefully selected places of worship.
- Attack on selected institutions of symbolic value like Assembly and Parliament.
- Sabotage of critical infrastructure, through 'cyber terrorism'.
- Use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons.

Research Q2) To what extent our police forces are competent in countering/ handling Terrorism?

Response: Majority of officers were of the view that our police forces were competent to a 'great extent' in countering and handling terrorism and that
they are to be trained and equipped with modern methods and weapons. Many opined that the fight had to be multipronged involving many agencies, the State Police leading the counter-terrorist operations, with the support of CPMFs and if required of the Army.

Q2.A) Strengths of our police forces vis-à-vis handling terrorism.

The following are listed as strengths of the police.

- Wide network and infrastructure already in place.
- State power and legal authority at their disposal.
- Experience in dealing/handling with public.
- Knowledge of people, terrain, language, customs and traditions.
- Police force represents a cross section of the society, with cosmopolitan outlook, by and large.
- Flexibility and adaptiveness in approach.
- Ability to get good ground intelligence, if properly trained and used.
- Particularly good at consequence management of terrorist incidents which includes crowd control, patrolling, picket duty, interdiction checks, and investigations.
- Numbers and loyalty.

It was emphasized that strengths of the police force depends largely on the leadership quoting examples of S/ Shri Reiberu and KPS Gill.

Research Q.2 B) Weakness of our police forces vis-à-vis handling terrorism.

Following weaknesses were identified:
- Lack of knowledge of terrorism and skills of counter terrorism.
- Lack of hard intelligence, and sharing of available intelligence.
- Lack of strategy and planning.
- Lack of training.
- Lack of leadership suited to fight terrorism.
- Lack of motivation and commitment, psychological preparedness.
- Lack of latest arms and ammunition, protective equipment, and communication equipment.
- Lack of coordination between the state police and CPMFs, and the Army. And 'one up' games of the agencies.
- Lack of coordination between I.B. RAW, and the State Intelligence.
- Lack of proper protection to kith and kin of police, from terrorists.
- Corruption and nexus with politicians and criminals.
- Lack of specially selected, properly trained, and equipped, operational teams for various tasks.
- Lack of legal protection for police officers fighting terrorism facing grave risks to life of self and family, incase of subsequent litigation, owing to change of Government etc.
- Lack of suitable incentives, commensurate with the risks involved.
- Lack of training in proper deployment of manpower, leading to wastage of man power, underutilization, and fatigue.

The need for proper leadership at the senior levels and equipping properly the operational level with the required knowledge, skills and an attitude is highlighted.
Research Q.3) In which aspects of the following domains, our police forces should develop, with regard to handling terrorism?

Response:

**Knowledge Domain**

Almost all, have agreed with the need for training in the listed areas viz.

- Terrorism (Nature and causes)
- Terrorist profile and psychology
- Terrorist organization and structure
- Terrorist weapons and tactics
- Terrorist strengths and weaknesses.
- Current, counter terrorism operations, their usefulness and limitations.
- Alternative strategies/tactics.
- Intelligence requirements
- Investigation of terrorist cases.

Besides, the following areas also listed for imparting training.

- Human Rights Laws/Issues
- Standard operating procedures for various terrorist situations, including those involving W.M.D.
- Infiltration, how to handle-and legal issues.
- Minimising collateral damage.
- Terrorist Funding channels.
- Linkages, supports from agencies/foreign governments/individuals.
- Data base and maintenance of records.
- Ability to sensitise, subordinates, public, and the media.
- National and international initiatives in combating terrorism.

**Skills Domain**

While agreeing with the listed areas viz.,

- Latest weapons and equipments.
- Bombs and Bomb explosions
- Hijacking and hostage rescue
- Securing potential targets (individuals/installations)
- Critical incident/disaster management.
- Interrogation, skills.
- Intelligence collection and analysis.

The following additional areas have been *listed for training*.

- Firing under stress
- Sniper firing skills
- Unarmed and close combat
- House entry and clearance drills.
- Public relations skills, to get public support.
- Skills to handle media
- Preemptive operational strategies including covert actions.
- Multi-storey operations.
- Fire control skills
- Ambush and counter ambush drill.
• Patrolling, R.O.P. in terrorist areas.
• Joint operations, coordination.
• Special operational teams and task oriented training.
• Raids and searches, precautions.
• Surveillance skills.
• Self protection/survival skills.

**Attitude Domains**

While concurring with the need for training in the following areas:

• Commitment to face the challenge.
• Respect for Human Rights.
• Ensuring Public Cooperation

The following additional areas have been listed.

• Attitude of cooperation, adjustment and helpfulness in joint operations.
• Aggressive attitude.
• Commitment to values of honesty, sincerity.
• Decisiveness, quick response without being panic.
• Sensing trouble in advance.
• Logical thinking and innovative approach

Research Q.4) What should be the main strategies for training in handling terrorism in our country?

The following are the strategies suggested:
- Mounting of intelligence gathering operations at all levels from police station upwards, utilizing human and technical means, so that preventive steps can be taken.
- Training should be realistic, and not academic or routine. Experiential learning methods should be used.
- Data base of case studies of real incidents should be built, and training based on those case studies.
- Academics, who have done research should also be involved in training.
- Psychological preparedness/motivational training a must.
- Legal protection for the force members and handling of human rights issues, needs emphasis.
- Training in latest weapons, equipment and operational techniques.
- Trainers should be experts and those who actually handled terrorism. There should be a pool of qualified trainers.
- For operations, specially selected and trained teams, equipped with latest weapons and equipment should be deployed.
- Good leadership, and special incentives to those fighting terrorism, as it is a highly risky and stressful job.
- Periodical (once in 6 months) refresher training.
Research Question 5) Is it desirable and practicable to divide training in handling terrorism into three modules viz (i) Preventive steps (iii) Handling incidents when they occur and (iii) Post incident i.e., detecting, investigating and prosecuting the terrorists.

Response:

Vast majority are of the view that, it is both desirable and practical, to divide the training as mentioned in the question.

Research Question 5.1) If the response is both desirable and practicable what should be the inputs for each module, in the knowledge, skills and attitudes areas?

The responses are:

Knowledge domain:

Terrorist organizations, leaders, overground/underground workers, sympathizers, knowledge of terrain, people, terrorist training camps/bases, modus operandi, methods, weapons and equipment of terrorists, funding, links, networks, outside support, legal aspects, C.T. measures, experiences in the past.

Skills domain:

Select groups should be formed, motivated, and equipped and trained with state of the art weapons and equipment. They should be imparted with specialized skills in weapons and tactics, commando training, firing under combat situations, ability to foresee a situation and respond quickly, command and control, controlling fire power and distinguishing friend from foe, limiting collateral damage and keeping public on its side.

Attitude domain:

High level of motivation, commitment to the cause, courage, aggressiveness.
Research Question 6: What special institutional arrangements are required in police for imparting training in handling terrorism?

The responses are:

6.1. Institutional, Requirements for Training

A– Faculty

- Multi disciplinary faculty
- Specialized/expert faculty in different areas.
- Qualified trainers, i.e. trained in T.O.T.

B– Training Infrastructure

Indoor

- Computer linked projectors in class rooms.
- Well prepared reading material.
- Library with books and periodicals on terrorism and related subjects.
- Case studies and their analysis.
- Video films, cassettes, clippings.
- Indoor shooting range and simulators.
- Table top exercises.

Outdoor

- Electronic firing ranges, F.A.T.S.
- Toughening equipment
- Sand models.
- Various explosive devices/booby traps, landmines.
- Display of weapons and equipment of terrorists.
- Mock exercises.
- Visit to field areas and demonstrations.
- Hostage rescue,Aircraft, vehicles, simulated exercise.

Training Material
- Books, article, papers written by various experts.
- Case studies of real events handled by army/security forces/police, throughout the country, and also abroad.
- Well developed case studies, films, V.C.Ds and presentations.

Special Fund Requirement

All are of the view that funds should not be a constraint, as it is a question of saving the lives of the civilians, security force members, nations' property and integrity and unity. Liberal allotment of funds, for training in handling terrorism, is a good investment and strongly advocated.

6.2. On the Job Training

The responses emphasized the need for on the job training, as it would be realistic. The Officers in the field, should expose the personnel to carefully selected scenarios, in a phased manner.

Research Question 7. With regard to States affected by terrorism, what nature of training do you suggest, at the induction level in basic courses.

The responses were on the following lines.

Constabulary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General awareness of socio-economic and political trends-grievances of certain sections of people.</td>
<td>Self protection</td>
<td>Patriotism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief history of terrorism, nature, dangers.</td>
<td>Handling sources and contacts, report writing.</td>
<td>Secular out-look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Skills</td>
<td>Attitudes</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist organizations leaders, aims, membership, weapons and equipment, tactics, bases, training camps, latest trends in their working and operations.</td>
<td>Handling latest weapons and equipments.</td>
<td>Courage and toughness. Iron will. Logical thinking. Not swayed by emotions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting terrorism, broad strategy, C.T. measures, Importance and methods of intelligence collection.</td>
<td>Combat skills, firing skills, fire control.</td>
<td>Aggressive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal aspects, Human Rights.</td>
<td>Detecting and handling of explosives, booby traps, landmines.</td>
<td>Bold and positive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisting cooperation of people and media.</td>
<td>Patrolling, ROP, convoy protection.</td>
<td>Quick response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical fitness and endurance.</td>
<td>Discipline and loyalty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quick response to situations.</td>
<td>Perseverance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication skills.</td>
<td>Inquisitiveness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Direct Recruited SIs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The topics for the constabulary, to be upgraded, with a conceptual frame work plus involvement of foreign agencies, linkages with other terrorist groups and organized crime.</td>
<td>The skills for the constabulary plus. Intelligence-collection methods, techniques, pitfalls. Ability to communicate with subordinates and inspire confidence.</td>
<td>The attitudes necessary for constabulary- with a conceptual frame work plus: Decisiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding channels.</td>
<td>Intelligence, collection and analysis.</td>
<td>Leading from the front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership, Team building, motivation.</td>
<td>Interrogation techniques.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational requirements.</td>
<td>Planning the operations and briefing.</td>
<td>Winning hearts and minds of the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of terrorist/extremist cases.</td>
<td>Use of information technology.</td>
<td>Inquisitiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managing pressure groups and media.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leadership, Team building, motivation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conflict Resolution and coordination.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>On the job training of self and subordinates.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Briefing and debriefing the subordinates.</td>
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## Directly Recruited DvSPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic political, trends their impact on crime and Law and Order</td>
<td>Leadership, team building and motivational skills.</td>
<td>Self-criticism, introspection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International terrorism-history and present trends.</td>
<td>Intelligence analysis and projection.</td>
<td>Perseverance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge</strong></td>
<td><strong>Skills</strong></td>
<td><strong>Attitudes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various terrorist operations in India, their objectives, leaders, strength, method/tactics, linkages with organized crime and vested interest groups/individuals.</td>
<td>Coordination.</td>
<td>Honesty, Integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various terrorist organizations in the State, their objectives, leaders, membership methods/tactics, linkages with organized crime and vested interest groups/individuals.</td>
<td>Operational skills • Commando training including weapons and tactics, map reading, using, G.P.S.G.I.S. • Strategic planning and thinking. • Briefing and debriefing of the subordinates. • On the job training of self and of subordinates.</td>
<td>Discipline and loyalty. Inquisitiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postulates for successful handling of terrorism</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Good governance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii) Early handling of grievances.</td>
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<td>(iii) Clear C.T. Policy-proactive.</td>
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<td>(iv) Well formulated C.T. measures.</td>
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- Strategic planning and thinking.  
- Briefing and debriefing the subordinates.  

I.P.S.(Officer Trainees)
<table>
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<th>Skills</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postulates for success-</td>
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<tr>
<td>The handling of terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xi) Good governance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xii) Early handling of grievances.</td>
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<td>(xiii) Clear C.T. Policy-proactive.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xiv) Well formulated C.T. measures.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(xv) Intelligence collection, Analysis - the key for prevention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xvi) Threat assessment.</td>
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<td>(xvii) Morale of the police.</td>
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<td>(xviii) Well-trained S.O.Gs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xix) Good leadership.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(xx) Peoples support to Government and police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xxi) Psy-ops with media support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xxii) Taking care of relatives of the victims of terrorist crime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(xxiii) Rehabilitation of surrendered militants and constant review.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Question 8) With regard to those who are actually deployed in handling terrorism, do you suggest training officers and men separately or as teams?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response: The uniform response was that, while handling terrorism officers and men have to act as a team in perfect anison and since high degree of trust in each other is called for it is essential that they are trained as a team. Some have suggested that the officers should be trained separately, and men separately initially, the former can be given inputs in leadership, motivation, command and control during that period, and thereafter as a team. Some have</td>
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</table>
suggested that the indoor training can be separate, as the level of understanding and language requirement differ for officers and men.

Research Q 9) What should be the nature and content of training for senior officers connected with handling terrorism?

Response: The responses emphasized the need for training in (i) understanding the changing phenomenon of terrorism (ii) the various range of C.T. strategies available, that were used in the past in India and abroad, their suitability for the specific States/groups.(iii) Intelligence analysis and threat assessments (iv) planning and implementing the C.T. operations (v) Coordination with different components of the security forces and other agencies. (vi) plans for protection of critical infrastructure and VIP Security (vii) Crisis/Disaster Management plans (viii) Leadership and motivation (ix) Incentive/rewards to C.T. Personnel, the protection of their kith and kin and welfare measures (x) managing the political executive and the media. (xi) procuring modern weapons and equipment and (xii) arranging necessary training, liaising with the training manager.(xiii) ability to withstand political pressures and take principled stand. (xiv) carrying the political executive with the police viewpoint, acting as a cushion between the political leadership and subordinates in cases of difference. (xv) constant monitoring of the developments to ensure nothing goes out of control, and also to minimize collateral damage during operations, keeping constant watch, to ensure that the officers don’t indulge in undesirable practices, like settling of past scores, exhortion, fake encounters etc.

Research Question 10) What according to you are the ‘very specific’ police leadership roles for providing institutional as well as on the job training to police personnel in handling terrorism?

Response:

- Data base building of terrorism and terrorists, incidents, weapons and equipment, methods and tactics, support bases, hideouts, funds collection, etc.
- Data base of police resources, experiences of success and failures, the people, language, terrain, traditions of people of affected areas.

- Ability to conceptualize, predict, be decisive, be clear headed, accessible and communicate and give and get feedback.

- Leading from the front.

- Clear reward and punishment policy.

- Evincing keen interest in the institutional and on the job training.

- Promote research and development, on counter-terrorism.

- Get experienced officers as faculty, retain and develop them.

- Constant liaison with the field officers, as to the new requirements of training, and the usefulness of the training already given.

- Training to be modern, sophisticated, and state of the art for which there is need to create centers of excellence at national and state level.

- He should be part of the think tank of the police department, on counter terrorism.

- Create a reservoir of expert trainers in handling terrorism.

Research Q 11) Besides training, which other strategies will be useful at organizational level, to handle terrorism in our country?

Response:

- Creation of an excellent data bank, at the national and state level.

- Better investigation and prosecution of cases.
• Awarding of special promotions, gallantry awards etc to the performers.

• Proper selection of officers and men for the C.T. job.

• Involvement of the NGOs to educate the public, on terrorism.

• Modernisation of weapons, communication system and other C.T. equipment.

• Reform the Criminal Justice System, so that different wings of the Criminal Justice Systems act as a deterrent to the terrorist, severally and combinedly.

• Winning hearts and minds of the people (WHAMP) initiatives.

• Strengthening of intelligence and communication network.

Research Q12) Any other comments.

Responses:

• Technology driven force is the need of the hour.

• Constant interaction at various levels with in the department, to promote ideas and consensus on the C.T. measures.

• Media Management, to mobilize public opinion.

• A strong political will is needed for a decisive police offensive, coupled with adequate legal provisions to deal with an abnormal situation.

• Unconventional methods, would also be needed to fight, an enemy who uses unconventional methods.

• Collateral damages, which can’t be ruled out, have to be accepted by the Government, as a fait accompli.
• Proper mechanisms for coordination between Army, C.P.M.F., and State Police, and also R and AW, IB and State Intelligence agencies has to be ensured.

4.3 QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES FROM CENTRAL POLICE TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

With a view to ascertaining the existing institutional arrangement for training in handling terrorism/a comprehensive questionnaire was constructed, and circulated among the State and Central Police Training Institutions. The questions focused on:

• Specific courses conducted on handling terrorism, with course title, level of participants, main topics covered and training methodology adopted.

• Specific topics relating to handling terrorism, covered in other courses.

• Number of such courses during the last three years, the feedback, whether the training was rank wise or team wise.

• Trainers with dealing with training in 'handling terrorism' and their expertise.

• Training interventions, for improving dedication and commitment, and the effectiveness.

• How the problem of coordination between different agencies was addressed during the training.

• Training interventions for police not alienating to people on the one hand and to positively enlist their cooperation on the other, during the course of counter-terrorism operations.

• Learning/training aids available, specific to handling terrorism (Books, magazines, videocassettes, films, casestudies etc).

• Special facilities available for outdoor training.
• Future plans for training in handling terrorism, including expansion of infrastructure, faculty etc. and

• In what area, the institution is known for its expertise.

1. B.S.F. Academy, Tekanpur. (M.P.)
2. Internal Security Academy (ISA), Mt. Abu
3. C.T.C.II, CRPF, Coimbatore (T.N.)
4. N.S.G. Training Centre, Manesar (Haryana)
5. I.T.B.P. Academy, Mussorie (U.P.)
6. SVP National Police Academy, Hyderabad.

Research Q1 and Q2 are preliminary questions.

Research Q.3 A) Specific courses conducted on handling terrorism.

Response: Compilation of the data discloses that: All the above Central Police Training Institutions conduct specific courses on handling terrorism/insurgency in general or in some specific areas of handling terrorism. The B.S.F in consultation with BPR & D has worked out a training needs analysis for the commando course, for which it has been declared as a center of excellence. The I.S.A, Mt Abu, is concentrating on Internal Security Courses, the main focus of which is handling terrorism. N.S.G. Training center Manesar, an elite organization, has been concentrating its training efforts in VIP Security and Anti terrorist Commando operations. It is declared as center of excellence for V.I.P. Security training. I.T.B.P Academy Mussorie conducts Anti-terrorism courses, apart from high altitude training. The N.I.S.A, Hyderabad apart from training in industrial security areas, conducts courses on Aviation Security, Critical Incident Management and WMD related Disaster Management, and for the later it has been declared as a center of excellence. The SVP National Police Academy a well known center of excellence in training, conducts a national security seminar for inservice
course officers, and has indoor and out-door inputs on terrorism for the I.P.S (O.Ts).

Most of the courses are for middle level officers, the remaining for senior level officers including vertical interaction courses for I.P.S. Officers.

Research Q3.B) Specific topics on 'terrorism' covered in various other courses.

Response: Topics on Terrorism, insurgency and extremism are covered, mainly as theoretical inputs in the basic/induction courses. In other inservice/pre-promotion/special courses some operational inputs like Fieldcraft, weapons and tactics, bombs and explosives are also covered. However, the inclusion of these topics or their coverage doesn’t seem to be a meaningful exercise.

Research Q3C) The number of courses and the number of participants under (A&B) during the last three years.

Response: The figures indicate only 22 Courses and over 4000 participants covered through specific courses on terrorism, and 54 courses and over 6900 participants are covered through other courses in which, topics on terrorism and related areas are included.


Response: It is generally reported that the feedback was good. The courses at NSG Training Centre, Manesar and B.S.F. Academy, Tekanpur are very well received. The courses on Disaster Management at NISA, Hyderabad are also well received. Some specific suggestion were to: (i) include more case studies on terrorism (ii) evolve a strategy for countering ‘Fidayeen attacks’ (iii) include inputs on interface and coordination between various agencies (iv) invite expert guest faculty from the field and (v) invite officers from IB for latest developments.

The average of rating was above 3 on a five point-scale.

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Research Q3.E) Is the training rankwise or as teams?

Response: The answers varied. In the N.S.G. Training Center, it is team wise, except in the case of those deputed from States. In the B.S.F. Academy, it is team wise as well as rank wise, depending on the Course. In other training institutions, it is mostly rank wise.

Research Q4) Trainers for dealing with training in handling terrorism.

Response: In the N.S.G., B.S.F., C.R.P.F. and I.T.B.P. Training Centres, the inhouse faculty have the experience of working in the field and selected officers from the filed are also called as Guest faculty. In the N.I.S.A. (CISF) while the present inhouse faculty has some expertise, they have prepared a panel of selected outside experts (outside CISF) which is a welcome thing. As far as N.P.A is concerned there is no dearth of qualified inhouse and guest faculty with varied experience. The N.P.A. faculty undergoes courses abroad, including in anti-terrorism, hostage negotiations and VIP Security.

Research Question 5) To match the dedication and commitment of the terrorists, what specific training interventions are made and how effective are they?

Response: It is generally mentioned that sessions on motivation, patriotism, the need to fight terrorism and to protect national security were included. N.S.G. Training Center, as part of developing an elite and exclusivist ethos, gives better emphasis to this aspect.

Research Q.6) How the problem of coordination among various agencies handling terrorism is addressed during training?

Response: It is mentioned that mostly the trainees are sensitized by emphasizing the importance of coordination in the fight against terrorism. The N.S.G. is better placed as their training is more realistic than others, which drives home the need for coordination to a large extent. It is suggested that coordination mechanisms should be streamlined in the field, and that
streamlined model can be adopted in the training institution. The use of case studies, is also recommended in training.

Research Q7) In what ways, the following are taken care of by training interventions:-

Response: (A) Not to alienate people by indiscreet actions/harassing innocents.

The responses were mostly general, indicating that the trainees were being sensitized on the issue, through lectures etc..

(2) On the positive side, to enlist peoples cooperation.

The responses were that, it was being impressed on trainees, to enlist peoples' cooperation through: (i) Developing cordial ties with local population (ii) respecting the traditions and culture (iii) psychological operations.

Research 8) Availability of learning/training aids for training in handling terrorism?

Response: They all have the learning/training aids in some format or the other. Those of the NSG and BSF are found to be of better standard.

8.1 Books/Manuals/Handbooks.

Generally, they have good libraries, which contain latest books on terrorism and related subjects. While the NSG and BSF have the manuals the others are in the process of developing manuals in selected areas. Reading material/handbooks are supplied to the trainees.

8.2 Journals/Magazines being subscribed.

Here again N.S.G. and BSF training centers subscribe to selected professional magazines published from abroad. N.P.A. has a better spread of these journals/magazines.
8.3 Films, Video Cassettes, V.C.Ds available in the institute.

N.S.G, B.S.F, N.P.A, I.T.B.P. training Centres have a good collection.

8.4 Case Study material.

N.S.G, B.S.F, ITBP training centers have a good number of case studies, of real incidents. Others are building up.

8.5 Special facilities available for providing outdoor training.

All have responded availability of excellent or very good, facilities in the 12 listed areas, excepting in the areas of (i) firing simulators (ii) handling of hijacking and rescue and, (iii) facilities for rescue and relief operations, in respect of which it is satisfactory or poor.

Research Q9) Future Plans for training in handling terrorism

Response: The responses are:

- Electric firing range, and electronic jungle lane shooting range.
- FATS (Fire Arm Training Simulator)
- Send young officers for Anti-terrorist courses abroad.
- Interaction visits, of senior officers to Israel.
- Updating training literature based on ground realities.
- To make 'seek and destroy' operations proactive.
- National Industrial Security Academy (NISA) Hyderabad, proposes to start new courses on (i) Medical First Responders (MFR) (ii) Collapse Structure, Search and Rescue (C.S.S.R.) with the help of Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (APDC), Bangkok. Also proposes to sharpen emphasis on aviation and industrial terrorism.
Research Q10) What additional resources/preparation will be required for further strengthening, training in handling terrorism.

Response:

10.1. Training Aids.

Requirements of street fighting range, survival course and facilities for counter terrorism in built up areas, are projected by CRPF.

10.2. Training material.

Responses are:

- Training material on latest trends in counter terror methods.
- Collection of research papers on international terrorism.
- Enrich training library by way of buying more publications.
- Training materials from Army is already available. Collection of Training materials from other training institutions like Grey Hounds and Punjab Police Academy is being done.
- Internet connection for all trainee officers.
- Collection of training material from countries, which conduct Anti Terrorist Courses like USA, UK, Israel etc.
- Multi-lane firing simulators.

10.3. Training of Trainers

Responses are:

- Sending officers abroad.
- Sending officers to N.S.G.
- Encourage officers to undertake research.
10.4. Outdoor Training

Response:

Requirement of expert instructors in counter insurgency and anti-terrorism.

10.5. Financial resources.

Response:

- Depends on MHA.

10.6. External expertise

Responses indicate that they require expertise from

- C.I.J.W. School, Vairengte (Mizoram)
- NSG Training Centre, Manesar.
- Grey Hounds Training Centre, A.P. Hyderabad.
- Infantry Section, Belgaum, Karnataka.

Research Q.11) In which areas of handling terrorism, is your institute known for expertise?

Response:

I.T.B.P

(i) Handling of Improvised and explosive devices.

(ii) Road opening and Bridge protection.

(iii) Cordon and Search Operations

(iv) Patrolling and domination of area in C.I, grid.

(v) Raid on militant hide out.

I.B. Central Training School
New Delhi

For imparting training in techniques of intelligence generation

B.S.F. Academy, Tekanpur (i) Raiding terrorist hideouts.
(ii) Quick reaction team drill.
(iii) Cordon and Search.
The Academy is declared, as a center of excellence, for the commando course.

N.S.G. Training Centre, Manesar (i) VIP Security
(ii) Handling explosives and IEDs
(iii) National Bomb Data Centre (NBDC)
(iv) Anti-terrorism and Counter terrorism.
(v) Martial arts.

C.T.C. II, CRPF, Coimbatore (i) Anti-terrorist operations.
(ii) Intelligence collection.

National Industrial Security

Academy, Hyderabad (i) Aviation terrorism
(ii) Industrial Sabotage and Subversion.

Research Q12) Any other Comments

Response:

- India has been fighting terrorism since independence. There is no other country in the world which has faced different types of terrorism and in all types of terrain for a continuous period of more than 50 years. Security Forces of India have wide, varied and rich experience of fighting terrorism successfully. In house expertise exists in plenty.
However, there is a need, where in, consolidation of our experience in fighting terrorism needs to be carried out and plans evolved to fight terrorism in whatever form it may manifest itself in future.

- Training on handling terrorism should invariably include following aspects:
  
a) History of terrorism related to area and availability of materials in library.

b) Knowledge of trainers on various operational techniques to counter-terrorism.

c) Skilled instructors to supervise and conduct outdoor training on operational techniques to trainees with eagerness and enthusiasm.

4.4 QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES FROM THE STATE LEVEL POLICE TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

State Police Training Institutions

The responses from the State Police Training institutions is neither that prompt nor that clear when compared to the Central Police Training establishments. The available information, reveals the following.

Research Question 3 A) Specific Courses on handling terrorism.

Response: While in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North East specific anti-terrorism/insurgency courses are conducted in other states it is not the case. In Andhra Pradesh the Grey Hounds Training Centre conducts highly focused, well planned anti-leftwing extremism training courses for its personnel, for other Andhra Pradesh Police Personnel and for other State Police Personnel. The S.K. Police Academy, Udampur J & K, has started conducting more anti-terrorism courses. The Tamilnadu Police Commando School Chennai, is engaged in the field of anti-terrorism training. In Punjab Commando Training is continuing. The North East Police Academy (NEPA), Shillong, is
conducting anti-insurgency courses. In other States no worthwhile antiterrorism training is being organized. Most of the commando courses are of 8 weeks, where as in Tamilnadu Commando School it is of 12 weeks as is the case with the N.S.G. Training Centre, Manesar.

**Research Question 3 B) Specific topics on terrorism covered in various other courses.**

**Response:** In many States specific topics on terrorism are covered in other courses, more particularly in the induction courses for Constables, SIs and DySPs. Here again while in Jammu and Kashmir, North East, Andhra Pradesh, there is some emphasis, in other States it is mostly at the theoretical/introductory level, through lectures. The duration/periods allotted also are not in tune with the requirements.

**Research Question 3 C) The number of Courses and the number of participants under A & B in the last three years?**

**Response:** While the number of courses and the number of participants under the 'A' category, is quite less- about 40 courses covering about 1200 personnel, the figures in respect of B though runs to over 7,000 cannot be indicative of any substantial number, owing to the large requirements and also the adequacy of the quality is highly doubtful. Most of them are recruit constables. At best it serves the purpose of sensitization about terrorism.

**Research Q3 D) Gist of feed back of the above (A& B) Courses.**

**Response:** It has been mentioned generally that the courses were found useful.

**Research Q3E) Is the training rankwise or as teams.**

**Response:** It is mostly rankwise. In the Grey hounds training center, A.P, Hyderabad, it is team wise. In vertical interaction programmes, it is a mix of officers of different ranks.
Research Q4D) Trainers for dealing with training on handling terrorism.

Response: While in the Grey hounds training center, AP, Hyderabad, and in the S.K. Police Academy, Udampur, J & K, there is expert inhouse and guest faculty, irrespective of other training institutions, the dependence on guest faculty is quite heavy, and it doesn’t forth come often. The North East Police Academy, Shillong is in dire need of expert faculty in all areas.

Research Q 5) To match the dedication and commitment of the terrorists, what specific training interventions are made, and how effective are they?

Response: The usual response of giving training on motivation, patriotism, etc, are mentioned by some. In most institutes, there is no specific intervention.

Research Question 6) How the problem of coordination among various agencies handling terrorism is addressed during training?

Response: Here again, the general response is ‘by impressing upon the participants the importance of coordination’. In States where there is no major terrorist problem, or only the State Police is handling, it is stated that there is no such problem of coordination.

Research Q7) In what ways, the following aspects are taken care by training interventions

Response: (1) Not to alienate people by indiscrete actions/harassing innocents.

The summery of the responses indicate that there is no particular training intervention and that during the course of various lectures, the importance of not alienating the people was stressed, apart from teaching human right laws.

(2) **On the positive side, to enlist peoples cooperation.**

*Here the responses were:*

- Using Maithri Committees (Community Policing in Andhra Pradesh).
- By Police Public-Relations.
- Helping people in distress.
- By opening help lines.
- Through Civic action programmes.
- Through lectures, group discussion and seminars.

Most of the responses are from Andhra Pradesh, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir.

Research Question 8) Learning/training aids for training in handling terrorism.


The Andhra Pradesh Police Academy, the Grey hounds training center, Hyderabad, the S.K. Police Academy, Jammu and Kashmir, the North Eastern Police Academy, the Punjab Police Academy, Phillaur, the Maharashtra Police Academy, Nasik do have adequate resources. The others fall short of the minimum requirements in this area.

Journals/Magazines being subscribed.

APPA, Greyhounds, SK Police Academy, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab Police Academy, Phillaur and N.E.P.A, Shillong do subscribe to some good journals. But most others do not have the basic minimum, requirement of good professional journals in terrorism/insurgency.

Films, Video Cassettes available.

The responses are on the above lines. Most institutes do not have the basic minimum requirements.

Case Study material

Again, same as in above areas. Most States do not have any case study material, except in A.P, J & K, Punjab, NEPA, on terrorism/insurgency.
Special facilities available for providing outdoor training.

The North Eastern Police Academy has very good infrastructure.

Grey hounds training center, Hyderabad has improvised most of the required facilities. Most of the State training institutes, require, most of the facilities mentioned in the lists.

Research Q.9) Future Plans for training in handling terrorism in your institute.

Response: The following are the responses:

- Grey hound training immediately after induction training in A.P..
- Planning to start a course, of handling terrorism.
- To run extra courses on the topic.
- To improve the weapon handling/use of new and modern weapons.
- Use of new and improved Radio/Wireless sets for communication.
- To give mental toughness training to the Police personnel who will be used in, Special Operations Group/Special Task Force (SOG or STF).
- Study, use/defuse of modern IED's/explosives, Grenades and Bombs.
- New techniques of cordon and search operations in militancy infested areas.
- Gather/Coordinating Intelligence.
- Specially trained and expert officers of state police being requested to come to PTC to impart training to the trainees regularly till posting of suitable trainers to this institution.
It is planned to run two courses on weapons and tactics for NGOs/Ors in which the training to handle the terrorist in various fields will be imparted.

We plan to continue this sort training in future also.

B.P.R & D has decided to upgrade the P.T.C. West Bengal as a Regional Training Centre for counter Terrorism and counter espionage. Pursuant to this, a proposal for setting up of a State school for weaponry and Tactics, construction of an Indoor firing range for snap shooting practice for enhancement of reflex action of the trainee officers and men is under consideration. It has also been suggested to take officers from the Armed forces, the CPOs and IB to work on deputation as trainers.

Punjab Police Academy, Phillaur is proposed to be designated as a Regional Training Centre for Anti-Terrorism courses by B.P.R & D, New Delhi.

Research Question 10) What additional resources/preparation will be required for further strengthening training in handling terrorism.

Response: Training Aids

Terrorists are using highly sophisticated weapons present in today’s market. They not only have imported versions of weapons but are helped by certain outside Governments and agencies, in addition to the monetary benefits given to them in carrying out operations, as seen from the attack on, Indian Parliament, Jammu and Kashmir Assembly etc, and the attack on WTC. These are some deadly events of mental toughness and to counter them we need tough and motivated soldiers. For that we have to give a) high class physical training b) most imported versions of weapons c) new and modern
communication facilities d) high class monetary benefits. e) besides the special training, high class motivation.

- Case diaries, annual report on terrorism in India/abroad may be prepared. Modernisation of training methods, communication equipment and weapons, is the need.

Physical resources :

- Judo and UAC Training should be improved.
- Survival course should be introduced.
- Mob operation
- Unarmed Combat training.
- Street fighting range.
- Raid on urban building settings.

Training Material

- Yet to be made. Concerned officers in IB may help us.
- Field craft and tactics (chart)
- Sand models
- Targets, Disc targets, reflex targets, fig-11 targets, fig 12 targets, snap shooting targets.
- Physical fitness gym.
- Assault obstacles track.
- New Arms/equipments are required with trainers to impart training to the trainees.
- Helicopter/Airbase etc
- Rope ladder.
- Bullet proof jackets
- Lesson plan/Handbook on relevant topics.
- Map reading equipments.
- IED disposal material.
- Case studies.
- Video cassettes and VCD on relevant topics.
- Simulated firing range
- Under the modernization scheme, various kinds of latest training equipment are being purchased and new innovations are being made.

Training of Trainers

- We are ready to attend a course at IB, Hyderabad.
- We are about to start a course.
- Courses are being conducted in the Academy for outdoor instructors.
- Trainers are being deputed outside/inside state to various training institutions for training in commando/anti naxalite and Grey Hound courses on approval.
- A four week "Trainers Training Course" was imparted to the Junior Instructors. In which, physical efficiency, handling of weapons, map reading and field craft were taught in the training.
- Trainers are required to undergo specialized training with other state police trainings institutes, imparting such training.
- Good efforts are being made.
Outdoor Training

- Being taken up methodically as per the State/BPR & D syllabus. All aspects of Counter-Guerilla operations are being taught.
- Jungle tactics and field craft etc.
- Modern physical training.
- Battle physical efficiency.
- Battle obstacle assault course.
- Weapon handling.
- Lecture/Demos.
- Firing practices
- Outdoor training is being improved by deputing experienced, outdoor instructors.
- Some more simulated outdoor exercises would be introduced in consultation with other CPOs and State Police Organisations.
- Good efforts are being made.

Financial Resources

- GOI (MHA) may provide funds for grounding courses on Counter Terrorism, Intelligence etc.
- Under modernization scheme we are acquiring modern facilities.
- Additional finances would be required.
- Good efforts are being made with the Government, to get more funds.
External expertise

- From IB and Special Bureau (Cabinet Secretariat) of GOI are required.
- We call outside faculty on different topics.
- Various probationer officer courses are sent for 2 to 3 months of attachment to
  1. CRPF Training School or
  2. BSF Training School or
  3. Army attachment.

  to get more advance training of modern weapons and of training skills in fighting terrorism, besides the field craft teaching and map reading.

Research Q11) In which areas of handling terrorism, is your institute known for expertise.

Response: Greyhounds Training Centre in – Anti extremist operations.

The other claims are not substantiated.

Research Q12) Any other comments:

Response:

- The IBs role in parting with certain information cannot be overemphasized. It is high time IB takes up educating the cutting edge level and senior officers in counter terrorism and counter intelligence, various trade crafts involved in the same.

- Madhya Pradesh is not a terrorist effected state in the sense in which some states of India are. However looking to the general scenario of the country. We are planning to start such courses.
4.5 ANALYSIS OF DATA

Interviews

A total of 20 persons who have expertise in the field of counter terrorism, have been interviewed. List is at Appendix . The salient observations are:

1. Shri M.K.
   Narayanan, IPS
   (Retd.)
   Former Director,
   Intelligence
   Bureau

Emerging security scenario is a cause for grave concern for India, particularly because of threats from ‘New Terrorism’. All the three main threatres of terrorism viz. J& K, North-East and the Naxal belt, are likely to face increased activity and increased levels of violence, and also likely to extend to other areas. Subversion is on the increase. The country is targeted by the Pakistan ISI not by 1000 cuts, but by a million cuts.

Apart from the dire need for political maturity and good governance, the police and security forces have to be more alert and professionally competent to prevent and face threats. The training for police has to be not only be generic i.e. understanding the phenomenon of ‘New Terrorism’ but specialized in different operational areas. The most important area is intelligence collection, analysis and threat assessment, inorder to plan preventive and pre-emptive strategies. The weakest link is State and District Intelligence branches. Grassroots Intelligence has to come from the State Police. The focus of training should be in this area-
HUMINT, Tech-Int and Comm-Int. Another important factor is building a comprehensive data bank, for each theatre and also for each group, using latest technology and developing software for forecast. This field has developed as a sophisticated science. Training has to address this area also. The entire police force has to be sensitized with the phenomenon and the emerging threats from "New Terrorism".

Re-iterates the dangers of "New Terrorism" and India’s vulnerability. Regarding the required capabilities for police and security forces to combat terrorism he divides the scenario into different stages, calling for different nature and type of training.

**Stage 1: Prevent terrorism from emerging as a major phenomenon (Through Strategic Intelligence).**

Through mechanisms, including Intelligence wings which forewarns of issues/situations, that might grow into violent movements and Govts taking note of it, and taking remedial measures. An ideal situation. Seldom done.

**Stage 2: Prevent terrorists from growing, organizing networking recruiting, equipping with arms and ammunition, planning and preparing for attacks.**

*(through strategic intelligence)*
Intelligence agencies through HUMINT, Tech-Int and Com-Int, giving advance information about leaders, training camps, hideouts, financiers, and preparations, leading to legal, and administrative and enforcement measures to neutralize and degrade the movement from being a threat.

Stage 3: Pre-empting the specific terrorist plans and preparations. (Through Tactical Intelligence)

Intelligence agencies supplying, tactical intelligence to the police and security forces, about the hideouts of important leaders, specific plans, preparations and targets, leading to raids, searches, seizures, arrests, access control, encounters etc and there by foiling the preparations/attacks.

Stage 4: Preventive Physical security: With or without intelligence the police identifying potential targets-structure, individuals, groups, areas etc, drawing up plans for physical protection through access control, electronic surveillance etc, to deny access and to foil the attempt, if gains access.

Stage 5: Incident Management/Crisis Management/Disaster Management.

When, preventive and pre-emptive steps fail, and the terrorists have their way, the police has to mange the incident, through prompt and professional response, to minimize damage,
rescue people, handle the trauma and panic, preserve evidence, coordinate other agencies, arrest suspects etc. Those tasked to do this have to be thoroughly trained for the job.

Stage 6: Post-Incident: Investigation and prosecution:

It is equally important that the terrorist incident is followed up, by thorough investigation, detection of perpetrators, marshalling evidence, and prosecuting them with a view to getting them convicted. Investigation of terrorist offences, is again a complex and difficult task requiring special skills, which calls for constitution of special teams who have been specially trained.

Besides, those who are to deal with i) hijacking situations ii) Hostage negotiations iii) Psy-Ops, iv) Media management and v) Handling the relatives of terrorist attacks, require specialized training in those areas.

Emphasised role of Psy-Ops, in the effected areas, and gave examples of how Awas and Prahas, projects have helped in winning over people to the police side. He observed that the State Police Personnel should be provided terrorism awareness training, and those selected for tasks, should be given specialized training.

He played a significant role in the fight against terrorism in Punjab. He advocates setting up of
Addl DGP, Punjab

a Brain Trust at National Level, to constantly study, the problem and come up with innovative ideas to handle terrorism. There should be R & D units at the State and National level, involving scientists from various establishments and industry, who should be given the task of developing fabricating the necessary vehicles equipment for C.T. Operations.

Shri D.S. Minhas, IPS
Director Organiser,
SSB, Jammu and Kashmir,
Jammu

Emphasised the need for a long term consistent C.T. Policy and re-orienting of the State Police to combat terrorism by "Combating" them. The present sporadic, reactive, and inconsistent polices of government are demoralizing the security forces. Those on duty in terrorist affected areas have to be trained in coping strategies for stress and strain. The disparity in weapons and equipment between Army and various central paramilitary forces, and the police, has led to feelings of discrimination adversely affecting morale.

Those who were actually involved in fighting terrorism in Punjab, and those who are on the job now in Jammu and Kashmir and North East, are of the view that, building of a comprehensive data bank, and conducting research studies is absolutely necessary for evolving drills for systematic handling of terrorism, as is the case now with U.S.A, U.K, Israel etc, instead of the present adhoc resources. As an example, the study of 'fidayeen' attacks, and developing of reasonably good strategies to foil or protect from them has to be done urgently. Also those deployed, should be trained in coping strategies for kidnapping/killing of relatives. What is permissible, what is not permissible
how complications arise when peace prevails or Government changes, has to be taught.

They advocated constituting small groups of selected people, thoroughly trained in operations, to be located as District and Range Headquarters. Old marksmanship training is totally unsuited and should be replaced with reflex shooting skills in crisis/stress situations. Practice with small weapons, with both hands is the need. Training should be, based on adequate study of past real situations and realistic. Dogs should be increasingly used in combating terrorism eg sniffing of explosives, narcotics presence in hide outs, etc. Coastal area patrolling, needs emphasis in states like Gujarat, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Maharashtra, Karnataka, West Bengal etc and proper training should be devised for that.

District level training centers should undertake the generic training. The metros should heave Q.R.Ts, trained in urban guerilla war fare, and bomb disposal squads.

View of other experts, through structured questionnaire.

Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon
Vice-Chancellor
The W.B. National University of Judicial Sciences, Kolkata
and Former Member Law Commission of India, and
Expert in Human Rights Law, etc.

He saw the need for the following training interventions:

1) Intelligence gathering, analysis, collecting and using in operations.
2) Advanced multiple weapons training.
3) Use of Information Technology in organized crime.
4) Capacity to face crises and to take risks intelligently.
5) Crowd, media, and disaster management and
6) Human Rights and Terrorism - Balancing competing interest.

Stating that Lawyers, Administrators and Judges have responsibilities as well, he observes “it is unfair to expect the police alone to tackle a problem, in the creation of which others have an equal share of blame. Police is to blame to the extent that they failed to enforce the ordinary criminal law and thereby allowed people to seek justice outside it”.

Has been covering Terrorism and authorized a number of articles on the subject. He advocates well laid down protocols for dealing with emerging terrorist situations like hijacking, attack on symbolic/sensitive institutions, suicide attacks, etc, which should be frequently practiced by all agencies. While listing local intelligence, knowledge of people and culture as the strengths of the State Police, he points out that training and leadership as the main weaknesses, citing that police personnel do not get the skills they need to fight modern terrorist groups, nor adequate resources and top officers do not have the power to fight political pressures. He wants training to focus on weapons, tactics, communications, intelligence, interrogation.
techniques and knowledge of terrorism and
terrorist. Though he doesn’t believe that
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological threats
are imminent, feels that we should
undoubtedly prepare for them, by the
institution of regular disaster management
drills involving hospital staff, police and
civilian support staff.

SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Opinionaire of selected Police/Military/Paramilitary officers.

That terrorism is a grave threat for nation’s unity integrity, and for the
democratic values and civilized way of life, that the police is competent and
best suited to handle terrorism, if properly equipped and trained. The training
strategies and interventions should be based on goals of a clearly spelt out
counter terrorism policy, that the training showed be a well planned
intervention, depending who is to play what role and that it should be realistic
using real life scenarios in training like simulators, practical exercises, table
top exercises, sand models etc. Training should be in teams and not as
individual as anti/counter terrorism operations are mostly done in teams.
While awareness is required at the induction level, anti terrorist/counter
terrorist training, divided into modules should be provided to those who are
required to act. Senior leaders should be trained in policy formulation,
standing up to principles motivation of those who are deployed in terrorist
affected area, their security and welfare, specific leadership styles required,
building data bank, research & development capabilities, threat assessments,
on the job training etc. While intelligence collection and analysis should be
the number one priority in training, training should focus on preventive
measures, protective measures, pre-emptive measures, handling the situations,
if they occur, and investigating the cases and prosecuting the perpetrators of
terrorism. Training in human rights, media management, Psy-ops, stress

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management, winning the hearts and minds of the people (WHAMP), interrogation techniques have been emphasized, as the other areas of training.

They expressed concern about lack of political will, determination, lack of national consensus, lack of a clear C.T. Policy, lack of mechanisms for research and development, building data bank, building training materials and aids and pool of competent trainers in subjects relating to terrorism and operations. Concern was also expressed about, possible excesses during C.T. operations and lack of legal protection, in such cases for security force personnel. Lack of coordination, inadequate sharing of intelligence and one up manship games, among the agencies, is decried.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CENTRAL POLICE TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

Central police training establishments particularly the N.S.G. training center, Manesar the B.S.F. Academy, Tekanpur, the I.S.A. (CRPF) Mt. Abu, the I.T.B.P. Academy, Mussorie, National Industrial Security Academy (NISA) Hyderabad are better placed, in terms of infrastructure, the faculty and support from the organization. They have clear idea of the training requirements and generally expressed satisfaction. However they expressed need for more funds, latest equipments, need for outside experts as trainers apart from exposure for the trainees, to training abroad.

STATE POLICE TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

The situation, as expressed in the replies, does not inspire much confidence in the capacity of the training institutions to give quality training in anti/counter terrorism area. While the Grey Hounds Training Centre, A.P., has emerged as center of excellence, and a hot-favourite for other states affected by left wing extremism, many state police establishments do not have the minimum required facilities for imparting anti/counter terrorism training in terms of infrastructure, mainly outdoor, faculty and funds. The support they get from the state government and the department, also needs considerable improvement. Many area of training like reflex small arms shooting in
simulated firing ranges, storming an urban: complex, sniper shooting skills and the weapons and equipment required for imparting training, are wanting. Generally the state police training institutions, barring a few are in a demoralized state, with disinterested faculty.

INTERVIEWS AND VIEWS OF NON-POLICE EXPERTS

The role of hard intelligence, in fighting terrorism is highlighted, coupled with the low caliber and capabilities of the state and district level intelligence apparatus. Lack of focused training for the police based on planned training interventions is orchestrated. While Sri M.K. Narayanan pleaded for educating the police on the nature and threats of 'new terrorism', technology driven police forces, and sharpening intelligence gathering capabilities, Shri B. Raman pointed the need for preventive, pre-emptive, critical incident management, post incident investigative training and also training in media management, Psy-ops and special operations. Dr. P.M.Bharga presents a gloomy picture about on unpreparedness for handling use of W.M.D. Particularly bio-terrorism. Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon, highlights the need for training in intelligence gathering and analysis, counter terrorist operational skies, coordination mechanisms and also to educate other agencies like the administration, judiciary and lawyers about their role.

LITERATURE SURVEY

The literature survey, highlights the global threats from the 'new terrorism' as 'grim', possibilities of use of W.M.D. as real, advocates a concerted fight at national and international level, with a thorough understanding of the problem, with an uncompromising attitude and determination, preparing the agencies to fight terrorism, with training and equipment, and educating all sectors, including the public about their role and responsibilities. Many experts paint a gloomy picture, and advocate thorough preparedness even it costs, as otherwise, in the event of a catastrophic event, we may deeply regret.

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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES

5.1 CASE STUDY -1

TRAINING CENTRE, NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD, MANESAR

The National Security Guard (NSG) was raised in 1985 as an elites Federal Contingency Force, conceptualized after studying and analyzing some of the world's well known special force such as the SAS of U.K, GIGN of France, C.S.G-9 of Germany, SAYARET-E-MATKAL of Israel and the Delta Force of U.S.A. It is an 100% deputationist force, drawing the personnel from Army, Police, C.P.M.Fs and others.

The primary tasks are: (a) Engaging and neutralizing terrorist threats in specific situations, (b) undertaking anti-hijacking operations and (c) undertaking hostages rescue missions. Secondary tasks are: (a) Security of high risk VIPs  (b) Anti-sabotage check of places to be visited by VIPs  (c) Maintenance of National Bomb Data Centre (d) Providing sky marshals.

The force is headed by a Director General rank Police Officer with headquarters at Delhi. The prestigious training center, is headed by an Inspector General (Major General) and is located in a sprouting and picturesque location at Manesar. It has developed an ethos based on: (a) elitism (b) pursuit of excellence (c) lead from the front (d) no runners up and (e) One for all. All for one.
Role

Primary Role: The Primary Role of the training center is to conduct basic, probationary and re-orientation training with a view to assist HQ NSG in inducting suitable personnel into the NSG.

Secondary Role: The Secondary Role of the training center is to impart anti-terrorist, VIP security, bomb disposal and martial arts training to state police forces, CPOs, Defence services and to personnel of other organizations in the country.

Tasks:

- Conduct probationary courses for special action groups and special ranger groups.
- Conduct basic and advance karate courses for selected NSG personnel and others as identified by MHA.
- Conduct VIP driving courses for NSG personnel and other organizations as and when required.
- Conduct Anti-terrorism training for para-military and state police forces in the country.
- Conduct VIP security courses for NSG personnel and other organizations.
- Conduct training capsules for various police forces and personnel or friendly foreign countries.
- Impart Basic and advance training in handling of explosives and bomb disposal to defence, CPOs, state police forces and personnel of other government department of the country.
- Assist HQ NSG in identifying suitable personnel for induction.
### NSG COURSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>STR</th>
<th>Duration (Weeks)</th>
<th>Courses per year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC (SAG)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC (SRG)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UROC</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Karate</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adv Karate</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP Drivers Course</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP Drivers Course (REF)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2515</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### NON NSG COURSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>STR</th>
<th>Duration (Weeks)</th>
<th>Courses per year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCIC</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>250</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD (DS/CPO)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>BD (SP)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD (REF)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5215</td>
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</table>
PERSONNEL TRAINED IN THE TRG CENTRE IN LAST FIVE YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trg. Yr.</th>
<th>NSG Probationers</th>
<th>Armed Force pers. trained in non-nsg courses</th>
<th>Police pers. Trained in non NSG courses</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>1487</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>2150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>1178</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>2510</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>1438</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>3329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total so far</td>
<td>20109</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>14455</td>
<td>37094</td>
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COURSES CONDUCTED FOR FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>STR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (Police)</td>
<td>Adhoc Course</td>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (Army &amp; Police)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (President’s Guard)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (Def.Servicess)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (Police)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius (Police)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal Army Officers</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal Police pers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Security pers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Army CDO</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalai Lama PBG-I</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalai Lama PBG-II</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius Police Officers</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Police pers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Police pers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2001-01</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal Police pers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan security pers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Army CDO</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dalai Lama PBG-I</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dalai Lama PBG-II</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius Police</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Police pers.</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>35</td>
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# STATE POLICE PERSONNEL TRAINED IN VARIOUS COURSES
## UP TO TRG. YR. 2001-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PCIC</th>
<th>PSO</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>568</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>435</td>
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<td>Assam</td>
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<td>185</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;N Islands</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>238</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chattisgarh</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>807</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>207</td>
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<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>797</td>
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<td>Haryana</td>
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<td>282</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>729</td>
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<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
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<td>128</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J&amp;K</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>515</td>
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<td>Jharkhand</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>370</td>
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<td>Kerala</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>407</td>
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<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>139</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>279</td>
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<td>Manipure</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>119</td>
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<td>Orissa</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>154</td>
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<td>Pondicherry</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>117</td>
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<td>Punjab</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>PCIC</td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikkim</td>
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<td>01</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>1132</td>
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<td>Uttarakhand</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laksh Dweep</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15439</strong></td>
<td><strong>3262</strong></td>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
<td><strong>10764</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trainers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>In-house/ Guest Faculty</th>
<th>Special Training in dealing with terrorism received by them</th>
<th>Areas of expertise</th>
<th>Any comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A total of 440 instructors from the Army and 30 from CPOs are posted. The instructor are of the ranks of officers, Aos and Rgs and have rich experience of fighting terrorism all over the country in different States. A number of them have already been instructors in Training Establishments of the Army and CPOs. The service group of these instructor range from minimum of 10 years upto 36 years.</td>
<td>In House</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism, Counter Terrorism, Handling of Explosive and VIP Security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Learning/training Aids

The Training Centre has an excellent collection of over 6000 books on terrorism and related subjects and also subscribes to some prestigious publications on the subject.
It has appropriate collection of films, videocassettes, VCDs required for training in handling terrorist violence and VIP Security. It is heartening to see that a good collection of carefully prepared case studies on: (a) cordon and search (b) search and destroy (c) Raid on airports and (d) VIP Security.

Special facilities for field/out-door training.

It has, the best available facilities, in the following areas:

- Physical fitness, agility
- Endurance
- Unarmed Combat
- Fieldcraft and Tactics
- Firing Ranges
- Firing simulators
- Sand Models
- Simulated incidents
- Handling bombs and bomb explosions
- Handling hijacking and rescue.
- Handling ambush and counter ambush.
- Facilities for rescue and relief operations.
- Handling Improvised Explosive Devices.

Expertise/Excellence

The N.S.G. Training center is known for its expertise in:

- VIP Security
- Martial arts
- Handling of explosive and IED.
- National Bomb Data Centre.
- Anti Terrorism.
- Counter Terrorism.
Future Plans

Despite the fact that inhouse expertise exists in plenty, it constantly reviews the training process. Consolidation of the experiences in fighting terrorism and planning to evolve better training strategies to fight terrorism of the future, is on cards. It has formulated necessary proposals for it, including sending its trainers for more courses on terrorism related subjects in countries like Israel, USA, UK etc and to courses for all ranks in police training institutions in the country, which designated as “Centres of Excellence”.

N.S.G. now is a household name in the country. Largely because of its elitist ethos and the track record of successes.

“I HAVE BEEN TO MANY COUNTRIES ALL OVER THE WORLD, BUT THE TRAINING STANDARDS AND COMMITMENTS AT THIS PLACE IS NOWHERE ELSE. WE GO EDUCATED FROM HERE.”

MR. RAY BASSI
HEAD OF US DELEGATION
05 FEB 2002
5.2 CASE STUDY-2

B.S.F. ACADEMY, TEKANPUR (M.P.)

Established in 1966, for training of the B.S.F. personnel, the academy has grown in size, status and quality into a major center of excellence, training, besides BSF, personnel of other C.P.Os and State Police Organisations.

Vision

To make an elite institution of the Nation in the field of Border Security, its management, conduct of insurgency operations and human resource development.

Mission

To conduct basic training of Officers and Sub Inspectors and in-service courses for commanders/staff at all levels, to make them leaders, and commanders and efficient staff officers in carrying out assigned role and tasks during, peace, disturbed peace and war like situations effectively and efficiently utilizing modern technologies/systems.

Objectives

- To make BSF Academy and training establishments located in Tekanpur as center of Excellence.
- To make institution as a ‘think tank’ and Academic center for Border Security, Counter Insurgency and Internal Security, Strategic Planning and Management.
- To establish R & D base with a view to study and recommend introduction of latest systems and redesigning tactical and strategical concepts.
• To train professionally competent, motivated commanders at all levels capable of handling ground level problems and lead troops to success utilizing available resources.

• To be a prime mover in areas of HRD and TQM.

• To act as a study center of Jeewaji University.

Organisation

The Institution, commanded by Director/Inspector General is assisted by Deputy Director/DIG. The Academy has four wings namely –

• Specialist Training Wing.

• Tactical Wing.

• Administrative Wing.

• Training Wing.

Specialist Training School

Objectives of the Specialist Training School are as under:

• To make direct entry officers and subordinate officers efficient and useful members of the force.

• To train directly recruited Assistant Commandants of BSF, SSB and ITBP to enable them discharge their duties effectively as Coy Commanders.

• Building of leadership qualities in direct entrants to cope up with operational, administrative and logistic needs at BOP/Coy level.

• Developing skills for operational planning and identifying futuristic trends for advance planning to suit the requirements of changing operational environments and functional ability.

• Developing skills for original thinking.

• Personality development.
• Developing quality of empathy for effective man management.

• To conduct Common Foundation Course for young officers of all the CPOs and to give them inputs about organizational structure, capabilities and limitations of various Police Forces, CPOs and to also give them inputs on issues of common interest.

Following Courses are Conducted by STS Wing -:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Basic Integrated Course for Directly Recruited</td>
<td>55 weeks 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gos of BSF, SSB and ITBP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Medical Officers Basic Course</td>
<td>09 weeks 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Basic Foundation Course for Sub Inspectors</td>
<td>47 weeks 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Direct Entry) of BSF, IR Bns and State Armed Bns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Common Foundation Course for Directly Recruited Assistant Commandants of CPOs</td>
<td>12 working days 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Accounts Course</td>
<td>06 02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tactical Wing**

The wing is headed by an Addl DIG, who is assisted by two Commandants and Six Deputy Commandants.

Objectives of the Tactical Wing are as under:

- To Generate awareness amongst DisG and Addl. DisG in conceptual planning and strategic handling of forces and to broaden their vision and perception about activities in other organizations, Public Sector Undertakings and the multi national organizations;
- To train Battalion Commanders, Coy Commanders and Platoon Commanders of BSF in handling a BSF Unit/Sub unit in peace, disturbed peace and war like situations.

- To train Young Officers (Commandos) of CPOs in carrying out small group operations in LIC and war like situations.

- To assess requirements of the Force on a conceptual level over a perspective of 10-15 years and in that backdrop evolve systems to cover operational deployment and optimum resource management towards maximizing performance.

- To analyse effectiveness of tactical operations being carried out in fields and devise innovative methods/drills for better results.

- Analysing training needs of the Force and suggest training to ensure operational preparedness.

**Courses conducted by Tactical Wing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Senior Officers Management Course II</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Senior Officers Management Course III</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Senior Command Course</td>
<td>11 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Staff Officers Course</td>
<td>18 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Junior Command Course</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Young Officers Integrated Course</td>
<td>08 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Coy Comdr (Sub) Course</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Platoon Commander Course</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides, it has, on its campus:

(i) a Central School for Motor Transport (CSMT),
(ii) National Training Centre for Dogs (NTCD)
(iii) Artillery Training School (ATS)
(iv) A Subsidiary Training Centre and
(v) Equitation Wing.

Facilities

The other facilities include, a library with wide ranging collection of about 12,000 books, a good computer facility. Messrs Tata Infotech conducts computer classes in the Academy.

Outdoor Training Infrastructure

Academy has latest audiovisual aids, group of firing ranges equipped with electronic/manual systems to teach basic skills, quick
shooting and response shooting, air recognition room, sand model rooms, assault course, commando obstacle course, I.E.D. parks, I.E.D. museum, mental mobility room, ex P.T. obstacle course, Grenade Golf Course and demonstration parks etc. It also has a well established Computer cell

**Tie-up with University**

The Academy is affiliated with the Jeewaji University, Gwalior, which awards Diplomas/Certificates to participants of certain courses.

**Recognition**

The Academy’s growing stature and contribution is reflected, in the Government of India declaring it as center of excellence, in respect of as many as 13 Courses including its “Commando Course” for which, there is a detailed T.N.A. available, and perhaps the best.

**Future Plans**

The Academy has ambitious plans to update the infrastructure, as well as Trainers and Training material.
5.3 CASE STUDY-3

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY ACADEMY, HYDERABAD
(Apex Training Institute of the Central Industrial Security Force)

Established in 1969 as C.I.S.F Training College at Partapur (Meerut-U.P.) primarily to conduct the basic induction training of the directly recruited officers and to develop professionalism and expertise in industrial security management, it made rapid strides with the growing requirements of the Central Industrial Security Force. It moved to the present N.P.A. Campus, Hyderabad in 1971, and finally to its own premises in Hakimpet, Hyderabad in 1987. It is upgraded as N.I.S.A. in December, 1990.

The Fire Service Training Institute (FSTI) of the C.I.S.F, located at Deoli in Rajasthan, was shifted to NISA in 1999, and functions under the Director. Spread over 237 acres of a fabulous greenbelt and with over 600 members as staff, it has been declared as a “Centre of Excellence” in the field of Industrial Security Training in 1994.

Mission

“The Mission of National Industrial Security Academy is to produce professionals in the field of Industrial Security Management who will command the Force with dedication, valour and professional excellence”.

The Academy will strive to inculcate the following values and ethics in the trainees.

- Integrity of highest order.
- High order of discipline.
- Professionalism in Industrial Security Management.
• Broadview of law of the land and judicial system.
• Respect for human rights and humanitarian values.
• Physical fitness and mental alertness.

Infrastructure

It houses the Silver Jubilee Computer Centre with Computer Training Lab, Modern Security Gadgets Complex, IBD Complex, Fire fighting demo room and Motivation Hall. Gadgetry complex has a range of access control and perimeter protection systems like anti-intrusion Microwave beam barrier, Infrared barrier, Power Fence, Laser, Vibration and PIR detectors and surveillance systems like CCTV, night vision binoculars, Video Motion Detector, access control devices like Hand Geometry, Proximity and Magnetic Card reader, and Turnstile. Anti-sabotage equipment like DFMD, HHMD, Deep Search Metal Detector, EOD Kit, Mail detector, BP Jacket, Bomb Blanket/Shield, Search lights and misc. equipment like Dhan Raksha, UV Desktop Shock Baton, Panic Switch items, Siren, Spy Guard system have also been installed. Various types of explosives and I.E.D. models which are generally used by terrorists have also been displayed in the I.E.D. section.

Faculty

Apart from the in-house faculty of 118 (Indoor-46, Outdoor-72) it has over 70 identified Guest faculty and 15 resource persons with expertise in different areas.
Terrorism related courses

- V.I.C. on Disaster Management for I.P.S. Officers (6 days).
- Critical Incident Management Course for G.Os and S.Os (6 days).
- Urban search; and Rescue Course for S.Os. 3 weeks.
- Disaster Management Course (NBC) for G.Os and S.Os (1 week).
- Search, Rescue and M.F.R. Course S.Os. (6 weeks).
- Medical First Responder’s Course. S.O.s (2 weeks).
- Medical First Responder’s Course. G.Os (4 weeks).
- Intelligence Course. G.Os. (2 weeks).

Besides, terrorism and insurgency related subjects from part of all the induction courses and may inservice courses.

Training of Trainers Course.

A unique feature is, NISA conducts Training of Trainers Courses in the following areas.

1. Training of Trainers in Aviation Security (G.Os and S.Os. – 2 weeks).

2. Medical First Responder Course (2 Weeks).
3. Collapsible Structure, Search and Rescue Course (Both for GOs & Sos) (4 weeks).

Tie-up

Proposal is in advanced stage of processing for affiliation with the Osmania University, Hyderabad for the award of Master's Degree in Industrial Security Management to Assistant Commandants (Probationers) undergoing training at NISA.

Achievement

The Government of India, has designated, the National Industrial Security Academy, Hyderabad, as one of the four institutions, to function as the 'nodal training institution' for the training of specialized search and rescue/response training in cases of disasters, in accordance with the approved syllabus for the specialized training, which is a feather in its cap.
5.4 CASE STUDY-4

GREY HOUNDS REGIONAL TRAINING CENTRE-
HYDERABAD

The Grey Hounds, created in 1989, as an elite commando force of Andhra Pradesh, is the first of its kind raised by any state in the country, to combat the left wing extremists, waging guerilla warfare. True to its name, it soon emerged as a prestigious, professional outfit in combating leftwing extremism, mainly because of the meticulous, professional training imparted at the “GreyHound Regional Training Centre” spread over 245 acres of ideally suited area in the outskirts of Hyderabad city.

The formation of the People’s War Group (PWG) in April, 1980 and launching of a wide spread guerilla warfare, put the conventionally trained state police force on the defensive, and the casualties of police personnel was rising high. The central forces deployed, though better trained, did not have the knowledge of the terrain, language etc, which reduced their effectiveness. It is in this background, the GreyHounds was raised and trained. The well trained and physically fit GreyHounds Commando’s professional competence in undertaking sustained and systematic field operations in the interior and inhospitable jungle terrain throughout the State has stood the test of time, for its performance, credibility and dependability. The force can reach any part of the State, in the shortest possible time with capabilities to penetrate inaccessible areas and if necessary stay there for long periods on its own.

The Greyhounds Commandos can perform any grueling task with ease and comfort in any part of the State, undertaking swift movements. The operations are conducted in a professional manner whether in Jungle, Villages or Cities. Greyhounds has succeeded in confronting the Left Extremists in inhospitable deep forests and hilly terrains. Successes achieved particularly since 1997 in curbing the Left Wing Extremist
menace and nabbing important leaders, bear ample testimony to the effectiveness of this force.

The Training

It mainly conducts 'Anti-Extremist Tactics Course' as a team for police officers ranking from constable to Dy.SP, for its own personnel and for the District Police Personnel of Andhra Pradesh and other left wing extremist affected states.

The police personnel on induction into Greyhounds are imparted specialized training in fieldcraft, tactics, map-reading, house intervention techniques, handling of explosives and other Commando skills. They are physically toughened through strenuous physical training. They gain in strength and stamina which enables them to stay and survive in thick and inhospitable jungles for several days with limited food and water, cross steep hill ranges overcoming several obstacles and walk for long distances at a stretch, and get engage enemy at a short notice.

Advanced methods for navigation through thick jungles are important inputs to overcome the landmines. Effective and accurate firing with the modern weapons—an essential ingredient of a Commando—is an important part of the specialized training. Mentally too they are moulded to stand the rigours of the operations they undertake. Members of the force are given training in unarmed combat, swimming and rescue operations, which have been found very useful in times of need.

The infrastructure

It is creditable that, most of the infrastructure necessary for commando training, has been improvised at low cost with an innovative approach. A great deal of reality has been built into the training, whether it is physical toughness, marksmanship, ambush, landmines, building search, or hideout in forest or engaging in encounter.
Training to other State Personnel

Significant results achieved in containing the Left Wing Extremism in Andhra Pradesh resulted in persistent demand from other States affected by Left Wing Extremism to organize Greyhounds training for their selected Police personnel. In order to meet this demand, the Greyhounds Regional Training Centre has been imparting training to the Andhra Pradesh district Police personnel as well as the Police forces of other Left Wing Extremist affected States since June, 2000. It has trained over 1600 district police personnel of Andhra Pradesh and over 1000 from other States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jarkhand, Orissa and West Bengal. This achievement reflects the popularity of the training in the Country.

It is worthwhile to mention that though Greyhounds is essentially a fighting force, it has developed its own training capabilities over the years particularly in Non-Conventional Warfare, including jungle Warfare.

Achievement

The professional handling of extremist violence situations and anti-extremist operations, has put the State Police, which was on the defensive, into an offensive mode, in its fight against left wing extremism. GreyHound teams on requisition by the District Police, go into the field, perform the task on the basis of intelligence inputs provided and getback. They also undertake operations on their own based on intelligence inputs. The success rate is quite high.

It goes to the credit of successive heads of the GreyHounds and those in the training wing, for building such an achievement oriented, dependable force, which has now become a model for other States.
5.5 CASE STUDY-5

SHER-I-KASHMIR POLICE ACADEMY, UDAMPUR
(JAMMU AND KASHMIR)

The Sher-I-Kashmir Police Academy, established as Police Training College in the year 1981 was upgraded to the level of Academy in April, 1998. The Academy runs induction courses for Dy.SPs, Prosecuting Officers and Sub-Inspectors of Armed and Executive Police, besides promotion courses for SgCts, Head Constables and ASIs. The Academy also runs 29 specialised courses for various ranks.

The complex is spread over an area of 1268 Kanals of land and another 600 canals is being added shortly. There is accommodation for 800 trainees and 200 staff members, including a hostel for G.O.s. About 2,000 police personnel of different ranks are trained in the institution annually. Forensic Science Laboratory, Riding School, Semi-Automatic Firing range, Computer Lab and Dog Training School are also located in the campus.
Mission Statement

The objective of Sher-I-Kashmir Police Academy, Udhampur is to prepare the members of the Police service for the current and future challenges. The training imparted in the Academy is more specifically aimed:

- To transform the hitherto law and order oriented force into a service oriented one.

- To prepare the force to fight terrorism and simultaneously uphold the dignity and rights of the citizens.

- To identify the training needs of the State Police at various levels and structure suitable courses, both basic and in-service to achieve professional excellence.

- To promote the concept of continuing education among police officers by planning inservice training on regular intervals and by circulating periodic bulletins on subject of police concern.

- To organize seminars, workshops, studies and surveys covering matters of police interest and bring to use this knowledge in the professional functioning.

- To lay emphasis on new trends in policing including cyber crimes, gender sensitivity and harnessing latest scientific and technological developments.
• To promote educational and research facilities in matters of police interest in cooperation with the universities of the State and IGNOU.

• To organize executive development programmes for senior police officers and orientation courses for the officers of the civil services and

• To encourage interaction between police personnel and experts in other fields including management, human rights, behavioural sciences, media, judiciary, bar, women's organizations etc. so that there is sufficient exposure to other disciplines.

**Organisation**

Headed by IGP/Addl. DGP rank officer, and assisted by a Joint Director (DIG), there are four departments viz., (i) A.D. (Admn) (ii) A.D. (outdoor) (iii) DDP and AD (FSL).

The following are the areas covered by the AD (Outdoor), DDP and AD(FSL).

**Assistant Director (Out-door)**

- Field Training
- Specialised Field Training
- Dog and Riding Trg.School
  - Induction Course of GO's.
  - Induction Course of NGO's.
  - Induction Course of Drill Instructor Security Pros Officers.
  - Promotion Course of all ranks.
  - Anti Terrorist Course
  - Unarmed Combat
  - Band
  - Firing Range
  - Campus
  - Sports

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D.D. P.

- Department of Law.
- Department of Management Studies.
- Department of Police Sciences.
- Model Police Station
- Museum.

A.D.FSL

- Inputs in forensic science
- Special Courses relating to Sc. Aids to Investigation.
- Practical inputs in field of forensic science in the laboratory.

The Academy conducts the following specific courses on handling Terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Course</th>
<th>Level of Participants</th>
<th>Topics Covered</th>
<th>Training Methodology Adapted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Terrorism and Counter Insurgency (Three Days)</td>
<td>Instr to SSP</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lecture/Films.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It conducts training of trainers course for outdoor instructors.

Future Plans

Taking into account the growing terrorism, the changing tactics and sophistication of their weapons, the Academy has plans to upgrade the training infrastructure, as well as the faculty expertise.
Achievement

The Special Operations Group (S.O.G.) of the State Police, which has been successful, in inflicting heavy losses on the terrorists and which has a positive impact on the police and the people, draws its leaders and cadets trained at the Academy.

Jammu and Kashmir Police is being presented the 'President's Colours' this year, and the Academy, has contributed, in no small measure, for this honour.

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CHAPTER 6
FINDINGS BASED RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 TRAINING FOR HANDLING TERRORISM -
BROAD CATEGORISATION

Training in handling terrorism can be broadly classified:

• **Awareness training:** - targeting all the police personnel in areas not
affected by terrorism or its like, and the new entrants to police
(induction/basic). Main objectives is to provide an understanding of
the emerging phenomenon of terrorism/extremism and its implications
for society and police so that they are able to understand the
developments that are taking place elsewhere, know what to look for
incase of suspicious activities and how to react if something happens.
This can be conducted at a convenient place in or near the place where
there is concentration of police personnel above 20, by the
Superintendent of Police, Commandant Unit head. Selected trainers
can be identified in consultation with the training head. Every
policeman, wherever posted, has to go through it, at least once. It is
mostly knowledge based.

• **Anti-terrorism training:** - targeting police personnel in the police
stations, who apart from normal policing, have to handle terrorism in
states, which are fully or partly affected by terrorist/extremist
activities. As stated elsewhere, police station personnel are in a better
position to make a dent in the fight against terrorism, in the long run.

The objective of this training is to enable the SHO and his men, to
understand the phenomenon of terrorism, to keep their eyes and ears tuned to
known/suspected terrorists/outfits, how to handle violations of anti-terrorism
laws, if any, look for efforts to exploit various grievances, their links, support etc, cultivate informants/sources, bring to the notice of higher authorities, the consequences if some genuine grievances are not redressed or addressed to, things and people that come in or go out, and the ability to put together various seemingly odd pieces of information etc. Listing out possible critical/symbolic, targets, their value for the terrorist, the categorization and deciding on what to protect and how. Above all how to protect themselves, their weapons/vehicles and the police station.

The fundamental premise is that whatever happens, has its origins in a police station limits, and nobody is better placed than the the local policemen, to know and understand it, and also to enlist the general populace, to counter any undesirable activity.

Apart from being first responders to any scene of occurrence, terrorist or not, police station personnel have to attend to the following terrorist/terrorist related activities.

- Handling of hoax calls/false alarms.
- Responding to hate/biased crime.
- Intelligence/information gathering.
- Selection and protection of vulnerable physical targets/individuals targets or arranging for it through a specialized agency.
- Who is who and their implications for policing.
- Vulnerable areas from law and order point of view, particularly communally sensitive.
- Anti-social elements/ shady characters, and their links.
- Incoming/outgoing routes for antisocial elements, and criminals.
- Explosives check and checking of other contraband, like smuggling, drug trafficking.
Beats and patrols.

Nakabandi.

Through the above activities, they contribute considerably for the preventive aspect of terrorism. At present, at the police station level, awareness of terrorism/terrorists is negligible, not to speak of building capabilities to prevent terrorist activity. A concerted effort, in this area, will produce tremendous results not only in preventing many terrorist activities by nipping them in the bud, but also in promoting confidence in the local people, who right now have little confidence in the local police vis-à-vis terrorism.

This training, in batches of 20-25, can be organized at the district level or range level, with an officer of SDPO level specially selected to be incharge, on a continuing basis. The required facilities, indoor and outdoor, can be found, if the venue is in the District A.R.Camp, or in an Armed Police camp. The S.P./CMT/Unit head, has to take active interest in organizing the facilities, fixing trainers in consultation with the training unit. This training includes, apart from knowledge, skills and attitudinal areas outdoor training including weapons. The duration will be 3-5 days, both indoor and outdoor. After covering initially, refresher courses of 2 days duration, have to be organized once in 6 months.

Counter-Terrorism training: This is predominantly skills oriented, operational training in specific highly specialized/risky jobs, in which the state police doesn’t have any or much of an expertise now and hence dependent on external forces like CPMFs or Army. Even in states, where there is terrorism/extremist violence, this requirement is sought to be met by a generic training under the banner ‘commando course’ organized in training institution of the state or CPMF of 8-12 weeks duration.

Generally, individual officers/O.Rs are nominated for these Commando Courses, who after completing the training may or may not be posted to a commando unit. In fact many go back to their normal duties, and after a few months they cease to be commandoes, i.e., they neither think nor
act like commandos. Once trained as a commando, he/she should remain a commando, by constant training, till de-categorised-owing to age, physical fitness or other reasons. Besides a commando, seldom operates as an individual and mostly forms part of a team. Hence the need for team based training in C.T. operations. Different specialized skills are necessary for different types of operations, and training has to be specific for those tasks.

6.2 A NATIONAL CONSENSUS – DIRE NEED

The literature survey, replies to the Questionnaire from experts, and the opinion’s expressed in the interviews, are emphatic that for the effective fighting of the menace of terrorism “national consensus” which demonstrates the unity and will to fight’ of the nation, is essential.

Political parties-ruling and opposition- have to rise above petty political consideration of electoral gains and ego factors. The intelligencia, the media, the Industry and Commerce and other opinion makers have to be roped in, to make the fight against terrorism stronger. Lessons have to be learnt from the U.S.A. and Israel. However our experience in this critical aspect of building a national consensus, has been found wanting, as seen from the responses to major terrorist attacks, and the passing of and implementation of POTA, not to speak of dissenting voices on various occasions involving terrorists or actions against terrorists, sometimes in a manner that helps the terrorist’s cause or their sponsors.

Recommendation: Given the present nature of the Indian Political process which is a rat race for power, come what may; given the communal and caste divide which impacts the electoral process negatively, the politician-criminal nexus, the print and electronic media having their own agendas; such a consensus seems to be extremely difficult, especially with elections to some State assemblies and to the Lok Sabha round the corner. Yet the need for consensus, can’t be ignored or deferred for better times. The following steps are suggested:
i. The ruling party at the Centre and the States have to take initiative to work out a consensus in respect of fighting terrorism/insurgency/militancy in each State. The political parties, the media, the Judiciary, the Human Right activists, have to be carefully handled and educated on this. Closed door meetings of the above segments, separately should be held wherein, renowned experts-national and international, and the spokes persons of the Defense, the Central Paramilitary forces and the Police speak about the dangers of terrorism, its networks, manifestations, dangers of a weak fight by the State, and the need for consensus etc.

ii. It has to be driven home that fight against terrorism, is not a fight by the ruling party and the security forces as it is now understood; but it is a fight by the entire nation. The intellegentia and the media should be involved in educating the public-in different segments, such as scientists, academicians, leaders of industry and commerce, the medical and other professionals, students and the trade union leaders etc. The result may not be tangible and immediate, but definitely, over a period of time, a broader consensus, than is noticeable now would be discernible.

6.3 FORMULATION AND ORCHESTRATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY

Here again, the literature survey, the expert opinion and the forces fighting terrorism have voiced concern at the lack of, or knowledge about it, if it exists; of a clear, comprehensive, consistent, threat and theatre specific counter terrorism policy. As was mentioned earlier, it is necessary for the purpose of serving as a bench mark, for its review and refinement, for the administration and security forces to understand their role and limitations and
for the public to understand and support it, and for the top brass to make unnecessary deviations based on expediency, difficult.

Recommendation: A national dialogue on the major terrorist/insurgent/militant movements should be promoted, by the politicians, intelligencia and other public figures, to project different alternatives for handling the problems. The Governments at the Centre and States, should constitute expert Committees, to recommend comprehensive counter terrorism policies which should be examined by the National Security Advisory Board and with necessary modification should be approved. These counter terrorism policies should be separate for the faith based terrorism, of the Jammu and Kashmir, the ethnic/secessionist terrorism of the North East and the Left Wing Extremism of AP, Maharashtra, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar etc, based upon the issues, the groups, the networks, the tactics, the internal and external support etc. The role of the States and Centre should be clearly delineated and the grey area, if any, should be negligible.

It can be argued that, the formulation of counter terrorism-policy is a prerogative of the Government, that for national security reasons it cant be made public. It is fallacious, and smacks of undemocratic approach. If U.S. and Israel can make their C.T. Policy clear to everybody, we too can. It is understandable that, everything cannot be in black and white or made known to everybody. A detailed, comprehensive policy can be there as a confidential document, but abroad C.T. policy can be made public. It is a must in the interest of transparency, getting public support, and interested parties not giving a twist to every development.

The working out of strategy and tactics, should be left to the professional experts of the agencies tasked to implement C.T. measures, and there should be no interference in that. It is conceded that political executive at the State and Centre has the responsibility and authority of supervising and monitoring, the implementation of the C.T. Policy.
6.4 RECOMMENDATION ON MECHANISMS FOR POLICY FORMULATION, MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW

Like the Department of Home Land Security in U.S.A. there should be an organization at the center and the States to specifically monitor the problem of terrorism/insurgency/extremism and help the government with inputs for policy making and review of it periodically. The functioning of the existing mechanism for this, which has not proved its credentials, has to be initially examined and new set ups created. The bureaucratic way of handling the matters connected with terrorism, has delayed many decisions and dampened the fighting spirit of the security forces time and again. This department should be directly under the Home Minister at the Centre and the Chief Minister in the States. It should have theatre/threat specific divisions headed by knowledgeable senior officers, selected for their expertise. It formulates draft C.T. policy for approval by the political executive, monitors implementation, reviews the policy and its working periodically, suggesting modifications whenever necessary. It is responsible for combating terrorism/insurgency/extremism in the country.

6.5 RECOMMENDATION FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERTS WING.

Fighting terrorism/insurgency/extremism is a highly complex job. With terrorists exploiting latest technology for their ends, security forces are always hard pressed to match the terrorists weaponry and tactics and to anticipate their next strategy. In Punjab, recognising the felt need for taking the battle to the court of the terrorist, Sri KPS Gill formed a special cell, with the Sri K.K. Athri IPS then DIG, Shri Gopal Misra, Director, State F.S.L. and a few selected others, to study the weapons and tactics used by the terrorists, prepare database about terrorists, their leaders, profiles, support etc. This cell,
in due course of time, came up with innovative ideas and equipment which were cost effective and which proved to be valuable in fighting terrorism in Punjab, the classic example being the bullet proof tractor, which took, the terrorists by surprise.

It is strongly recommended, to have a broad based Research and Development and Expert wing, both at the Centre and in States. It can have three distinct committees. One for ‘Research and Development’ consisting of selected scientists/technologists, to study the weapons and equipment of the terrorists, how to neutralize their effectiveness, what new equipment can easily be innovated/fabricated, to give more teeth to the security forces. Universities, Public and Private sector companies can be associated with them, as is being done in U.S.A. Apart from it being fed with information, there should be free interaction between those scientists/technologist and those actually fighting terrorism, to ascertain their problems/difficulties, to see whether they can be alienated by innovative approach/equipment. When the terrorist has access to the latest technology, the security forces, who in fact should be one step ahead, should not be denied the advantage, owing to bureaucratic procedures.

The other committee should be the Data bank committee, consisting of I.T experts and researchers on terrorism, to prepare a comprehensive data bank of not only terrorism, terrorists, equipment, tactics, the supporters, the finances, the hideouts but also the targets selected, the recruiting process, preparations, methods used to gain access, the timings and the contacts in the administration and security forces, and the ground situations which help them. In Punjab, this effort, did help a lot in taking the terrorist head on.

The third one, is that of counter terrorism experts from India and abroad, who in association with the Data bank committee and the R & D Wing, will help the Government in policy making with regard to counter terrorism and also prepare periodic threat assessments. A continuous system of unmediated (direct) coordination between field commanders and R & D
personnel, data bank and experts, at various levels, will have to be created, so that the time lag between emerging trends in terrorism and counter terrorist initiatives is reduced to the minimum.

All the three committees, if properly constituted with a clear charter, liberally funded and devoid of bureaucratic controls and procedures, would be highly beneficial, in the fight against terrorism, also saving many precious lives of security force personnel and civilians. With an arrangement like, this every aspect comes into a sharp focus: the C.T. Policy, the strategy and tactics, the weapons and equipment, the preparedness and motivation of those fighting the menace.

6.5 RECOMMENDED TRAINING INTERVENTIONS FOR THE POLICE IN HANDLING TERRORISM - GENERAL

Any training has to be a planned intervention based on the felt training needs. Much more so, in respect of training the police for handling terrorism. From the literature survey, the data analysis from the replies to the questionnaires/opinionnaires and interviews, it has strongly emerged that training for the police in handling terrorism, should generally be:

- Planned carefully in consultation with the field officers, taking into account, the requirements of handling the different situations/attacks in each State, the terrorist groups operating, their strength and weaknesses, the policy of the Government, the weapons and equipment of terrorists, their targets, the topography, the people, the traditions etc. It should be a comprehensive research oriented exercise.

- The training should be as realistic as possible, that is, the scenarios those handling terrorism are likely to face, should be the focus of training simulations, case studies, table top
exercises, sand models, rehearsals, have to be extensively used, apart from video films etc.

- Since most of the training aims at building skills and attitudes, and since skills are perfected by repetitive practice, the training should be long enough and also incorporate more and more practices. Also imperative is, refresher training at regular intervals.

- Since, to be effective in handling terrorism, a high standard of knowledge, skills and attitude are required, there should be minimum standards of proficiency worked out for each area by experts, to be prescribed for qualifying.

- Training has to be with reference to the weapons and equipments and methods and tactics used by the terrorists. It is imperative that the training infrastructure has them in sufficient measure, for demonstration as to how they look and work.

- Since the terrorist plans and executes his attacks in unconventional way, the pattern of training has to change from conventional to innovative. 'expect the unexpected', 'think the unthinkable' should be the catch words during every counter terrorist move. Philosophy behind each method/tactic has to be taught.

- Matching the commitment and dedication of the terrorist, is the crucial aspect. Strategies for developing conviction, motivation, confidence, courage, decisiveness, fighting instinct, have to be developed by involving expert psychologists.

- The emphasis should be training as teams, not large scale training rank wise, as is frequently done. Most of the anti/counter terrorist operations/tasks are team based. Teams of
selected personnel to be constituted and trained in the area required with the special equipment.

- Training should be prior to deployment. Each person must understand the reason for his presence, in the field.

- There should be continuous interaction between the field officers and the training manager/faculty, and between the training manager/faculty and the trainees, in order to relate training to the practical requirements and to the changing needs.

- The training institute whistle should have its own data bank on anti/counter terrorism or access to the state level data bank, freely.

- On the job training, should follow immediately after the institutional training, under carefully selected field officer.

- Anti/counter terrorism training, to be meaningful should be conducted in the state, relating it to the States’ requirements, instead of sending the trainees to some other state, as that training might not have much relevance to the trainees. However it is conceded, that there are institutions of excellence, in particular areas, and each state cannot create infrastructure in each area. In such cases, the training manager has to closely liaise, with the center of excellence to orient the training, to the requirements of the trainee state. In the alternative, a capsule course, can be had in the state, after the training in the center of excellence, to explore, if any modifications required for the states problems.
Training should be result oriented. The strategies for handling terrorism fall into the following categories: (i) preventive, (ii) pre-emptive (iii) Incident management and (iv) post incident investigations and prosecution. These functions, in a terrorist environment, are performed most often by different agencies of the police. Training to be effective, has to focus on the above areas and target those personnel who are to perform those specific functions. Accordingly it is recommended that prevention training should target the police station staff and those specifically deployed on preventive duties vis-à-vis terrorism. The pre-emptive training which is mostly operational part of counter terrorism, should target the special operational groups formed for different types of operations. When preventive and pre-emptive steps fail, then it is the incident happening, which has to be managed. The incident management training should target the first responder teams as well as the second responders. Then comes the post incident function of investigation of the incidents/cases, identification of perpetrators and bringing them to justice by prosecuting before a court of Law. This training which is no less important should target the investigating officers, who are normally, the State Crime Branch or the CBI. Taking this into consideration the following training modules have been worked out, which are not exhaustive, but illustrative. They have to be validated through implementation, feedback and further research.
# Recommended Course Modules

## I Preventive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course and Duration</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Policy and Strategic initiatives in handling terrorism (1 week) | Officers at the policy making level from SP to DGP | * Enable the senior officers to understand the terrorist environment, the implications for police and others.  
* To deliberate on various policy alternatives for handling terrorism, and their implications.  
* To evolve consensus on the most appropriate policy initiatives for handling the given situation.  
* To convince the political executive and to withstand political pressures, taking principled stand.  
* To chalkout strategies for implementation of the policy.  
* To educate the media and influential sections of the public on the situation and the policy.  
* To plan and organize training interventions.  
* To plan schemes for motivation, welfare, and protection of officers, their kin and kin. | * Presentations by experts.  
* Case studies  
* Brain Storming.  
* Group discussions. |
| Intelligence Gathering and processing handling Terrorism/Insurgency/Extremism (2 weeks) | Intelligence Officers. (SI to DySP) of the State Intelligence and District special branches. | * The phenomenon of Terrorism/Insurgency/Extremism in their jurisdiction and their links, support etc.  
* The dire need for strategic and tactical intelligence to fight terrorism etc, and to motivate for the task.  
* The problems of intelligence generation, in a terrorist environment, the risks to the offices and to the assets.  
* Methods and tactics of collecting intelligence. HUMINT, TECHINT and COMINT. What is to be tried, when, precautions, legal issues.  
* Technology in intelligence work.  
* Electronic surveillance.  
* Briefing, debriefing, grading of reports.  
* Source protection, handling, guarding against duplicity double crossing. Checking-cross checking.  
* HUMINT-Human factor-how to handle  
* Importance of sharing of Intelligence -need to know basis.  
* Time factor.  
* Cut-outs.  
* Pitfalls.  
* Reading between the lines.  
* Interrogation skills.  
* Piecing together, odd pieces of information/developments, collation, compilation, analysis and assessment.  
* Case Studies.  
* Films and Clippings.  
* Surveillance exercises.  
* Experience sharing. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course and Duration</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Officer Security/ Survival (1 day) (can be part of other courses) | - Generally for every police personnel.  
- Each police station staff  
- Each unit (intelligence, crime branch, communication wing, computer etc.)  
- Each team of operatives (SOG, STF, QRT etc.) | - Personal safety precautions.  
- Safety of weapons/equipment.  
- Safety of installation/infrastructure.  
- Safety of information/operations.  
- Protective equipment for WMD.  
- If kidnapped-What to do.  
- If held hostage—what to do.  
- Safety from Ambush.  
- Terrorists mind set, their intelligence set up, tactics.  
- UAC and martial arts. | |
| Critical Infrastructure Protection (2-3 days) | - Those tasked to protect vital installations. (Preferably as a team) | - The nature of the installation, its meaning to the terrorist looking from the terrorist’s eye.  
- The layout, the discussion, the outer, inner, and the core areas, the strength and weaknesses of physical protection the possibilities and plans of the terrorist.  
- Previous attempts-critic.  
- Devising physical and psychological obstacles-access control, gadgets.  
- Incase of suicide attack-what preventive steps required.  
- Observation post, alert systems.  
- Requirement of arms and ammunition.  
- Coordination, communication etc.  
- Collection of intelligence.  
- If terrorist gains access what alternatives.  
- Mock exercises of different scenarios.  
- Standard Drills.  
- Backup cover.  
- Crisis management. | |
| Protection of targeted individuals. (3-5 days) | Those officers and O.Rs working in VIP Security, Special Protection Wings. | Understanding.  
- Threat perception.  
- Likely quarters, tactics their tactics.  
- Their weapons/equipment and strength and weaknesses.  
- Interaction with the VIP or next to him to convey threats and expectation from the VIP. When to say ‘no’.  
- What to be avoided, and say no firmly.  
- Intelligence-specific general/vague.  
- What to sacrifice and what not to be sacrificed.  
- Physical fitness, mental alertness.  
- Reflex shooting, controlling fire power.  
- Access Control. | |
| **Detection of fraudulent documents (one day)**  
(can form part of other courses) | **Policing the Boarder areas (2 days)** | **Cyber Terrorism (one week)** | **2. Preemptive**  
Commando/ SOG/QRT SWAT teams (12 weeks) |
---|---|---|---|
- Police station staff  
- Immigration staff at Airport seaport and land border check post  
- State Intelligence and District Special Branch. | - Police station staff of boarder stations of neighbour countries.  
- Police station staff of boarding stations of neighbouring states, within the country.  
- Special units deployed in such areas. | - Those manning the computer systems in vital areas like Transport, Airtraffic, Water supply, Energy, Health, Financial Institutions. | - Small specially selected teams, at District Range and State level, for handling special counter terrorism operations. |
- Antisabotage check.  
- Frisking.  
- Human Bombs.  
- Sniper fire.  
- Using vehicles/Aircraft as missiles.  
- Coordination if something happens – how to respond. | - Safety precautions.  
- Familiarize with various statutory documents that should be carried these entering and staying in the country.  
- Interrogation skills  
- Enable to distinguish between genuine and fake documents-technology available.  
- Methods of use of fake documents.  
- Legal aspects – investigations.  
- charge sheeting. | - Cyber Terrorism-nature-dangers.  
- Information Security drills.  
- Intelligence gathering.  
- PSP encryption/description.  
- Integrated Cyber Terror at/Conventional weapon (ICCSW).  
- Building of a counter, cyber Terrorism team.  
- Prevention, detection and response to cyber attacks.  
- Tools of counter-cyber terrorism.  
- Coord nation. | - To be able to analyse and assess the intelligence input.  
- To plan and execute successfully, counter terrorist operations.  
- To imbibe the skills and attitudes necessary for counter |
- Presentation by experts and discussion.  
- Demonstration.  
- Case studies. |
<p>| Police action | Small, specially selected teams for flushing out terrorists/arms and explosives hiding/operating from places of worship. | To successfully launch operations to flush out terrorists from places of worship, with minimum damage to the structures and without hurting the sentiments of the believers. To be able to safe guard from the plans deception /Psyops of the terrorists, and expose the terrorist game plans. | Simulations. Video films Demonstrations. |
| Hostage Negotiations (10 days) | Selected police officers who are likely to be involved in hostage negotiations. (preferably as multi-agency team). | To develop expertise in handling hostage negotiations scenarios, the techniques, the structure of the Negotiation unit and skills required, the standard operating procedures, risk assessment and decision making, crisis management, handling the media, the relatives of the hostages. | Case studies. Simulated exercises. Practical exercises. |
| Hostage Rescue Operation (2-3 days) | Selected teams likely to be used for catching/killing the hostage takers if negotiations are ruled out or fail. | To develop the special expertise needed in gaining entry to the aircraft/other closed places, and launch operations for immobilizing the hostage takers, with no or minimum damage to the hostages, the philosophy of operations, the weapons and equipment handling, the coordination, the risk assessment, decision making, crisis management. | Case studies. Simulated exercises. |
| First Responder Training (2-3 days) | Police Station personnel in vulnerable areas. Selected police and other emergency services personnel at Sub-divisional/District Head- | Response to the incident from the police station/unit. Quickly reaching the scene. Determining the nature of incident, the safety distance, beyond which nobody should be present. Cordonning of i.preventive/decontamination steps, protective equipment for the first responders and to the victims, evacuation, rescue, trauma handling, entry for the specialist teams. | Presentation by experts. Case studies. Simulated exercises. Rehearsals/practice. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Post Incident Management</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of terrorist cases (1 week)</td>
<td>To members of specially earmarked investigative teams and forensic scientists who from part of such teams.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                              | * Equip the participant with knowledge, skill and attitudes necessary for investigation of terrorist, insurgency/extremist offences, with particular reference to interrogation skills, evidence collection, legal requirements, unraveling the ramifications of money laundering, networks, hideouts, arms and ammunitions, suppliers etc. circumstantial evidence.  
* To develop expertise in the investigation of cases involving explosives.  
* Problems in prosecutions and solutions.  
* Safeguarding interests of witnesses and others. |
| Investigation of terrorist funding | Special teams in CBCID |
|                              | (i) sensitise about the sources of funds for terrorist organizations,  
(ii) skills of investigating these cases.  
(iii) Use of outside experts like chartered Accountant/Legal experts  
(iv) Legal aspects  
(v) Prosecution |
| Anti Hijacking | Those in charge of Airport security. Those who are to provide backup support QRTs who foil the attempt. |
|                              | * Provide the conceptual framework.  
* Sensitise about the tactics of terrorists, their mindset  
* Discuss the various preventive steps to deny access to aircraft.  
* The drills, if terrorist gains access to the aircraft.  
* Coordination in the other agencies.  
* Crisis management.  
* Operations by QRT to spoil the attempt.  
* Managing the media and relatives of co-stays. |
| Management of stress and trauma | All those who are deployed in areas affected by Terrorism/insurgency/extremism  
For more than three months. |
|                              | * To help distress, through various coping strategies.  
* Experiential. |
6.8 RECOMMENDATION FOR A NODAL AGENCY FOR ANTI/COUNTER TERRORISM TRAINING.

Training for handling terrorism, being a highly specialized and a priority area, there should be a nodal agency at the national level, which is competent and at the same time active in the training field. This role, it appears, is at present being performed, by the B.P.R.& D. Taking into account the limitations of the BPR&D, it is recommended that the National Police Academy, be declared as the nodal agency for anti/counter terrorism training, and a separate wing for this be formed. This ideas is mooted for reasons (i) National Police Academy is a training institution of excellence (ii) all senior police officers visit the Academy as participants of training programs or as faculty (iii) it has been sponsoring research in different areas of policing (iv) Its faculty do undergo training programmes inside and outside the country in the areas of handling terrorism (v) it has excellent indoor and outdoor facilities and with little extra funds can build the additional facilities required and (vi) it is net working with other police training institutions in the country. Undoubtedly such a step would go a long way in coming out with research based training designs, methodologies, and training standards for use by other training institutions in the country.

6.9 RECOMMENDATION FOR CREATING A POOL OF EXPERT TRAINERS FOR HANDLING VARIOUS ASPECTS OF TERRORISM TRAINING

It is obvious that, various state police training institutions, which now conduct anti/counter terrorism training, do not have expert faculty with field experience in handling terrorism.

They also are not able to spot expert faculty for inviting them as guest faculty. While there is a rich crop of experienced officers, who have earlier
handled terrorism in Punjab, and those who are handling terrorism/insurgency/extremism, in Jammu and Kashmir, North-East and in Andhra Pradesh, neither their experiences are compiled, nor are they invited as guest faculty, nor is there formal interaction among them to exchange experiences and ideas. A number of officers attend foreign training programmes relating to terrorism. A number of officers are deputed for peace keeping duties in Bosnia, Kosavo etc. Neither their views are elicited, nor are their experiences used. There is a compulsive need for creating a pool of experts in handling terrorism, from police and outside, and strengthening their expertise through Training of Trainers/Training Administrators/Training Managers Courses at the National Police Academy. A directory of trainers in handling terrorism, should be brought out, and supplied to all the training institutions in the country, conducting training in handling terrorism. National Police Academy, is in a better position to perform this function better.

6.10 RECOMMENDATION FOR ON THE JOB TRAINING

On the job training, even otherwise, is an essential part of training. On the job training, is an important role of the senior officers, which is often neglected. Immediately after the institutional training, the trainee officers/teams should be attached to a carefully selected senior officer, for on the job training. The senior officer should intuit, select the scenarios to which the trainee officers/teams should be exposed, and it should culminate in the trainee officers independently, doing the real-time job with the unobtrusive supervision of the senior officer.

On the job training, is a continuing process. The age old institutionalised systems like Roll call, catechism classes in police stations are meant for educating/training the staff in crimes and criminals, intelligence etc. Unfortunately this good practice is given up in many states. The SHO and the visiting senior officers can make use of there systems for increasing the awareness and understanding of terrorism, discussing the possible terrorist
activities, the targets, the precautions to be taken, how to collect intelligence etc. Likewise the monthly/quarterly crime conferences/crime review meetings, can be another forum for on the job training and exchange of information about terrorism, terrorists, the intelligence etc. At the higher levels, periodical conferences, symposiums, seminars, brainstorming sessions should be used for enhancing the perceptions, policies and strategies on terrorism.

6.11 RECOMMENDATION FOR TRAINING AIDS

Apart from institutional and on the job training, which are formal in nature, there are many informal ways of continuous updating of knowledge, skills and attitudes of police personnel, whenever they are. This is being increasingly used in USA, UK and Israel.

Some of the recommended training aids are:

(i) Terrorism awareness bulletins. Carefully drafted by knowledgeable persons, about the developments trends, analysis of events/incidents, operations, tactics etc would be highly useful to the reader, who learns at his leisure time.

(ii) Restricted /limited access websites for police officers on terrorism, counter terrorism, training etc. would be beneficial for police officers.

(iii) Video cassettes and computer discs containing training material, is being extensively used in the USA. Computer discs are being issued to each participant at the end of the training programme.

(iv) Quick Reference Cards is another training aid. These handy cards contain dos and don’ts in various situations, and the drills. The New York Police Department, USA, has compiled quick reference cards titled “First Responder Domestic Preparedness Cards.”
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10. www.ict.org
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*****
Q1) What threats do you perceive from the growing "Terrorism" in our country?

Q2) To what extent our police forces are competent in countering/handling terrorism?

Fully/To a great extent/To a considerable extent/To some extent/ Not at all.

Please elaborate:
2. A) Strengths of our Police forces vis-a-vis handling terrorism by them.

Your comments:

2. B) Weaknesses of our Police forces vis-à-vis handling terrorism by them.

Your comments:

2. C) At present the subject of law and order and crime are with state laws. Since terrorism has interstate and international ramifications, should handling of terrorism be brought under 'emergency' or 'emergency' laws?
3Q) In which aspects of following domains our police force should develop, with regard to handling terrorism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge Domains</th>
<th>Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Terrorism (Nature and causes)</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Terrorist Profile/Psychology</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Terrorist Organisation</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Terrorist weapons and tactics</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Terrorists strengths and weaknesses</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Current counter terrorism operations and their usefulness/limitations</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Alternative strategies/Tactics</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Intelligence requirement.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Investigation</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Skills Domains**

**Handling:**

1. Latest Weapons and equipments  
2. Bomb explosions/bombs  
3. Hijacking and hostage rescue  
4. Securing of potential targets (Individuals/Installations)  
5. Disaster management  
6. Interrogation  
7. Intelligence collection and analysis  

Any other:

8.  
9.  
10.  
11.  

Yes/No
Attitude Domains

1. Commitment to face the challenge  
   Yes/No

2. Respecting Human Rights  
   Yes/No

3. Ensuring cooperation of the general public.  
   Yes/No

Any other:

4Q) What, according to you, should be the main strategies for training in handling terrorism in our country?
5Q) Is it desirable and practicable to divide training in handling terrorism into three modules?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neither desirable</th>
<th>Desirable</th>
<th>Desirable and both</th>
<th>Nor practicable</th>
<th>but not practicable</th>
<th>Practicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. Preventing terrorists' action/incidents
   (Preventive steps)

2. Handling terrorism
   Incidents/action.
   (on the spot)

3. Detecting and prosecuting
   Terrorist activities / Incidents.
   (post incident)
5.1Q) If the response is both desirable and practicable, what should be the inputs for each module.

(i) Knowledge domain

(ii) Skills domain

(iii) Attitudes domain.

6Q) What special institutional arrangements (including inputs/equipments and facilities) are required in Police for imparting training in handling terrorism?

6.1 Institutional Training

A. Faculty
B. Training Infrastructure

i) Indoor

ii) Outdoor

C. Training Material

D. Special Equipments

E. Special Funds requirements
6.2 On-the-job-Training

7Q) With regard to States affected by terrorism, what nature of training do you suggest at the induction level in basic courses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Constabulary

2. Directly recruited to SIs

3. Directly recruited Dy.SPs

4. IPS (Officer Trainees)
8Q) With regard to those who are actually deployed training in handling terrorism, do you suggest training officers and men separately, or as teams?

9Q) What should be the nature and content of training for senior officers connected with handling of terrorism (mention areas, topics etc.)? (5Ps and above)
10Q) What according to you are the *very specific* Police Leadership roles for providing institutional as well as on-the-job training to Police personnel in handling terrorism?

11Q) Besides training, which other strategies will be useful at organizational level to handle terrorism in our country?
Any comments.
(Please feel free to give your frank and considered views on the issues relating to the topic of training interventions in handling terrorism.)

Name of the respondent: ____________________________

Designation: ____________________________

Place of posting: ____________________________
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRAINING IN HANDLING TERRORISM

1. Name of Training Institution: ________________________________

2. Training courses conducted (in a year: ____________________________
   (Course calendar/lists of courses to be attached)

3. A) Specific Courses on Handling Terrorism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Course title with duration</th>
<th>Level of Participants</th>
<th>Main Topics Covered</th>
<th>Training Methodology Adopted.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Please enclose Course designs.
B) Specific Topics on 'Terrorism' Covered in various other courses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Course</th>
<th>Level of participants</th>
<th>Topics Covered</th>
<th>Time Allotment</th>
<th>Training Methodology Adapted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C) The number of courses and the number of participants under A and B above, during the last 3 years.

D) Gist of feedback of the above (A & B) courses.
E) Is the training, rank wise or as teams (officers and men as a team)?

Q4) Trainers for dealing with Training on 'Handling Terrorism'.

| Sl. No. | Name | In-house/Guest Faculty | Special Training in dealing with terrorism received by them | Areas of expertise | Any comments |
|---------|------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------|
|         |      |                       |                                                          |                    |              |             |
5Q) To match the dedication and commitment of the terrorists, what specific training interventions are made, and how effective are they?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training intervention</th>
<th>Highly effective</th>
<th>To a great extent</th>
<th>Some what effective</th>
<th>Not effective at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

i)  

ii)  

iii)  

iv)  

Q6) How, the problem of coordination among various agencies handling terrorism is addressed during training?
Q7) In what ways, the following aspects are taken care of by training interventions

(1) Not to alienate people by indiscreet actions/harassing innocents.

(2) On the positive side, to enlist people’s cooperation.
Q8) Learning/training aids for Training in handling terrorism?

(Attach the list)

8.1 Books/Manuals/Hand books

8.2 Journals/Magazines being subscribed

8.3 Films, video cassettes, VCDs available in your institute.

8.4 Case study material : 
8. Special facilities available for providing outdoor training. (Attach a detailed list of facilities).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Facility Description</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Rating Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Physical fitness, agility</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Endurance</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unarmed Combat</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fieldcraft and Tactics</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Firing Ranges</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Firing simulators</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sand models</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Simulated incidents</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Handling bombs and bomb explosions</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Handling hijacking and rescue</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Handling ambush and counter ambush</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Facilities for rescue and relief operations</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Excellent/Very Good/Statisfactory/Poor/Very Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q9) Future plans for training in “Handling Terrorism” in your Institute.


Q10) What additional resources/ preparation will be required for further strengthening training in handling terrorism in your institute, taking into account the past experience and future trends?

10.1. Training aids

   **Physical resources:**

   a. Street fighting range

   b. Survival course

10.2. Training material
10.3 Training of Trainers

10.4 Outdoor training

10.5 Financial Resources

10.6 External expertise
11Q) In which area(s) of handling terrorism, is your institute known for expertise?

1.

2.

3.

Any other comments.
(Please feel free to give your frank and considered views on all the issues relating to the topic of training interventions on handling Terrorism).

Name of the respondent: ____________________________

Designation: ____________________________

Place of posting: ____________________________
## Abbreviations Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.T.</td>
<td>Anti Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.T</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.W.</td>
<td>Biological Warfare/Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.C.</td>
<td>Nuclear Biological, Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPMF</td>
<td>Central Para Military Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSF</td>
<td>Border Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITBP</td>
<td>Indo-Tibetan Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPF</td>
<td>Central Reserve Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>National Security Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISF</td>
<td>Central Industrial Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPR&amp;D</td>
<td>Bureau of Police Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISA</td>
<td>National Industrial Security Academy, Hyderabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFPA</td>
<td>North Eastern Police Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psy-Ops</td>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOG</td>
<td>Special Operation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STF</td>
<td>Special Task Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRT</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTC</td>
<td>World Trade Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.E.T</td>
<td>Laskgar-e-Tayyiba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWG</td>
<td>Peoples War Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICD</td>
<td>National Institute of Communicable Diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECIL</td>
<td>Electronics Corporation of India Limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>